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ORIGIN

OF

LANGUAGE AND MYTHS.

ORIGIN OF LANG[redacted]

AND MYTHS.

By MORGAN KAVANAGH.

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VOL. II.

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ERRATA.—VOL. I.

Page 8, line 10, *for* hands *read* hand
— 45, — 18, *for this sign* 3, *read these two signs* I 3
— 82, last line, *for* uis *read* suis
— 210, line 10, after fourth word *supply* so
— 213, lines 22 and 26, *for* Quecherat *read* Quicherat
— 275, line 4, *for* debur *read* debar
— 290, — 23, *for* five *read* firo
— 291, — 26, *between* of *and* word *supply* a

ERRATA.—VOL. II.

Page 62, line 6, *dele* and
— 113, — 18, *for* tou *read* tau
— 224, — 20, *for* imol *read* imal
— 279, — 10, *for* more *read* no more
— 300, — 7, *for* OI *read* A
— 340, — 10, *for* their *read* then
— 412, — 7, *for* his *read* this
— 432, — 20, *for* Didier *read* Regnier
— 481, — 9, *for* Max Müller *read* Lecturer
— 300, — 7, in these two signs OI, there should be only a part of the O, and its top part should be attached to the I. It is deduced by the learned from the Hebrew A 𐤀.

ORIGIN

OF

LANGUAGE AND MYTHS.

CHAPTER I.

KÖNIG.

THOUGH German philologists know very well all the different forms which their word for *king* has obtained in their own and other cognate languages, such as Gothic, Saxon, and English, yet they cannot tell us what the word itself, or any of its equivalents, originally meant. Ought I not, therefore, to try if I can, by the applying of my principles, discover this meaning for them? Let us see.

As the *k* of *könig* does here but represent the aspirate *h*, and as it should for this reason be left out, because no radical part of the word, it follows that *önig* is all we have to account for; and as a single vowel is equal to any other vowel, or combination of vowels, *önig* cannot differ from either *einig* or *unig*, of which the former means (in German) *alone;* and the latter has still the same meaning, it being only another form of the French *unique*, and of the *unic* of the Latin *unicus*, as well as of

the ἑνικ of the Greek ἑνικός. In the German *eins* we have also (radically considered) the same word, for its *ei* being equal to *u*, and a vowel being understood between its *n* and *s*, it cannot differ from its Latin representative *unus*. Of these several words the original signification being *one*, and *one* being among the names of the *sun* (witness *sol* and *solus*), we see that the German *könig* is, as well as all and each of its other different forms, traceable to the same source, and to which source are to be also traced such ideas as *height, head, chief, greatness, dominion, power, might*, &c., as we shall see presently.

And as a king is the chief or head of his people, it was by such a name he must have been first known, and this name was, no doubt, after the creation of language, one of the earliest in use. But why so? Because as soon as men began to increase, and form themselves into separate bodies, the stronger must, for the sake of some advantage, have begun to prey upon the weaker, and to choose from among themselves chiefs to lead them on in their pursuits. And such must have been the origin of kings. They were in the beginning, as they are even still, the heads of a body of people; that is, the most powerful among all to whom they belonged.

And not only at the distant times when such kings were first named, but probably for ages afterwards, the habits of the human race—then very little above those of the brute creation—must have advanced so slowly towards civilization, that a mother could seldom, or ever, tell who was the father of her child. It is even so at the present hour in the wilds of Australia, and so, in the beginning, must it have ever been all over the world.

As to the *head*, it was, from its being the first part of any thing, signified by the word *one*, because *one* is the

first of numbers; and as *one* is among the epithets applied to the sun, this accounts for the name *king* being radically the same word, even when the person so designated was not called after this object, as he may, through adulation, have often been, especially when the sun was revered as God.

In Hebrew *ahd* (אחד) means *one*, and it cannot differ from head, of which the aspirate forms no radical part. In *Ad* we have still the same word, and respecting which I have already made the following quotation from Higgins: "When the Buddhists address the Supreme Being, or Buddha, they use the word AD, which means the *first*[1]." Now as Buddha is allowed by all to have been the sun, this goes to prove that AD, or Buddha, means not only the *first*, but also the *sun*. And though this word AD is from its meaning the *sun* and the *first*, significant of *height*, it might just as well mean *low*, since these opposite ideas (high and low) are as in Latin (witness *altus*) often expressed by the same word. Hence *hades* (ἅδης), which word means the *lower* regions, and is consequently significant of lowness, cannot differ from the *shades*, which word has the same meaning; yet *hades* is radically the same as *head*, and also as *Ad*, the *first*.

We have just said that at the remote period when men had chiefs for the first time, society must have then been, and probably for ages afterwards, in so low and barbarous a state, that the mother could not tell who was the father of her child; and this can be very easily conceived, since such habits prevail even still among the uncivilized of certain parts of the world. Now when men lived in this primitive state, what power or authority could a father have? None whatever. And when supposed to

[1] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 199.

have been the author of a child's existence, how was he named? By a word which had the meaning of *maker*, as we have already shown; so that a king, from having been a head or chief over others, could not have been known by such a name, for he was no maker but a leader, a governor, a man of power, and who seldom rose to his high place but through blood and rapine, and by being the least merciful of a merciless horde. But there are instances, I shall be told, of the same word, signifying in Sanskrit both *father* and *king*. But this affords no proof that a king was called after a father. The circumstance may, however, have suggested the humane belief that a king is, or ought to be, the father of his people; and though there are instances on record of some kings having deserved in the more enlightened ages of the world to be so considered, this could not have been when they first made themselves chiefs, and succeeded more through brutal force and their being dreaded than through any kind of feeling resembling parental affection. When the same word happened to signify both *father* and *king*, it did not arise from a father having been called a *chief*, but a *maker*, which name was then derived from the hand; and as the sun was also when worshipped as God styled our Maker, it thence happened that a father had a name not different from that of the sun though not called after it. And as *chief* or *head*, which is but another word for *king*, means the *first*, and *first* means the *one*, and as *one* is among the names of the sun, we thus see how, from the titles *father* and *king* being traceable to the same source, they may have been sometimes expressed alike, though neither idea can have been called after the other.

M. Max Müller says, "*Ganaka*, one of the words for

king in Sanskrit, means originally *parent, father,* then *king*[2]." Now the *ganak* of *ganaka* is, it must be allowed, but a different form of both *könig* and *king.* Jacob Grimm, who was, says M. Max Müller, "one of the most thoughtful etymologists," supports this view, since his opinion was that the different forms of king, such as *könig, cyning, konungr,* and *kongr,* are all one and the same word. And this was no mistake; but it is a mistake to assert again, as M. Max Müller does, that this word meant "originally, *father;* secondly, *king,*" for the words have not the same meaning. While language was yet in an infant state, the primary signification of every word must have been well known, even to the least enlightened. Though no learned philologist can now tell, as we have seen, after what the idea *father* was first called, every one had then as clear a perception of it as we have now of the word *maker,* such being then its meaning for every understanding. And though no one can now tell—not even all Germany—the primary sense of so common a word as *könig,* or *king,* no one could, when it was first in use, have been ignorant of its real meaning, as it must have been then the word *head* itself.

Now since *ganaka* and *king* are not radically different, it follows that the *gan* of *ganaka,* and the *kin* of *king* are equal to each other; and as *an* is the root of *gan,* and as it is but another form of *on* or *un,* and consequently of *ein* in German, and of *one* in English; such, too, must be the *in* of *kin* or *king,* by which we see that *in* has, as well as *an, on,* or *un,* the meaning of *one.* Hence the root of the Saxon *cyning,* or of its other form *cyng,* is *yn,* which cannot differ from *in,* nor, since *y* is the same as *u,* from *un;* but if the word for *king* meant anciently *head*

[2] "Chips from a German Workshop," vol. ii. p. 257.

why does it not end with *d* instead of *n*? It might have very well ended with *d*, or any other consonant, as well as *n*; for, as before stated, all the roots of a language are equal to one another, and have, when primarily considered, the meaning of *one*, and of which the various uses are but so many different acceptations. Of the English word *skonce*, or *sconce*—now a low, but very old word for the head—*kon* is the radical part; but there are, no doubt, in different languages, words of which the root is *ad*, serving for the names of persons in high positions. Witness *Cadi*, *Caid* and *Alcade*, of which the *cad*, *caid*, or *cade* are but other words for *head*; for the *c* of these titles is equal to *k*, just as the *c* of the Saxon *cyng* is equal to the *k* of its English equivalent *king*. The eastern titles *Kan*, *Kaun*, or *Khan*, are also significant of *height*; and as men in high places are also men of power, it follows that the latter idea has been called after height. The titles *Excellence*, *Eminence*, and *Highness* are also significant of *height* and *power*. Hence the English verb *can* implies *power*, and it is radically the same as *könig*, or *king*; and it may have consequently often served to signify *the first*, *the head*, or, which amounts to the same, *captain* or *chieftain*.

Another instance of the same word signifying both *height* and *power* is *sovereign*, for it is evidently the *supern* of *supernus*, and may, when analyzed, be said to mean literally the *high one*. When we drop its *s* (here a substitute for the aspirate) it is literally the *over* one, by which we discover that in the Latin *super* and the English *over* we have the same word; but as the *sup* of *super* cannot, from the identity of *b* and *p*, differ from *sub*, *under*, we may say that it is only conventionally that *super* implies *height*, as it might as well signify what

is low, and which becomes evident when we compare the Greek of *sub*, that is, *ὑπο* with *ὑπερ*, which has the opposite meaning, that of *super;* for the root of *ὑπο* is *υπ*, and so is it the root of *ὑπερ*. In Hebrew also אל *al* means both *high* and *low*, just as *altus*, of which the root *al* is the Hebrew word itself, does in Latin, as we have already seen, and have shown why it is so. If we want to convince ourselves still more that the *s* of the *sover* of *sovereign* must be for the aspirate *h*, we need only put *h* in its place, and so obtain *hover*, by which height is implied, since to *hover* as a bird is to flutter *over* from *above*. We shall have still the same radical meaning when we make a *c* replace the aspirate, as we shall then get *cover* for *sover;* and to *cover* is to put *over*. Nor have we a different meaning when we replace the aspirate by *g;* for the *gover* then obtained is to be found in *govern*, and a governor is a chief or sovereign. We may even say that in sovereign and govern we have the same word.

One or two more rather curious etymologies are suggested by this notice of *sovereign*, as I am now going to show. When the same word meant, like *altus* in Latin, both *high* and *low*, it was often made to appear differently for the sake of distinction. Witness the English word *top*, when significant of height. As *top* is for *toip* (*i* being understood with *o*), this word becomes, when its *o* is dropped, *tip*, which still means *top*, but conventionally the least part of the top, that is, its point. When we now read *top* from right to left, as in Hebrew, we get *pot*, which, from the constant interchange of *b* and *p*, cannot differ from the *bot* of *bottom*, which means the *lowest* part of any thing. Top and bottom are, therefore, when radically considered, the same word; and this is confirmed by *tip* (this other form of *top*), for when read as

in Hebrew it is *pit;* and as *tip* means the highest part of any thing, so does *pit* mean the lowest. If we now suppose *top* to be derived from a Latin word, the question is what word must it be? We know, from what we have already seen, that initial consonants often take vowels before them, and that such vowels may, like all others, be aspirated. Now having put all the vowels one after the other before *top,* and having then aspirated them, and replaced the aspirate by its most usual substitutes, and having by this means obtained no Latin word likely to have been the original of *top,* I am led to read this word as in Hebrew, and proceed in the same manner; that is, put aspirated vowels before it. *Top* will, when so considered, become *pot,* and with a vowel aspirated, *pot* will make *hapot;* which not suiting, I change the aspirate for its common substitute *c,* and so bring *hapot* equal to *capot;* which, from *o* being for *oi,* and *oi* for *u* (witness· *croix* and *crux*), becomes *caput,* the Latin of *head.* Now as the *ca* of *caput* has, according to this analysis of the word, grown out of the aspirate, it cannot be regarded as belonging radically to *caput.* Hence *caput* is reducible to *put,* and as the *p* is here for the aspirate *h, put* is reducible to *ut,* which is the same as *at,* and consequently as *ad;* and *ad,* as shown above, means the *first,* radically *one,* and also the sun and Buddha. And when we further observe that, from a single vowel being equal to any combination of vowels, such roots as *at, ut,* and *ad* cannot differ from *aut* or *ood,* of which the former cannot, when the aspirate is supplied, differ from *haut,* which is the French of *high,* and, without the aspirate, is equal to the *alt* of *altus.* In *haut* it is also easy to perceive another form of *hood* and *head,* and of which *hafud* (Saxon of *head*) is still but another form. The root *at* is also, when aspirated, the

same as *hat*, and consequently as head, after which *hat* has been named.

Now, as *pot* (this other form of the *put* of *caput*) is the radical part of *potens* and *potentia*, we thus discover that power has been called after height. In order to confirm the truth of this derivation, we need only observe that the *s* of the *souver* of the French word *souverain* is for the aspirate *h*, and that when *p*, which is another common substitute for the aspirate *h*, replaces the *s*, instead of *souver*, we shall have *pouver*; that is, since the *uv* of this word is equal to double *u* or double *v*, *power*. A sovereign is therefore a *power*; that is, a man of power, as well as a man in an exalted position.

Power being thus traced to *caput*, it must have been called after height. This derivation also is confirmed by our observing that *pot* (this other form of the *put* of *caput*) is not only the same as the *pot* of *pot*ens and *pot*entia, but also of *potentate*, which is a synonym of *sovereign*.

Having referred so often to the word *height*, it may not be here out of place to say something of its origin. When we drop its initial aspirate, and so reduce it to *eight*, it is easy to perceive in this word a corrupt form of *at* and *ad*, which proves height to be equal to *head*. And when we replace the initial aspirate of the adjective *high* by its common substitute *b*, we shall instead of *high* obtain *bigh*, and this word is for *big*, so that *bigness* is but another word for *highness*. Hence *gross* in German means both *big* and *high*. If we now, instead of the initial *h*, of *high*, use its substitute *g*, we shall have *gigh*, in which we see the *gig* of the Greek *gigas*, which means a *giant*; and by this we discover that such a man was not called, as is supposed, after the Greek of earth (γῆ), but after his high stature.

If we now read *big* from right to left, as in Hebrew,

we shall have the *gib* of *gibbosity*, and thus perceive that this word may be said to mean *big*osity, that is, *bigness;* and this etymology corresponds with the meaning of *gibbosity*, which is defined a "*round* or *swelling prominence*," and this definition means both *bigness* and *height*. These etymologies lead still to another. In the *gib* of *gibbosity* we have the radical part of *gib*bet; and as this word *gib* is, when read as in Hebrew, equal to *big*, and as bigness is the same as highness, as shown above, it follows that a *gibbet* must have been called after its great height, so that it might as well mean a sovereign as an instrument of punishment. And do we want proof of the truth of this etymology? If so, we can find it in *potence*, which is, as well as *gibet*, the French of *gibbet;* and in *potence*, *potens*, and *potentate* we have radically the same word.

These etymologies serve to show the great advantage of knowing how to trace words and ideas to their primary sources. How very different are two such words as gibbet and sovereign! Their original meaning—that of *height*—is however the same. But to find this, it was necessary to know that *pot* is for *caput*, and also for the French *potence*, and the Latin *potens*.

If we now attempt the etymology of the Greek and Latin words for *king*, we shall, while doing so, not only confirm those we have just made, but, in all probability, add one or two more to the number.

Having already found that in Sanskrit, German, Saxon, and English, the primary signification of *king* is *head* or *chief*, we are led to suppose that such, too, may be its signification in Greek. But the βασ of βασιλεύς is radically the same word as *basis* in Latin and English; so that *lowness*, instead of *head* or *height*, seems to be implied by the radical part of the Greek word for *king*. We

should, however, observe, that the same word may signify, as we have often seen, both *high* and *low;* and this word *bas* happens in the Turkish and Arabic languages to mean *head,* and to designate a *governor,* which is, as we have shown, the same as *sovereign;* but we must admit that in this case the word *bas* is written *bash,* as we see by *bashaw;* but *bash* is as equal to *bas* as *finish* is to *finis,* so that it is a difference of no importance. As to the *ileus* of βασιλεύς, it is nothing more than a compound of two articles equal to *il* and *ous,* fallen behind the radical part βασ at two different epochs; or, perhaps, at the same time, having then some such form as *ilos,* and corresponding in meaning with *ille* in Latin.

But there is another word in Greek which had anciently the same meaning as βασιλεύς, as we shall see presently; but let us first endeavour to discover the etymology of *rex,* which has been hitherto as much unknown as that of *könig* or *king.* M. Max Müller derives *rex* from *regere,* to *steer*[3], and it is very true—nothing can be more so—that in *rex* and *regere* we have radically the same word. *Rex* is, however, so far from being the derivative of *regere,* that had the steering of a vessel never been heard of, *rex* would be still in both form and meaning the very same word it is at present. The more, but not the most, ancient form of *rex* must have been *rax;* and why so? Because its *e* is for *o,* and this *o* has, as usual, *i* understood, and these two signs (*o* and *i*) compose *a.* This is confirmed by *rajah,* or *raja,* which means in India a *native prince* or *king,* and is supposed to be derived from *rex;* but this I take to be a mistake, for *rex* seems to be less ancient—it is certainly so in form—than either *rajah* or *raja.* Granting, however, that *rajah,*

[3] "Chips from a German Workshop," vol. ii. p. 258.

or *raja*, may come from *rex*, this does not tell us after what the idea expressed by either word was first called, without which knowledge all etymologies are little better than worthless.

Now, finding that *rax* makes no sense that will apply on the present occasion, and knowing that vowels following *r* had often in the beginning gone before it, as we see by the Latin *pro*, of which the elder form *por* still remains in Spanish, and the present English word *frost*, which is in Saxon both *frost* and *forst*; we are, from knowing this, led to make the *r* and *a* of *rax* change places, by which alteration this word becomes *arx*, and in Latin *arx* means *top* or *head*. Hence *arx corporis* is for the *head*, literally the *top* of the *body*. There is, therefore, no difference whatever in meaning between *könig* or *king* and *rex*. In the *akr* of the Greek word *akra* (ἄκρα) we have still this word *arx*, as we see when noticing the transposition of its letters; and as ἄκρα means also *top*, or *summit*, there is no opposition in meaning between it and *arx*. Greek scholars do not therefore mistake when they refer to the identity of the Latin *arx* and the Greek ἄκρα. This serves to show that the *x* of *arx* is equal to the *k* of ἄκρα. And as *k* and *ch* interchange, we see that *arx*, from its being equal to *ark*, is also equal to *arch*; which, as *ch* is represented in Greek by this single sign χ, makes arch to be in this language ἄρχ; which has evidently the meaning of *chief*, or *king*, since mon*arch* means sole-*king* or *sovereign*; *mon* being here for μόνος. And *arch* (ἄρχ) is the radical part of ἀρχός, which means a *chief*, and as βασιλεύς meant, according to Donnegan, "in remote antiquity any chief or ruler," this affords sufficient proof that ἀρχός and βασιλεύς have, when primarily considered, the same meaning—that of *chief* or

king. And as I have had occasion to observe that the βασ of βασιλεύς is equal to the βασ of βάσις, which is significant of *lowness*, like *basis* in Latin and English; even so has ἀρχός this meaning of *lowness*, since the authority just quoted explains it not only "a *leader*, a *chief*," but also "the *fundament*, the *breech*." We may say that the Hebrew word *ras* ראש (*ras*) has the same opposite meanings, for it signifies *head* or *chief*, and also "very *poor* or *low* in the world," as Parkhurst has it[4]. And if we transpose its two first letters, we shall have, with the exception of a final *e*, the vulgar English word for *fundament* or *breech*. And if we drop the *i* of *arise*, which certainly implies *elevation*, we shall obtain further proof of the opposite ideas *high* and *low* having been often signified alike. We can see also in the Hebrew ראש *ras*, and still by transposing its two first letters, the Latin *arx*, as well as *rax*, *rex*, and the *raj* of the Indian word *rajah* or *raja*. As neither *power* or *pouvoir* can differ from *pauper*, *pauvre* or *poor*, this affords additional proof that the same word may signify both *high* and *low*.

Let me now transcribe Donnegan's definition of ἄρχω, which is the verbal form of ἀρχός. His words are: "To be the first, to do first, to take the lead, make a beginning, to begin."

If we now supply the vowel due between the *r* and *x* of the Latin *arx*, and so make *arx* become *arix*, we at once discover another form of the *aris* of *aristos* (ἄριστος), which means the *first*; and as *arx* cannot differ from the αρχ of ἄρχω, it is still the same word. And ought not this to be, since ἄρχω means to be the *first*, and ἀρχός means *the first?* It is therefore evident that *arx*, ἀρχός, and ἄριστος are radically the same word, and to which

[4] See Lex., p. 615.

we may add our word *first;* for when we leave out its *f*— here only a representative of the aspirate *h*—*irst* remains, which, from its *i* having *o* understood, and from *o* and *i* making *a*, becomes *arst;* that is, a vowel being due between two consonants, *arist*, radical part of *aristos*.

We should now seek the original form of *grandis*, *grand*, and *great*, of which etymologists seem to know nothing, since they derive *grandis* from *granum*, with a sign expressive of doubt, and *grand* from *grandis*. As to *great*, all they know of its origin is that in Saxon it is the same word, and that in German it is written *gross*, and *groot* in Danish; but as greatness is power, and, as we have shown, that power has been called after *height*, it is reasonable to suppose that greatness comes from the same source. Hence in English *grand* and *sublime* are synonyms. Let us now apply our rules to the analyzing of *grand*. As every vowel may take or lose a nasal sound, that is, have an *n* or an *m* put after it, or, when found necessary, have either of these signs taken from it, we obtain, on here dropping the *n* of *grand*, *grad*, which is but another form of *great*. In *grand* and *great* we have therefore the same word, and of which the Danish *groot* is but another form, and, as we shall see presently, the German *gross* also. As the *g* in these different forms of the same word is for the aspirate *h*, and as it may, for this reason, be left out, *grad* becomes *rad;* that is, when the vowel following *r* takes its original place, *ard;* and this is the radical part of *arduum*, which means a *height*, an *elevation*, a *mountain*, &c. But *ard* is also, I shall be told, the radical part of *ardor*, *heat*, as well as of *ardeo*, to *burn*. And how are we to account for the same word expressing these different ideas? By observing that all ideas called after *heat* can be traced to the *sun*, either directly or in-

directly, and that so can all those relating to *height*, such as *head*, for instance. And though we have in *heat* and *head* the same word, yet neither of the ideas they express can have been called after the other, but they both belong to the same source, and this accounts for their identity. Now, as *r* and *l* do constantly interchange, there can be no difference between *ard* and *ald*, nor between *ald* and the *alt* of *altus*. In *grandis* and *altus* we have therefore the same word, which is the cause of their having the same meaning.

But is not *granum*, I may be asked, radically the same as *grandis?* Certainly it is; and the cause of its being so is this; *grain*, or *granum*, being a principal support of life, it has thence taken its name; and from life having been called after the supposed author of life, the sun, to which every such idea as *head* or *height* must be always traced either directly or indirectly, we see how, for this reason, *granum* and *grandis* are radically the same word. As to the Danish *groot*, it is still but another form of *great*, and also of the *grad* of *grandis* above noticed. And as the German *gross* is but another variation of these forms, it must be analyzed in the same way; that is, we must drop its *g* from its being a representative of the aspirate *h*, and its *o* must return to its first place before the *r* instead of being after it, by which means *gross* becomes *orss*: that is, since *o* is here for *oi*, and *oi* for *a*, *arss*; and this is not only the same as the Latin *arx*, but also as the *aris* of *aristos*, Greek of the *first*. The Hebrew ראש *ras* (*head*), which, when the *a* returns to its first place, becomes *ars*, is still the same word.

By knowing that these different forms of the same word are expressive of *height* and consequently of *power*, as we have seen, and from knowing that *strength* is

a synonym of *power*, we may be asked to account for its name being so different in form from all the words to which it is so closely allied in meaning. But the word *strength* is not so different as it appears to be from those of the same meaning. The only radical part of strength is *reng*, for its *st* is a common prefix, being, it would seem, a contraction of the verb *to be* under its Latin form *est*, or its German equivalent *ist;* witness *street* being for *est reet*, that is, *est root*, whence *route* and *road;* and witness also *strap* being for *est rap*, that is, *est rope*, in which cases the *est* or *ist* has the power of a pronominal article, such as *das* in German, or *this* in English. As to the suffix or ending of *strength*, it is for *the* (an article fallen behind its noun), such as we see in *length*, *truth*, and *fourth;* which are for *the long*, *the true*, *the four*. According to this analysis the word *strength* is reduced to *reng*, which, as the nasal sound may be omitted, is brought equal to *reg*, and this is the same as *rex*, and consequently as *rax* and *arx*, which we have already fully explained, and have shown to be equal to the ἀρχ of ἀρχός and ἄρχω.

Strong, I need scarcely observe, is the same as the *streng* of *strength*, the *o* being for *e;* and as this *o* has *i* understood, and as *o* and *i* make *a*, this accounts for *strong* being in Saxon written also *strang*. How easy it is now to trace *fortis* (the Latin of *strong*) to its source! From all we have just seen we know that the idea *strong* must have been named after a word meaning *high*, which is the adjective of *height*, just as *strong* is of *strength*. The *f* of *fortis* being here for the aspirate *h*, we have only *ortis* to account for, and as *r* and *l* do constantly interchange, *ortis* cannot differ from *oltis;* and as *o* has here *i* understood, and as *oi* is equal to *a*, it follows that *oltis* is the

same as *altis*; and as the *i* of *altis* has *o* understood, and as *oi* is as equal to *u* as to *a*, *altis* is thus brought equal to *altus, high*; so that in *fortis* and *altus* we have really the same word. And as *f* and *g* may each represent the aspirate *h*, the *fort* of *fortis* cannot differ from *gort*, nor *gort*, when the *o* falls behind the *r*, from *grot*, which is but another form of the Danish *groot*, and its English equivalent *great*. And when we drop the *f* of *fortis*, it is easy to obtain, by transposition, the *arist* of *aristos* (ἄριστος), and which is confirmed by this word (*aristos*) being the Greek of *fortissimus* as well as it is of the English word *first*.

All we have thus far said of *könig* may be more fully confirmed by what we are now going to observe. The verb *archō* (ἄρχω) means, as we have seen, both to be the *first* and to *begin*. The radical part of the latter is *gin*, as is proved by *gyn*nan in Saxon, of which the *gyn* is still the same word. We may say the same of the *gan* and *gun*, and of *began* and *begun*, for the different vowels of *gin*, *gan*, and *gun* are not here for signifying a difference in meaning but in time. The form *gan*, which is therefore equal to both *gin* and *gun*, happens to be the radical part of *ganaka*, one of the words—according to M. Max Müller—in Sanskrit for *king*. But if we give to the verb *begin* its substantive form we shall have *beginner*, and as a *king* is not a *beginner*, he cannot from such an idea have obtained his name. But as he who *begins* an undertaking is regarded as its *head* or *chief*, the idea *king* must, from its having been taken in this sense, have received a name not different from that of *beginner*, though not called after it. Hence in the *arch* of *archē* (ἀρχή) and the *arch* of *archō* (ἄρχω) we have the same word, yet the former means *beginning*, and the latter to

begin, or to be the *first*, that is, the *head* or *chief*, and consequently the *king;* for, as we have seen, the αρχ of ἄρχω, ἀρχός or *archon*, is the word *rex* itself. How evident this becomes, when we observe that *principium* (the *beginning*) and *princeps* (a *prince*) are, in both form and meaning, radically the same word; for the *cep* of *princeps* is equal to the *cap* of *caput;* and *prin*, by which it is preceded, being for the *prim* of *primus*, the entire word may be said to mean the *first head* or *chief*. This accounts for *prince* being so often taken in the sense of *king*. It is a mistake to suppose that the *cep* of *princeps* is from the *cap* of *capio*, for the latter idea must be traced for its source to the *hand* and not to the *head*. It is also a mistake to derive the *cip* of *incipio* from the *cap* of *capio*, for this *cip* is but a different form of the *cap* of *caput*. But there is no difference between the *cap* of *capio*, and the *hab* of *habeo*, all such ideas as *taking*, *having*, *holding*, &c., being named after the *hand;* but though it can be easily conceived that the *ap* of *capio* is equal to the *ab* of *habeo*, *p* and *b* being so frequently used for each other, why should the *c* and the *h* of these words be made to interchange? Because the *c* is a common substitute for the *h*, and it may, for this reason, be here used in its stead.

The reader may receive a plainer instance and proof that the ideas *king* and *beginning* have been signified alike, though neither has been called after the other, when he observes that ἐν ἀρχῇ is rendered into Latin by *in principio*, as the first verse in Genesis serves to show: "ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποιήσεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν; *in principio creavit Deus cælum et terram.*"

Though a *beginner* in any pursuit holds, when compared with all above him, a low position, yet the name

by which he is designated may be one expressive of height; witness ἄρχμενος which is radically the same as ἀρχός, a *chief*, a word significant of *height*. This observation, though apparently of little or no value, will lead to some two or three important etymologies. After what idea, let me ask, was *tyro*, a *beginner*, called? Johnson, who never misses an opportunity of endeavouring to find the original of a word when he can with any appearance of truth do so, says nothing of this word, if we except his telling us that it ought to be written *tiro*, as in Latin; which is no etymology, since we now know no more of the primary signification of *tyro* or *tiro* than we knew before. Webster, however, attempts an etymology of *tyro*, but one that is very faulty; and in his endeavours to make it appear probable, he gives to this word a meaning which it never had nor ever will have. These are his words: "Tyro [*L. tiro;* Sp. *tiron*, from *tirar*, to *draw, tug, pull;* Port. *tirar;* Fr. *tirer*. Hence L. *tirocinium*]. A beginner in learning; a novitiate; *one who tugs in the rudiments of any branch of study*. Hence a person imperfectly acquainted with a subject."

Here we have an instance of the evil that results from wrong derivations. Webster, because he derives *tyro* from words meaning to *draw, pull*, or *tug*, at once concludes that such a person must have been so called because he *tugs in* the rudiments of whatever he may be learning. And this must be, he allows us to understand, why a person imperfectly acquainted with a subject is called a *tyro*. But this is not the reason. Neither *pulling* nor *tugging* has ever suggested the idea expressed by the word *tyro*. When a person imperfectly acquainted with whatever trade or art he may be pursuing is called a *tyro*, it is because this word means a *beginner*, and a

beginner is not regarded as a great proficient, but as a novitiate.

To what source must we now trace *tyro?* To the same source we have traced its Greek equivalent, *archemenos* (ἀρχεμένος); namely, to that of *height.* Hence the Latin *alumnus*—and which is but a different form of ἀρεμένος—means a *beginner,* and is justly derived from *alo,* to *bring up,* and is consequently significant of *height,* as we see more plainly by its supine *altum,* which is not different from the neuter of *altus, high.*

The French of *alumnus, élève,* is also significant of *height,* since its verbal form *élever* means, like the Latin *alo,* to *bring up.* We may now safely suppose that the *tyr* of *tyro* is the same as the *tyr* of *tyrant,* and such a person is one who domineers over others, and is consequently in a *high* position. The primary signification of such a name does not, however, differ from that of a *turret,* for *tyr* is equal to *tur,* as we see by comparing *tyr*annus and τύραννος; and a turret has, like a *tower,* of which it is the diminutive, been so called from its height. Nor can the *tur* of *turret,* nor the word *tower* itself, differ from *taur,* which is the radical part of the Greek ταῦρος, the Latin *taurus,* and the French *taureau.* It is thus shown that the names of the different ideas *tyro, tyrant, turret* or *tower,* and *taurus,* are all radically the same word; which arises not from these ideas having been called after one another, but after the same idea—that of height. Let us now read the following observation: "the letter *s* is often placed euphonically before words beginning with consonants, especially *m* and *t*[5];" and when we do place an *s* before the Greek of *bull* (ταῦρος) we shall get *stauros* (σταυρός), which means a *gibbet;* and this confirms

[5] Donnegan, Dict.

our etymology of this instrument of punishment, since we have shown it to have been called after *height*. And such too must be the idea after which a cross has been called, since in Greek it is also expressed by σταυρός.

The Hebrew noun אלף *alp*, a *bullock*, is also expressive of height; for *alp* means a *mountain*, and it is but another form of the *alt* of *altus*. When a participial noun it is written אלוף *aluf*, and is then thus explained by Parkhurst, "one taught, a disciple;" which confirms our etymology of *tyro*, and proves that this word does not, when radically considered, differ from *taurus*, though not called after the animal so named. But Parkhurst, in his endeavours to connect the meaning of "one taught" with the name given to an ox or bullock, supposes this animal to have been so styled because he is "broken, or *taught* to bear the yoke[6]."

This derivation is as faulty as the one given by Webster of *tyro*. Hence when the real origin of a word is unknown, there is great probability that the definition it receives may be imperfect.

But I was forgetting to observe that אלף *alp* is also used as a verb; and then it means, according to Parkhurst, "to *direct, guide, teach.*" As *direct* can be easily traced to the Latin *dirigo*, and as this verb is equal, as the learned admit, to *dī rego*, and as the *reg* of *rego* cannot differ from *rex*, for which we have already fully accounted, it follows that this Hebrew word for *bullock* might, from the animal so named having been called after height, have served to signify all such ideas as *power, strength, dominion, sovereign, governor*, &c. Hence though M. Max Müller makes a grave mistake when he derives *rex* from *regere*, to *steer*, he would not have erred

[6] Lex., p. 19.

if he had said that *rex* and *regere* are radically the same word; for to *steer* a vessel is to *direct*, to *govern* it in its course. And if it seem doubtful that a Hebrew word for ox or bullock should, when used verbally, have, by its then signifying to *direct*, such a meaning, ought not our doubt to vanish, when we find that the same happens even in English? Thus in this language the noun *steer* means an *ox* or a *bullock*, whilst when used as a verb it means, in the words of Webster, "to direct, to govern; *particularly* to direct and govern the course of a ship by the movements of the *helm*." The only liberty I have taken with this definition has been to underline the word *helm*, which has here made its appearance unexpectedly, for the express purpose of confirming, as it were, one and all of the latter etymologies; for it is the same as *helmet*, and both words are thus joined and explained by Webster: "Helm, Helmet, defensive armour for the head; a head-piece; a morion."

Now, though there is no relationship whatever between the *helm* of a ship and a soldier's *helmet*, yet they make only one word, which arises from both ideas coming from the same source. Thus the *helm* of a ship may be called its *head*-piece, since it is the instrument by which it is governed; and hence it is in Latin *gubernaculum*, and in French *gouvernail*, which are but other words for *gubernator* and *gouverneur*, or *governor*. And as to a soldier's helmet, it must, like a hat, have been called after that to which it belongs, namely, the *head;* and to this source, as already shown, may be traced all such ideas as *chief, captain, king, governor, sovereign*, &c.

There are other etymologies suggested by the word *helmet*, which I beg to leave unnoticed, for the reason that they might not appear to others as evident as they do to myself. But there is an observation suggested by

the Greek of *bull* (*taurus*, ταῦρος) which should not be omitted. I have shown that there is a euphonic tendency to sound *t* with an *s* prefixed to it, and that *tauros* does, for this reason, became *stauros*, which means both a *gibbet* and a *cross*. The word *stauros* ought, therefore, to mean a *bull* as well as a *cross* or a *gibbet;* and this is proved by the noun *steer* in English, which cannot differ from the *staur* of *stauros*. But *staur* must have once been only *aur*, which is the Hebrew of *light*, and light has been called after the sun; by which we see that the same word must, when slightly modified for the sake of distinction, have served to name the *bull*, a *cross*, and the *sun*. And though the bull has been designated by a word expressive only of his great height and bulk, yet from every such idea having received a name equal to one or more of the many appellations by which the sun was once signified, the bull became, like *fire*, an object of worship all over the world.

And as the sun was anciently regarded as a *saviour*, even so was the *bull*, because having a name not different from that of the *sun*. Hence אלף *alp* with *s* prefixed, as a substitute for the aspirate *h*, becomes *salp*, which is the same as the *salv* of *salvator*, *saviour*. But if instead of an *s* as a substitute for the aspirate *h*, we use *c*, *alp* (a *bull* or a *bullock*) will become *calp*, that is, *calv* or *calf*. By this it is shown that the *calf* was called after its parent. The *calf* may, therefore, as well as the *bull* have been revered as a saviour or mediator. Hence the following from Higgins: "In the earliest time of which we have any history, God the Creator was adored under the form or emblem of a *bull*. After that we read of Him under the form of a *calf* or two calves[7]."

"In the ancient collections we often meet with a per-

[7] Anac., vol. i. p. 642.

son in the prime of life, sometimes male, sometimes female, killing a young *bull*. This *bull* was the mediatorial Mithra, slain to make atonement for, and to take away, the sins of the world. This was the god *bull*, to whom the prayers are addressed which we find in Bryant and Faber, and in which he is expressly called the *Mediator*.

"This is the Bull of Persia, which Sir William Jones and Mr. Faber identify with Buddha or Mahabad. The sacrifice of the bull which taketh away the sins of the world was succeeded by the sacrifice of the lamb, called by the Brahmins the *Yajna*, or *Agni*, or *Om-an, sacrifice*, or the sacrifice of the *Agni* or of *fire* by our Indians. The doctrine arose among the Indians in, comparatively speaking, modern times. While the sun was in *Taurus*, the *bull* was slain as the vicarious sacrifice; when it got into *Aries*, the *ram* or *lamb* was substituted [8]."

As we have just found that the *calf* was called after the *bull*, we should expect to find the *lamb* having a name similar to that of its parent the *ram*. Hence as *r* and *l* do very often interchange, may we not suppose that *lam* (for *lamb*) is equal to *ram?* Hence כר *kr* means according to Parkhurst[9], a "*lamb* or *young sheep* [1], and its plural form כרים *krim* is rendered (battering) *rams* and captains." In Greek also it is easy to perceive the close resemblance between the old word ἄρς (a *lamb*) and the Latin *aries*, a *ram*.

In Hebrew ראם *ram* means, as Higgins justly observes, both a *bull* and a *ram* [2]. It was, no doubt, from the words for *bull*, *ram*, and *lamb*, being equal to some of

[8] Anac., vol. i. p. 707. [9] Lex., p. 287. [1] P. 288.

[2] See Anac., vol. i. p. 231, and Parkhurst, Lex., p. 14.

those naming the *sun*, that arose the superstitious belief of a relationship between these animals and the great object then worshipped over all the earth. As to the origin of burnt offerings, it must be ascribed to the coincidence of the animal's name and that of fire, and consequently of the sun, happening to be also found identical, such as the words *agnus* and *ignis* must have once been.

Nothing has been hitherto more difficult to account for than the universal practice of presenting slaughtered or burnt animals to the Deity as a most acceptable offering. But if the words designating such animals as were, on account of their names, made sacred to the sun, happened to have also the meaning of *interposition*, *saviour* or *mediator*; this was sufficient for their being offered as a suitable sacrifice to the prevailing object of worship, whatever it might be. One of the words in Hebrew for *ram* is אֵיל *ail*; but it happens to have also the meaning of interposition[3]; and no more was needed to cause the ram to be regarded as a powerful mediator. And as the sun was the universal divinity, this accounts for the barbarous practice under consideration having, in remote times, been common to all nations, his name being always found equal to one for *saviour*, and hence for *mediator* and *protector*.

Godfrey Higgins was a close observer as well as a profound reasoner; but he certainly mistakes when he believes he has discovered the real origin of religious sacrifices. His account is as follows: "Learned men have exercised great ingenuity in their endeavours to discover the origin and reason of sacrifices (a rite common to both Jews and heathens), in which they have

[3] Parkhurst, p. 14.

found great difficulty. They have sought at the bottom of the well what was swimming on the surface. The origin of sacrifice was evidently a gift to the priest, or the cunning man, or the Magus or Druid, to induce him to intercede with some unknown being to protect the timid or pardon the guilty; a trick invented by the rogues to enable them to cheat the fools; a contrivance of the idle possessing brains to live upon the labour of those without them. The sacrifice, whatever it might be in its origin, soon became a feast, in which the priest and his votary were partakers; and if, in some instances, the body of the victim was burnt, for the sake of deluding the multitude, with a show of disinterestedness on the part of the priest, even then, that he might not lose all, he reserved to himself the skin. (Lev. vii. 8.)

"But it was in very few instances that the flesh was really burnt, even in burnt offerings. (Deut. xii. 2.) 'And thou shalt offer thy BURNT OFFERINGS, the flesh and the blood, upon the altar of the Lord thy God: and the blood of thy sacrifices shall be poured out upon the altar of the Lord thy God, and thou shalt EAT the flesh: not *burn* it.' At first the sacrifice was a feast between the priest and devotee, but the former very soon contrived to keep it all for himself; and it is evident from Pliny's letter to Trajan, that when there was more than the priest could consume, he sent the overplus to market for sale[4]."

But it is difficult to conceive that so singular a mode of deception could have been practised over all the world, even among nations widely apart from one another, and between which no intercourse can have ever existed. Words could not, however, have led to so

[4] Anac., vol. i. p. 89.

cruel and unnatural a practice until their first meanings were forgotten, and they were perceived to have those which had never been intended for them. And as the first name given to the sun is the parent of all other words, and as it is common to all the nations of the earth, this accounts for the doctrine of sacrifices having every where sprung from the same source. Learned Christians do not therefore mistake when they come to the conclusion that this universal rite must have had the same origin; but they do mistake when they regard it as a Divine institution, first known to the ancient Jews and communicated through them to the rest of mankind. And this mistake was in the beginning the more grievous as it then led not only to the slaughtering and burning of animals as an efficacious atonement for sins, but even to the crucifixion of human beings.

Godfrey Higgins continues thus: "It is difficult to account for the very general reception of the practice of sacrifice, it being found among almost all nations. The following is the account given of it by the Rev. Mr. Faber: 'Throughout the whole world we find a notion prevalent that the gods could only be appeased by bloody sacrifices. Now this idea is so thoroughly arbitrary, there being no obvious and necessary connexion, in the way of cause and effect, between slaughtering a man or a beast, and recovering of the Divine favour by the slaughterer, that its very universality involves the necessity of concluding that all nations have borrowed it from *some common source.* It is in vain to say, that there is nothing so strange but that an unrestrained superstition might have excogitated it. This solution does by no means meet the difficulty. If sacrifice had been in use only among

the inhabitants of a *single* country, or among those of some few neighbouring countries, who might reasonably be supposed to have much mutual intercourse, no fair objection could be made to the answer. But what we have to account for is, the universality of the practice; and such a solution plainly does not account for such a circumstance; I mean not merely the existence of sacrifice, but its universality. An apparently irrational notion, struck out by a wild fanatic in one country, and forthwith adopted by his fellow-citizens (for such is the hypothesis requisite to the present solution), is yet found to be equally prevalent in *all countries*. Therefore if we acquiesce in this solution, we are bound to believe, either that all nations, however remote from each other, borrowed from that of the original inventor, or that by a most marvellous subversion of the whole system of calculating chances, a great number of fanatics, severally appearing in every country upon the face of the earth, without any mutual communication, strangely hit upon the self-same arbitrary and inexplicable mode of propitiating the Deity. It is difficult to say which of the two suppositions is the most improbable. The solution, therefore, does not satisfactorily account for the fact of the *universality*. Nor can the fact—I will be bold to say—be satisfactorily accounted for, except by the supposition that no one nation borrowed the rite from another nation, but that all alike received it from a common origin of most remote antiquity[5].'"

Here the concluding observation, that all nations must have received the idea of sacrificing from a common origin is very true, it being utterly impossible to account otherwise for its prevalence in all parts

[5] Anac. vol., i. p. 89, 90.

of the world. But the nature of its origin has been hitherto as much unknown as that of the Trinity or any other impenetrable mystery. When Faber says that no nation ever borrowed this rite from any other nation, he alludes, of course, to very remote times, and to those nations separated by immense distances from one another, and between which no relationship can have ever existed.

It may be supposed that from the *ram* and the *bull* being expressed in Hebrew by the same word (though this did not happen always) they must have been named after the same idea; yet it was not so. The *ram* was called after his horns, and not, like the bull, from his great size, or from his being the chief or head one of his herd. Then how have they obtained the same name? By a horn having been named from its ending in a point, from its serving like a sword as a pointed instrument of defence. And as the *point* of any thing is its top part, this idea has therefore obtained a name not different from that of height, after which the bull has been called, and this accounts for the *ram* and the *bull* having, in some languages, the same name, though not called after the same idea.

We have another observation to make respecting the idea *king*, which will confirm still further our etymology of this word. Farther back we saw that words signifying *man* have each the meaning of *one*; so that *king* and *man* ought, I may be told, to be expressed alike, and yet these words differ widely from each other in form. And so they may, and yet be the same word, even if they had not so much as a letter in common. Now the *gan* of *ganaka* is its radical part, but not its root, which is *an*, and this is also the root of *man*. And

though the word *man* does not mean a *king*, yet that it might have done so is shown by the Saxon word *cwen*, which, as it means both a *woman* and a *queen*, serves to show that so might *man* mean a *king* as well as what it does mean, since it is the masculine of *cwen*, a *woman*. In *cwen* and *queen* we have therefore the same word, their chief difference in form arising from the aspirate *h* being represented differently, in the one word by *cw* and in the other by *qu*. That I do not mistake in taking the *cw* of *cwen* as a substitute for the aspirate *h*, becomes very evident when, instead of this substitute, we use the *h*, for *cwen* will then become *hen;* and as a *hen-bird* means a *female-bird*, it follows that *hen* is but another word for *cwen* or *woman*, and that a *hen-bird* is in meaning literally a *woman-bird*. This is beautifully confirmed by Bosworth, who, though he knew not that *cw* can serve as substitute for *h*, says that *cwen* is "put before nouns to denote the gender;" and he gives the following as an example: "*Cwen-fugel*, a *hen-bird*." Another form of both *cwen* and *queen* is *quean*, pronounced like queen; and it still means a *woman*, but conventionally "a *worthless woman*."

Should I be now asked if there be any difference between *cwen*, meaning a *woman*, and *cwen*, meaning a *queen*, I should answer that in form there is no difference whatever, but that in meaning the difference is very considerable. In both cases, however, the word *cwen* means *one*. Thus, when signifying a *woman* it means *one*, but any *one* of the feminine gender—there is no distinction as to rank. But when *cwen* signifies the *wife* of a king, though it still means only *one*, it is, conventionally, *one* in the sense of *first;* the *head* one, the *principal* one. The Saxon of *quean* is *cwene*, which still

means *one*, but conventionally, a bad *one*. Bosworth defines it "a common woman, a harlot."

What difference is there now in meaning between *cwen*, a *queen*, and *cyng*, a *king*? There is none; their difference in form serves to distinguish the one sex from the other; and when we remark that *c* had anciently the sound of *k*, we at once see that *cyng* cannot differ from *king* or *könig*. Hence *king* and *queen* have each the meaning of *one*. And can this etymology be confirmed still further? It can; for as *cwen* means both *woman* and *queen*, it follows since *woman*, as shown by our etymology of *homo*, means *one*, that such too must be the primary signification of the Saxon *cwen*, and consequently of its masculine form *cyng*.

And this being granted, it were as just to derive king from a word meaning *man* as from one meaning *father*. Nor would a very plausible reason be needed for such a derivation; for as *man* is allowed to be the noblest of all God's works, so is a *king* allowed to be the noblest of men. But such a derivation is only plausible; a king was never called after either father or man, but after *one* taken in the sense of *first*, or, which has the same origin, *head* or *chief*.

In order to find another very plain proof that *king* has this meaning of *first*, it is only necessary to notice these three forms of the same word—*begin*, *began*, *begun*; of which the primary signification—that of *beginning*—is the same; for the very slight difference in the form of these words—the change of one vowel for another—has been made for the sole purpose of distinguishing the present from the past time, and not for altering the original sense. But the radical parts of *begin*, *began*, and *begun* are *gin*, *gan*, and *gun*, as we see when we observe that

the radical part of *gynnan* (Saxon of to *begin*) is *gyn*, which cannot differ from the *gin* of *begin*. Now as this word *gin* is but another form of both *gan* and *gun*, and as *gan* is the radical part of *ganaka*, which, according to M. Max Müller, means a *king* in Sanskrit, it follows that this word may, from its being radically the same as the verb to *begin*, be correctly defined a *beginner*. And as the beginner of any kind of work is the *first* employed upon it, it follows that a beginner means he who is or who was the *first*. All this is fully confirmed by what we have already stated, namely, that ἐν ἀρχῇ, or its Latin representative *in principio*, may be rendered into English either by *at first* or *in the beginning*, both ways being equally correct.

And as the roots of *gin*, *gan*, and *gun* are *in*, *an*, and *un*, it is easy to perceive in each of these three words a different form of the German *ein*, the English *one*, and the French *un*, though every such word might as well end with any other consonant as with *n*. And though *one* is thus the root of the several important words just noticed, its acceptation is not, however, always the same. Thus *ganaka*, meaning *father*, is not, as has been supposed, the same as *ganaka*, meaning *king*; nor is *cwen*, the Saxon of *queen*, the same in meaning as *cwen*, which in this language signifies *woman*. And though the root of the word *man* (that is *an*) does not differ from the root of the *gan* of *ganak*, whether the latter be taken in the sense of *father* or *king*, yet they are no way related to each other, neither *father* or *king* having been called after *man*, nor *man* after either *father* or *king*. But there is a close relationship between *man* and *cwen* when the latter means a *woman*; so much so, that we may regard them as the same word, their difference in form serving

only to distinguish the one sex from the other. When we now observe that *man* and *cwen* have, notwithstanding their relationship, only one letter in common; a *queen* and *cwen*, a *woman*, which do not express kindred ideas, are written exactly alike; we see that some words may differ from one another considerably in form, though closely allied in meaning, whilst others that are not at all allied in meaning may be very much so in form.

So much for the primary signification of the German word *könig*. And during this inquiry what a number of important etymologies have, for the first time, been brought to light! of which several account for the origin of old superstitious practices. Only witness what is discovered by our notice of the word *bull*, and how from taking advantage of the knowledge thence derived we have been able to account for all nations, even those between which no relationship ever existed, having regarded burnt offerings as an acceptable atonement with the offended object of worship for man's transgressions. Of all superstitions this one has appeared the most inexplicable, inasmuch as it extended not only to harmless animals but to human beings also. This barbarous belief could not, however, have begun to obtain until some considerable time after the original meanings of words were wholly forgotten.

CHAPTER II.

PHŒNIX.

I AM induced to attempt the etymology of this word for two reasons: the first is, that it does not in *one respect*

differ from the German *könig* just noticed; and the second is, that the cause of its meaning a certain fabulous bird has not been hitherto known.

As the k of *könig* does but represent the aspirate *h*, the same may be said of the *ph* of *phœnix*, so that *könig* being reducible to *önig*, *phœnix* is reducible to *œnix*; and these reduced forms—*önig* and *œnix*—are equal to each other, and their radical meaning is *one*. But the identity in this respect between the two words goes no farther; for the meaning *one*, when it refers to *könig*, stands for *first*, whilst when it refers to *phœnix* it means *alone*, and consequently *single*.

This bird was thought to live longer than any other animal, to have red plumage, to be always single, and, on being consumed by fire, to be born over again from its own ashes. But why was it supposed to have been a bird more than any other creature? because its name in Greek (φοῖνιξ) must in the beginning have been often heard without its aspirate φ, and then it was but a different form of οἰωνός, a *bird*; or the radical parts of each word, that is, οιν and οιων, must by many persons have been pronounced so much alike as to have been often confounded. The οιων of οἰωνός must have been also mistaken for αἰών, which means a *very long space of time*; it may even mean *eternity*. This will account for the φοῖνιξ, when its name had not the aspirate, having been thought to live to a very great age. If we now observe that ἑνικός means *single*, or *alone*, and that from its aspirate being equal to φ, it cannot differ from φένικος, its radical identity with φοῖνιξ becomes very apparent. We have, therefore, only the red plumage of the bird to account for, and which presents no difficulty whatever; since without submitting it to the least alteration, the

word φοῖνιξ is not only the Greek of *phœnix* but also of *red* or *purple*. But I was forgetting to tell why the phœnix on being consumed was thought to be born over again, and even from its own ashes. When this belief prevailed the aspirate of φοῖνιξ must have been represented by *k*, and then the word was κοῖνιξ, and κοῖνιξ must have been often confounded with κόνις, which happens to be the Greek of *ashes*, and is but a different form of its Latin equivalent *cinis*, the *c* of the latter having been anciently sounded as *k*. So much for the origin of the belief that once prevailed respecting this fabulous bird.

The most usual etymology hitherto given of *phœnix* consists in its Greek and Latin forms being submitted to the inquirer, as all that can be said of its origin. De Roquefort and M. Littré have attempted to go a little farther, but it were better they had made no such attempt. De Roquefort says the phœnix was so called because its plumage was red; as if any one could tell the colour of a bird which this authority allows to be fabulous. He should have endeavoured to find out why the plumage of the phœnix was thought to be red more than any other colour. His words are, "Phœnix, du grec phoinix, rouge, couleur de pourpre; ainsi appelé de la couleur de son plumage." But I should observe that he begins his article by styling the phœnix "*oiseau fabuleux.*" M. Littré's etymology of *phœnix* is somewhat peculiar, for it is not so much the name of the bird he attempts to explain, but rather its colour; his words being, "φοῖνιξ, le phénix, proprement le rouge, de φοῖνιξ, phénicien, à cause que les Phéniciens avaient découvert la pourpre."

These two faulty etymologies of φοῖνιξ serve to show

the advantage we have by our fixed principles over philologists, who may be said to have had no settled principles of any kind whatever.

CHAPTER III.

GALETAS.

M. LITTRÉ, in the preface to his dictionary, even on the same page where he refers to *espièyle,* allows his readers to understand that he, and he alone, has had the good fortune to discover the original of GALETAS; an etymology that lay far beyond the reach of all his predecessors, and which he himself did not make but fortuitously, that is, by the merest chance in the world. But has he, after all, made this grand discovery? By no means; as I am now going to show. But let us first quote M. Littré's own words. Alluding to the happy discoveries in etymology which are sometimes made fortuitously, he says: "Un cas de ce genre m'a été fourni par mes lectures, et de la sorte j'ai pu donner une étymologie nécessairement manquée par tous mes devanciers qui n'avaient pas mis la main sur ce petit fait. Il s'agit de GALETAS; Ménage le tire de *valetostasis,* station des valets; Scheler songe au radical de *galerie;* on a cité un mot arabe, *calata,* chambre haute; Diez n'en parle pas, ce qui, en l'absence de tout document, était le plus sage. Quittons le domaine des conjectures qui ne peuvent pas plus être réfutées que vérifiées, et venons aux renseignements particuliers qui, dans des significations que j'appellerai fortuites, contiennent seuls l'explication. Galetas est, de l'efficacité de ces trouvailles, une excellente preuve; en

effet, qui le croirait? [ce ne serait pas moi, toujours.] C'est la haute et orgueilleuse tour de Galata à Constantinople qui, de si loin, est venue fournir un mot à la langue française. Galata a commencé par quitter l'acception spéciale pour prendre le sens général de tour, puis il s'est appliqué à une partie d'un édifice public de Paris; enfin ce n'est plus aujourd'hui qu'un misérable réduit dans une maison. Il n'a fallu rien moins que l'expédition des croisés de la fin du douzième siècle, leur traité avec les Vénitiens qui les détourna de la Terre Sainte sur Constantinople, la prise de cette ville, l'établissement momentané d'une dynastie française à la place des princes grecs, pour que le nom d'une localité étrangère s'introduisît dans notre langue et y devînt un terme vulgaire. Galetas est allé toujours se dégradant; parti des rives du Bosphore dans tout l'éclat des souvenirs de la seconde Rome, il s'est obscurément perdu dans les demeures de la pauvreté et du désordre[6]."

As M. Littré has brought this etymology from Constantinople to Paris, he must admit that it is—at least in one sense of the word—rather *far-fetched.* But there was not the least necessity for his bringing it from so great a distance. He could have found the original in his own street; perhaps, for aught I know, in his own house.

The radical part of *galetas,* not its root, is *galet;* and as *l* and *r* do, from their being the same letter under two different forms, often interchange, there cannot be the least difference between *galet* and *garet,* the latter being now written *garret,* that the short sound of the *a* in *galet* might be preserved. If M. Littré will now look out, in any English and French dictionary for *gar-*

[6] Preface, p. 34.

ret, he will find it rendered into French by both *grenier* and *galetas,* which two words—as if synonyms—are often used indifferently. And if he will now look out in a French and English dictionary for *galetas,* he will find it represented by *garret.* Now as the *gal* of the *galet* of *galetas* cannot differ from the *gar* of *garret,* nor *gar* from *far,* any more than *gero* and *fero* can differ from each other; and as *far* has in Latin the meaning of *grain* or *corn,* we thus see that *galetas* and *grain* are radically the same word. And as a place for holding grain is named a *grenier,* such too must have been the first use ever made of a *galetas,* and consequently of a *garret.* When we now allow the *a* of *gar* to fall behind its *r,* as vowels preceding this consonant frequently do; this word will then become *gra,* which, as every vowel may or may not receive the nasal sound, is equal to the *gran* of *granum.* It is thus shown that in the *gal* of *galetas,* the *gar* of *garret,* the Latin *far,* the *gran* of *granum,* and the French and English *grain,* we have radically one and the same word. But what is its primary signification? As *grain* or *corn* serves to support life, it must, like *water,* have been called after *life;* so that words expressing ideas relating to *grain* should be traced to the same source. Hence as *bread* is made from *grain,* it must have been called after it, and have consequently the same primary signification, that of life. Such reasoning as this will necessarily lead to the conclusion that the same word might mean either *bread* or *water,* these two ideas being traceable to the same source. Hence in Gaelic the word *bàr,* which is marked obsolete, means *bread;* and under *barach* I find the following: "Genitive of *bair* or *bàr,* the *sea;*" so that from the *sea* having been called after *water,* as is

also shown[1], it follows that the old Gaelic word *bùr* means both *bread* and *water*. Parkhurst does not, therefore, mistake when he derives the Latin *far* from the Hebrew בר *br*, *corn;* and to this same word he assigns, with other meanings, that of *well*, whence he derives the old English word *burn*, a *spring*. By which we again see that the same word may mean both *bread* and *water*, for whatever word means *grain* or *corn* must also mean *bread*.

But does the Latin *panis*, I shall be asked, mean both *bread* and *water?* It does; for its radical part *pan* is, from its *a* being composed of *o* and *i*, the same as *poin*, that is, when the *o* is dropped, *pin*, in which we see the πιν of πίνω to *drink*, an idea called after *water*. *Pin* is also equal to *vin* (*wine*) as April is to Avril, because of the interchange of *p* and *v;* and *wine* we have already fully accounted for, and have shown it to be but another word for *drink*, which idea was first called after *water*.

Now, from what we have just seen, it is evident that the *gar* of *garet* or *garret*, cannot differ from *bar* any more than the *ger* of *gero* can from *bear;* and *garet* is therefore the same as *baret*, that is, when the *a* falls behind the *r*, *braet*, which is but a different form of *bread* in English, *brot* in German, and *brod* in Danish; and to which may be added the *brôt* of the Greek words βρωτόν and βρωτύς, words meaning *food*. And that such an idea has been called after life is shown by our word *victuals*, and its French equivalent *les vivres*, which are but other words for *living* or *life*. And as *brute* cannot differ from such a form as *brot*, we see from the latter meaning *bread*, and from *bread* meaning *food* or *life*, that such too must be the primary signification of *brute;* and which is made evident by *brute* being synonymous with

[1] Vol. i. p. 176.

animal, and by *animal* being radically the same as ἄνεμος in Greek, and *animus* and *anima* in Latin, which are all significant of life.

This etymology of *brute* is fully confirmed by what I find in Parkhurst under בער *bor,* which, according to this authority, means "to *feed* or *graze* as a beast." Hence as a noun, בעיר *boir,* a brute animal, a beast that feeds itself without knowledge or regard to good or evil," &c. "Hence perhaps, English, a *boar,* a *bear* βορά, *food,* properly of brutes, βρόω and βρώσκω, to *feed;* whence βρωτόν, *food,* German *brot,* Danish *brod,* and English *bread.* Also Latin *voro, devoro,* &c. Whence English *voracious, devour,*" &c.

בער *bor* is also according to Parkhurst, "a brutish person, one resembling a brute in stupidity," &c. Whence he derives the English words "boor, boorish."

And the verb ברה *bre,* which is radically the same word, is explained, "to feed, eat, or take food," and ברי֫ה *brie* means "food, victuals;" and ברות *brut,* which is clearly our word *brute,* is explained "*food*[8]."

It is thus self-evident that the ideas *bread* and *brute* have been each called after life; the one because it supports life, the other because it is a thing of life, an animal.

Another meaning given by Parkhurst to בער *bor* is to *burn*[9], so that the same word can be said to mean *bread, brute,* and *burn.* How widely these ideas differ in meaning from each other! A child, made acquainted with our principles, can, however, tell why they are named alike. He knows that bread has been called after life, because it serves, like *air* and *water,* to support life; and he knows that a *brute,* because an *animal,* is literally a *life,* and that it has for this reason been signified by a word not

[8] Lex., p. 68. [9] Page 61.

different from one meaning *bread*, though the two ideas —*bread* and *life*—are no way related. And the idea *burn* can, he knows, be traced to both *fire* and the *sun;* the latter having once been the supposed author of all life.

And have we not here a clear proof that the initial consonant of those words does, as I have said, but represent the aspirate? for when we leave out the *f* of *fire ire* remains, and it can be easily conceived that such an idea may be called after *fire;* and this is confirmed by the Hebrew בְּעֵר *bor*, respecting which, in addition to its meaning of *burn*, Parkhurst gives the following: "Applied to anger or the like. To be kindled, to burn." And that the aspirate, or one of its substitutes, may be used or not used before initial vowels, we obtain numerous living proofs every time we hear either Frenchmen or Englishmen speak their own language. The Latins, too, had the same habit; witness their old word *ir*, which meant both *hand* and the *palm* of the hand, and is now usually written *hir;* and this shows that there is no difference between *h* and *ch*, since *hir* is for *cheir*, the Greek of *hand*. But it also shows, I may be told, that the ideas *ire* and *hand* must have been once expressed alike. But are they not so still? Are not *manus*, *mania*, and *maniac* radically the same word? And why should this be? Because as it is with the hand we make, it was hence called after its use, that is, a *maker;* which was a name given to the *sun*, the once supposed maker of the world; and the ideas *fire* and *ire*, as just shown, are also traceable to the same source.

These etymologies lead to another, namely, to that of *rage;* for here we see the *ra* of *ira*, which *ra*, as initial consonants take vowels before them, cannot differ from

ira. But how are we to account for the *ge* of *rage?* By observing that some persons having given to the *a* of *ira* a guttural sound, they pronounced it as if written *irag,* whence *irage,* and then by dropping the *i, rage,* so that in *ira* and *rage* we have the same word. How now are we to find in *rage* a word for *food,* such as the Hebrew בער *bor,* or its Greek equivalent *βορά*? By observing that *rage* is by transposition the same as *arge,* and that *arge* is the same as *orge,* the French of *barley,* of which the radical part *bar* is the Hebrew of *corn,* and but another form of the Hebrew בער *bor* and the *βορ* of the Greek *βορά,* and each of these means *food.* Barley, though now a particular kind of grain, must have once meant grain in general, and that its French form *orge* might as well mean *rage* is proved beyond all doubt by this Greek word *ὀργή,* which is, letter for letter, *orge,* signifying, as Donnegan expresses it, "mostly vehement anger."

I have said that all ideas relating to grain or corn must have been called after it; hence when we allow the *a* of the *gran* of *granum* to return to its place, that is, to precede the *r,* we shall instead of *gran* have *garn;* and as we have found *gar* to be the same as *bar,* the form *garn* cannot differ from *barn,* and a barn is, like *granarium, granary, grange,* and *grenier,* a place for corn. But if we allow the *a* to fall behind its *r,* we shall, instead of barn, have *bran;* which idea must, as it is the husks of grain when ground, have been called after corn. It is scarcely necessary to observe that corn is but a different form of the *gran* of *granum;* for its *o* is equal, as the reader must know, to *oi,* and consequently to *a,* which brings *corn* equal to *cran;* and *cran,* from the interchange of *c* and *g,* is the same as *gran* or *grain.*

I have, it may be supposed, said enough to convince

every one that *galetas* was never named after the great tower Galata at Constantinople, but that it is nothing more than a synonym of the word *grenier*.

Of this important etymology I have still another proof to offer, and which will enable me to give the primary signification—long since forgotten—of another French word in very common use. I mean *galette*, which cannot differ, save conventionally, from the *galet* of *galetas;* and as it is a cake chiefly made of meal (*farine*), it was at first nothing more than another word for bread. From an account I read of it some years ago, it appears to be for the natives of Brittany what oatmeal bread is for the Scotch; but English travellers find it far more coarse and tasteless. As it is now made in the more refined parts of France it is a very dainty morsel. M. Littré derives it from *galet*, which is a round pebble thrown up by the waves of the sea on the beach. But as I have differed from this gentleman in his etymology of *galetas*, I must take the liberty of doing so again respecting the origin of *galette*. But if *galette* had been written, as it might have very well been, *farette*, every philologist would then know, since *far* means *corn*, the primary signification of this word. And that *gar* might be represented by *far* is proved by *granarium* being also *franarium*, for each of these words means a *place for holding grain*. Nor could M. Littré, or any one else, mistake discovering the primary sense of *farreum*, which should be regarded—and not *placenta*—as the genuine Latin equivalent of *galette*, since it means *a cake* made of the *flour of wheat*. And *farreum* was also used for *horreum;* that is, it meant not only a *cake made of wheat meal*, but a *barn* also; which is a further proof that *galetas*, *grenier*, and *galette* are all radically the same word. As

the *o* in *horreum* is for *oi* or *a*, and as *h* is constantly replaced by *f*, there can be no difference between *farreum* and *horreum*, which accounts for *farreum* having the two meanings now assigned it.

What a number of different ideas can be thus traced to the same source! Thus there is no relationship whatever between the ideas *garret, bread, brute*, the verb to *burn* and the noun *well;* we have just shown, however, how they can be all easily traced to the same source. And how many such ideas escape my notice! Thus it is only now I perceive that *g* in *grain* being for the aspirate, which is never to be counted, there can be no difference between this word and *rain*, and as this idea was called after that of water and water after life, it is thus brought to the same source. And as *rain* cannot differ in form from *run*—a combination of vowels being equal to a single vowel—and as to *run* implies *motion*, and as *motion* implies *life*, we thus see why *grain*, *rain*, and *run* should be expressed alike. Who now cannot account for *far*, Latin of *corn*, being the same as the *far* of the Saxon *faren*, to *go*? And as the action *going* implies *motion* so must it imply *life*, and it might for this reason have served to signify *corn*. And what have we in *corn* itself but a form equal to *coirn?*—*o* having *i* understood—and as *oi* makes *a*, *coirn* is equal to *carn*, and *carn* to *garn*, and *garn* to *gran*, whence *rain* and *run*.

CHAPTER IV.

M. MAX MULLER'S ETYMOLOGY OF WHEAT.

I HAVE so many other etymologies on my hands that I did not intend to notice the word *wheat*, but finding that M. Max Müller derives it from a word in Sanskrit, meaning *white*, I cannot help thinking that this is a serious mistake, and one that should be taken up. It is not because a word for *wheat* may bear a close resemblance to one for *white* we should suppose it to have been called after this colour, especially if we find it under another name—that of *corn*, for instance—to mean both *bread* and *life*. But I do not mean to say that M. Max Müller has found out that corn has this meaning, or that any one else has done so besides myself; but being convinced that corn has this meaning, I am inclined to suspect that wheat also must have it, as it is but another word for corn. Ask some children four or five years old to say *bread*, and at least the half of them will allow you to hear *bled*; and as children pronounce certain words, so may many grown persons, even whole nations. Witness the Chinese, who having, I am told, no *r* in their language, do always, when meeting it in foreign words, represent it by *l*. Even in London when the apprentice boy speaks of his favourite young woman, he will oftener call her his *gal* than his girl, and if he attempts the pronunciation of such a word as *garret* he will make it *gallet*. In France, also, many children and even

grown persons pronounce Paris as if it were written *Palis*.

To what conclusion must these observations lead? That in *l* and *r* we have two different forms of the same sign, and that they do, for this reason, replace each other very often, so that *bread* is but another word for *bled*, which is the French of *wheat;* and as I have shown bread to have been called after corn, and corn after life, because serving as its principal support, such too, I conclude, must be the real meaning of wheat.

M. Max Müller, referring to wheat, says it "was called the white plant, *hvaiteis* in Gothic, in Anglo-Saxon *hvæte*, in Lithuanian *kwetys*, in English *wheat*, and all these words point to the Sanskrit *sveta*, i. e. *white*, the Gothic *hveits*, the Anglo-Saxon *hvit*[1]."

But if M. Max Müller knew that the idea white is to be traced to light, and through light to the sun, the once supposed author of existence; and that from corn having been called after food, and food after life, and life after the sun, he would at once perceive that the two ideas *wheat* and *white* may have very well had the same name without either having been called after the other. In Greek *sitos* means *wheat*, and *sitia* means *victuals;* and the radical part of each word is *sit*, which by transposition becomes *ist*, and this cannot differ from the *est* of ἐστί, nor from the Latin *est*, nor the German *ist;* and each of these forms is rendered into English by *is*, and *is* implies *existence* or *life*, after which corn has been called, and *wheat* means *corn*. Hence the radical part of the word *wheat* is *eat;* for the combination *wh* or *hw*, as it would be in Saxon, does but represent the aspirate *h*, a sign which should *never* be regarded as belonging to the

[1] Lec. 2nd Series of his Lectures, p. 66.

radical part of a word. And in the *eat* of *wheat* it is also easy to perceive another form of the Latin *edō*, to *eat*, and which is made evident by *esse* meaning not only to *be* but also to *eat*, so that *edit*, *he eats*, may be also expressed by *est*. Nor is it less difficult to perceive in the German *essen*, to *eat*, the Latin *esse*.

The Gothic of wheat is, according to M. Max Müller, *hvaiteis*, of which neither the *hv* nor the *eis* at the end belongs to the radical part *ait*, and this is but another form of the *eat* just explained, and such too is the *æt* of the Anglo-Saxon *hvæte*, and the *et* of the Lithuanian *kwetys*. It must, however, be admitted that the words given by M. Max Müller for *white* are radically the same as those meaning *wheat;* but, as I have already said and shown, this is no proof that *wheat* has been called after *white*.

From what we have now seen it may be inferred, that whatever serves to support life must have been often—not always—called after it. Hence between the radical part of *meat* and that of *wheat* there is no difference; which leads to the conclusion that *meat* also has, as well as *wheat*, been called after life, and which we confirm by comparing *viande* and *vivre* or *vivere*. But when we compare *flesh* and *flush*, and remark that to be flushed is to be red, we cannot say that *flesh* has been called after *life* but after *redness*, and that such too was the original meaning of the Latin *caro*. And as *carrotty* hair means *red hair*, may we not suppose that a *carrot* also has been named after *redness?* And does not this go to prove, M. Max Müller may ask, that *wheat* has been named from the *whiteness* of its grain? There are two reasons for believing that such cannot have been the original of its name. In the first place, the whiteness of wheat

is not sufficiently striking to have obtained for it such a name. It is not like *snow* or a *swan*, of which the whiteness is so attractive as to be noticed by all persons who have the use of their eyes. It seems to me—but I am a poor judge of colours—that a field of wheat is more remarkable for its being yellow than white, and that if such a plant were to be named after its colour it would be when seen standing, and ripening under a hot sun, and not when its grains were stripped of their husks, and looked at very closely. In the second place, the real meaning of its name, that of *food*, an idea called after *life*, can be easily discovered, as we have seen, by the applying of my principles; and as these two meanings, *food* and *life* are made evident by that of *bread*, and *bread* by that of *bled*, French of *wheat*, our etymology of this word is further confirmed. And as *bled* has the meaning assigned to *blood*, and as blood is, because a liquor, traceable to water as its original source, and water to life; this affords another proof that the same word may signify both *bread* and *water*. And still another proof of the same kind is afforded by *bread*, *brod*, and *brot*, as none of such forms can differ from *broth*, and as this is a liquor, it is, like blood, traceable to water, and from water to life. And, from the common interchange of *b* and *f*—compare *brother* and *frater*—*broth* cannot differ from *froth*, which word, from its being equal to both *brot* and *broth* might have also served to signify both *bread* and *water*, and consequently *life*.

I should now observe that of the several words noticed in connexion with the etymology of *galetas*, the radical parts only have been given. The initial consonants of those words are all but substitutes for the aspirate. Thus when the *g* of the *gal* of *galetas* is removed, *al* alone

remains, and it is the root; and when the *f* of *far* is removed *ar* is the root, and these two roots (*al* and *ar*) are equal to each other. As to the words *bread, brot, brod, broth,* and *froth, ear* is the root of the first, and *or* of the others; but the vowels *ea* and *o* of these roots must have first preceded the *r*, and have afterwards fallen behind it. In *bled,* French of *wheat, el* is the root, or rather *al,* for *e* is for *o,* and *o* for *oi* or *a:* the same observation will apply to the *or* of *brod* and *brot;* that is to say, it cannot differ from *ar.* We should also observe that there is not the least difference between the *r* and the *l* of *ar* and *al* and any other consonant; hence the *or* of *brot* or *brod* might as well have been *od* or *on.* There must have been therefore a time when the root of such a word as *fodder* was only *od;* but when it was aspirated it became *fod,* of which *food, feed,* and *fed* are but different forms and acceptations. Now the Greek of *fodder* is βορά, of which the radical part *bor* does not differ in the least from the *fod* of *fodder.* If we now change the *b* of βορά for *f,* this word will become *fora,* and its radical part be *for;* and as *b* and *f* are here but substitutes for the aspirate, there cannot be any difference between *bora* and *fora.* And to what does this observation lead? To the etymology and primary signification of *for*age, for its radical part *for* is the same as the *far, corn,* noticed above; and by this we learn that it is only conventionally that all such words as serve to signify *corn, wheat, meat, bread, fodder, forage,* and *food,* differ from one another, and that they are all to be traced for their origin to the idea *life,* because they serve to support it.

On now looking over the words I had occasion to mention, in connexion with *galetas,* I have, I perceive,

forgotten both *grain* and *corn*, in which we have the same word, the *g* in the one, and the *c* in the other being each for the aspirate; and as the *ai* of *grain*, when made to precede its *r*, gives *air*, it follows that *air* should be taken as the root of this word; and *garner*, since it is the same as *granary* or the French *grenier*, and since its *a* precedes instead of following the *r*, shows that the *ai* of *grain* must, as I say, have first preceded its *r*; and another proof of this is afforded by the French word *aire*, which means the place in a *barn* where the corn is threshed. As to the *or* of *corn*, it is also a proof that the *o* of such words as *brot* and *brod* must have first, as shown above, preceded the *r*. According to these views the *r* of the Greek ῥέω, to *flow*, must have first had its *e* or some other vowel, or combination of vowels before it, in which case it will—radically considered—not differ from ἀήρ, *aer*, or *cur*, though now, from its meaning to flow, water is implied. But are they not both—*air* and *water*—accounted fluids, and is not each, to the highest degree, necessary to life, which accounts for the words by which they are signified being radically the same? In the beginning such words must have served as names of the *sun*, because the supposed author of life; and as *fire* has been also called after the *sun*, its name might, for this reason, not differ radically from one signifying either *air* or *water*, though it cannot have been called after either. When we do, therefore, leave out the *p* and *f*—here replacing the aspirate *h*—of the Greek πῦρ, the Saxon *fyr*, and their English equivalent *fire*, we shall have in what remains, that is, in *ur*, *yr*, and *ire*, words radically the same as *air*, though this idea was never called after fire. In the *bur* of *burn* we have another word equal to *air*; for when its *b*—here representing the aspirate—is omitted, *ur* alone

remains, which is the same as the root of πῦρ, *fire*, and even as ἀήρ or *air*; and that the *b* of *burn* is here only for the aspirate, is made evident by its Latin equivalent *uro*, of which the initial vowel has escaped being aspirated. As *fire* must have been called after the *sun*, it follows that if the idea *burn* has been called after *fire*, the word by which it was first expressed must have been radically the same as a name of the sun. Nor can אור *aur*, Hebrew of *light*, differ from *air*, nor from אר *ar*, which means not only to *flow* but also a *stream*, &c.; and this is so true, that Parkhurst accounts for the apparent relationship between two such words as signify both *flowing* and *light* by observing that light is a fluid[2]. I need scarcely observe that all words signifying *light* must have been also but other names of the sun.

And under the Hebrew of *day*, יום *im*—also an idea called after the sun—Parkhurst observes as follows: "This word is nearly related to חם *em*, if indeed it ought to be reckoned a different root." But חם *em* means *water*; and Parkhurst's words are, in his endeavours to account for the identity of *im* and *em*, the following: "From the tumultuousness or agitation of the celestial fluid while the sun is above the horizon." He did not know that if day and water have been named alike, it arose from not only *day* having been called after the *sun*, but *life* also, which implies *motion* or *agitation*; and that water, from the great assistance it affords towards the support of life, was named after the great object the sun, which was believed to give life to all nature. And here we can perceive why *ignis* means *fire*; we see that it arises from its root *ig* being the same as the *ag* of *ago*, to *act*, and no way different from the *aqu* of *aqua*, or

[2] See Lex., p. 29.

from the *ag* of *agua,* which is the Spanish and Portuguese form of *aqua.* And this proves that *fire,* however it may be signified, will be expressed by a word equal to the one for *water,* and that both ideas—*fire* and *water*—must, with a very slight difference for the sake of distinction, have been named like the sun.

The reader may now easily find other etymologies suggested by those just noticed. Thus when the *b* of such words as *barn* and *bran* is considered as no part of their roots, but only a substitute for the aspirate *h,* we see that such a word as *brine* is reducible to *rine;* that is, *rhine,* the name of a river; so that it is but another word for *water,* and radically the same as ῥέω, to *flow.* When we do also leave out the *g* of *grain,* because only representing the same aspirate, we shall have in the remainder of this word, *rain,* and *rain* is water, and but a different form of *rhine;* and as *run* cannot differ from either *rain* or *rhine,* we thus see how all such words imply *motion,* and consequently *life. Broth* and *froth* are also suggestive of other etymologies; for when here the *b* and the *f* are, as representing the aspirate, left out, the word *roth,* which remains, cannot differ from the ῥυτ of ῥυτός, and ῥυτός means a *flowing,* a *stream,* &c. *Roth* is also the same as the ῥοθ of ῥόθος, which means the *loud rushing of water;* and the root of both ῥυτός and ῥόθος is ῥέω, to *flow.*

The Hebrew word רוח *ruh* will confirm many of the latter etymologies. It means, according to Parkhurst, "Air in motion, a breeze, breath, wind[3]." This word is evidently the same as ῥέω, to *flow,* though *water* is now implied, and not *air* or *wind.* But neither רוח *ruh* nor ῥέω can differ save conventionally from the French word

[3] Lex., p. 626.

rue, a *street*, which, from its having been called after motion, because a place where people move and pass, may be regarded as being radically the same as ῥέω, to *flow*, which gives it the same origin as that of water, and also as that of life.

Now when I made the preceding etymologies I was not aware that there is in Hebrew such a word as רוה *rue*, which is letter for letter the French word *rue*. But what does it mean? Here is what Parkhurst says of it: "To be wet, soaked, saturated, or drenched with liquor; to be watered, drunkenness," &c. It is therefore made evident that my etymology of such words as *rue* and *road* was no mistake. As to our word *street* its radical part is *reet*, and this is but another form of *root*, *route*, *road*, and the *rad* of the Italian *strada*. Nor can there be any doubt that *via*, *way*, and *vita*, *life*, and *vite*, *quick*, are all radically the same word, and for which the cause has now been shown.

This identity of words must, when language was in its infancy, have been far more apparent than at present—a circumstance which has been the cause of much superstition long anterior to the Christian era. This is well known to all learned men who have made ancient history the study of their lives, though they little thought it had been first suggested by the meanings of words. Godfrey Higgins says, "The Etruscans baptized with *air*, with *fire*, and with *water:* this is what is alluded to many times in the Gospels[4]."

This information cannot but be agreeable to all the good Christians—and they are tolerably numerous—who believe in the doctrine of types.

When John says, "I indeed baptize you with water,"

[4] Anac., vol. ii. p. 67.

and then adds, "He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire;" that is, with *air* and *fire;* this serves to show that three kinds of baptism were then well known. "In some parts of Scotland," says Higgins, "it is a custom at the baptism of children, to swing them in their clothes over a fire three times, saying, *Now fire, burn this child or never.* Here is evidently baptism by *fire.* When the priest blowed upon the child in baptizing it, in my presence, in the baptistery at Florence, was this to blow away the devils according to the vulgar opinion, or was it the baptism by air, *Spiritus Sanctus?* Priests confess to communicate the *Spiritus Sanctus* [5]. The baptism by *fire* and water was in use by the Romans. It was performed by jumping three times through the flame of a sacred fire, and being sprinkled with water from a branch of laurel. Ovid says,—

> "Certe ego transilui positus ter in ordine flammas,
> Virgaque roratas lauren misit aquas."

This is still practised in India [6]. From old Grecian authorities we learn, that the Massagetæ worshipped the sun, and the narrative of an embassy from Justin to the Khankan, or emperor, who then resided in a fine vale near the source of the Irtish, mentions the Tartarian ceremony of purifying the Roman ambassadors by conducting them between two fires [7].

But besides the doctrine of types there is another happy mode, as some believe, of accounting for the origin

[5] See Protestant Ordination Service, and the Petition to the House of Lords, August 5, 1833, of the Rev. Charles N. Wodehouse, Prebendary of Norwich, for an alteration of this and other parts of the Liturgy.—Editor of the second volume of the "Anacalypsis."

[6] Vide Maurice's Ind. Ant., vol. v. p. 1075.

[7] Jones on the "Language of the Tartars," Asiat. Res., vol. ii. p. 31. 4to. Anac., vol. ii. p. 67.

of ancient baptism with the heathen, as the following from Justin shows: "The devils no sooner heard of this baptism spoken of by the prophet, but they too set up their baptisms, and made such as go to their temples and officiate in their libations and meat offerings first sprinkle themselves with water by way of lustrations, and they have brought it to such a pass, that the worshippers are washed from head to foot before they approach the sacred place where their images are kept[8]."

On the above the Rev. Mr. Reeves gives the following note: "That such mock baptisms were set up by the contrivance of the devil in the Gentile world we find not only asserted by Justin but all the primitive writers, and particularly by Tertullian, *De Baptismo*[9]."

If we now remark that the sun was anciently regarded not only as the creator but as the saviour of mankind, and that the name by which he was then known had the several meanings of *life*, *air*, *water*, and *fire*, we can easily conceive, as men then believed in the doctrine of the WORD as sincerely as every Christian does now in that of the Trinity, that *air*, *water*, and *fire* might each assist towards *saving* life. It is therefore my humble opinion that the doctrine of baptism with the heathen was no artful contrivance of the devil, but that it was wholly suggested by the meanings of the several words just mentioned. Nor is this opinion—which I give, however, in trembling—in any way antagonistic to the doctrine of types; so that all who now believe that without baptism no man can be saved, will no doubt regard this doctrine, when yet only known to the idolater, as a Divine foreboding of the truth one day to be revealed.

What a number of important etymologies can be

[8] Section lxxxi. [9] Quoted by Higgins, vol. ii. p. 66.

thus suggested by an inquiry into the origin of a single word! Since I began to show that *galetas* is but a different form of its synonym *grenier*, I have happened to discover the primary sense of more than thirty names of the most common-place ideas. Some of those which I have seen I have feigned not to see, lest the notice of them might lead me still farther; and I can readily believe that the enlightened reader has seen some that I neither did nor could see. One that has until now escaped my notice is ἄρτος, which means not only *bread*, but, as Alexandre justly observes, food in general: but this authority traces it, as does also Donnegan, to ἄρω and ἀρτύω, words signifying to *arrange*, *adjust*, *adapt*, *prepare*, &c. When, however, we aspirate its initial vowel, and then replace the aspirate by one of its common substitutes, by *b*, for instance, the radical part of this word, that is, *art*, will become by transposition, *brat*, which cannot differ from *brôt* or *bread*; it is, in short, the *brôt* of βρωτόν, *food*.

I find in M. Littré's dictionary some two or three proofs of the truth of my etymology of *grain*; but I can find no proof that either he or any of the etymologists he has consulted could tell the primary signification of this word. In Provençal, grain is, according to M. Littré, both *gran* and *gra*, which is confirmatory of my statement, that the *n* of the *gran* of *granum* is to be accounted for by the rule I have laid down and have already so often applied, namely, that a vowel may or may not take the nasal sound. But M. Littré was not aware that *gra* must have first been *gar*, and that *gar* cannot differ from *far* any more than *gero* can from *fero*, and that the *far* thus obtained is but a different form of *gra*, just as *gra* is of the *gran* of *granum*. But when

M. Littré tells us that a relationship has been found between *granum* and the Gothic *kaurn*, the German *korn*, and the English *corn*, there is no mistake; though it is a very great mistake to give *gar*, which, it appears, means in Sanskrit, to *disperse*, as the root of these words. There is not the least connexion between two such ideas as *corn* and *dispersing*. M. Littré should not therefore approve of this etymology as he does when he says *de sorte que granum serait la chose qui s'éparpille;* so that *granum* is the thing that is scattered.

As far as I have yet seen, it appears to me that a great deal more is lost than gained by tracing words to Sanskrit for their roots. The most valuable information I have yet received from Sanskrit scholars is that given by M. Amedée de Caix de Saint-Aymour, when he shows that the *v* in Sanskrit is often *m* in Latin. When I both made and published this discovery many years ago, I was not aware that it could be confirmed by a knowledge of Sanskrit.

As long as I have been in France I have never heard *grain* used in the sense of *rain;* and for this knowledge I now own myself indebted to M. Littré, whose twenty-second meaning of this word is the following: "Pluie subite accompagnée de bourrasque." Referring to this meaning of *grain* in his etymologies, M. Littré says: "Il n'est pas absolument sûr que *grain* au sens d'orage soit le même mot que *grain* de blé; cependant on peut concevoir que cet orage ait été appelé un *grain*, à cause des grains de grêle et des gouttes de pluie qu'il verse; les étymologies qu'on en a données ne s'appuient sur rien de positif: Anglais *rain*, pluie; ou, d'après Jal, le Hollandais *gram*, furieux, colère." Here I find—thanks to M. Littré—a curious confirmation of several of my

etymologies given farther back. I ought to have then stated these proofs, but I was not aware of their existence. When I then said that the initial consonants of the words I was considering were only substitutes of the aspirate, and that for this reason they should not be regarded as belonging in any way to the radical parts of the words to which they are attached, I removed the *g* from *grain*, and so reduced it to *rain*, which I had shown, as the reader may recollect, to be but another word for *water*, and that this idea and that of grain were both named after life because serving to support it. I regret that M. Littré has not favoured us with the names of the philologists who have found that *grain* when meaning *pluie* was the English word *rain*. It is evident that they were not led to such an opinion by the application of any rule, but from merely knowing that of which I happened to be wholly ignorant, namely, that in French *grain* means not only *corn* but *rain* also; and so it ought, as I have already shown, though I have never heard it used in this sense.

We can easily believe M. Littré when he says that the etymologies which connect the ideas *grain* and *rain* repose upon nothing certain; for, not knowing the primary signification of either *grain* or *rain*, how could he discover in such etymologies any thing conclusive? Nor are these two ideas in any way related, though they are signified by the same word. *Grain* was never called after *rain*, nor *rain* after *grain;* the sole cause of their exact identity in form—as in French for instance—is that both ideas were named after life, without either of them being, at the time, referred to the other. But from *grain*, meaning in French not merely *rain*, but rain with a storm, M. Littré has been induced to suppose

that the idea may have been so named from the resemblance which both hail and drops of water bear to grains of corn. But this is mere fancy and conjecture, and nothing more.

Another curious confirmation of the truth of my etymology of grain is still given by M. Littré, and for which I feel very thankful. The reader no doubt recollects how I have shown the idea *ire* to have been called after *fire*, and how *rage* is still but another form of *ire;* and that if such an idea is expressed not differently from one meaning *grain, corn, bread,* or *water,* it arises from fire having, like those ideas, been called after the sun, the once supposed author of all life, and that there is not otherwise the least relationship between *fire* and any of these ideas. But a philologist named Jal—some learned German, I suppose,—on perceiving that the Dutch word *gram* is the same as *gran*—and this is no mistake—and that *gram* means, when rendered into French, *furieux, colère*—has been led to imagine that this is why *grain* has been made to signify *rain* with a storm. But this also is mere fancy, and nothing more. In *grain* and *rain* we have the same word, because the *g* in *grain* being for the aspirate it counts for nothing; so that *rain* may have once meant *corn,* that is, before it took an aspirate; and as it must have then been called after life as well as when it first obtained the *g,* it is not surprising that its name should be identical with one meaning *rain* or *water,* since this idea has been also called after *life.* But the words by which these ideas are in general expressed, differ on many occasions so considerably from each other in form as not to appear in any way related. In proof of this, witness only *granum* and *aqua.* Then how can the identity be proved? By stripping such

words of their adjuncts, and so finding their roots. Thus *ar* is the root of *granum*, and *aqu*, *ak*, *ag*, or *ac*, is the root of *aqua;* and as all roots are, like the letters of an alphabet, equal to one another, it is only conventionally that such roots as *ar* and *aqu* can differ from each other.

If I were now to be asked if M. Littré could have possibly discovered the primary signification of either *corn* or *water*, I should answer that he might have very easily discovered that of *water*, and probably that of *corn* afterwards. Then why has he not done so? Because he has not paid sufficient attention to one of his own important statements made under his article *eau*, and which is the following: "*Esse*, signifiant *eau*, se trouve dans le nom de plusieurs localités du Berry." The moment M. Littré wrote these startling words he should have laid down his pen and have begun to think, and so have remained, if necessary, whole days and nights still thinking and thinking, until he could tell why two such ideas as *existence* and *water* were once expressed by the same word. And I can suppose that a man of his rare powers of mind, might, after a few days and nights of hard thinking, solve this apparently very difficult problem. Thus he could not help asking himself, What has water to do with existence? And the answer would necessarily be, that existence could not go on without it, and that for this reason water must have been called after existence, since it is as it were existence itself; and than this conclusion nothing could be more natural and logical. But M. Littré does not appear to have thought so, for putting his important statement in a parenthesis, as if deserving of no better place, he dashes thoughtlessly on and never more alludes to it. But had he reflected seriously on these his own words, and had he by so doing

found out why water and existence are signified alike, this knowledge might have led him to discover the primary signification of *granum* also. Thus on perceiving that in his own language *grain* means not merely *corn* but even *rain*, he would, from knowing that rain is water and that water was called after existence, ask, What has grain to do with either water or existence? and the answer would follow that grain is the chief support of human life, and that it must for this reason have, like water, been called after existence. And from this he would conclude that the names of at least some kinds of food, if not of all, should be traced to words meaning *life*, and in this opinion he would be fully confirmed by such words as *vivres* and *viande*, which are radically the same as *vivere* in Latin and *vivre* in French.

I have not, with perhaps one exception, quoted the opinions of philologists respecting the origin of the many words which I have had occasion to notice in connexion with my etymology of *galetas*. And I have abstained from so doing for two reasons, namely, the fear that I may want space, and the dread of tiring the reader with a repetition of what has been already sufficiently proved; namely, the origin of language, and of which philologists have hitherto known nothing, not even the origin of its first letter. They have, in general, thought it sufficient to trace one word to another without giving the radical sense of either word. The truth of this statement is sufficiently shown by what they say of *bled*, now written *blé*. Thus M. Littré, on having given several of its forms, says: "On tire ordinairement ce mot de l'Anglo-Saxon *blaed* (feminin), fruit." But supposing this derivation to be correct, I am still kept ignorant of the primary sense of *bled* or

blé, unless I am told the primary sense of *fruit*, which M. Littré and others derive from *fruor*, to *enjoy*; but this cannot be its original meaning, for *enjoyment* cannot give *fruit*, but it is *fruit* that gives *enjoyment*. It is true, however, since *bled* is the same as *bred*, and *bred* the same as *brod* or *brot*, and that *brod* or *frot* is the same as *frod* or *frot*; so that, radically considered, *fruit* or *fructus* cannot differ from either *bled* or *bred*. But it does not follow that *fruit* has been called after the idea *bread*, for had this kind of food never existed *fruit* would be named just as it is. And why so? Because *fruit* is, like *grain* and *water*, necessary to life; and it would, for this reason, have been called after life. Now M. Littré, not approving of this origin of *bled* or *blé*, that is to say, not supposing *bled* or *blé* to be derived from the Saxon *blaed* (*fruit*), says, "mais le caractère germanique de ce mot Anglo-Saxon n'est pas assuré, et il se pourrait qu'il vînt du Roman: aussi Grimm a-t-il songé au Celtique: Kymri, *blawd*; Bas-Breton, *bleud*, *farine*." The reader must know that Grimm is looked up to as the very greatest of all philologists either living or dead; and yet, notwithstanding his great name, he supposes *bled*, that is, *wheat* or *corn*, to be derived from a word for *farine*, that is, from one meaning *meal*. But is this possible? No; it is equal to this other gross blunder of deriving the name of the sun from one meaning both the light and the heat of the sun; or it is equal to our saying that *aqua* was named after *aquosus*; or that in English *water* comes from *watery*, and not *watery* from *water*. When I meet with mistakes like these, made by the highest authorities, my heart sinks within me, and I ask myself if I shall be ever understood, and if I have not come some two or three centuries

before my time. For a verity, great philologists are not very great thinkers. As *farine* or *meal* is signified in Bas-Breton by *bleud*, the word for *bled* or *blé* must have been like it. But supposing that *bleud* meant *bled* or *blé*, and not *farine*, we should be still as far from knowing the primary signification of *bled* as we were before.

But to this etymology of Grimm's there is, according to M. Littré, an objection, and we are introduced to another very different one made by Diez, M. Littré's great favourite. But this is the strangest etymology of all. As corn (*bled*) is always carried off from the field where it has been reaped, this shrewd observer derives *bled* from *ablata*, which will mean the *things carried off*. But to this etymology, though coming from so high an authority, there is still, in M. Littré's opinion, an objection. But does this great philologist himself afford us any better information respecting the primary signification of *bled?* I fear not, but that he rather adds confusion to what appears already sufficiently confused. That the reader may, however, judge for himself, I beg to quote his own words from where I left off: "Mais la *forme* [*bleud*] n'en concordant pas très-bien avec le Roman, Diez a proposé une autre étymologie, le Latin neutre pluriel *ablata*, c'est-à-dire, les choses enlevées (des champs, la dépouille, la récolte) d'où, avec l'article, *l'ablata*, *l'abiada* et *la biada;* à quoi il y a une objection considérable, c'est que le Français et le Provençal perdent difficilement la voyelle initiale du mot; quant au bas-Latin *ablatum*, *ablatus*, *abladium*, qui est dans Du Cange avec le sens de moisson, et que Diez cite à l'appui de son opinion, ces mots paraissent être bien plutôt formés du Français (*ablais*, *ablaier* ou *ablaver*, de *à* et *blé*) qu'être vraiment les représentants du Latin *ablata*, au

sens de récolte. Il est donc difficile de prononcer entre ces deux étymologies, qui ont chacune leur objection. On remarquera l'orthographe *bleſ* ou *bleif;* le *t* ou *d* se change sans peine en *f*, par exemple, *soif* de *sitis*, *mœuf* de *modus;* c'est cette *f* qui a permis de former le dérivé *emblaver*, l'*f* et le *v* permutant, comme on sait, ensemble. On remarquera aussi qu'on a dit *blée* au féminin, comme en Italien."

M. Littré might well say, on concluding this article what he has said, as we shall see, of *garçon;* namely, that the etymology of *blé* or *bled* "*reste en suspens,*" for there is not in all that has been said of it, so much as a distant approach towards its real meaning having been made out.

But if *blé*, in the sense of *corn*, has been called after life, how is such a word to be traced to the sun, the supposed author of existence? We need only make the *e* of *blé* return to the place it must have had before it fell behind *l*, by which means we shall obtain *Bel*, a well-known name of the *sun*, as was also *Bal*, which is but a different form of *Bel*. And as the *B* of both these names does but replace the aspirate *h*, we see that *Hel* and *Hal* must have preceded *Bel* and *Bal;* and as in *Hel* we have the radical part of ἥλιος, so have we in *Hal*, the radical part of ἅλιος, which is the Doric form of ἥλιος.

It is now easy to discover how the English word *life* itself was formed. By reading Bel after the Hebrew manner, from right to left, this word becomes *leb*, which is the radical part of *leben* (German of *life*); and as the *e* of *leb* is equal to *o*, and consequently to *oi*, and as its *b* is constantly represented by *f*, we see that *leb* cannot differ from *loif;* that is, *life*. Hence *life* is, in Saxon,

written *lif* and *luf;* the *o* having been dropped when *loif* became *lif;* and *oi* having been changed—as it often is—for *u*, *loif* became *luf*. And as *Bel* and *Bal* are, from the constant interchange of *l* and *r*, equal to *ber* and *bar*, whence the Latin *far, corn*, and the *bro* of the German *brot* and the English *bread;* so are those other two forms of *Bel* and *Bal*, that is, *loif* and *luf*, the same as *loaf;* and as *l* is often aspirated in Saxon, the word *loaf* is in this language written *hlaf*. We have thus seen how in *bread* and *loaf* we have the same word, though they have only one letter in common. This accounts for *pain* in French meaning both *bread* and *loaf*.

Now as the *laf* of the Saxon *hlaf* is the same as *loaf*, and as it cannot differ from the *lav* of *lavare* in Latin or *laver* in French, how, it may well be asked, since *lavare* or *laver* means to *wash*, can ideas so dissimilar be in any way related? The cause of their being signified alike must be ascribed to the idea expressed by the word *wash* having been called after *water*, and *water*, like *bread*, after *life*. Hence *was*, the Saxon of *water*, cannot differ from the *wes* of *wesan*, which is, in the same language, the verb to *be;* and to *be* is to have *life*. *Wes* is also the preterite of *wesan*, and not different from *was* in English.

There are two other forms—which should be noticed—of the French word *blé*. These are *blav* and *bled*. As to *blav*, it is the radical part of *emblaver*, to *sow corn*, which should be *blaver;* the *em* of this word being here as superfluous as it is in the English verb *embroider*, which might be *broider*, as we see by its French original *broder*. But how do we know that *blav* is another form of *blé?* We know it from its being the most radical part

of *emblaver*, or, as this verb may have first been, *blaver*. Hence, from *blav* being the same as *blé*, it follows that the literal meaning of *emblaver* or *blaver* is to *corn*, so that *emblaver un champ* may be explained to *corn a field*; that is, to *sow it with corn*. But how was the *v* of *blav* obtained? By aspirating the *e* of *blé*, and then by representing the aspirate by *v*, which would give *blev*; and of *blev*, *blav* is but a slightly different form.

If we now put the pronominal Latin article *id* before *blé* or *blav*, and allow it, as usual, to fall behind its noun, we shall get *bled* and *blavd*, this article *id* having joined with the noun it followed, and both words having been contracted to *bled* and *blavd*, of which the latter form is the same as *blaud*; and *blaud* is the same as *bleud* and *blawd*, two Celtic words meaning, according to M. Littré, *farine, meal*, and which this authority gives, with other forms, under *blé*, as we have seen.

When we compare *far, corn*, with *farine, meal*, we cannot but admit that both words are radically the same. But how are we to account for such a form as *meal*? By remarking that it cannot differ from *mel*, as is shown by *melu*, which is, according to Bosworth, its Saxon form. And *mel* cannot, from the interchange of *b* and *m*, differ from *bel*, which, as we have just seen, is the elder form of *blé*.

But why should *mel, meal*, be the same as *mel*, Latin of *honey*? Because the latter is a *fluid* substance, and is, consequently, to be traced to the same source as water, though not called after it any more than after any other fluid. And as *corn* has, like *water*, been called after life, this accounts for two such ideas as *corn* and *honey* having been signified in the same way; though it may have been often done by two words so different in form from

each other as not to have a letter in common. Another word which might very well mean *honey* is *wine*, for its radical part *in* is for *oin*, which with the aspirate gives *hoin*, and *hoin* is the same as the *hun* of *hunig*, Saxon of *honey*. In the Hebrew יי *iin*, *wine*, and the *οιν* of the Greek *οἶνος*, *wine*, it is easy, when we aspirate, to perceive the same word.

Every one can now tell why *bladder* and *bled*, this other form of *blé*, *corn*, are radically the same word. It must arise from *bladder* having been called after its use; namely, from its being a vessel for holding animal water; and it might, for this reason, have served as a name for any other vessel, even one for drinking. This is confirmed by the three Saxon words *blæd*, *bled*, *bledu*, each of which means a *drinking-cup*.

Every one can also tell why the French *bled*, *corn*, is the same as the *bled* of the Saxon *bledan*, which means to *draw blood*; for blood being a liquor, it is, like the three Saxon words just mentioned, traceable to the same source as water; and this accounts for words that have this meaning—that of water—being so often equal to such as have been called after life.

CHAPTER V.

SHOWING THAT THE VERB TO CORN IS NOT, AS IT HAS BEEN HITHERTO SUPPOSED, THE NOUN CORN, AND THAT IT HAS A VERY DIFFERENT MEANING, AS THE DISCOVERY OF ITS ORIGINAL FORM WILL SHOW.

THOUGH we have now seen the origin of the names of several ideas expressed by words signifying *corn*, something yet remains to be said respecting this word *corn* itself, which, because of its importance, requires especial notice. Can any one of all the very learned philologists by whom I have been preceded tell me how it happens that the English noun *corn*, which means *grain in general*, has also, when used verbally, the meaning of *salt*, since to *corn* meat means to *salt* it? No, this cannot be told; at least, it never has been told. *Corn* in the sense of *salt* is not, however, of recent date. Thus Dr. Johnson, after telling us that the verb to *corn* comes from the noun *corn*,—which is, as we shall see, a great mistake,—and that it means "to *salt*; to sprinkle with *salt*;" observes as follows: "The word is so used, as Skinner observes, by the old Saxons."

The primary signification of the verb to *corn*, has been, therefore, lost to the whole world for many a century; that is, if the etymology which I am now going to give of this word be found correct.

When the verb to *corn* first meant to *salt*, it could not have had the form it bears at present, but some

other one of equal value; for the same word has been often written and pronounced in several ways in order to distinguish its different acceptations from one another. Let us therefore put the word *corn* under some of its forms in order to discover, if we can, the one it must have had when signifying *salt*. If we give to the *o* of *corn* its *i* understood, we shall get *coirn*, which giving no meaning, we should allow the *o* and *i* to become, by coalescing, *a*, which shows *coirn* to be equal to *carn;* and this, too, gives no meaning. But if we here allow the *a* to fall behind *r*, as vowels frequently do, we shall get *cran;* and as *c* and *g* interchange, *cran* can no more differ from *gran* than *cat* can from the *gat* of *gatto: corn* is therefore equal to *gran*, by which we only learn that *corn* and its Latin equivalent *granum* are radically the same word, and that such, too, is *grain*. In *gran* we can see the radical part of *granary* and also of *garner*, which words do each mean a *place for corn*. But as none of these words signify the verb to *corn*—that is, to *salt*—we must make *corn*, or the *gran* of *granum*, take other forms of equal value. As *g* and *f* interchange, witness *gero* and *fero*, there can be no difference between such forms as *gran* and *fran;* but as *fran* gives no meaning, we should give to *a* its first place—that is, put it before *r*—which brings *fran* equal to *farn*, of which the part *far* means *corn*, just as *granum* does. It is, therefore, evident that in *farn* and the *gran* of *granum* we have the same word, and which becomes still more evident when the *a* of *gran* returns to its place before *r*, as this will give *garn*. In *farn*, this other form of *garn*, it is easy to perceive *farina*, as well as the French *farine*. And though all these words are but different forms of *corn*, none of them can be shown

to have, like the verb to *corn*, the meaning of to *salt*. We must therefore alter *corn* to some other form. In its equivalent *farn*, just noticed, we can perceive —since *f* and *b* are often used for each other—the word *barn*, which is, like *garner* and *granary*, a place for *corn;* and its radical part *bar* happens to be the Hebrew of *corn*. And when the *a* of *barn* falls behind its *r*, instead of *barn* we shall have *bran*, which, as it comes from *corn*, must have been called after it; so that it is but another word for *corn* itself. To *bran* does not, however, mean to *salt;* but let us give to its *a* its eldest form, that of *oi*, and then see what we shall obtain. By this slight change we shall, instead of *bran*, have *broin;* and what is this but a very ancient form of *brine?* It is, even at the present hour, so pronounced in the north of England, where so much of the old pronunciation of the English language is still preserved. And if we now make the *f* of the French *farine* take its common form of *b*, we shall instead of *farine* have *barine;* that is, when its *a* is dropped, *brine*. In like manner when we allow to the *g* of the *gran* of *granum* its form of *b*—witness *gero* and *bear*—we shall again have *bran*, and consequently *broin* and *brine*.

The intelligent reader can now tell why *corn* and *brine* are signified by the same word under different forms, though neither of the ideas they express has been called after the other. He must know from the etymology of *brine* already given, that it is for *mrine*, that is, *marine*, which is derived from *mare*, the *sea*, and the sea is salt water. Hence to *brine* meat is literally to *salt-water* it; that is, to *steep it in salt water*. And as the sea has been called after water, as we have also seen, and water after life, and as corn is traceable to the

same source from its being, like water, a principal support of animal existence, we thus see why *corn* and *brine* are signified by the same word. Hence Dr. Johnson should not, as he did, derive the verb to *corn*, that is, the verb to *salt*, from the noun *corn*, which is a general name for grain; whilst *brine* is, when followed up to its source, another word for *water*, but sea water. Dr. Johnson could not possibly know—nor indeed could any one else—that the word *corn* was also written *brine*. Had he known this he would not have said that the verb to *corn* is to be derived from the noun *corn*, meaning *grain*, but from its other form, *brine*, which means *salt water*, an idea no way related to grain. And if Johnson were now living, and if I were to assure him that the verb to *corn* should be derived from *brine*, would it be in his power to believe me? No; and why so? Because not knowing the cause; that is, because not knowing that *brine* is, when followed up to its source, traceable to water, and that water has been called after life, and that so has corn; which brings these two very different ideas, *corn* and *water*, from the same source, that of life.

As to the initial consonants of all the above words for corn, they should be regarded as substitutes of the aspirate *h*. Thus *corn* must have first been *horn*; and *horn* have been replaced by *forn*; that is, *farn*, whence *farina* and the French *farine*; then, from the interchange of *f* and *b*, *farn* became *barn*, *bran*, *broin*, and *brine*. And as *m* often represents *b*, *barn* became *marn*, which is radically the same as *mare* the *sea*, another word for *water*, and not different from the French river called the *Marne*, which word must have once meant *water*, such having been at first the general name of all rivers.

And as to the roots of those words, each of them might,

like every other root, serve as a name of the sun. Thus the *or* of *corn* and the *ar* of *far* are equal to *al* and *el*, which, as we have often shown, mean both the true God and the sun.

How evident this becomes when we compare the root of *bran* (now *ra*, but previously *ar*) with its French equivalent *son*, of which the root is *on*, the *s* being here for the aspirate, just as it is in the word *sea*, *ea* (its root) being the Saxon of *water*. It is needless to observe that this French word for *bran*, *son*, cannot differ from *sun*, or from the corresponding word in German, and that the Greeks rendered its root *on*, then Hebrew, as shown farther back[1], into their language by ἥλιος, as already stated.

As to the *n* of *corn*, *barn*, *bran*, and all such words, there has been with many people a euphonic tendency to sound this sign with *r*; thus the French *séjour* is the English *sojourn*; and *tour*, meaning in French a *circular motion*, becomes *turn* in English. The *n* of every such word should be therefore never considered as a part of its root.

I have now fully accounted for the verb to *corn* having the meaning of the verb to *salt*. And of this etymology I may well have some little reason to be proud, seeing that it has been hitherto unknown, and that it would, in all probability, have ever remained so but for the use of those principles of which I have had already so often occasion to show the advantage.

Even living philologists are still under the impression that the *corn* of the verb to *corn* must mean *grain*, and that to "*corn* beef means to *preserve* and *season* with salt in *grains*, to *sprinkle* with salt." But let them only

[1] Vol. i. p. 32.

observe what they will not deny, namely, that the *far* of *farine* cannot differ from its Hebrew equivalent *bar;* so that *farine* might just as well be written *barine,* and what is *barine* when its *a* is dropped but *brine?* This can perhaps be more easily understood than that *bran* is equal to *broin* and *broin* to *brine.* But both etymologies are equally correct. And as *b* and *m* do often interchange, *barine* is as equal to the *marine* of the French *mariner* as it is to either *barine* or *farine,* and *mariner* is the French of to *pickle,* that is, put in *brine.*

CHAPTER VI.

GARÇON.

I NEARLY forgot to give the etymology of the French word *garçon,* yet no word can, in the language to which it belongs, be more deserving of notice, for none appears to have puzzled French philologists more in their fruitless endeavours to account for its origin. Before we give M. Littré's long account of the etymology of this word, it may not be out of place to submit to the reader the following several notices of it, as I find them in De Roquefort:—

"Clevier dérive ce mot de l'Allemand Karl [Kerl]; Borel, du Grec gasaura, ou de l'Espagnol varo, forme du Latin viro, ablatif de vir. Isaac Pontanus avait déjà émis cette opinion. Enfin Juste Lipse le tirait de garson-ostasium, lieu destiné à Constantinople pour élever les jeunes enfants mâles, et les faire eunuques. Gébelin le

fait venir de l'Arabe gar, gari, jeune, vaillant, audacieux, plein de courage; gari, jeune fille, femme; chir, vaillant, courageux. Voyez Gloss. de la langue Romaine, garce et garchon."

How opposed to truth these different etymologies of *garçon* will appear when we show presently, by the application of our principles, its real origin! But let us first see what M. Littré and Diez have to say of it. According to M. Littré the following are the different forms of this word in several languages and their dialects:—

"Picard, *guerchon*; Franc-comtois, *guichon*; Bourg. *gaçon*; Prov. *gart, guart, garsi, garso, gasso, guarçon*; Catal. *garso*; Esp. *garzon*; Ital. *garzone*; Bas-lat. *garcio*." Such are the different forms of *garçon*, on giving which M. Littré continues thus: "Mot très-difficile. On remarquera d'abord qu'en vieux Français le nominatif est gars, et le régime garçon; au pluriel, le nominatif est le garçon, et le régime les garçons; de même en Provençal le nominatif est gart et le régime garçon. Il faut donc que ce mot vienne d'un Bas-latin garcio où l'accent se déplace par l'effet de la déclinaison: garci, garcionem. Diez en a donné une étymologie fort ingénieuse: il a remarqué que dans le patois milanais garçon signifie à la fois garçon et une espèce de chardon; il en a conclu que c'était le même mot, et qu'il répondait à un dérivé du Latin carduus, chardon. Pour la forme du mot, il approche de l'italien guarzuolo, cœur de chou, milanais garzoen, bouton, qui, tenant à carduus, témoignent du changement de *c* en *g*. Pour le sens, il suppose qu'un jeune garçon a été dit, par métaphore, un bouton, un cœur de chou, quelque chose de non développé. *Cette dérivation ne porte pas dans l'esprit une conviction complète*, vu que les intermédiaires manquent pour montrer

le passage du sens de cœur de plante à celui de jeune garçon. Aussi dans l'état de la question ne peut-on abandonner absolument la dérivation Celtique : Bas-bret. gwerc'h, jeune fille ; le *gu* se trouve dans quelques formes Provençales et dans le Picard. Mais cela aussi est incertain ; et *l'étymologie reste en suspens.* Garçon n'a pas plus que *garce,* par soi, un mauvais sens ; pourtant il y eut un temps dans le moyen âge où il prit une acception très-défavorable, et devint une grosse injure, signifiant coquin, lâche. Aujourd'hui il ne s'y attache plus rien de pareil, et c'est *garce* qui seul est tombé très-bas."

Now what must the learned members of the French Academy and its Institute think of these different opinions respecting the origin of so well known a word as *garçon?* Why, they must admit that of the origin and science of language nothing whatever has up to the present hour been known. The different etymologies of this word, as given in the passage from De Roquefort, are, it must be allowed, bad enough ; but is the one given by Diez a shade better? M. Littré says it is *fort ingénieuse,* and I bow to M. Littré's superior judgment ; but if allowed to hazard an opinion of my own, I should say that it is so far from being *fort ingénieuse,* that I cannot help considering it extremely far-fetched, so much so as to assign it a prominent place amongst some of the worst I have ever met with. Only imagine Diez finding a relationship not only between two ideas so opposite as a boy and a thistle, but even between a boy and the heart of a cabbage! But M. Littré tells us that this derivation does not bring home *complete* conviction to the mind. There was surely no great necessity for such an assurance. Very few, if any at all, of M. Littré's intelligent readers would, had he never made such a state-

ment, feel inclined to accept this etymology of *garçon* as faultless.

But what is M. Littré's etymology of *garçon?* The little he says of it amounts to nothing at all; and under the circumstances—that is, from his being unacquainted with the origin of language and its principles—he has acted very prudently, much more so than Diez or any of the philologists referred to by De Roquefort. He begins his notice of the etymology of *garçon* with the words "*Mot très-difficile.*" And so it is, and very difficult, when we have not the means of tracing it to its birth, just as a door is very difficult to open when we have not the proper key; but as with the proper key a door is very easily opened, even so is the word *garçon* very easily traced to its original by the use of our principles.

M. Littré allows us to understand, as shown above, that the ending *on* of *garçon* has grown out of *garcionem,* accusative of *garcio,* a word in low Latin; now granting that there ever has been such a word, and that it has been regularly declined after the manner of words in the third declension, I cannot help regarding as a mistake this derivation of the ending *on* of *garçon,* which I believe to be the same as the *on* of *bouton, crouton, mouton,* &c.; that is, as an article fallen behind its noun, and of which a more ancient form appears to have been *un,* and, that like this word, it then meant *one.* And this view is confirmed by M. Littré himself, since he shows, in passages quoted from old writings, *garçon* to have been often writen *garçun.* And we should remark that every word which served anciently as an article meant both *one* and *the;* that is to say, it was both indefinite and definite. Hence the word *garçon* must have

once been *un gars* or *on gars*, and then the meaning was either *un gars* or *le gars*; as the sense directed. Thus the peasant, with whom the old forms of words in all languages remain longest, frequently uses *gars* for *garçon*, as every Frenchman knows. We have, therefore, in our endeavours to trace *garçon* to its original, to notice only *gars*, which must have long preceded *garçon*, just as *il sole* must have long preceded *soleil;* that is, before *il* fell behind *sole*, and joined with it.

Now all philologists, whether English, German, or French, know very well that *g* may represent *f*, and they are equally well aware that *r* is often replaced by *l;* they must, therefore, in their endeavours to discover the original of the *gars* of *garçon*, have often remarked that it is precisely equal to *fals*. But on perceiving that *fals* makes no sense they went no farther, and so gave up all hopes of ever discovering the original of *gars*. But a child acquainted with my discovery could not, on perceiving that *a* is composed of *o* and *i*, help perceiving at a glance that *fals* is the same as *foils;* and on philologists learning only this, the most ignorant of them would be obliged to admit that *foils* is reducible to *fils*, for the dropping of a letter being of very frequent occurrence, the *o* of *foils* may be left out, as is shown by comparing *boil* and *bile*, a *tumour*, and τρεῖς and its Latin form *tres*.

In *fils* and *gars* we have therefore one and the same word, and which is confirmed by the fact that they are constantly used for each other. There must have been therefore a time when *filius* was written *foilius*, after which it became, by the dropping of the *o*, *filius*. But it cannot have been at this time that the form *gars* was obtained, but rather when *foilius* was, in some old Latin

dialect, contracted to *foils*. It does not appear that the *o* and the *i* of either *foilius* or *foils* have ever coalesced and made *a*; for if this had happened, we should have now *falius* and *fals* instead of *filius* and *fils*.

Now this etymology, which is as clear as light, has been hitherto unknown, utterly unknown to all the philological societies over the world; for were it otherwise, the several learned authorities I have quoted could not have been so ignorant of it as they have proved themselves to be. No such German as Diez could then think of tracing *gars* to a *bud*, a *thistle*, or to the *heart of a cabbage*; nor could such a man as M. Littré think of styling this etymology, which is so far-fetched and so destitute of common sense, as being *very ingenious*. Why his own original of *galetas*, however faulty it must appear, is logic itself compared to it. And as to the etymologies quoted by De Roquefort, though they deal not in buds, thistles, or cabbages, they are nevertheless also very faulty.

But what has enabled me to find the original of *garçon*, a discovery which so many learned men have sought in vain to make? It was not obtained through any ingenuity of mine, for I am any thing but ingenious, as every one who knows me will readily admit. The sole cause of my success must be ascribed to my knowledge of the origin of human speech, even of man's first word, the *o*; and that this sign has always *i* understood, just as *i* has *o* when either sign comes singly; and that when both signs are allowed to join they make *a*. It was, therefore, in order to make this etymology, only necessary to know that the first letter of the alphabet must, in the beginning, have appeared thus *oi*, and that at this time one of its two parts must have been often dropped

and so have been then understood. Than this little bit of knowledge no more was necessary for enabling every one to discover the original of *garçon.*

Let us now analyse *filius, fils,* and the *gars* of *garçon. Fil* is the radical part of *filius,* and as its *f* does but represent the aspirate *h,* it follows that *fil* cannot differ from *hil,* nor *hil* from *hoil*—*o* being understood with *i*—nor *hoil* from *hal,* since *o* and *i* make *a: filius* is therefore equal to *halius,* which is the same as *Halios,* Doric of *helios,* the *sun.* Now *fils* being but a contraction of *filius*—the *iu* of the latter having been dropped—it is to be accounted for in the same way; and so is *gars,* since, as shown above, it is for *foils,* and *foils* for *fils.* We have already seen why a *son* should have a name not different from *sun.* It does not arise, the reader will recollect, from a *son* having been called after the *sun,* but after one of its chief meanings, namely, that of *maker,* which happens to be also the meaning of *father;* so that a *son* from having been called after his *father* obtained a meaning not different from that of the *sun,* though not called after this object. Now as the root of *fil*—radical part of *filius* and *fils*—is *il,* and as *il* is equal to *al,* we obtain a name of the *sun,* and which cannot differ from *an, un,* or *on,* any more than one root can from another.

And as the *ar* of *gars* is another root, it is equal to *al;* hence *bar*—Hebrew of *son*—becomes when its *b* (here for the aspirate *h*) is dropped, *ar;* and *ar* with the aspirate is the *har* of *haris,* in Hebrew חרש *hrs;* and this word was one of the names of the sun, as shown farther back[2], where it is traced to the form *chris,* and shown to have the meaning of *preserving* and *saving,* and also of *artificer* or *maker,* names belonging to the *sun.* Nor

[2] Vol. i., p. 93.

is a name of the Deity wanting, since *chris* cannot differ from the χρης of χρηστός, which means *good*, and in Saxon *God* and *good* are expressed by the same word, as we have seen. *Good* is, however, in meaning, much less than *God*, which word means *goodness* itself.

CHAPTER VII.

GRISETTE.—DISCOVERY OF ITS PRIMARY SIGNIFICATION, AFFORDING ANOTHER INSTANCE OF THE ADVANTAGE TO BE DERIVED FROM KNOWING HOW THE FIRST LETTER OF THE ALPHABET HAS BEEN MADE.

Gris is the French of *grey;* and *grisette*, which should be regarded as the diminutive of *gris*, may be fairly represented in English by *greyish*. Hence it is that the French, wanting a name for a sort of grey cloth, called it *grisette*. But at this time and long previous to this time, *grisette* meant a *young woman*, and served solely as a diminutive of *garce*, this being the feminine of *garçon*, and not of *fils*, of which the feminine is *fille*. Both *garce* and *grisette* are now used—though they were not so used formerly—in a bad sense, just as we sometimes hear the word *girl* used in English. When etymologists, who seldom bestow a serious thought on the origin of ideas, saw that the word *grisette*, meaning a *young woman*, did not differ from the one meaning *grey cloth*, they at once leaped to the conclusion that the young woman must

have obtained her name from the colour of her dress, which could not be unless this dress were a sort of livery worn by all such females for the purpose of distinguishing them from others of the same class. But this is not conceivable, as the word *grisette,* in the sense of a young woman, must have long preceded the use of such a dress. Let us now apply our principles.

We know that the *i* of *grisette* has *o* understood, and that *o* and *i* make *a,* which will bring *grisette* equal to *grasette,* that is, when *a* returns to the place it must have first had, *garsette* or *garcette;* and this must have been the original of *grisette;* it being more reasonable to suppose that this word is the diminutive of *garce*—that is, when designating a young girl—than the name of a sort of grey cloth.

The following is, according to M. Littré, the origin of *grisette*:—

"Jeune fille de petite condition, coquette et galante, ainsi nommée parce que autrefois les filles de petite condition portaient de la grisette."

But this happens to be a mistake, and the mistake must be ascribed to its not having been hitherto known that the dot over the *i* is for *o,* and that *o* and *i* make *a;* which being granted, *grisette* is, consequently, for *grasette,* and *grasette* is, when the *a* returns to its first place, *garsette;* that is, a *little* or *young garce;* but primitively, a *young girl;* that is, before *garce* was taken in a bad sense, and when it was only the feminine of *garçon.*

CHAPTER VIII.

LE LOUP ET LE RENARD.

As an instance of M. Littré's great industry, reading, and research, I may here quote all the forms he gives, from many languages and their dialects, of only the word *loup*: "Wallon, *leu*; Berry, *laube* des deux genres, *loup* et *louve*; Picard. *leu*; Provenc. *lup*, *lop*; Catal. *llop*; Espagn. *lobo*; Ital. *lupo*; du Lat. *lupus*; Grec. λύκος; Lithuan. *vilka*; Slave. *vluku*; Anc. Pers. *varka*; Sanscr. *vrika*. Le Slave *vluka* explique la transition de *varka*, forme primitive de *vrika* en *valka*, *vlaka*, et par affaiblissement de l'*a*, *vluka*; et de là Fλύκος, λύκος, et en Latin *lupus*, par changement de la gutturale en labiale."

This affords a fair specimen of M. Littré's powers as a philologist. He has here given us many forms of the word *loup*, but of its primary signification in French he says nothing; and this is the more to be regretted, as it would, no doubt, lead to the primary signification of all its other forms. But M. Littré could not go any farther than he has gone. He needed the necessary knowledge, the origin of language. Why the animal in question was first named a *loup* or a *wolf* we now know no more than we knew before reading M. Littré's etymology of this word. But the reader will soon see why the *loup* or *wolf* has the name by which it is now known. A very slight knowledge of our principles will enable every school-boy to discover its original meaning.

The reader will please recollect that during the expla-

nation I gave of the myth SAVITAR, I showed the word *wolf* to mean *motion*, but conventionally *rapid motion*; and this is so true, that any thing else named after motion might serve as a name for the wolf. Even the word *walk*, which does not imply *rapid motion*, might do so. This is confirmed by some of the forms given of the word *loup* by M. Littré; but he saw it not. Witness these two, *valk* and *varka*, in which we have the same word; the *r* of *varka* being as equal to the *l* of *valka* as the *terr* of *terra* is to the *tell* of *tellus*; and is it not very easy to perceive that the *valk* of *valka* is our word *walk*, and that, from the identity of *l* and *r* such too must be the *vark* of *varka*? Now as *p* and *v* do constantly interchange, because only the same letter under different forms, it follows that *loup* is the same as *louv*, and that the difference between it and its feminine *louve* is but conventional. If we now take advantage of what we saw in our etymology of LORD, namely, that *l* was anciently aspirated, as Bosworth shows by the Saxon of *loaf* being *hlaf*, we shall find that *louv* and *louve* are each equal to *hlouv* and *hlouve*; and as the aspirate is, as we have seen many times, replaced by *f* or the digamma, *loup* and *louve* are equal to *flouv* and *flouve*. And as the combination *uv* of *flouv* is equal to double *u* or double *v*, and as the same may be said of this combination in *flouve*, it follows that these two words cannot differ from *flow* and *flowe*; and when we give to the *o* of *flouve* its form *e* —witness *show* and *shew*—this word will become *fleuve*, which is the French of *river*. It is thus made evident that *loup* in French and *flow* in English are one and the same word, which arises from their being each expressive of motion. If the reader will now please to look over the different forms of the word *loup* given by M. Littré, he will

find several of them confirmatory of our etymology of *loup*. Witness *flukos, vluka, vlaka,* of which the radical parts are *fluk, vluk,* and *vlak,* the *f* and the *v* standing in these words as substitutes for the aspirate *h,* to which the *l* was, as shown by Bosworth, anciently entitled. Now what is the first of these three words for *loup,* that is, *flukos* but *fluks,* its *o* having been dropped? and what is *fluks* but *flux?* which is confirmed by what school books tell us, namely, that *x* is a double letter, and equivalent to *ks.* Hence a *flow* is a *flux,* and the wolf might have been so called. But was he ever so called? Undoubtedly he was; for as the *f* of *flux* is for the aspirate, and as the aspirate is never to be counted in the radical part of a word, and as the *x* of *flux* is for *ks,* it follows that *lux* is for *luks;* that is, when the vowel here due between *k* and *s* is supplied, *lukos,* and this is the Greek of *wolf,* and so must *flukos* have been often written, since all persons cannot have aspirated the *l.* Thus in Saxon, *lid* and *list* were by some persons pronounced *hlid* and *hlist,* but they were not so pronounced by every one. By these observations we are necessarily led to suppose that *lukos* cannot differ from *lux;* and what relationship can there be between such an animal as a *wolf* and so grand an idea as that of *lux* or *light?* There is no relationship whatever; but *light* is traceable to the *sun,* and so are, as we have already often shown, both *life* and *motion;* and as the wolf was called after the latter idea, this accounts for his name not differing from light, nor even from the sun, after which light was called. Hence when we aspirate the *l* of *light,* what have we but *flight?* And as this word implies *motion,* it might have also served as a name for the *wolf.*

Now from *lux, light,* and *lukos, wolf,* being as it were expressed alike, may they not have been sometimes used for each other? Nothing can be more likely, and of which—since in *lux* and *sol* we have the same word—the following from Donnegan, under λύκος, is a proof:—"λύκος was an ancient name for the sun according to Macrobius." This explains the myth which tells us that the wolf was sacred to Apollo or the sun. We see that it was suggested by λύκος having served as a name for both the wolf and the sun, this having led some persons to suppose that the *wolf* must have been the *sun.* But when the wolf was first named, every one knew very well that his name signified *motion,* conventionally *rapid motion* or *swiftness.* But when this true and original meaning was, with time, forgotten, and when no one could account for his name being the same as that of the sun, then the strange belief began to prevail that this animal and the sun must have once been allied to each other. And such was the origin of myths—they all grew out of an identity in the meanings of words.

The reader must now see and feel convinced that the *wolf* was called after *motion,* conventionally *rapid motion* or *swiftness;* and that the meaning of his name does not for this reason differ from that of *water* or the *sun.* And as we have said that any thing else called after motion might have served as a name for the wolf, we see this statement then made in advance now confirmed by the verb to *fly,* in the two past forms of which are *flew* and *flown,* whilst *fly* itself is equal to the *flig* of *flight.* And though *flew* and *flown* never refer to water, yet they cannot differ from *flow* and *flowed,* which arises from the primary sense being still that of motion.

In the etymology I have given of *savitar,* one of the

names of the sun, I had occasion to show that this word means not only *saviour* and *avatar*, but that its radical part *sav* cannot differ from *zab*, which is the Hebrew of *wolf*. Yet *zab* under its form *zeb* means, according to Parkhurst[3], *gold*, *clear*, *bright* and *resplendent*, which ideas being traceable to the sun, proves *zeb* to have also had, like *savitar*, this meaning. Now as the *s* and the *z* of these words are but substitutes of the aspirate *h*, and as they must for this reason be omitted, we have, in what remains, the roots of these radical parts, that is, *av*, *ab*, and *eb*.

Now as all the roots of a language are, like its letters, but one and the same root under so many different forms, and as they do not for this reason differ in meaning from one another but conventionally, it necessarily follows that they can, like the signs of which they are composed, be traced from one to another until they be brought to their parent the *o*, man's first word and first root. I make these observations to show how the Hebrew and English words *zab* and *wolf* are radically the same word. The root of the former is, as just stated, *ab*; and as the *w* of *wolf* is for the aspirate *h*, and as the *f* at the end with the *l* is also for the same aspirate, what remains, when these non-radical signs are removed, is the root of *wolf*, namely, *ol*. And as *l* appears often under its form *u*, there can be no more difference between *ol* and *ou* than there can be between the ancient French word *sol* and its present form *sou*. And as *ou* is the same as *ov*, and *ov* the same as *oiv*—*i* being understood with *o*—and as *oiv* by the joining of *o* and *i* becomes *av*, we thus obtain both the root of the *sav* of *savitar* and also that of *avatar*. And as *b* and *v* do constantly interchange, we

[3] Lex., p. 140.

find in *av* the root of *zab*, Hebrew of *wolf*. Hence *wolf* and its Hebrew equivalent *zab* are as one and the same word. Nor does *zeb*, which Parkhurst explains, *gold, clear, bright* and *resplendent*, differ radically from either *sav* or *zab*. Thus when read as in Hebrew it is the verb *be* itself, and from its meaning *existence* it is consequently traceable to the *sun*, and but another word for *motion* and *water*. When we remark that its *e* is for *o*, and that *o* has as usual *i* understood, it follows that *be* is equal to *boi*, which by the dropping of the *o* becomes *bi*, and *bi* is the root of *bios*, Greek of *life*. But when the *o* and *i* of this fuller form of *bi* coalesce, and *ba* is obtained, we get a form equal to the *wa* of *water*. It is worthy of remark that as the German river named the *Waser* cannot differ in this language from the word for water; that in the *lif*, Saxon of *life*, we have also the radical part of the river Liffey in Dublin; and that in *Boyne* we have also when its *b*—here but a substitute for the aspirate—is left out another word traceable to water, for the *oyne* thus obtained cannot differ from the *οιν* of *οἶνος*, Greek of *wine;* and, as we have seen, *wine* and *drink* are each traceable to *water*.

The *eb* of *zeb* calls for another observation; it cannot differ from *ev*, and this is the root of the name *Eve*, and according to M. Littré—who seems to pay no attention to his own statements—*Eve* happens to be one of the many different forms of *eau*, and hence it means *water*, and consequently *life*, after which water was called. Let us now read the following: "And Adam called his wife's name Eve, because she was the mother of all *living*." (Gen. iii. 20.) Now have we not here proof incontestable that *water* was called after *life*, since two very high authorities make an admission to that effect.

Thus M. Littré says that *Eve* was once used instead of *eau;* and certainly this ought to be, for the *u* of this word being for *v*, the form *eau* is letter for letter *eav;* that is, when here the *a* falls behind the consonant *v*, as vowels frequently do, *Eva.* And this word, as we see it stated in Genesis, means *life;* hence the same word means both *water* and *life.* And is not this important etymology confirmed still further by M. Littré himself, since he also tells us, as observed farther back, that *esse* has been used for *eau?* Thus from his own statement, unwittingly made, that *eau, esse,* and *Eve* are as one and the same word, this is equivalent to his admitting that *water, existence,* and *life* were once expressed alike; and so are they still, but he sees it not. To a certainty old Adam was a better philologist than M. Littré. Only remark how clearly he tells why he gave to his wife the name Eve. But when M. Littré tells us that water, or *eau,* was also known by the word *Eve,* he assigns no reason, as he ought to have done, why it was called after *life.* And how well he could confirm this valuable etymology by remarking that *eau* was also signified by the word *esse,* which is but another word for *life,* since it implies *existence.* Another proof that *Eve* means *water* as well as *life* is afforded by the Sanskrit word *Iva,* which is explained *she,* and in Saxon *she* is represented by *se,* and in this language *se* stands also for *sea,* and *sea* was, as I have shown, called after *water.*

Another of the many different forms of *eau* given by M. Littré is *ewe;* and here the *w* is equal to *v*, as we see by comparing *wine* and *vinum;* so that *ewe* is the word *Eve* itself. And as *ewe* is the radical part of *ewer,* a vessel for holding *water,* it was called after water; hence it is rendered into Latin by *aquàlis;* and in the

first word given for *eau* by M. Littré, that is, *aigue*, we see the radical part of *aiguière*, which is the French of *ewer*. That *Eve* means *existence* and also the verb to *be*, I had also occasion to show farther back in Volume I.[4]; and when we call to mind that life or existence was called after its supposed author the *sun*, and that the sun, which was the first object of worship over all the world, served as a type of the true God, this will account for the name *Eve* serving to signify the true God, because serving to signify *existence*. Hence the following: "In Chaldee הוא *eva* is the same as the Hebrew הוה *eve*, to be." And Parkhurst, still under הוא *eva*, continues thus: "As a noun one of the Divine names, He who hath permanent existence, who exists eminently[5]."

We have seen that the root of *zab*, Hebrew of *wolf*, is *ab*, and as this root happens to be one of the words given by M. Littré under *eau*, it serves to confirm that *flukos*, one of the names of the *wolf*, cannot differ from *fluks*, nor *fluks* from *flux*, nor *flux* from *flow*. When we do therefore read *zab*—Hebrew of *wolf*—from right to left we obtain *baz*, that is, from the identity of *b* and *w*, *waz*, which is radically the same as *wasser*, and also *wesan*, which is the verb to *be*, in Saxon. It is now made self-evident that any word serving as a name for the *wolf* might have served to signify *water*. Hence when we do not find a name of the *wolf* being also a word for *water*, or for *life*, *being*, or *motion*, that will not go to prove that it might not have done so. *Zab*, Hebrew of *wolf*, does not seem to signify *water*, but we have just shown that it does mean water; and when we do with the word *wolf* what we have done with *zab*, that is, read it after the Hebrew

[4] Pp. 338, 339. [5] Lex., p. 125.

manner from right to left, the result will be the same, as we shall then obtain the word *flow*, and which we have shown to be the same as *flux*, and *flux* the same as *flukos*, one of the names of the *wolf*, according to M. Littré, but of its primary signification he knew nothing; and yet he knew as much as any one else, and it is so for this simple reason, namely, that the origin of language has been hitherto unknown. M. Littré is as well acquainted with the primary signification of words as any other philologist, which is, he will no doubt allow, a comfort and a consolation for his mind. Hence, if his friends of the Academy and the Institute came now before him with reproaches for his not knowing the primary signification of *loup*, might he not say to them: "Gentlemen, if there be any one among you who can, on his oath, declare that he was in this respect any wiser than myself, let him hold up his hand;" and he would soon see that they all held their hands down—ay, and their heads too.

I was forgetting to notice *lupus*, but as its radical part *lup* cannot differ from *loup*, the explanation given of this word will apply to its Latin equivalent.

CHAPTER IX.

RENARD.

LET us now see if the primary signification of *renard* has been hitherto known. When we regard the *a* of *alōpēx* (ἀλώπηξ) as having come from the natural tendency

prevailing of attaching a vowel sound to initial consonants, this sign should not be counted as forming a part of *alōpēx*, on which account *lōpēx* only is to be considered. Now the *lōp* of *lopēx* cannot differ from either the *lup* of *lupus* or the French word *loup;* and as M. Littré has given *flukos* as one of the many other words meaning *loup*, and as we have shown this form to be expressive of *motion*, it is reasonable to suppose that the *lop* of *alopex* must have the same meaning. And so it has. Thus there can be no difference between the *alope* of *alopex* and the English word *elope*, and this word means to *run*, and it is radically the same as the Dutch word *loopen*, which has the same meaning. Nor can the *lauf* of the German *laufen*, to *run*, be regarded otherwise than as a very slightly different form of the *lop* of *alopex* and *elope*. And the Dutch *loopen* and the German *laufen* show that the *a* of *alopex* and the *e* of *elope* may be left out. Now what is the radical part of *renard?* It is the same as the radical part of the German *rennen*, which means to *run;* so that the literal meaning of *renard* is the *runnard*, that is, the *runner*. But does not this word differ widely in appearance from *fuchs*, which is the German of *renard?* It does; but do not *laufen* and *rennen*, though in the same language, differ also very much in form from each other? They have, however, the same meaning. *Running* and *flowing* are also no way alike in form, but they are so much so in meaning that *a running knot* cannot be rendered into French by *un nœud courant*, but by *un nœud coulant*, literally, *a flowing knot.*

How now are we to account for *fox* and its German equivalent *fuchs?* We have first to show how *fox* is the same as *fuchs;* and this is done by applying our rule,

which says that *o* when it has not its *i* expressed has it then understood, and that *oi* is as equal to *u* as *croix* is to *crux*, or *noix* to *nux;* from which it follows that the English *fox* cannot differ from the German *fuchs*, of which the *ch* is for *k*—witness breach and break—so that *fox* is in its most literal form *fuks*, the *x* of fox being, as every one knows, a double letter, that is, for *ks*. Now as *k* appears often as *g*—witness *partake* and *partage*—there can be no difference, since *k* is the same as *ch*, between *fuchs* and φυγάς, that is, when its *a* is dropped, *fugs*, which cannot differ from either *fuks* or *fuchs*. And what does the Greek *phugas* mean? *Flight*. And is not this the very meaning we gave to *flukos*, one of the names of the *wolf?* and we reduced it to *fluks* by the dropping of the *o;* and when we now drop the *l* of *fluks*, what shall we have but *fuks*, and consequently *fuchs* and *fox*. By this we see that in *flukos* and *fox* we have only one and the same word; yet *flukos* is composed of just twice as many letters as *fox*.

Another Greek word now occurs to me which will also serve to confirm our etymology of *fox*. It is ὠκύς, which means *swift, rapid*, &c.; for when we give to the *o* of this word the aspirate *h*, to which it has a right in common with all initial vowels, and when we replace this aspirate by its very common substitute *f*, we shall, instead of *ōkus*, get *fokus;* that is, when its *u* is dropped, *foks*, and consequently *fox* and *fuchs*.

In short, as we said farther back, every word implying motion might signify *wolf*, and consequently *fox*, and of which there are several in both Greek and Latin; witness φυγή, φύξις, φεύγω, and *velox, fugax, fugio, fluo*, &c. Even a word so different from any of these as *couler* in French can be shown to be but a different

form of *fluere* in Latin. Thus its *c* being for the aspirate *h*, and this sign being constantly represented by *f*—witness *hacer* in Spanish and *facere* in Latin, and *Hernando* being for *Fernando*, and *Hesperus* for *Vesperus*—it follows that *couler* is equal to *fouler;* that is, when the combination *ou* falls behind the consonant *l*, *flouer*, in the *flou* of which we see a form not only equal to the *flu* of *fluere*, but also to *flow* in English. And as we have shown *flukos* to be the same as *fluks*, and *fluks* the same as *flux*, *flux* the same as *flow*, and *flow*, when read as in Hebrew, the same as *wolf*, even so can all the other words just noticed be traced to the same source.

Thus as I have shown the *raven* and the *crow* to be the same word and to have the same meaning, even so have I now shown the *wolf* and the *fox* to be the same word and to have the same meaning. Indeed the *vulp* of the Latin of *fox*, that is, *vulpes*, is so much like *wolf*, that their similarity in form has been observed. Thus in Ogilvie's Webster I perceive an admission to that effect; but this authority knew not the primary signification of either *wolf* or *fox*.

What I have thus far said of the names *loup* and *renard* was written while the present work has been going through the press, and to which I now beg to add what I wrote several months ago respecting M. Littre's attempt to discover the primary signification of *renard*. But when I tell the reader that *renard* is not regarded by M. Littré as an appellative, but as the name of a man noted for his wisdom, he cannot, I am sure, help receiving in advance such an etymology as a failure.

The reader will find, and I hope excuse, some two or three statements already made in the foregoing account

of the names *wolf* and *renard:* I learn from M. Littré that in Wallon, which is very old French, *rina* was the word for *fox;* but he adds that the true name of the fox was *goulpil, gorpil, golpille,* which he derives from *vulpeculus* or *vulpecula,* diminutive of the Latin *vulpes.* In this derivation there is no mistake, for the *g* serves also as a substitute for the aspirate; so that *goulp,* radical part of *goulpil,* cannot differ from *voulp,* nor *voulp* from the *vulp* of *vulpes.* But as M. Littré does not give us the primary signification of *rina, goupil,* or *vulpes,* we cannot tell what any of these words meant when they first served as names for the fox. But we know from our principles that they are, like wolf, significant of *swiftness.*

As to the *rin* of *rina* it is the radical part of the German *rinnen* which, like *rennen,* means also to *run,* and is radically the same as ῥέω, to *flow,* which arises from to *run* and to *flow* being each expressive of *motion;* so that it is only conventionally they differ in meaning as they do.

There is, I perceive, another word in German which means to *run,* that is, *laufen,* and of which the radical part, *lauf,* cannot differ from *laup,* nor *laup* from *loup,* nor *loup* from the *lup* of *lupus;* nor can any of these differ from the *loop* of the Dutch *loopen,* to *run,* or from the *lop* of *elope* in English.

M. Littré makes a great mistake when he tells us, in his etymology of *renard,* that this word is a proper name, and that it means *bon conseil.* The following passage shows how he has been led to this rather strange conclusion: "Renart ou renard, Provenc. raynart, anc. Catal. ranart, est un nom propre, le même que *Renaut* et *Reginald,* dont les formes les plus anciennes sont *Raginohard, Reginhart,* mot Germanique composé de *ragin,* conseil, et de *hart,* dur; le sens est *bon au conseil.*" This etymology

of *renard* is, I say, a great mistake. This animal was first called the *runner,* and from its being very cunning, many persons were, on account of their craftiness, called after it. The fox did not therefore receive its name from that of a crafty person, but it was the crafty person received his name from that of the fox.

When M. Littré allows us to understand in another part of his etymology, that *goulpil* was replaced by *renard,* he should say that there were then two words for *fox,* *goulpil* and *renard,* and that the latter prevailed over the former. And that two words so different in form as *goulpil* and *renard* should be each, in the same language, expressive of *motion,* is not more surprising than that *rinnen* should in German mean to *run,* and that *laufen,* of which the form is so very different, should in this language have still the same meaning.

We have now had a fair specimen of the sort of etymologies with which philologists are accustomed to favour their readers. It is evident from what we have just seen, that M. Littré knows no more of the primary signification of *loup* than if it belonged to the language of another world. And the same may be said of its forms in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, German, and other cognate languages. And this severe but just remark will apply not only to M. Littré but to all other philologists except one—Parkhurst, who, though he knew nothing of the origin of language, construes thus the Hebrew of *wolf*: "זאב *zab* denotes not only a *wolf* but also *impetuosity,* to *hasten, move with swiftness,* festinavit in incessu [6]."

We see thus fully confirmed our etymology of *loup* or *wolf.* And as this animal's name is here traced to its primary source, so are all the other names we shall have

[6] Lex., p. 137, ed. 1778.

yet to notice in the following pages. What are we the wiser for knowing that *loup* in French is *lupus* in Latin, and *lukos* in Greek? This is what every schoolboy knows, but this is all he knows, nor is his master a whit wiser. If the boy would fain know why the *wolf* obtained such a name as *loup*, *lupus* or *lukos*, no one can satisfy his commendable curiosity, because no one knows any thing of the origin of language. A Hebrew scholar may tell him that in this language the name of the wolf implies *swiftness*, but this affords no proof of its having in his opinion the same original meaning in French, Latin or Greek. And why so? Because the principles which have grown out of the discovery of the origin of language are not yet known to any one except to the discoverer himself. If Parkhurst, who was very learned in Greek, were to be asked if the word for wolf in this language has the same meaning it obtains in Hebrew, he would, to a certainty, answer *no*, because in need of the knowledge by which it could be shown that λύκος and זאב *zab* have, notwithstanding their wide difference in form, exactly the same meaning.

In 1856 I gave the same etymology of *wolf* as the one just seen; that is, I proved it to be a word significant of *motion*, and not to differ from the word *flow*[7].

But not then knowing the word for wolf in Hebrew, it was not in my power to produce this additional proof. And this fact ought now to confirm still more the truth of my principles, since it was through their means, and not from a knowledge of Hebrew—of which I still know very little—I discovered the original meaning of the word *wolf*, by showing that it does not differ from *flow* when read as in Hebrew.

[7] Myths, vol. i. p. 313.

CHAPTER X.

TYPES—SHOWING HOW CERTAIN IMPORTANT DOCTRINES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION HAD, FOR THE ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE HEATHEN, BEEN TYPIFIED BY LANGUAGE LONG PREVIOUS TO THEIR HAVING BEEN DIVINELY REVEALED.

It is not unusual with the learned in their fruitless attempts to trace nations and religions to their earliest sources, to draw very positive conclusions from an identity of particular names. But these principles must, when well understood and correctly applied, show that such deductions, and the arguments thence originating, are very far from being conclusive. As all languages have been made after the same manner, it is only reasonable to expect that their words must, in numerous instances, bear a very close resemblance to each other, and for the same reason, so must the fables to which these words have given birth. One nation may therefore be found to have not only several of the religious doctrines and leading events belonging to the ancient history of another nation, but even several of the very names by which its fabulous characters and celebrated towns and rivers were first known. And coincidences apparently so extraordinary may have very well happened without either of these two nations having ever had the least intercourse with the other, but merely

from certain words in their languages having suggested similar ideas. Were the learned and conscientious author of the "Anacalypsis" now living, it would, I imagine, be in my power to undeceive him in not a few of his shrewd deductions; for these principles of mine enable me to discover that he has on more than one occasion allowed himself to be influenced by a resemblance of names. Take for instance the following: "When I find this city of Rome in Saturnia in Italy, and the Saturnia of Rome in India, followed by two histories of a black infant god born of an immaculate conception, crucified and raised from the dead, and both bearing the same name—Crist—it is impossible not to believe in the identity of the mythoses[8]."

The identity of the two histories must be admitted, but it does not follow that either of them was borrowed from the other. What was said farther back respecting Buddha will apply here. The Crist, Cristna, or Chrishna of the Indians should not be considered as the original of the Christ of the Christians, even though the histories we have of both characters bore a closer resemblance to each other than they do. But ought not this, the infidel will ask, to shake the faith of the believers in the Saviour of the world? Not in the least. It is not so easy to remove a man's faith as the infidel supposes. Though according to Sir William Jones the Christ of the Indians must have long preceded our era, yet this did not in any way trouble his faith. He both lived and died a most zealous and sincere Christian. Does not the Mahometan firmly believe in his own religion, and pity the blindness of the Christian, and does not the Christian pity fully as much the blindness of the

[8] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 584.

Mahometan, and the same may be said of the Christian and the Jew, and of the Roman Catholic and the Protestant, and their numerous divisions and sub-divisions *ad infinitum*.

And that the very learned and sincere Christian, Sir William Jones, did make the admission just mentioned, the following will suffice to show: "That the name of Chrishna, and the general outline of his story, were long anterior to the birth of our Saviour, and probably to the time of Homer, we know to a certainty. In the Sanskrit dictionary, compiled more than two thousand years ago, we have the whole history of the incarnate Deity born of a virgin, and miraculously escaping, in his infancy, from the reigning tyrant of his country. I am persuaded that a connexion existed between the old idolatrous nations of Egypt, India, Greece, and Italy long before the time of Moses. Very respectable natives have assured me that one or two missionaries have been absurd enough, in their zeal for the conversion of the Gentiles, to urge that the Hindus were even almost Christians, because their Brahma, Vishnou, and Mahesa, were no other than the Christian Trinity; a sentence in which we can only doubt whether folly, ignorance, or impiety predominates. The Indian triad, and that of Plato, which he calls the *Supreme Good*, the *Reason*, and the *Soul*, are infinitely removed from the holiness and sublimity of the doctrine which pious Christians have deduced from texts in the Gospel."

Sir W. Jones, who was as timid as he was pious and learned, has, in order to quiet the apprehensions of some over-zealous divines and laymen, made some slight changes in this passage. All who would see how he thought when uncontrolled by others should consult, for

the above, the edition of the "Asiatic Researches" of 1784, chap. 9, on the gods of Greece, Italy, and India.

And that a man's sincerity cannot be taken as any proof of the truth of his doctrines is admitted to the full by a learned Protestant divine, then Dr. Watson, afterwards an eminent bishop, and is thus shown in his "Apology for the Christian Religion," addressed to Gibbon: "Every religion, nay, every absurd sect of every religion has had its zealots who have not scrupled to maintain their principles at the expense of their lives, and we ought no more to infer the truth of Christianity from the mere zeal of its propagators than the truth of Mahometanism from that of a Turk. When a man suffers himself to be covered with infamy, pillaged of his property, and dragged at last to the block or the stake, rather than give up his opinion, the proper inference is, not that his opinion is true, but that he believes it to be true[9]."

And a few short passages from Sherlock, another eminent Protestant bishop, "On the State of Idolatry, and the Conduct of Socrates," will serve to show that a man's great wisdom does not always enable him to rid his mind of all the gross errors in which he has been brought up. "To prove," says this high authority, "the truth of the assertion, that even the wise men who knew God did not glorify him as God, let us consider the case of one only; but of one who, among the good men, was the best, and among the wise ones the wisest. I shall easily be understood to mean Socrates, the great philosopher of Athens; and were the wise men of antiquity to plead their cause in common, they could not put their defence into better hands. . . . He had talked so freely of the heathen deities, and the ridiculous stories

[9] "Apology for the Christian Religion," page 3.

told of them, that he fell under a suspicion of despising the gods of his country, and of teaching the youth of Athens to despise their altars and their worship. Upon this accusation he is summoned before the great court of the Areopagites, and happily the apology he made for himself is preserved to us by two, the ablest of his scholars, and the best writers of antiquity, Plato and Xenophon; and from both their accounts it appears, that Socrates maintained and asserted before his judges that he worshipped the gods of his country, and that he sacrificed in private and in public upon the allowed altars, and according to the rites and customs of the city. After this public confession, so authentically reported by two so able hands, there can be no doubt of the case. He was an idolater, and had not by his great knowledge and ability in reasoning delivered himself from the practice of the superstition of his country. . . . . The manner in which Socrates died was the calmest and bravest in the world, and excludes all pretence to say that he dissembled his opinion and practice before his judges out of any fear, or meanness of spirit; vices with which he was never taxed, and of which he seems to have been incapable. Consider then, was it possible for any man upon the authority of Socrates, to open his mouth against the idolatry of the heathen world, or make use of his name to that purpose, who had so solemnly, in the face of his country, and before the greatest judicature of Greece, borne testimony to the gods of his country and the worship paid them?"

"The city of Athens," continues Sherlock, "soon grew sensible of the injury done to the best and wisest of their citizens, and of their great mistake in putting Socrates to death. His accusers and his judges became infamous, and the people grew extravagant in doing

honours to the memory of the innocent sufferer. They erected a statue, nay, a temple to his memory, and his name was had in honour and reverence. His doctrines upon the subjects of divinity and morality were introduced in the world with all the advantage that the ablest and politest pens could give; and they became the study and entertainment of all the considerable men who lived after him."

These extracts suffice to prove beyond all doubt what was stated farther back, that few men can entirely divest their minds of early impressions, however erroneous and ridiculous these impressions may be. It is not, therefore, likely that the numerous instances of the resemblance between the religion of the Christian and that of the heathen will have the least serious effect on the true and zealous believer in Christ. And if a doubt should at any time cross his mind from a rather startling similarity, it can be easily removed by the happy discovery made of late by certain eminent divines and other learned advocates for the truth of the Gospel. I allude to the use of types, by which all resemblances between the doctrines of idolaters and Christians can be accounted for to the entire satisfaction of every one except the confirmed sceptic. Godfrey Higgins refers frequently to the opinions entertained respecting types. Witness the following: "The Cambridge Key says, 'Buddha, the author of happiness and a portion of Narayen, *the Lord Haree-sa, the Preserver of all*, appeared in this ocean of natural beings at the close of the Dwapar, and beginning of Calijug: He who is omnipotent, and everlastingly to be contemplated; the Supreme God, the eternal ONE, the divinity worthy to be adored by the most pious of mankind, appeared with a portion of his

divine nature. Jaydeva describes him as bathing in blood, or sacrificing his life to wash away the offences of mankind, and thereby to make them partakers of the kingdom of heaven. Can a Christian doubt that this Buddha was the type of the Saviour of the world?' Very well," adds Higgins; "I say to this learned Cantab, I will not dispute that the Cristna crucified, Baliji crucified, Semiramis crucified, Prometheus crucified, Ixion crucified, were all types of the Saviour, if it so please him; but let me not be abused for pointing out the facts. Type or no type must be left to every person's own judgment. On this subject I shall quarrel with no one. But then the Gentile religion must have been a whole immense type. This will prove Ammonius right that there was *only one religion*[1]."

And this *one religion* was, according to St. Augustine, the Christian religion: "That in our times," says this eminent Father of the Church, "is the Christian religion which to know and follow is the most sure and certain health, called according to that name, but not according to the thing itself of which it is the name; for the thing itself which is now called the Christian religion, really was known to the ancients, nor was wanting at any time from the beginning of the human race, until the time when Christ came in the flesh, whence the true religion, which had previously existed, began to be called Christian; and this in our day is the Christian religion, not as having been wanting in former times, but as having in later times received this name[2]."

This opinion of St. Augustine was quoted in my work on the "Origin of Myths" many years ago; and

[1] Anacalypsis, vol. ii. p. 118. Cam. Key, vol. i. p. 118.

[2] Opera Augustini, vol. i. p. 12. Basil edit. 1529.

I again submit it to the reader in trembling, being well aware that it may startle some rather too sensitive minds, such as cannot admit that the religion of the heathen must have served as a type for that of the Christian. And I have the more reason to tremble for taking this liberty, on perceiving that M. Max Müller has been very lately somewhat censured for entertaining an opinion which I believe to be in perfect accordance with that of St. Augustine. His words are: "But more susprising than the continuity in the growth of language is the continuity in the growth of religion. Of religion, too, as of language, it may be said in it every thing new is old, and every thing old is new, and that *there has been no entirely new religion since the beginning of the world.* The elements and roots of religion were there, as far back as we can trace the history of man; and the history of religion, like the history of language, shows us throughout a succession of new combinations of the same radical elements. . . . During the last fifty years the accumulation of new and authentic materials for the study of the religions of the world has been most extraordinary; but such are the difficulties of mastering these materials that I doubt whether the time has yet come for attempting to trace, after the model of the science of language, the definite outlines of the science of religion."

Referring to this passage, M. Max Müller's critic says, "An attentive reader will see with no little surprise the boldness with which an exact parallel is here drawn, and will readily concede that if the science of language is not positively defined, according to M. Max Müller's theory, the new science of religion is still more undetermined. Those who read of the scientific treatment of

religion as a whole may be disposed to think M. Max Müller to have denied revelation altogether[3]."

The opinion of St. Augustine, just quoted, confirms the following:—"In the Pythagorean and Platonic remains, written long anterior to the Christian era, all the dogmas of Christianity are to be found. Witness the *Δημιουργός*, or *Ζεὺς Βασιλεύς*; *δεύτερος Θεός*, or second God; *δεύτερος Νοῦς*, or second mind; the *Μίθρας μεσίτης*, mediatorial Mithra; *γεννητὸς Θεός*, or generated God, begotten not made. Again, *ψυχὴ κόσμου*, or soul of the world; i.e. the רוח *ruh*, or *spiritus*, of Osiris and Brahma, *in loto arbore sedentem super aquam*, brooding on the waters of the deep; the *θεῖος Λόγος*, or Divine Word, *verbum*, which Jesus announced to His mother that He was, immediately on His birth, as recorded in the Gospel of his Infancy[4]."

St. Augustine must have had, with other parts of the religion of the ancients, these Pythagorean and Platonic remains in his mind, when he gave it as his opinion that the religion of Christ had been in existence "from the beginning of the human race." If he had the views of the learned of our day, he would have regarded them only as types of the Christian dispensation.

As a great many very learned and conscientious men have, on perceiving the close resemblance which the dogmas of the Christian religion bear to those of the heathen, become so very obstinate and steadfast in their disbelief as to remain all their lives the inveterate enemies of the faith in which they have been brought up, it follows that the true believer must hail with rapture the

[3] The London Review, Feb. 29, 1868. M. Max Müller's work here noticed is entitled, "Chips from a German Workshop."

[4] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 120, and Maur. Ind. Scep. Conf., pp. 53 and 139.

discovery of the doctrine of types as an advantage and a blessing not to be too highly appreciated. Godfrey Higgins, who has written so much and so well on the origin of languages, nations, and religions, considers this doctrine as the best and the only means yet brought forward by the advocates of his religion for accounting for the rather too suspicious circumstances with which it is beset.

As the reader has been already shown several passages from Parkhurst strongly advocating the doctrine of types, nothing more needs be quoted on this subject from the same authority. But we may state what Godfrey Higgins thinks of it. These are his words: "Throughout the whole of my work it has been my sedulous wish to conduct my abstruse investigations with the strictest impartiality, and never to flinch from a consideration of imaginary injury to religion; for if religion be false, the sooner it is destroyed the better; but if it be true, there can be no doubt that *veritas prævalebit*, and it is very well able to take care of itself. But I will not deny that when I meet with any theory which takes religion out of my way, and leaves to me the free investigation of the records of antiquity, I receive great pleasure; for my object is not to attack religion: my object has been to inquire into the causes of innumerable facts or effects which have hitherto baffled the efforts of the most industrious and learned inquirers. Such is the observation made by the learned Parkhurst on the subject of Hercules and Adonis, that they are symbols or types of what a future Saviour was to do and suffer. It must be obvious, on a moment's consideration, that all the histories of the births, deaths, resurrections, &c., of the different gods, may be easily accounted for in the

same manner; and if this be granted, it is equally obvious that the nearer they are to the history of Jesus Christ, the more complete symbols they become; and thus the development of the ancient histories, to those who admit the doctrine of symbols, becomes a handmaid instead of an opponent to religion.

"I am well aware that the doctrine of Mr. Parkhurst comes but with an ill grace from priests, who have never ceased to suppress information, and that the time of the discovery by Mr. Parkhurst is very suspicious. But notwithstanding this very awkward circumstance, I beg my philosophic reader to recollect that the want of principle or the want of sense in priests cannot in fact change the nature of truth, and that it is very unphilosophical to permit such want of principle or want of sense to influence the mind in his philosophical inquiries.

"On the reasonableness of Mr. Parkhurst's doctrine I shall give no opinion; to some persons it will be satisfactory, to others it will not be so. But, as the opinion of our Church, I have a right to take it. If any ill-judging member of the Church should deny this doctrine of Parkhurst's, then I desire him to account to me in some better way for what we have found in the histories of Buddha, Cristna, Salivahana, Pythagoras, &c. If he fail in his attempt, let not the honest inquirer for truth blame me. I have fairly stated Mr. Parkhurst's opinion and mode of accounting for the facts which I have developed, because I consider them the best which I have seen, and because I should not have acted with fairness and impartiality had I not stated them. They have a tendency to promote the interests of science, not to injure them[5]."

[5] Anacalypsis, vol. ii. pp. 132, 133.

There is a sentiment in the passage just quoted from Higgins which I did not expect from such a writer. He says, "If religion be *false*, the sooner it is destroyed the better." He should not say if religion be *false*, for it never is false, nor can it possibly be so. He might as well say *if truth be false*, which no one can say; for religion is truth itself, and, like this grand and glorious attribute of the Deity, it cannot be cherished, loved, and valued too highly. By religion Higgins here probably means the particular system of belief in which he was brought up, and of which Christ is the acknowledged Founder; though, as we have seen, it must, according to St. Augustine, have long preceded his existence on earth. But the whole world—and especially that part of it called Christendom—is full of systems of belief. And if you ask any sensible, good, and pious man which of them all ought to be preferred, there are at least some hundreds of chances to one but he will assure you, with a very grave and compassionate look, that every one of them, with the single exception of his own, inculcates the most deadly error. And if you wish to learn from him what he means by the error he believes to be *deadly*, he will allow you to understand, not only without a shudder or changing of countenance, but with the same quiet and tender look as before,—and while quoting Scripture for his authority—that it implies neither more nor less than the excruciating torture of hell-fire through all eternity. Nor are you to imagine that he who entertains such an opinion of the great Being whom he every day invokes as his heavenly Father behaves as a merciless monster of cruelty towards his own offspring, he being most likely, notwithstanding the unspeakable severity of which he sincerely believes his God to be

capable, a very kind and loving parent. Nor is any one likely—except perhaps some unfortunate Deist or infidel —to throw out a hint that the views of such a person are in the slightest degree indicative of mental derangement. Such a person may be even an archbishop, a man revered for his great wisdom and sanctity by all who have the happiness to know him; or he may be some very shrewd and erudite doctor of divinity, one devoting his whole life to the abstruse study of theology and religious controversy, and who by his sensible and eloquent preaching and lecturing never fails to captivate the admiration and understanding of all his adherents.

This admission of the reality of types will happily be found to apply not only to the entire system of the Christian religion, but even to its doctrines and some of the names of its earliest followers. As a very plain instance of the latter, let us only consider the name of the apostle *Thomas*. Every one will tell you that he was so called because he was a twin child, his Greek name Didumos having this meaning. It is also admitted that he was famous for *doubting*. But to *doubt* is to be of *two* minds, and as a *twin* is one of *two*, it follows that *doubt* and *twin* have radically the same meaning. Hence the *doub* of *double* and the *doub* of *doubt* are letter for letter the same; and a twin is a double child, that is, one of two. The ideas, *twin*, *two*, and *doubtful*, are, therefore, radically considered, expressed alike. As *dubia lux* in Latin means *twi-light*, and as *twi* is for *twa* or *two*, this is further proof that *doubt* was in the beginning signified by *two*, for *dubia* means *dubious* or *doubtful*. Now as *m* may be represented by *w*—witness *nomen* and *nowen*, now written *noun*—it follows that *Tom*, the familiar of *Thomas*, is the same as *tow*, that is, *two*. For the

same reason *Thomas* is equal to *Towas*, that is, *twice*. Hence *Didumos* does not more clearly mean *twin* than the word *Thomas* itself. Another very plain proof that *doubt* was called after *two* is afforded by *ambo* and *ambiguous* being radically the same, since the former means *both* and consequently *two*, and the latter means *doubtful*.

Now in conformity with the doctrine of types, in which very learned and orthodox Christians have so firm a belief, we are obliged to admit that the Pagans must have had a Thomas, who, from his name meaning *two*, and from two serving to signify *doubt*, was supposed to be very incredulous. Such was the original or type of the apostle, of whose reality no true Christian can entertain a doubt. He who is an infidel with regard to the doctrine of types, will say that the apostle may have obtained his name from its being known that he was a very incredulous person; but as every one is well aware that he had received his name previous to his having such a character, this objection it must be admitted is of no weight whatever.

St. Andrew also appears to have had his type. Thus he is said to have been crucified on a tree, and, in truth, this is clearly signified by his name, in Greek *Andreas*, and which the learned explain by the Greek word *Andros*, that is, *manly*. But *Andreas* cannot be equal to *Andros* without its being also equal to *Andrus*, which is composed of *an* and *drus*, of which the former means *on*, it being the elder form of *on*, and the latter means *tree*. And as it is allowed that *d* in Greek may represent *k*, as we see by comparing *daiō* and *kaiō*, to *burn*; and *duophos* and *knephas*, *darkness*; it follows that *drus*, a *tree*, is equal to *krus*; which cannot differ from *krux* or *crux*, a *cross*. Even the English form Andrew can be

shown to mean *on* a *tree;* as *tree* is in Saxon *treow,* and this cannot differ from the *drew* of *Andrew.* And as this word *treow* means *faith* also, this were enough to suggest the idea that when St. Andrew died on a tree it was for the faith.

Now if the reader should meet with any thing in the explanation I am about to give of such characters as Mercury and Bacchus bearing a rather close resemblance to his own belief, he will of course regard it as a type, and as nothing more. Indeed, all learned men who have hitherto noticed any such striking likenesses, should not, as they have mostly always done, have neglected to regard it as a type of the truth that was to be one day made known to the whole world. Thus when Sir William Jones tells us that "The name of Crishna, and the general outline of his story were long anterior to the birth of our Saviour," he should have said that this was only a type of the truth which was one day to be divinely revealed.

While correcting the proof sheets of this work, my attention was drawn to the following passage in the *Edinburgh Review* of December, 1860 :—

"Towards the close of the last century great interest was excited among the scholars of Europe, by the information that the Hindus are in possession of a sacred literature which is the most ancient and authentic in the world, and which exhibits a view of the creation and government of the universe wholly *subversive* of the records on which Christianity was founded."

Now this passage is well calculated to disturb the faith of all such good Christians as have not yet heard of religious types; but by changing its epithet *subversive* for that of *typical,* it can have no such bad effect.

And as this passage is taken from a review of Professor Max Müller's work, entitled "A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature," I hope this gentleman, whose influence with the *Edinburgh*, is, I am assured, as powerful as it is with the *Times*, will—were it only out of gratitude for the many times I have in this work drawn attention to his etymologies as well as to those of his dear friend and correspondent, M. Littré—order that the change I humbly suggest be duly attended to, and that my request be strictly complied with in the next edition of the *Edinburgh*. He has only to say the word, and he will of course be at once obeyed.

CHAPTER XI.

ETYMOLOGY OF THE NAMES HERMES AND MERCURY, A TYPE, WITH MANY ETYMOLOGIES HITHERTO UNKNOWN.

Hermes is the Greek of *Mercury;* and it is easy to perceive that the two words are radically one and the same. Thus when we remark that *c* serves as a common substitute for the aspirate *h*, we see that the *Herm* of *Hermes* cannot, when read as in Hebrew, differ from the *Merc* of *Mercurius*, for the letters are the same, *Herm* being then *Mrec*, which, when the *e* returns to its primitive place, becomes *Merc*. And as the *c* of *Merc* is for the *h* of *Hermes*, it follows that *Merc* is for *Merh;* that is, when the *r* takes the place it always holds with the aspirate, *rhēm*,

which is the radical part of ῥημα, and ῥημα means the WORD, and Mercury was the god of eloquence and the patron of orators, for which attributes he might thank his name. As the *Herm* of *Hermes* is, from the interchange of *m* and *b*, as we have often shown, equal to *herb*, it cannot be less so to the *verb* of *verbum*, *v* being a common substitute for *h*, witness *Hesperus* and *Vesperus*. Nor can *verb* differ from *verd* any more than *barbe* can from *beard*, and *verd* is the same word. Another form for *word* or *rhema* is *sermo*, which has been obtained from the aspirate of *Herm* (*Hermes*) having been, as it often is, represented by *s*. And in *term*, which means a *word* or *expression*, we have also the radical part of *hermes*, that is, *erm*. But how are we to account for the *T*? By observing that the ancient name of this alphabetical sign was *Tau*—in Hebrew it is still so called—and *Thoth*, *Taatus*, *Thoh*, *Thoyth* and *Teut* are but so many different forms of *Tou*, and they were all, as learned men admit, so many names of the god Mercury; and as *T* was, as Higgins justly remarks, "the last letter of the ancient alphabets[6]"—it is still so in Hebrew—it was thence taken in the sense of *terminus* or *boundary*; and this accounts for sign-posts and boundaries being still represented by such a sign as *T*, and their having been made sacred to Mercury. And as a *border* is a *boundary*, this will also account for *bord*—its radical part being from the interchange of *b* and *w*, the same as *word*, and hence it is that *term* has this meaning of *ward* as well as that of *terminus*, *border*, or *boundary*. But if the sign *T* had not obtained the meaning of *last* or *end*, just as Ω (Ωμέγα) has in Greek; and if it had not, on being prefixed to the *herm* of *hermes*, joined with this name, the

[6] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 269.

divinity so called might have never been made the god of boundaries.

It must have been from the belief of his having been the inventor of letters that the *Tau* of the ancient alphabets was made to signify his name, from which it would appear that anciently, as it is at present on most occasions, the signature of an author was put at the end of a composition instead of the beginning.

The circumstance of Mercury's being the supposed divinity whence language and letters emanated brought him equal to the sun, to whose name words could be also traced. This accounts for his having been worshipped as the son of Jupiter, and Jupiter was the sun; as well as for his having been called *Cod* in Sanskrit, and in German both *God* and *Got*[7]. And as *vocare*, to *call*, comes from *vox*, which means both the *voice* and a *word*, this explains why Mercury was thought to have been the god of public *criers*, that is, of *heralds*.

It is reported of Mercury that he obtained his name from his having been the god of merchants; hence M. Littré says that Mercurius comes from "*merx, marchandise:* le dieu des marchands." But this is a mistake, and one which no etymologist has escaped making. Mercury had many attributes, and the whole of them were suggested by the various forms and meanings which his name had obtained at different times and places.

Thus the *Merc* of Mercury is as equal to the *merk* of the German *merken*, to *mark*, as it is to the Latin *merx*; and the *marg* of the Latin *margo*, a *frontier*, a *border*, and the *marc* of the Italian *marcare*, to *mark*, and its French form *marquer*, are all one and the same word; and Mercury was believed to have been not

[7] See Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 269.

merely the god of alphabetical signs but of *sign*-posts also. In *merx* we can also perceive the *merce* of *mercer* and *commerce*; and as *m* in Latin is *w* in Sanskrit, *merce* is equal to *ware*s in English. Still, for the identity of *m* and *w*, *merc* is equal to *work*, of which the radical part *ork* is the εργ of the Greek ἔργον, *work*; and Mercury was believed to be the patron of workmen.

Nor can *work* differ from *wolk*, nor *wolk* from *walk*; and Mercury was the god of walkers, that is, travellers. Hence the identity, even in English, of *travail*, *work* or *labour*, and *travel*, to *walk*. And as *march* is, from the identity of *r* and *l*, equal to *malk*, so is it, from the identity of *m* and *w*, equal to *walk*. In march and walk we have therefore the same word. Hence the primary signification of *merchant*, or, as it is in French, *marchand*, was that of one who *marched* or *walked* from place to place for the selling or purchasing of wares. And as I have shown, in my etymology of *pater* or *father*, that working implies *motion*, this accounts for its being expressed by a word equal to one meaning to *walk*, which is also expressive of motion. And as motion is traceable to life, this accounts for the name Mercury not differing in meaning from one for the sun. Hence the following: "The Chaldeans and Egyptians esteemed Hermes as the chief deity, the same as Zeus, Bel, and Adon[8]."

Now as each of these three names may have often served to signify Mercury as well as Helios or Sol, we see how differently the same name may be represented. And why should this be? Because all the roots of language, though they have, like so many streams of light, flowed from the sun, take, like the letters of an alphabet, various forms, and conventionally many meanings,

[8] Holwell's Extract of Bryant's Mythology, p. 220.

though, primarily considered, only one meaning, that of having each, at some time or other, served as a name for their great parent the sun. Thus when we take Bel, the second of the three names above quoted, and observe that its *B* is for the aspirate *h*, we see that its root must be *el*, which has in Hebrew the same meaning, and also in Greek, for it is the *el* of *helios;* but when the aspirate in Bel is represented by *v*, as it often is, Bel will become *vel*, or rather *vol*, for in Hebrew *bel* is בעל, that is, *bol;* and *vol* is in French the root of *voler*, to *fly*, and also of *voleur*, a *thief;* and this accounts for Mercury, when named *Bel* or *Bol*, having wings, as well as being made the god of thieves. And when we observe that even the northern nations had this word *bol*, we need not wonder at finding it in French under its form *vol*. But Parkhurst finds such a circumstance rather strange: thus on finding it with the Phœnicians and Carthaginians he says, "This is no more than one might naturally expect, but it seems not a little remarkable that the northern nations should have retained this Hebrew word in its physical sense[9]."

But as all languages have had the same origin, that of having grown out of a single sign, we may often expect to find the same words with the people of different nations who can have never so much as heard of one another.

But why should two such ideas as *flying* and *robbing*, or *stealing*, be signified alike? Flying is traceable to motion, motion to life, and life to the sun; but robbing should be traced to the hand, and as the *hand* means *maker*, and as the sun also was called a *maker*, the idea of robbing can be thus traced, but indirectly, to the same source as flying. Hence *rap* is the radical part of *rapid*, *swift*, and so is it of *rapere*, to *rob;* indeed in *rap*

[9] Lex., p. 61.

and *rob* we have the same word. We can now account for *rap* meaning also a *blow:* we know it arises from the *rap* of *rapere* and *rap*, a *blow*, being each traceable to the hand.

This word *rap* explains several circumstances relating to Mercury. When its *a* returns to its first place, *rap* becomes *arp*, which is equal, with the aspirate, to *harp*, and such an instrument Mercury is reported to have received from Apollo.

In *harp* and *herpe* we see also the same word; and *herpe* was Mercury's sword. And as *h* is often represented by *sh*, neither *harp* nor *herpe* can differ from *sharp*, and a sword is a *sharp* weapon, and Mercury was, we are told, a *sharper*. And as that which is *sharp* is that which *cuts*, so was he very *cute*, that is, *acute;* and to be *cute* is, says Webster, "to be *keen*-witted." And this word *keen* means not only what is *sharp*, as a *keen* blade, but also to *know;* for it cannot differ from *ken*, which means not only to *descry*, to *see at a distance*, but also to *know;* and to be knowing is to be cunning. And as the word *know* cannot from its *i* being, as usual, understood with *o*, differ from *knoiw*, nor *knoiw* from *knoiv*, we thus bring out *knife;* and as keen is its radical part, we see that it has also the meaning of *sharpness*, and consequently of *acuteness*, for which Mercury was so remarkable. Nor does the word *knife* fail to signify his most prominent attribute, for it cannot differ from *knave*, as it is very easy to perceive; and no one will deny to this god the glory of his being, from what we are told, the greatest knave that ever lived. That is to say, if such a character ever did live; and if his life and adventures have not been suggested, as I am sure they have been, by the different forms and

meanings of his name. But why should this be? Because there was a time when all men believed in the WORD. And why so? Because when language was in its infancy, no word being then of more than one syllable, it must have been easy to trace them all, whatever their other meanings might be, to the name of the sun, their first great parent; and as the sun was then worshipped as God is at present, all words were therefore respected as so many divine revelations. But at this time, however remote it may have been, words could be only in a secondary state, their earliest meanings having been already forgotten.

In the *herp* of *herpe*, the name of Mercury's sword, we see also, on dropping its aspirate, the *rep* of *reptile*; for the *e* of *erp* thus obtained must have often fallen behind its *r*. And as one vowel is not only equal to any other vowel, but to any combination of vowels; and as *rep* cannot, for this reason, differ from either *rip* or *reap*, this proves such a form as the *rēp* of *reptile* to have also had the meaning of *cutting* as well as that of *creeping*. Hence the Saxon of to *reap* is *ripan*; and a *reaping-hook* is consequently a *cutting-hook*. The time of reaping corn must therefore be the time of cutting it. This leads us to the etymology of *harvest*; for as *c* often serves as a substitute for the aspirate, it follows that the *harve* of *harvest* cannot differ from *carve*, and to *carve* is to *cut*. This word *carve* leads still to other etymologies. It cannot, when its *a* falls behind its *r*, differ from *crave*. But why should this be? Because the idea of cutting has been, as already shown, called after the hand; and to *crave* means to hold out the *hand* in supplication. Nor can the *crav* of *crave* differ from *grav*, nor *grav* from the *graph* of the Greek γράφω, to *write, engrave*, &c. In

carve it is also easy, when we drop the substitute for its aspirate, that is, when we drop its *c*, to perceive a form equal to the *arpe* of *harp*, *sharp*, &c. I need scarcely observe that all such words as those just noticed, beginning with *chr* or *har*, are but different forms of *cheir*, Greek of *hand;* and as *hand* means *maker*, a name of the sun, these ideas are consequently traceable to this source.

Here I shall no doubt be reminded how I had farther back occasion to show that the sun was believed to be a *saviour*, and that the serpent was anciently worshipped by all men as a god. But so it ought to have been, for whoever believed in the WORD, and saw that the *serp* of *serpens* was the same as *serv*, could not help regarding this animal as one that *serves* or *saves;* that is, as a *servator*, of which, as our principles show, *salvator* is but a different form; and *servator* or *salvator* means a *saviour*.

On looking over the latter etymologies, others which I have left unnoticed now start up. Some of them, but not all, may be here set down as it were at random.

Verb cannot differ from the French *fourbe*, a *knave*. And when we allow to the *r* of the Latin *fur* a substitute for the aspirate, that is, *b*, we obtain *furb*, out of which *verbe* and *fourbe* have grown.

In the *bar* of *debar*—Hebrew of *word*—we see also a form equal to *fur*, and also when read from right to left, a form equal to both *rob* and *rap*, and consequently to the *rep* of *reptile*.

As this *rep* is, as already shown, equal to the *rip* of *ripan*, Saxon of to *reap*, and as every initial *r* may, as in Greek, take the aspirate, and as *f* is a constant substitute for this sign, it follows that this *rip* of *ripan* is equal to the *frip* of *fripon*, by which we discover that *fripon* and *fourbe* are radically the same word. And this we can

perceive the more easily when we give to *fourbe* the ending *on* belonging to *fripon*, as this word will then become *fourbon*, which is clearly but another form of *fripon*.

This etymology is the more valuable as the origin of *fripon* has been hitherto wholly unknown. Thus in De Roquefort I find the following under *fripon*, *friponneau*, *friponner*, and *friponnerie*.

"Ménage avoue que l'origine de ces mots ne lui est pas connue, ainsi que Joseph Scaliger. Il présume qu'ils pourraient avoir été faits de *rapo*, *raponis*, gourmand."

M. Littré is also of opinion that *fripon* comes from a word meaning to *eat*, as the following serves to show: "Fripon signifie essentiellement gourmand, et de là les sens consécutifs qu'il a; il vient donc de *friper* au sens de *manger*."

This is a great mistake. The two ideas *stealing* and *eating* are no way related. And the cause of the mistake must be ascribed to the right use of the aspirate *h* not having been hitherto known. This sign, as I have often had occasion to show, constitutes no radical part of a word, so that it may for this reason be left out. In the *frip* of *friper* and *fripon* it is represented by *f*, by which we see that *rip* alone should be considered when we analyze either of these words. When we do therefore bear in mind that the letter *i* has *o* understood, and that *o* and *i* make *a*, we see that *rip* is equal to *rap*, and that *fripon* is, for this reason, equal to *rapon*, in which it is easy to perceive the word *rapine*. Now as *friper* means also, according to M. Littré, "*derober* and *friponner*," there is no necessity for establishing a relationship between it and such an idea as that of eating, *fripon* and *friper* being radically alike.

How now are we to explain *friper* when it means to

eat, conventionally to *eat greedily?* It is still the same word, and its literal meaning is to *take*, but to *take down*, to *gobble*. And as the *rip* of *friper* is equal to both *rap* and *rob*, so is it to the *rav* of *ravenous*, nor less so to the *rav* of *ravir*, which also means to *rob* or *take*. When the same word was thus made to have different acceptations or different shades of meaning, its form was slightly changed, or it was read in a different direction; witness *ravenous* and *voracious*; the *rav* of the one being the *vor* of the other. Thus the *vor* of *voracious* is the *vor* of *devorer* and the *vour* of *devour*.

In *robe*, a *dress*, we have an instance of the same word being read differently. Its radical part *rob* is the same as *bor*, and consequently as the *por* of *porter*, to *bear*, which cannot differ from *wear*. Hence the French *porter* means both to *bear* and to *wear*, and a *robe*, from its being what is *borne*, is also what is *worn*; that is, what we are accustomed to wear, and also what has been used very much. If we were therefore to invent a word having the original and literal meaning of *robe* we should call it a *wearing*, that is, a thing for wearing; and such must have been the first meaning assigned to this part of dress. This will account for its representing several very different kinds of wearing apparel. Thus its German representative is *rock*; and what is this, since its *r* may take *f*—here a substitute for the aspirate—but frock? *Rock* in this language means also a *gown* for a woman or a child, a *riding-coat*, a magistrate's *robe*, an *undercoat*, *cloth*, and even a *petticoat*. Hence to be well *robed* must have been once used in the sense of being well *clothed*, well *clad*.

Let us now turn this knowledge to account. In the *rob* of *robe* we see several of the forms already noticed,

but here let us only observe that it is equal to *rap*, and consequently to *frap* and *frip*, this arising from *r* being entitled to the aspirate *h*, here replaced by *f*. Now *friper* has, according to M. Littré, for one of its other meanings, that of wearing out: "gater par usure;" which corresponds with the English *worn*. *Fripe* has also—and still according to M. Littré—the meaning of *chiffon*, *rag*. Why has this single word so many opposite meanings? Because they are all traceable to the hand. Thus when we observe the constant interchange of *f* and *p*, we see that the *chif* of *chiffon* cannot differ from the *chip* of *chiper*, which is explained by M. Littré "*derober, voler.*" In *chip* it is also easy to perceive the English words *chip* and *chop*, as well as the *coup* of the French *couper*. According to this view, un *chiffon* serait un *coupon*, un morceau coupé. But how are we to reconcile such ideas as these with the one expressed by *word*, of which Mercury is reported to have been the inventor? By observing that as the *w* in Sanskrit is the Latin *m*, there can be no difference between the *mord* of *mordeo* and *word*; and as *mordeo* means to *bite*, so must it mean to *cut*; and a *bite* is a *bit*, as we see by comparing *morceau*, a *bit*, with *mordeo*, to *bite*; and a *bite* or *bit* is a *cut*, and a *cut* is made by what is *sharp*, and Mercury was, as already shown, a *sharper*. In *sword*, a *sharp* weapon, we see also the term *word*, and consequently the *herp* of *herpe*, Mercury's sword, as well as the *serp* of *serpent*, which animal was made sacred to this god.

Now from philologists knowing nothing of the principles by which we are thus enabled to account for the same word having so many different meanings, they must have been greatly puzzled in their endeavours to explain such a difficulty. Thus M. Littré under *friper*

asks, "Y a-t-il là deux mots: *fripe,* chiffon, et *friper,* ou n'est-ce qu'un seul mot? Puis *friper,* user, et *friper,* manger, est-ce un seul mot, ou bien y a-t-il deux mots? L'histoire de *friper* est obscure, d'autant plus qu'on manque d'exemples."

And if there were thousands of examples this would not make the obscurity less. Nor can it ever be made clear until philologists learn that all such ideas as those just referred to belong to the same source, to those belonging to the hand, which accounts for their being expressed alike while their meanings are so different.

Farther back I had occasion to show that the *harve* of *harvest* is the same as *carve;* the same word is found in German, now written *herbst,* but formerly, says Dr. Schuster, *herbist.* Do the Germans know its original meaning? It would seem that they do not, since Dr. Schuster who is fond of tracing words to their earliest forms, does not attempt the etymology of *herbst,* beyond telling us that it is *harvest* in English, which is no etymology. Let us now confirm our origin of this word by accounting for its French representative, *moisson,* of which *moiss,* its radical part, cannot differ from *meiss,* nor *meiss* from the *mess* of the German *messer,* a *knife,* and a *knife,* as already shown, is that which *cuts.* *Moisson* and *harvest* have therefore the same original meaning, the etymology of either word serving to confirm that of the other. The *mess* of *messis,* Latin of *harvest,* is clearly the *mess* of the German *messer,* a *knife.* However modern the French may be, some of its words are certainly more ancient in form than those of the Latin; and *moisson* is one of those words. How can this be known? By observing that *o* is the elder form of *e,* and that from its having, as usual, its explanatory sign *i* understood, it

follows that the *mess* of the Latin *messis* is modern compared to the *moiss* of the French *moisson*. From this we may safely conclude that if *moisson* be derived from the Latin, it must be from one of its old dialects, long since lost and forgotten.

On finishing this etymology I began to flatter myself that no Frenchman had ever discovered the original meaning of *moisson;* but M. Littré has undeceived me, for on opening his valuable dictionary he has, I perceive, obtained the same result, though in a different way. His etymology of *moisson* is as follows:—

"Wallon, *mehon;* Mannur. *mechon;* Hainaut, *michen, misson;* Provenc. *meisso, meisho;* du Latin *messionem,* dérivé de *messis,* récolte, qui vient de *metere,* couper, moissonner; comparez le Grec *ἀμάω,* l'Allem. *mähen,* le Danois *meye.* Le Bry dit *metive,* dérivé directement de *metire.*"

Thus what M. Littré has here discovered by comparing the words of several languages and their dialects with one another, I have discovered by merely knowing that *c* may serve as a substitute for *h;* for it was this apparently insignificant little bit of knowledge that allowed me to perceive in *carve* and the *harve* of *harvest* the same word. And this etymology I have been enabled to confirm by knowing what I do of the origin of letters and the primary signification of words. Thus from being aware that in *o* and *e* we have the same letter, and that for this reason the *mess* of the Latin *messis* and that of the German *messer* could not, from *o* having *i* understood, differ from the *moiss* of *moisson,* and that from a *knife* being a *cutting* instrument, and its German form *messer* being radically the same as *moisson;* it necessarily follows that this word must have also once signified *cutting,*

So much for the different ways M. Littré and I have recourse to for making our etymologies. His method may sometimes succeed, but its success must be very rare, from its being wholly destitute of fixed principles, whereas mine can never fail if its principles be properly applied. Whenever I am therefore found to go wrong by giving false etymologies, which may sometimes happen, it is not my system but my own want of discernment should be found fault with; for my system is faultless, and so are the laws to which it has given birth; but the latter may, as well as those by which poor people are governed, be sometimes misapplied or abused.

Nothing has been hitherto less known in language than the right use of the aspirate and its substitutes. But this deficiency is more pardonable in the French than the Germans, the latter being regarded as the very founders of philological science. But they little suspect that in the *kerb* of their word *kerben*, to *cut*, they have the *herb* of *herbst*; for had they this knowledge, they would have known that *herbst* or *harvest* means *cutting*. Nor do they seem to suspect that both *kerb* of *kerben* and the *herb* of *herbst* appear also in their word *scharf*, that is, *sharp*; and yet it is so: by which we see that the aspirate may be replaced not only by *k* but by *sch* also. But as the aspirate and its substitutes should never be considered as belonging to the root of a word, and as they may for this reason be left out, it follows that the *schneid* of *schneiden*, to *cut*, is reducible to *neid*, and as the *ei* is here equal to *oi*, and consequently to *a*, we see that *neid* cannot differ from the *nad* of *nadel*, which means a *needle*; and as this is a sharp-pointed instrument, and as the Germans are a sharp-witted people, they will soon perceive, and of course admit, that in *schneiden* and *nadel* they have,

though it does not appear, radically the same word. And this they will not fail to confirm by observing that their word *noth*, must, according to my principles, be equal to *noith*, *nath*, and the *nad* of *nadel*, that is, *needle*, of which the radical part *need* means *want*; and as *w* is a substitute for the aspirate, it follows that *want* is the same as *hant*, and *hant* the same as *hand*, by the holding out of which *need* must have been first signified. But though *need* and *needle* are thus expressed alike, it does not arise from either having been called after the other, but from both being traceable to the *hand*, to which source, as well as to the mouth, such an idea as that of cutting owes its origin.

But how, I may be asked, can such a word as *lop*, which means to *cut off*, be traced either to the *hand* or the *mouth*? By observing that its *o* has *i* understood, and that it is consequently equal to *loip*, which, when its *o* is dropped, becomes *lip*, and a lip has been named after the mouth, because belonging to this organ. Hence in *lop* and *lip* we have the same word, though neither of them can now be used for the other. I learn from René Bedel's Dictionnaire Français-Hebreu that the etymology of שפה *spe* (Hebrew of *lip*) is "*coupé, bord,*" which ideas can be also traced to the mouth, as shown farther back. And as there is a euphonic tendency to sound *s* before *p*, as well as before some other consonants, it follows that the ש of שפה *spe* should be left out, so that פה *pe* is the real word, and this happens to be the Hebrew of *mouth*, whence it may be safely inferred that the *lip* took its name from the *mouth*. From Court de Gebelin[1] I learn that "Chez les Hebreux

[1] Dict., p. 614.

lévre était synonyme de *langue.*" This serves to show that what belongs peculiarly to the mouth has been called after it. And that *lip* has really the meaning of *lop* becomes evident when *c*—now only a substitute for the aspirate—is put before it, as it will then be *clip*, and to *clip* is to *cut*. But *clip* being equal to *cloip*, and *cloip* to *clap*, how does it happen that *clap* does not mean to *cut?* I cannot tell why. It might as well mean to *cut* as what it does mean; for it cannot differ from *clip*, except conventionally. Then why are both words equal to each other in form? Because they are, as well as a great many other words of different meanings, traceable to the word for hand.

But in what language can we find a word for the hand bearing any resemblance to *lip*, *lop*, or *clip?* There are two such words to be found in Greek. Let us only remark that *l* and *r* do constantly interchange, and that *clip* is consequently equal to *crip*, and *crip* is, from *o* being understood, equal to *croip*, and *croip* by the dropping of its *i* gives *crop*, which means, when a verb, to *clip;* and when a noun, it has *harvest* for one of its meanings, by which our etymology of the latter is confirmed anew. Now the *cr* of *crop* is its radical part—not its root—and it cannot differ from *cheir*, χείρ, Greek of *hand*, and of which the root is *eir*, that is, *oir*, and consequently *ar;* and this is also the root of *marē*, μάρη, another word in Greek for *hand*. When we now remark that the *o* in *crop* is for *oi*, and consequently for *a*, we see that *crop* is equal to *crap;* that is, when the *a* returns to its place, *carp*, and this is the *carp* of the Latin *carpo*, which means also to *cut*. We have also in *carp*, from *p* interchanging with *v*, the *carve* of *harvest*, and to *carve* means to *cut*.

These etymologies are confirmed by others. Thus from the *ei* of *cheir* being equal to *oi*, we see that it is equal to *choir*, and this word means a number of *singers* or *dancers;* but it does not mean either to *sing* or to *dance.* However it may be used its real meaning is a *collection*, a *body* or *troop.*

Another form of *choir* is *quire.* Both words are pronounced alike, and they have literally the same meaning, that of *collection;* and this idea, like the Latin *grex*, which comes from *cheir*, χείρ, has been named after the *hand.* Hence *manus* has in Greek and Latin, with its other meanings, that of *troop* or *collection;* and so has the German *manch*, the French *maint*, and the English *many;* all are referrible to the *hand.* How evident all this can be made by *quire*, which means not only a *band* or *collection* of singers, but also of *paper;* and a *quire* of paper is rendered into French by "une *main* de papier;" by which is meant a *handful* of paper, just as a *sack* of corn means a *sackful* of corn.

The French of *choir* is *chœur*, and M. Littré says no more of its etymology than this: "Le Latin chorus, de χορός, danse." But the Greek χορός means, literally considered, only a *collection.*

Another word in French for a *collection of paper* besides *main de papier*, is *cahier*, of which French philologists know not the etymology. And why so? Because they know not the etymology of *chœur*, or of either of its English equivalents *choir* or *quire. Cahier* is, however, but a different form of these words. At present it is never used but for a collection of paper, answering to the English word copy-book, but anciently it must have meant a collection of other things; for M. Littré quotes a passage from Godefroy, showing that it referred

to candles: "On trouve cahier de chandelles[2] qui signifie probablement un paquet de quatre chandelles, et qui se montre encore sous la forme de *cahoer.*" But why does M. Littré suppose *four* candles more than any other number? The following explains why: "Origine obscure. Les mots des autres langues Romanes, Ital. *quaderno,* Catal. *cuern,* se rapportant au bas-latin *quaternum,* cahier de quatre feuilles; serait-il possible que *quaternarium* eût été contracté en quaier?" There is no necessity for supposing so extraordinary an alteration. *Cahier* has appeared, according to M. Littré, under several other forms, such as *quouez, quaier, cayers,* besides those before mentioned? and so it must have appeared under the form of *chœur;* but then it meant conventionally, a *collection* of singers and not of *paper.*

Dr. Johnson's etymology of *quire* when it refers to paper is the French *cahier;* and though we are not by this told that *cahier* or *quire* is but a different form of *cheir,* Greek of *hand,* it serves, however, to show that this great man regarded the two words as making only one, and so far he was right. Does M. Littré ever consult Johnson? I have not yet met with an instance of his having done so. Such an authority is not, however, to be made light of. Though his etymologies never go, for his want of the necessary knowledge, to the origin of an idea, yet no man ever caught more justly the right word. Only witness here his explanation of *quire:* "a *bundle* of paper consisting of twenty-four sheets:" *bundle* is, on this occasion, the best word he could use, and how well it shows that a *quire* of paper means literally a *hand* of paper, since here the usual Latin word for bundle is *manipulus.* A *bundle* is therefore a *hand-*

[2] Godefroy, Annotations sur l'Hist. de Charles VI., p. 708.

ful; and if *bundle* had been *bandle*, this form would be equally correct; for the idea *band* has also been called after the *hand*. Hence a *band* means, like *choir* or *quire*, a *collection*, a *troop*, a *considerable number*; as a *band* of robbers, a *certain quantity* of robbers. And when we observe that the *b* of *band* is for the aspirate *h*, and that such too is the *qu* of the *quant* of *quantity*, it will be easy to perceive that *quant* is for *hant* or *hand*, so that *quantity* might as well have been *handity* or *bandity*, and have simply the meaning of a *troop* or *collection*. It must be therefore admitted that if anciently men expressed sometimes abundance by such a word as *ocean*, and which they do still—witness *oceans* of money—their more usual manner was to signify this idea by a word for the hand. Hence the *coup* of *beaucoup* must once have had this meaning, and so must *much* have had it in English, and *manch* in German, and the *much* of *mucho* in Spanish, as before observed. The intelligent reader will easily find other instances. Witness one which only now occurs to me. It is the French word *poignée*, which means both a *handful* and a *handle*; yet neither of these ideas has been named after the other, but both have been named after the hand.

On looking over, after my manner, the latter etymologies, I cannot help noticing M. Littré's etymology of *lèvre*: "Provç. *labras*, du latin *labrum*, lèvre, qui se rapporte à lambere, λάπτειν, *lécher*; c'est le membre qui lèche. Comparez l'allemand *lippe*, lèvre."

I was not aware until now that it is with our *lips* we lick; but as M. Littré is a medical man, and is consequently well acquainted with all the parts of the human body, as well as their uses, I bow to his superior knowledge in such matters. But will his colleagues of the

faculty be equally acquiescent? I am afraid that they will not; and that they may compare me to the simpleton in Molière, who was led to believe that the faculty had changed the place of the heart from the left to the right side. They will probably remind M. Littré of what I have shown, namely, that the parts belonging to the mouth have been called after it, and that the words by which those parts are expressed may, for this reason, be often used indifferently, and that this accounts for what Court de Gebelin states, that "chez les Hebreux *lèvre* était synonyme de langue;" so that the word which M. Littré takes for *lip* may have been the one for the *tongue*, which would strengthen the vulgar belief that when a man licks his lips it is with his tongue he does it, and not with his lips. But why does M. Littré in his etymology of *lèvre* refer to λάπτειν? The *literal* meaning of this word is not to *lick* but to *lap*. The word in Greek for the verb to *lick* is λέχω. And if λάπτω has been sometimes taken in this sense, we should not hence infer that λάπτω means to *lick*. M. Littré should consult his own good dictionary for the French of λάπτω, which is *laper* and not *lécher*. He forgets that in his definition and etymology of *laper*, he never alludes to the lips, but to the tongue. These are his words: "Boire en tirant la *langue*, ce que font certains quadrupèdes, et en particulier le chien." So much for M. Littré's definition of *laper*. His etymology of this word is as follows: "Anglo-Sax. *Lappian;* Angl. to *lap;* Flumand, *lappen.*"

Another word deserving of further notice is *choir*, a *band* of *singers*, which, as I have shown, is the Greek word for *hand*, χείρ; and that it may, for this reason, like *manus* in Latin, mean a *troop*. Hence Alexandre in his Dictionnaire Grec-Français gives for one of the meanings

of χείρ, "*troupe, armée, multitude.*" And the same authority gives to χορός not only its usual meaning of *chœur, ballet;* that is, a *band* of *singers* or *dancers;* but also the following: "réunion nombreuse de personnes; groupe ou assemblage d'objets quelconques, comme rangée de dents, de colonnes," &c. Hence it is only conventionally that χορός in Greek, *chorus* in Latin, *chœur* in French, and *choir* in English, refer to *singers* or *dancers,* for the original sense is a *collection,* a *number,* of no matter what kind of objects. In the χορ of χορός it is therefore easy to perceive, by the application of our principles, the word χείρ itself, its *o* being for *oi,* and *oi* being for *ei.*

The original meaning of χορός does not, we now see, differ from that we have discovered in the English word *quire,* a *bundle* of paper; and it may be therefore explained, a *band,* or *troop* of persons, whether musicians, singers, dancers, or robbers.

Now if χορός had been hitherto written χειρός, to which form it is exactly equal, its first meaning might have been long since known. And why has it not been so written? Because the origin of language has not been hitherto discovered. Some other reason may be assigned, but this can be the only true one. Thus it has not been suspected that *i* belongs to *o* as an explanatory sign, and that when this sign is not expressed with the *o* it is then understood; and that when the *o* and *i* are not allowed to coalesce, that is, not to make *a,* they are equal to *ei.* Hence it is that χορός cannot differ from χειρός.

But how are we to account for the evident identity of κόρος and κόρυς, of which the latter is no way related in meaning to the hand, but rather to the head, since it means a *helmet,* the *crown of the head* and the *crested lark?* By observing that the meaning of hand

is that of *maker*, from its having been called after the sun, the supposed maker of all things; and that ideas named after height, such as the head, are traceable to the same source; so that *hand* and *head*, though no way related in meaning, may be sometimes found signified by the same word. But two words expressing the same idea may, from their having different roots, bear no resemblance to each other; yet their relationship will not be the less apparent. Thus στέφανος and κόρυς are no way alike in form though they are in sense, since the former means a *crown*, and the latter is traceable to the *head*, as we see by its meaning just given. But κόρυς is not more traceable to the head than κόρος; and that the latter might mean a *crown* is shown not only by its radical part κόρ being the same as the *cor* of the Latin *corona*, but by its corresponding so far in sense with στέφανος, a *crown*, as to have as one of its other chief meanings, that of an *assembly;* and *corona* has also this meaning as well as that of crown.

If the idea *crown* has been called after the *head* or *height*, where is the likeness between κεφαλή and στέφανος? εφ is the root of both words, and it cannot differ from the επ of ἐπί, a well-known preposition, which is, like ὑπέρ in Greek, *super* in Latin, and *on*, *upon*, and *up* in English, expressive of *height*. And as the French *coup* must have been named from the hand, we see on leaving out its *c*, which is here for the aspirate, that in its remaining part, *oup*, we have but a different form of the English word *up;* so that *hand* and *head* or *height* are thus shown to be radically alike; and which can be shown still more clearly by dropping, according to one of our rules, the nasal sound in *hand*, which will then become *had*, and this word cannot differ from *head*,

nor, when its aspirate is left out, from the Hebrew יד *id*, which means the *hand*. In יד *id* it is also easy to perceive *aid*. Hence to lend a *hand* is to lend *aid*. René Bedel does not, therefore, mistake when he gives the Hebrew of *hand* as the word for *aid*. But we should observe that as man must have often, when in great distress, called upon his God for assistance, this great name may, as well as the *hand*, have become a common word for *aid*. Hence when *aid* is read after the Hebrew manner it becomes *Dia*, which is the Irish and Gaelic of God. In the *de* of *Deus*, the *di* of *Dio*, *Dios* and *Dieu*, all names of the Deity, we see, while still reading as in Hebrew, such forms as cannot differ from יד *id* or *aid*. And as in *God* *g* does but represent the aspirate, *od* is the root of this word; and as its *o* has *i* understood, *od* is equal to *oid*, and consequently, by the joining of the *o* and *i* to *ad*, which cannot differ from *aid*. And as I had occasion to show farther back, *Ad* was the name given by the followers of Buddha to the Supreme Being.

But as the *hand* has been called a *maker*, a name of the *sun*, and as the two ideas have for this reason the same name, it were perhaps difficult to determine whether *aid* was called after the sun—then worshipped as God—or after the hand. Nor does the word *help*, synonym of *aid*, make this difficulty appear less; for when its aspirate is represented by *s*, as it often is, *help* will become *selp*, which cannot differ from *selv*, nor *selv* from the *salv* of *salvator;* and the sun was revered as a saviour, and consequently as God. But when the aspirate of *help* is replaced by its substitute *c*, *help* will become *celp*, that is, by transposition, *clep*, which is the same as *cleip*, *cloip*, and *clip*, in the last of which we see a word for *cut;* nor can any of the three forms, the aspi-

rate being dropped, differ from *lop*, which has still the same meaning, and, as already shown, every such idea has been called after the hand.

But no two words can show more clearly that the *sun* and the idea *help* are signified alike than *Jove* and the *juv* of *juvare*; for *Jove* was the *sun*, and *juvare* means to *help*. And Jove and Jehovah are allowed by the most orthodox Christians to be the same word. Thus Parkhurst: "Varro, cited by St. Austin, says, Deum Judæorum, esse Jovem, Jove was the God of the Jews; and from יהוה *ieue* the Etruscans seem plainly to have had their Juve or Jove, and the Romans their Jovis or Jovis-pater, i.e. Father Jove, afterwards corrupted into Jupiter. And that the idolaters of several nations, Phœnicians, Greeks, Etruscans, Latins, and Romans, gave the Incommunicable Name יהוה *ieue*, with some dialectical variation, to their false gods, may be seen in an excellent note in the 'Ancient Universal History[3].' I add that from the Divine Name the Greeks had their exclamation of grief *Ἰού*, as *Ἰοὺ, Ἰοὺ Δυστῆνε*, and the Romans theirs of triumph, Io, Io Triumphe, both of which were originally addresses to Jehovah[4]."

The same very learned and orthodox authority gives also the following:—"It would be almost endless to quote all the passages of Scripture wherein the name Jehovah is applied to Christ[5]." And having quoted many passages from both the Old and the New Testament in support of this statement, and referring to all such Christians as "own the Scriptures as the rule of faith," he thinks, "on their comparing those passages of the two Testaments, they cannot possibly miss of a scriptural demonstration that Jesus is Jehovah. That

[3] Vol. xvii. p. 274, &c. [4] Lex., p. 127. [5] Lex., p. 126.

this Divine Name יהוה *ieue* was well known to the heathen there can be no doubt."

And as the word *Jesus* is, according to St. Matthew, allowed to mean *Saviour*, and as this epithet belonged to the *sun*, as the learned of ancient times admit; and as Jove was the sun, and the same as Jehovah, it is thus made evident that the sun, Jesus, Jehovah, and Jove, have all the same meaning. And is not this an excellent type? And should not Parkhurst, whose belief in the doctrine of types knew no bounds, have taken advantage of it? But, strange to say, he does not. Yet the sun, which is, it must be admitted, the grandest and most beneficent of all inanimate objects, seems as deserving of being considered a genuine type of the promised Saviour as any of the heathen divinities, to all of whom, from Jupiter himself down to Hercules, this glory is now so often assigned by the most competent judges of such matters, even in our own enlightened days. But it will, no doubt, be observed by the intelligent reader, that no single divinity of the heathen world could possibly serve as a type of Jesus without the whole body of them doing the same, for the simple reason that they all, like the letters of our alphabet and the roots of language, interchange with one another, and finally with their great original, the sun.

So much for *Jove* and *juvare*; they are radically the same word; and as many persons pronounce *j*—even still —as they do *z* or *s*, so must they have done anciently; by which we see that Jove did not differ from *sove*, nor *sove* from *save*; whence *Saviour*, a name by which both Jesus and the sun have been known.

How many more startling observations and etymologies might be derived from a close examination of the

name Mercury! Thus we see, from its form *merx* and *wares* being, as we have shown, equal to each other, that the idea signified by *wares* is that of things *worked*, the *erx* of *merx* being the same as the εργ of ἔργον; that is, what has been made by the hand and not by nature.

We have also seen how *merx* is the same as both *march* and *mark*, and how neither of these can differ from such a form as *malk*, nor *malk* from *walk*. But how are we to reconcile such an idea as the French *marché* or its English equivalent *market*, with walking, Mercury having been revered as the god of both walkers and markets? By observing that though a market is stationary, it is, however, a place to which people walk, so that it might be styled a walking-place; and as walking implies motion, a market, though immovable, has been called after the verb to *march*. Hence the *far* of the Saxon *faran*, to *travel*, cannot differ from *fair*, a *market*, nor from its French equivalent *foire*; by which we see that the name of such a place is also significant of *motion*.

Let us now show the roots of several words of which we saw farther back only the radical parts. Thus how are we, let us again ask, to account for Mercury's name not meaning merely to walk, but even to fly? By observing that words implying *motion* do not, as before stated, differ from one another but conventionally; from which it would follow that at first they may have been sometimes confounded, or used indifferently. Thus fly cannot, from the interchange of *y* and *g*, differ from *flg*; that is, *flig*, radical part of *flight*. Nor can *flig* differ from *flug*, radical part of *flugel*, German of *wing*; and of which the *flieg* of *fliegen*, to *fly*, is but a different form. And if we now remark that when the *u* of the

flug of *flugel* returns to its first place *flug* will then be *fulg*, we at once perceive, by the changing of one aspirate for another, that *fulg* is the same as *wulg*, and *wulg* as *walk*; so that these several ideas are, from each having been named after motion, expressed, as it were, by one word. And the root of this one word is *al*, just as we see it in *walk*, and to which the *l* of the other forms of this word becomes equal when preceded by its vowel or vowels. In this *al* we see also the root of *ala*, Latin of *wing*, and of which the *ail* of its French representative *aile* is but another variety. And as *walk* cannot, as we have shown, differ from *march*, we now see that the root *al* of *walk* is the same as *ar*; and so might it be the same as every root in a language. And why so? Because every root has been, or it may have been, a name of the sun, and life has been called after the sun, and life is motion. In the German *wallen*, which, according to Dr. Schuster's definition, is highly expressive of motion, we have, it may well be said, the French verb *aller*; for its *w* being only for the aspirate it may be left out, and *wallen* will then become *allen*, and the ending (*en*) of this infinitive answers exactly to the ending of every such French infinitive as that of *aller* and *marcher*, which are two of the meanings of *wallen*, and we may say two of its forms also.

If we now notice *wing* we shall obtain another word and root, each significant of motion. Thus by dropping, as we may do, the nasal sound of this word it will become *wig*, and consequently *woig*, that is, *wag*, and which is the same as *way*, just as the German *tag* is the same as *day*; and *way* was called after *motion*, from its being a place where people travel and consequently *move*. When we now drop the *w*, it being the aspirate of *wag*—this

other form of *way*—we get the *ag* of *ago*, to *act*, and thus discover another root equal to any of those just noticed. In the *ol* of *vol*, *voler*, and *voleur* we have another root; for as its *v* may, because standing for the aspirate, be dropped, and as its *o* is for *oi*, and consequently for *a*, we see that *ol* cannot differ either from the *al* of *walk* or the *al* of *aller*.

This latter etymology forces me to perceive that I ought to have accounted better than I have done for *travail* and *travel* being the same word. We should observe that there can be no difference between the *vail* of *travail* and the *vel* of *travel*; so that the *tra* prefixed to each of these words should be regarded as an article, having the meaning of *the*, or of the verb to *be*. In short, this *tra* of *travail* or *travel* means literally *the thing* or *the being*, as we have shown in the etymology of *tranquil*, which means *the being* upon one's keel or hinder part. Hence, as the French *travail* and the English *travel* do each imply *motion*, this accounts for their being the same word, and also for their being both equal to *vol*, which means both *robbery* and *flight*, these two ideas being also expressive of *motion*; for *robbery* means the *carrying off*, the *running away with*; and this is as expressive of motion as *flying*, though *robbing* and *flying* have conventionally very different meanings.

These latter etymologies and observations serve to show how a word signifying motion may take different forms and as many different meanings. M. Littré has a very long article on the origin of the verb *aller*, referring particularly to its first syllable *al*. So far he is right, for *al* is the root of *aller*. But if M. Littré knew that all the roots of a language are, like its letters, equal to one another, and that their difference in meaning is

wholly conventional, this knowledge would have spared him a great deal of trouble. Every name of the sun may, because signifying *motion,* have also served to mean *aller.* And the *a* of this word might as well have any other consonant after it as *l,* and have still the same meaning; that is, be a name of the sun, and have also the meaning of *aller.* It would take me at least some two or three hours to transcribe M. Littré's long article on the etymology of *aller.* But during the whole inquiry he seeks only to know under what other form the *al* of *aller* has appeared. But what are we the wiser for being told that with some people the *al* of *aller* became *an,* unless this knowledge can allow us to discover the idea after which *aller* was first called? In Hebrew both *al* and *an* are, as shown farther back, names of the *sun,* after which life was called, and as life is motion, this accounts for the root of such a word as *aller* having the same meaning, since it is also expressive of motion. But M. Littré does not go so far. Thus on learning that the ancient form of the Italian *andare* was *anare,* he says, "Ici se présente une première question: aller et andare sont-ils un seul et même mot?" What M. Littré means to ask is this: Is the *al* of *aller* the same as the *an* of *andare* or *anare?* But it does not signify a straw to know whether these two roots be or be not one and the same word. And why so? Because we could not discover by having *merely* this knowledge, the original meaning of the verb to *go;* that is to say, it would not enable us to perceive that *go* must have been first named after motion, motion after life, and life after its supposed author, the sun.

Or what more do we know of the original meaning of the English verb *go,* from being told that it is written *gan* in Saxon, and *gehen* in German? And this infor-

mation, which scarcely deserves to be so called, is all philologists can give us respecting the origin of *go;* for if they can show that in Gothic or some other cognate language, the word *go* appears under a similar form, we are still no wiser respecting the idea after which it was first called than we were when without such information. But when, according to our rule, which says that initial consonants may take vowels before them, we prefix the sign *a* to *gan, gehen,* or *go,* we see that the root of each of these forms will be *ag,* which is also the root of the Latin *agere,* to *act;* and to act implies motion, just as the verb *aller* does, and which is confirmed by the fact that ἄγω in Greek, and *ago* in Latin, are sometimes used, as all Greek and Latin dictionaries testify, in the sense of the verb to *go.* The root *ag* may have therefore often served, like every other root, as a name of the sun whence life, motion, and consequently, such ideas as *going* and *acting.*

On looking over the latter pages we see that every one can now easily account for the origin of the belief that Mercury was not only the god of travellers, but that, from his having *wings,* he could also fly. In the radical part of one of the words just brought under notice, namely, the *flug* of *flugel,* German of *wing,* we see also a form that can, by the applying of our principles, be shown not to differ from the *falc* of the Latin *falco,* a *hawk;* nor even from this word *hawk* itself. Thus the *h* of the latter not being different from *f,* nor its *w* from *u, hawk* is brought equal to *fauk,* in which we see the *fauc* of the French *faucon,* and from the constant interchange of *u* and *l,* the *falc* of its English quivalent *falcon.* Now as the hawk can fly, we are told, at the astonishing rate of one hundred and fifty miles an

hour, it might be supposed that he obtained his name from his being so gifted. But as this bird has another quality for which he is also very remarkable, that of seizing and carrying off his prey; and as this idea is also like that of flying, traceable to motion, we have, therefore, when endeavouring to discover the origin of his name, to choose between these two qualities. And which of the two ought we to take? either seems to apply; but as a name was never given for more than one attribute or quality, we cannot say that the hawk was named after these two qualities of his. And as he is called a bird of *prey*, and not a bird of *flight*, and as *prey* is that which is carried off, this will serve to show the original meaning of *hawk*. This etymology is further confirmed by the Latin word *accipiter*, a general name for birds of prey; and as it is also used figuratively for *robber*, and as such a person is one who *carries off*, the meaning of his name appears to be identical with that of *hawk*.

If we now give to the *w* of *hawk* its form *b*—witness the name Will being the same as Bill—we shall, instead of the *haw* of *hawk*, obtain *hab*, in which we see the radical part of the Latin *habeo*, and its English equivalent *have;* and as every such idea is, like *taking* or *carrying*, to be traced to the hand, this serves to show that *hawk* might have been also written *habk;* that is, when the vowel here due between *b* and *k* is supplied, *habik*, which cannot differ from the *habich* of *habicht*, and *habicht* is the German of *hawk*. Dr. Schuster does not, therefore, mistake when he gives *haben* as the original of *habicht*. But how has the Doctor been led to make this discovery, since, though a very learned man, he knows no more of the origin of language than any of

his countrymen? By merely observing that *habicht* and *haben* are radically the same word. And is this a safe method to go by? By no means. It may sometimes serve, as in the present instance, but it will oftener lead to mistakes than prevent them; of which this word *hawk* affords two instances, as I am now going to show. This bird's name is in Greek ἱέραξ, and this word is radically the same as ἱερός; indeed we may say —since it is only by their endings they differ from each other—that they make only one word.

But how widely they differ in meaning! since ἱερός, which is explained *divine,* cannot in any way be related to the idea expressed by ἱέραξ or *hawk.* The evident identity in form of the two words has, however, induced the most learned of Greek scholars to derive ἱέραξ from ἱερός; because, as Donnegan observes, the flight of this bird "was especially observed for purposes of religion." This is not Donnegan's opinion, but that of others; he gives none of his own. Alexandre makes no remark, but sets down ἱερός as the original of ἱέραξ. M. Regnier also derives ἱέραξ from ἱερός, but with a note of interrogation (?), which he uses to signify doubt. See his "Jardin des Racines Grecques." Let us now show the advantage of our principles by discovering the etymology of ἱέραξ, and accounting for its being radically the same as ἱερός.

In the ἱερ of either word we have a form precisely equal to *hior* or *hoir,* for the signs ι and ε of ἱερ may change places, and hence it is that Iη has been also, as Parkhurst shows[6], written EI after the Oriental manner. And what do we see in *hoir,* when its *oi* becomes *a,* but *har;* and I learn from M. Littré under *ravir,* that in Sanskrit *har* means *porter* and *prendre.* And so it ought, for its aspi-

[6] Lex., p. 128.

rate is as often represented by *ch* as it is by *h*; and the *char* thus obtained cannot, from its *a* being for *oi*, differ from *choir*, nor *choir* from *cheir*, Greek of *hand*, as we saw farther back, when *choir* was shown to mean a *collection* or *handful*; and it is with the hand we both *carry* and *take* (*porter* et *prendre*). We thus discover the real etymology of the Greek word for *hawk*, ἱέραξ, and perceive that it has not been called after one meaning *divine*, ἱερός, but after to *take*, *prendre*, which is the meaning it has every where else.

But why should the same word mean *divine?* Because the *hand* received the name of *maker;* and *maker* happening to be also one of the many epithets by which the sun was known, and the sun having been then regarded as the supreme *divinity*, this accounts for the word *hand* being radically the same as one signifying *divine*, though never called after such an idea.

Now this discovery of the primary signification of ἱέραξ has remained unknown to the whole world for many ages, and it would, no doubt, remain for twice as many more but for the use of these principles.

Let us now see if Frenchmen know the origin of *faucon*, their word for *hawk;* and let us for this purpose consult M. Littré: if he does not know it, I should like to know what Frenchman does. Having given several of its forms, he observes as follows: "On rattache le Latin *falco*, faucon, au Latin *falx*, faux, à cause des ongles recourbés en faucille, ou à cause des ailes étendues qui ont la forme d'une faux."

This statement allows us to understand that the hawk had not received a name until some time after the invention and use of scythes. But if either the bird or the instrument was named after the other, it must have been

the instrument that was named after the bird, and not the bird after the instrument. The scythe is comparatively a modern invention; but the existence of the hawk may, for aught we know, be as old as creation itself, and it must have had a name, and a very significant one too, shortly after the formation of language.

Then as the two words—the one for *hawk* and the one for *scythe*—are in Latin radically the same—witness *falco* and *falx*—are we to suppose that the one for scythe was made with reference to the one for hawk? We might so imagine if we had no better etymology to offer; but we happen to have one which is a great deal better. Thus as the combination *sc* of *scythe* is for the aspirate it may be reduced to one of its signs, and when we drop the *s*, and write *cythe*, we obtain a form equal to *cut*, the *the* being reducible to *t*. In *sickle*—a synonym of *scythe*—we have also a word for *cut*, for its radical part *sick* is the same as the *sic* of the Latin *sica*, which means a *short sword*, or *pocket dagger*; in short, a *sharp instrument*, and equal to the *sec* of *secare* to *cut*. In the *sicul* of *sicula* we may see the word *sickle* itself, and *sicula* means also a *scythe*. *Falx* must therefore, from its being a synonym of *sicula*, have been named after the idea *cut*, just as the English word *scythe* has been. Let us now observe that the *fal* of *falx* is, from its *a* being for *oi*, and from *oi* being reducible to *i*, not different from the *fil* of *filum*, a *thread*; and Ennius uses this word to signify the *edge* of a sword: "Deducunt habiles gladios *filo* gracilento." *Fil* d'une épée means also in French the *edge* of a sword; and *filou*, as we saw farther back, means a *sharper*.

From all this it appears very plain that there is no relationship whatever in meaning between *falco*, a *hawk*, and *falx*, a *scythe*; for it is evident that a *hawk* cannot

have been named after the verb to *cut*, which idea can be easily applied to such an instrument as a *scythe*. But it must be admitted that *falco* and *falx* are radically so equal to each other that they might change places; that is, *falco* might have been for *falx*, and *falx* for *falco*. Hence ἅρπη means not only a *bird of prey*, but also a *sickle* or *scythe*; and Donnegan explains it thus: "a bird of rapid flight and loud voice, probably an eagle or falcon; a fish, species undetermined; the name either from its rapacity, or the rapidity of its motion; a sickle, a goad for driving elephants; a harpoon."

It would therefore seem that such words as signify sharp instruments might all change places with one another[7]. Thus wishing to see if there is a word in Gaelic resembling the Latin *falx* just noticed, I have looked out in Macleod and Dewar's dictionary for *fal*, radical part of *falx*, and have found that it means not only a *scythe* but a *spade* also. *Speal* is another word in this language for *scythe*, and so is it for *sword*. *Spealt* is radically the same, but it means neither scythe, spade, or sword, but a *splinter*, and when used as a verb its signification is to *cleave*, to *split*.

And thus it is in language. The same idea, as that of cutting, for instance, may be expressed in many ways, of which each may serve to signify a different object, such as scythe, spade, and sword. Nor can any reason be assigned why such words might not have changed places. When the farmer handles his spade, he never supposes that the first meaning ever given to this instru-

[7] Except such as may have been named after their inventors, or after the places where they were invented. Witness the French *bayonette*, of which De Roquefort says, "Ainsi dite de la ville de Bayonne, où cette arme fut inventée."

ment was that of the *cutter*, and that, from its having this meaning, it might as well have been named a *sword*. But *spada*, which cannot differ from *spade*, and which is the Italian of *sword*, serves to show that the original meaning of the two words, *spade* and *sword*, was in the beginning one and the same, and that this must have arisen from the parent idea of both having been such as we now signify by the noun *cutter* or the verb to *cut*.

But as a single vowel is equal to a combination of vowels, and as there can, for this reason, be no difference between *spade* and *speed*, how are we to account for two ideas so dissimilar being expressed, as it were, by the same word? By observing that as a spade is an instrument used for cutting—whence its name, as shown in our etymology of *boucher*—and as to cut or divide has been called after the hand, and the hand after maker—one of the many names of the sun—it is thus shown that a word for spade might, from its being equal to one for the hand be also equal to one for the sun, and consequently to one for life, whence such ideas as *motion* and *speed* are to be derived. But the sole cause of two such idea as *spade* and *speed* being alike must be ascribed to their belonging to the same division of language; for *speed* was called after the *foot*, as shown farther back; and the *foot* after *motion*, and *motion* after *life*, and *life* after the *sun*.

Nor do French philologists know any thing more of the original meaning of their word for *scythe*, that is, for *faux*, than they do of *faucon*, which, strange to say, they derive, as we have seen, from *falx*, as if scythes could have been known before hawks. M. Littré gives, after his manner, several forms of *faux*, but no hint of its first

meaning; nothing to show why this instrument obtained such a name. He derives it from *falcem*, the accusative of *falx*. But why not from the nominative? When we give to the *u* of *faux* its form *l*, it will become the word *falx* itself, by which we see that the two words are, letter for letter, one and the same. Hence, as we have shown and abundantly proved, that *falx* was named after the idea expressed by the word *cut*, which, as we have often seen, has been called after the *hand*; it follows that such too must be the original meaning of *faux*, since it does not in this respect differ from *falx*. All we have said of *falx* will therefore apply to *faux*.

But in the etymology given of *falx* no notice is taken of its German form *sense*. The Germans do not mistake when they suppose this word to have been called after the idea expressed by the word *cut*; but they cannot find an original of the same meaning from which it may have been taken; that is, they can find no word signifying *cut*, and resembling *sense* in form. Dr. Schuster tells us to compare it with *sichel*, which is our word *sickle*. But what two words can differ more in form than *sense* and *sichel?* Two other learned Germans, F. G. Eichhoff and W. de Suckau, suppose *sense* to be for *seg-ens-e*, and to be derived from *sag-en, couper, cut*. These authorities are right as to the meaning of *sense*, but wrong when they endeavour to find a word resembling it in form. Yet there is such a word, nor is it difficult to find when the rule by which it can be found is known. This rule, which has grown out of my discovery of the origin of language, I have already applied many times and always with equal success. The reader has not yet, I dare hope, forgotten the evident advantage obtained by this rule in correcting M. Max Müller's

notice of the words *erst* and *first;* nor how it has enabled me to make so many useful discoveries in etymology as shown by those I have given under the verb *suivre.*

The reader must know from this introduction to what rule I allude; he must know it is that which says initial consonants are nothing more, for the most part, than substitutes for the aspirate *h,* and that they may, for this reason, be often suppressed, because constituting no radical part of a word. Hence when the initial *s* is, as a substitute for the aspirate, suppressed in the *suis* of *je suis, I am, uis,* that is, *vis,* remains, by which we see that *je suis* means literally *I live.*

When we now apply this rule to the German of *scythe, sense, ense* will remain; in which we see *ens,* radical part of *ensis,* Latin of *sword.* And that this instrument was, as well as a scythe, named after the idea signified by the word *cut,* is sufficiently proved by its Greek equivalent κοπίς, of which the radical part κοπ cannot differ from the κοπ of κόπτω to *cut,* nor from the *coup* of its French form, *couper,* and of which the word *cut* itself is still but another form, and to all of which may be added the *cout* of *couteau.* It is therefore evident that the word *scythe* meant originally *cut,* and that such too was the meaning of *sword.* And how very clearly this etymology is proved by a statement which I had occasion to make only a while ago, when giving the original meaning of *falx!* This is the statement: "Wishing to see if there is a word in Gaelic resembling the Latin *falx,* I have looked out in Macleod and Dewar's Gaelic dictionary for *fal,* radical part of *falx,* and have found that it means not only a *scythe* but a *spade* also. *Speal* is another word in this language for *scythe,* and so is it for *sword.*' By this we see that in Gaelic *scythe* and *sword* are signi-

fied by the same word, and this must convince every enlightened German that in his language *sense*, a *scythe*, and *ensis*, a *sword*, are also, radically considered, the same word. And so must every enlightened Frenchman feel now convinced that in his language *faux* is the word *falx* itself; and as *falx* was named after the idea signified by the word *cut*, a *faucon*, or *falcon*, of which the name does not mean to *cut*, but to *take* or *seize*, cannot have been called after such an instrument, though so high an authority as M. Littré happens, as we have seen, to think otherwise.

That the initial *s* of the German *sense* is for the aspirate *h* is further shown by this aspirate being so often replaced by *f*, which will bring *sense* equal to *fence*, and to *fence* is to *defend*, and to *defend* is to *hinder*, in the *hind* of which we see *hand*, after which the idea of to *cut* was named.

In this explanation of the myth Mercury I have, no doubt, neglected many things deserving of notice. It occurs to me now only that I should have accounted for the belief that Mercury served as a guide to the dead. But one of the many forms of his name shows clearly the origin of so strange a notion. This form has grown out of *merx*, of which the radical part *mer* is equal to *moir*—*e* being for *o*, and *o* having *i* understood—and *moir* makes, by the joining of the *o* and *i*, *mar*, and this is the same as the *mar* of *μάρη*, Greek of *hand;* nor is it different from the *man* of *manus;* for the *r* and the *n* interchange as we see by the following: "Sommona Codom I consider to be admitted as one of the names of Buddha. M. La Loubère says, 'His mother, whose name is found in some of their Bailie books, was called, as they say, Maha Maria, which seems to signify the

great Mary, for Maha signifies great. But it is found written Mania as often as Maria[8].'"

The radical part of the name Mercury is thus brought equal to a word for the hand, after which, as can be easily conceived, the act of guiding or leading must have been first called. This becomes evident when we remark that the *men* of the Greek μηνύω, to *guide*, cannot, according to the principles so often developed in this work, differ in the least from *manu*, ablative of *manus*. The *mon* of *moneo*, to *guide*, is radically the same word. In *manes*, the *spirits of the departed*, and to whom Mercury was supposed to serve as guide, we have still but another form of *manus*; for as the Manes were also regarded as *gods* of the infernal regions, and as *manus* is allowed to have had anciently the same meaning as *bonus*, and as this idea has been called after God, *Manes* is thus brought equal in meaning to *manus*, from which it differs so slightly in form.

But if *Manes* can be thus shown to have the meaning of *good*, so ought it to have the meaning of *merx*, or rather, since it is in the plural number, of *merces*, and of *wares* in English; and *Manes* can be shown to correspond in meaning with the idea *good*, since *merces* may be rendered into Latin by *bona*, plural of *bonum*, and *wares* be represented in English by *goods*.

Here I cannot help remarking that our word *wares* does not, since it has no *c*, come from the plural of *merx*, which is *merces*, but rather from *mer*, the radical part of *merx*, and which cannot differ from *mar*. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that there must have been a time when *merx* was only *mar* or *mer*, and that its *x* does here but serve as a substitute for the aspirate sound, which

[8] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 308.

attends so often the *r*. According to this view, *wares* may be an older word than *merces*, which we can the more easily admit when we observe that the *m* of the Latin *mare* is the *w* in the Sanscrit *wari*, which has the same meaning. And Sanskrit is, they say, much older than either Latin or Greek.

According to the passage just quoted from the Anacalypsis, Buddha's mother was named Maria; but Mercury had also, it would seem, the same mother, since he is said to have been the son of Jupiter and *Maia*, for Maia is Maria or Mary. Hence Higgins[9], alluding to the Carmelites, says, "They were the original monks of Maia or Maria." Thus showing, as he does in many places, that Maia and Maria are one and the same. And it is worthy of remark that when a child is not yet old enough to pronounce the word *Mary* he calls the person so named *Mah-ye*, from which we may conclude that *Maia* is the elder form of *Mary* or *Maria*. Pausanias calls her Maera, which differs but slightly from Mary[1].

All the good Christians who believe in the doctrine of types, cannot but admire the one supplied by the account given of Mercury; for he was the son of Maia, and Maia was Mary, and his father was Jupiter, and Jupiter was Jove; and according to Parkhurst and others, Jove, as a name, did not differ from Jehovah. Mercury would be therefore the son of Jehovah and Mary. This beautiful type becomes still more evident when we observe that Mercury was also called the Word, or Logos. Hence the following: "We have seen, I think, that it is beyond the possibility of doubt that Buddha and Mercury, sons of Maia, were the same person. This receives a very remarkable confirmation from the fact that Mercury was

[9] Anac., vol. i. p. 305.

[1] See Jameson's Hermes, p. 130.

always called by the Gentiles the *Logos*—the *Word* that in the beginning was God, and that also was a God. But this Logos we have also shown to be the *Divine Wisdom*, and he was, according to the Pagan Amelius, the Creator. He says, 'And this plainly was the Λόγος by whom all things were made, he being himself eternal, as Heraclitus would say, and by Jove the same whom the barbarian affirms to have been in the place and dignity of a principal, and to be with God, and to be God, by whom all things were made, and in whom every thing that was made has its life and being; who descending into body, and putting on flesh, took the appearance of a man, though even then he gave proof of the majesty of his nature; nay, after his dissolution, he was deified again.'" "If this do not," continues Higgins, "prove the identity of Buddha [or Mercury] and the Romish Jesus, nothing can do it[2]."

But many good Christians will remind Higgins that this identity, which every lover of truth must admit, is after all, only a type, a doctrine to which he is not himself opposed, as we have already shown.

Among some more of the omissions in my explanation of the myth Mercury, for which I deserve to be censured, I wish here to notice only one or two. I should when showing his name to be equal to the *verb* of *verbum*, have remarked that *verb* is not only equal to *bard* and *word*, but also to *barbe*, and which accounts for Mercury having been represented with a flowing *beard*. Nor can either *bard* or *word* differ from *bird*, which may lead us to suppose that birds were with some people not called after the action of flying, but after the idea *voice*, for the use of which they are so remarkable, especially singing birds. The three ideas *bird*, *bard*, and *word*, have

[2] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 308.

according to this view, sprung from the same source. And as the form *verb* is also equal to *varb*, and consequently to the *warb* of *warble*, it would seem that the idea expressed by such a word as *sing* or *song* can be also traced to one signifying the *voice*. Hence a form equal to *sing* is *sang*, and *sang* becomes, when its nasal sound is dropped, *sag*, which is the *sag* of the German *sagen*, and is also our word *say*. And as the German of to *sing* is *singen*, we see still more clearly, when we drop the nasal sound of its first part, *sing*, that it is the same as *sagen*, to *say*. Hence to sing a song means literally to *say* it, but conventionally by modulating the voice; and to *say* any thing is to *word* it, to express it by means of *words*.

Now the sole difference between *say* and *word* is in their roots; the *ay* of the former is its root, and so is *or*, the root of the latter; and as *ay* is equal to *ag*—witness *say* and the *sag* of the German *sagen*—and as *ag* is but a different form of such roots as *ac*, *ak*, and *ok*, we thus bring the *ay* of *say* to the *ox* of *vox*; whence the French *voix* and the English *voice*. The roots of *speech* and *speak* are therefore *eech* and *eak*, and are still the same as all and each of the foregoing. The *p* of *speak* is for the aspirate, and its *s* comes from the euphonic tendency to sound this letter before *p*. With the exception of *speech* and *speak* there is only one sign to each of the preceding roots, such as *v*, *w*, *b*, and *s*, and these signs do but stand for the aspirate *h*, and they might be replaced by any other consonant. Thus the *og*—root of *logos*—is but another form of the *ox* of *vox*; and its *l*, if it be not the remains of an article, must be the representative of the aspirate. And as the *log* of *logos* is equal to *long*, and *long* to the *lang* of *langue*; and as in *tongue* we have still the same word, it follows that *t*, if not the remains of an article, may be also a substitute for the

aspirate. Another representative of this sign before a word relating to the voice is *c;* thus *carol,* which means both a *song* and to *sing,* has before its root *ar, c* for the aspirate *h.* The *c* of *canere,* of which the root must be *an,* is also for the aspirate.

If we now take away the *j* of the French *jaser,* which is here for the aspirate, *as* will be the root, of which the *a* being for *oi,* this root is shown to be equal to *ois,* which is the root of *oiseau.* And when this root receives such a substitute for the aspirate as *v,* it will become *vois,* and this is but a different form of *voix,* just as *voix* is but a different form of *vox.* And as initial consonants have a tendency to take vowels before them, *vois* can become *avois,* that is, when the *o* is dropped, *avis,* which is the Latin of *bird;* and, though French, it is certainly its elder form. And at that time, when *avis* was *avois,* it may have had also the meaning the French *avis* has at present, that of *advice.* According to this view, advice would have been first called after the idea to *say,* and not after to *see.* When we now ask a friend's advice, we are more accustomed to use such a phrase as "What do you *say?*" than "What do you *see?*" And granting *avois*—this assumed form of the Latin *avis*—to have once meant *advice,* this were enough to lead to the belief that birds could give advice: and may not this have been the origin of *augury?* which is allowed to mean the chattering of birds, *avium garritus.*

We have seen that the *as* of *jaser* is equal to *ois,* which is the root of *oiseau;* and this being granted, it follows, when we drop the *j*—here for the aspirate—that *jaser* may have once been *oiser,* which would mean, to *chatter like birds.* This view is confirmed by *gazouiller,* which, from its *g* being also for the aspirate, might have just

as well been written *jazouiller*. And when we now bear in mind that the *as* of *jaser* and the *az* of *gazouiller* are each for the *ois* of *oiseau*, and when we drop the *g* of *gazouiller*, what shall we obtain but *oisouiller*, to which every Frenchman would at once attach the meaning he gives to *gazouiller*, that is, to *chatter like birds*. Hence in *jaser* and *gazouiller* we have really the same word, and from which it would appear that idle talk was first signified by the chattering of birds. Whatever may be now the difference in meaning—and if any it must be very slight—between *jaser* and *gazouiller*, it can be only conventional.

On finishing those etymologies suggested by the word *bird*, I consult other authorities in order to see how far I may have been successful. They all confirm my views, though they know nothing of the original meaning of bird. M. Littré draws attention to the identity of the *jas* of *jaser* and the *gaz* of *gazouiller*, but he does not seem to suspect that in the roots of *jas* and *gaz*—that is, in *as* and *az*—we have the *ois* of *oiseau*. Nor does he suspect that this *ois* can be traced to the Latin *avis*, and that *gazouiller* is literally when its *g*—here replacing the aspirate—is dropped, *oisouiller*.

The following, from De Roquefort, confirms also what I have said of *jaser*: "Causer, babiller comme un coq; être indiscret par bavardage. On se sert encore du verbe *jaser* en parlant des *oiseaux*."

According to Nodier, whose whole life appears to have been devoted to the study of words, both *oiseau* and *gazouillement* have been made through imitating the chirping of birds. Thus De Roquefort gives from this authority the following under *oiseau*: "La construction de ce mot, dit M. Nodier, est extrêmement imitative; il est

composé de cinq voyelles liées par une lettre doublement sifflante, et il resulte de cette combinaison une espèce de gazouillement très propre à donner une idée de celui des oiseaux." But this is a mistake. In *avis*, which is radically the same word, there is no such combination.

It would seem that many birds have all radically the same name. Witness *oie*, in which we can perceive the *oi* of *oiseau*. Its English form *goose* has, when its sign for the aspirate is dropped—leaving *oose*—still the same root. We may see in *gans*, German of *goose*, when we drop its nasal sound, leaving *gas*, a word equal to *gos*, and consequently to *goose*. *Gas* is also equal to the *gaz* of *gazouiller*. And when we drop only the *g* of *gans*, we get the *ans* of *anser*, its Latin form. But a vowel being due between the *n* and *s* of the *ans* of *anser*, it follows that *ans* is equal to *anas*, and this is the Latin, not of a *goose*, but a *duck*.

Another proof that very different kinds of birds have radically the same name is shown by the following: "Jars, le mâle de l'oie, ainsi dit du cri de cet oiseau. Huet le dérive du Bas-Breton *jar*, poule[a]."

By this we see that a gander and a hen have been named alike, just as a goose and a duck have been in Latin. And that the voice must have been the source to which those names are to be traced is further shown by the *can* of *canard* not being different from the *can* of *canere*, to *sing*.

If we now observe that the *garrit* of *garritus*, which means the *chattering of birds*, may have easily become *gart* in some other language or dialect of the Latin, and that its *g* may have been often replaced by another substitute for the aspirate, such as *b*; we shall instead of

[a] De Roquefort.

gart—this contracted form of *garrit*—have *bart*, whence *word*, *bard*, and *bird*.

But all birds cannot have been called after such an idea as *word* or *voice;* for those which have qualities remarkably peculiar to themselves may have obtained names expressive of them. Thus the hawk has been called, as shown farther back, after the idea to *seize* or *carry off*, and the swan has been called after *wan*, its *white* colour.

We may now close our explanation of the myth Mercury or Hermes. It is plain that his history has grown out of the different meanings of his name, which it were wrong for this reason to regard as the original of any of the words from which it is derived. We may say that ἑρμίδιον, a small statue of Mercury, has been called after *Hermes;* and to which we may add the two following: ἕρμαιος, of Mercury; ἕρμειον, temple of Mercury. But it is a mistake to derive, as all philologists seem to have done, the following words from Hermes: ἑρμηνεύω, to interpret; ἑρμηνεία, ἑρμήνευμα, interpretation; ἑρμηνευτής, interpreter; ἑρμηνευτικός, explanatory. And to what source should all these words be traced if not to Hermes? They should be traced to ῥῆμα, which means *word*, and Mercury was called the WORD, and he was, for this reason, worshipped as God; the roots of language being in the beginning man's only words, each serving to signify the *sun*, out of whose first name they all grew, and the sun was then believed to be God. The word ἑρμῆς does not mean *interpreter*, but it is radically the same as the word which has this meaning (ἑρμηνευτής), and it was this circumstance suggested the belief that Hermes was an interpreter. It can moreover be easily conceived that however ancient

the story we have of Hermes may be, it must be a great deal less so than a word signifying interpreter. This mistake is that very common one of taking a derivative for an original. The several Greek words, above set down as so many instances of this evident fault, are to be found in M. Regnier's "Racines Grecques;" but no other Greek scholar who has referred to those words appears to be less deserving of censure. But why is it so? Because they knew that those words must have roots, and not conceiving how they could come from a word so dissimilar in appearance as ῥῆμα, they have been led to derive them from ἑρμῆς, a mistake as grave as if they were to derive good from goodly, or bad from badly, instead of deriving goodly and badly from good and bad.

And though the difference in form between two such words as ῥῆμα and ἑρμῆς is very considerable, it is not so much so as the difference between Hermes and Mercury; yet these two words name not only the same person, as every one knows, but, as our principles have shown, they make—radically considered—one and the same word.

The question now is, was there ever in ancient times such a person as Mercury, and if so, what was he? There may have very well been a person of this name, but who can tell what he was? He may have been a very learned man, an interpreter, a great merchant or a notorious thief, for his name suggests all these characters, not to mention some others; so that if he were called after any quality for which he was remarkable, it were now impossible to guess what that particular quality may have been.

So much for the origin of the myth Mercury. Many important circumstances may, through the author's want

of sufficient discernment and research, have been omitted; but more than enough, he presumes, has been shown to open the way to further inquiry, and enable the philologist of future times to make up, by new discoveries of his own, for all present deficiencies.

CHAPTER XII.

BACCHUS.

THE Greek of Bacchus is *Βάκχος*, and of which the radical part *ακχ* is reducible to *ak*; and as the *k* of this root might be replaced by any other consonant, there can be no difference between such forms as *ak*, *as*, *an*, *at*, &c. There must have been, therefore, a time when the single sign *a*, or the parts of which it is composed, that is, *oi*, *ei*, *io*, or *ie*, served to name Bacchus.

As to the B of *Βάκχος*, it is for the aspirate, so that such persons as were not accustomed to aspirate initial vowels, must instead of *Βάκχος* have named this divinity *Ἄκχος*. This accounts for his being also named *Ἴακχος*, which is but a different form of *Ἄκχος*.

Now the root *ak*, here noticed, does not differ in the least from the *aq* of *aqua*; and this ought to be, for water is drink and so is wine, which was, as I have already shown, named after water. How now did the root *ak* become the *ον* of *οἶνος*, Greek of *wine*? By its

a having, under its form *oi*, taken a nasal sound after it instead of a guttural; that is, *n* instead of *k*. And the *oin* thus obtained, when aspirated by these substitutes of the *h*, namely, *b*, *w*, and *v*, becomes *boin*, *woin*, and *voin*, out of which grew the Spanish *bino*, the English *wine*, and the *vin* of the Latin *vinum*. Nor can the *bin* of the Spanish *bino* differ from the *πίν* of the Greek *πίνω*, to *drink*; and when we drop the *i* of the form *boin* we get the *bon* of *bonus*, and as *bonus* means *good*, and as this idea was called after *God*, we thus see that *oin*—this other form of *ak*—must have once not only named *Bacchus*, but have also meant both *wine* and *God*. Hence grew the belief that Bacchus was the god of wine.

From all we have already seen, we can easily account for such a word as wine meaning also God; we know it arises from this drink having been called after water, and water after life, and life after God. This etymology may remind the reader of the one given farther back, when I had occasion to show that Le Dieu *bon* was sometimes taken for both Jupiter and Bacchus; that is, for the supposed supreme Author of goodness, and also for the god of wine. Every one can now tell why it has been so.

I said above that the root *ak* of *Βάκχος* might end with any other consonant as well as with *k*. And this statement is now confirmed by the *od* of *God*; which *od* is as equal to *oid* as it is to *oin*, root of *woin*, now written *wine*. And if instead of the *n* of *woin* we use *s* we shall get *wois*, in which we see, since the *o* and *i* of this form make *a*, the *was* of the German *wasser*; and in the same way, when instead of the *n* of *woin* or the *s* of *was*, we use *t*, we shall get the *wat* of *water*. And if instead of the *n*, *s*, or *t* of any of these forms we use *m*, we shall get

oim for *oin*, and *oim* becomes, by the dropping of the *o*, *im*, which is the Hebrew of *water*, and but another form of *iin*, which is in the same language the word for *wine*.

Now as the *oi* of any of the above forms is the same as *io*, and *io* the same as *ie*, we see that the *ois* of *wois* —whence the *was* of *wasser*—cannot differ from *ΙΗΣ*, which is the well-known monogram of Bacchus, and also of Jesus; indeed it is the three first letters of *Ιησοῦς*, Greek of *Jesus*. This monogram must have therefore once served as a name for both Bacchus and Jesus, because signifying a God; whence came the idea life and that of water, because the latter was called after life. *ΙΗΣ* means, according to the priests, *Jesus hominum Salvator*. But this is a mistake. Its root *Ιη* is well explained by Parkhurst[4], who, alluding to its Hebrew form יה *ie*, says, "Our blessed Lord solemnly claims to Himself what is intended by this Divine Name יה *ie*. John viii. 58: 'Before Abraham was *ΕΓΩ ΕΙΜΙ*, I AM.'" And it is again well explained by the same authority, when he says, "From this Divine Name יה *ie*, the ancient Greeks had their *Ιὴ*, *Ιή*, in their invocations of the Gods, particularly of Apollo, that is, the Light."

Nor does Parkhurst fail to observe that *Ιή* was also written after the Oriental manner, from right to left, which confirms what I stated of *OI*, namely, that it was equal to *IO*, and consequently to *IE*; which is, I say, the root of *ΙΗΣ*. Be it further observed that יה *ie* is also explained by Parkhurst, "The Essence, HE WHO IS" *TO ΩN* of the Greeks.

And this is as it ought to be, for *water*, as already fully shown, was called after *life*, so that it is equal to

[4] Lex., p. 128.

the verb to *be*. When we do therefore drop the *I* of *IHΣ*, and consider its *H* as equal to *O*, and consequently to *oi* or *a*, we shall see that *HΣ* cannot differ from *as*, which in Sanskrit is the verb to *be*. But if instead of *I* we drop the *H* of *IHΣ*, we shall have *IΣ*; that is, in Roman characters *is*, in which we have still the verb to *be*, in Hebrew יש *is*.

As Ἰή means also a *voice*, a *shout*, &c., this accounts for Bacchus having been worshipped with much noise and tumult. This is confirmed by the verb Ἰάχω, to *shout*, *make a great noise*, &c., for its radical part Ἰάχ cannot differ from the Ἰάκ of Ἰάκχος, the ancient name of Bacchus.

Ἰή was also used by the ancient Greeks when they invoked Apollo, as Parkhurst testifies[5]; and this also ought to be, for Bacchus was, in common with the other heathen divinities, the same as Sol. Thus Higgins, alluding to the latter, says: "Bacchus, Osiris, Hercules, Adonis, &c., were personifications of that great luminary[6]."

It may be difficult to make any one suppose that Bacchus was also known by the name of Eve, yet I have no doubt but he was. Thus Higgins[7] says, while giving Parkhurst for his authority, "The Bacchantes invoked Eve by name in their ceremonies." This happens to be a mistake. It was not Eve they invoked but Bacchus, this divinity being then called Eve. And this can be easily conceived; for the word חוה *eue* or *Eve*, has for one of its meanings, as Higgins himself admits, "to *live*, *exist*, or *be*;" and this meaning, as I have shown, corresponds with that of *IHΣ*, the monogram of Bacchus, since in *IHΣ* we have both *as*, Sanskrit of *be*, and also *is*. I find still in the same page of the "Anaca-

[5] Lex., p. 128. [6] Anac., vol. ii. p. 100. [7] Ibid., vol. i. p. 523.

lypsis" that the name *Eve* meant also a *serpent*, and that Bacchus was worshipped under the form of a snake, which is a serpent: "Maximus Tyrius states, that when Alexander entered India he found a prince who kept an enormous snake as the image of Bacchus." And as water was called after life, and as to *live* means to *be*, we thus see that Eve and Bacchus must have been in meaning equal to each other; since Bacchus, as we have found, must have first meant *water* and afterwards *wine*. We should, moreover, not forget what M. Littré has shown under his article *eau;* namely, that "Esse signifiant *eau*, se trouve dans le nom de plusieurs localités du Berry." Of the importance of this true statement M. Littré saw not the consequence; and there is something else in the same article, which is also very important, and to which he seems to have been equally indifferent, and it is that he gives among several old words for water, the name Eve itself. He then little thought that Eve was one of the names given to Bacchus, and that the word *Bacchus* itself means *water*. Had M. Littré known this he would not have derived Bacchus from a Sanskrit word meaning to *eat*, because this divinity "dévore les sacrifices."

Two words very different in form, as different as Bacchus and Eve, may, we now see, be alike in meaning. But what two names can differ more in form from each other than Jesus and Bacchus, and yet they have radically the same meaning, even the same monogram. And that this identity of meaning is no mistake of mine, I am now going to show by the admission of a very learned and religious antiquary: "Athenæus IX. gives Bacchus the name of Jēios. I doubt not but it is the great name of Jehovah, which they learnt from among

the Jews; and that Evohe Sabohe is the Jehovah Sabaoth, Lord of Hosts, in the Scripture; whence Bacchus was called Sabazius likewise. Diodorus Siculus says expressly, the Jews call God Jao; and the learned universally agree *that* is Jehovah. Evohe is but another awkward way of pronouncing it.[8]"

We have already shown, on the authority of Parkhurst, that Jove, Jehovah, and Jesus were names of equal import; and now again, by another orthodox authority, it is shown that the name Bacchus also was the same as Jehovah, which cannot be without its being also the same as Jesus. Indeed, the name *Jēios* is but another form of Ἰησοῦς or *Jesus.*

But what other two names can differ more in form than Jesus and Christ, and yet they have each the meaning of Saviour, though the learned assign to the name Christ no other meaning than that of the Anointed. This is, however, only one of its several other meanings. That Jesus means Saviour we are told by St. Matthew; and to find the same meaning in the name *Christ* we need only observe that its part *chr* cannot differ from *cheir,* Greek of *hand,* after which idea that of saving was called. Hence the Greek χαῖρε, which is but another form of χείρ, is rendered into Latin by *salve;* and this is radically the same as *salus, health,* and *salvation,* and also as *salvator* or *saviour.* Nor can *sol,* radically considered, differ from any of these; and the sun, as the learned allow, was called a *saviour,* because revered as God by the heathens; but not because he seems to ascend from the lower to the higher hemisphere, which Drummond suggests as shown in the passage quoted from this learned authority farther back.

[8] Stukely, Pal. Sac. No. I. p. 21.

It would seem from all we have just seen of the name Bacchus, that it was because this word meant water it became equal to that of Jesus, which has also this meaning as well as that of Saviour. And why should this be? Because water was called after life, and life after the sun, who was believed to be a saviour. According to this reasoning any ancient character, whose name was perceived to mean water, might have been also regarded as a saviour. And this has really happened. Thus the name *Joseph* cannot, radically considered, differ from *Jesus*, for its most radical part is *Jos*, and this is the same as the *Ἰης* of *Ἰησοῦς*, and the *Jes* of *Jesus*. Another word meaning *water* is *Moses*, of which *os* is the root; so that its *m* is only a substitute for one of the signs replacing the aspirate, such as we see in *μορτός*, which is the same as *βροτός*, its earlier form.

This will account for both Joseph and Moses having been regarded as saviours. And which will, no doubt, be sufficiently confirmed by the following passage: "The Abbé de Rocher shows that several kings are copies of Abraham, several of Joseph, several of Moses, &c., and that Joseph was the Proteus of the Egyptians and Greeks. He observes that Joseph was called a *saviour*, and this, from the peculiarity of his story, would be of no consequence; but the Abbé artlessly observes, which is indeed of great consequence, that St. Jerome calls Joseph *redemptor mundi*. The Abbé was not aware of the consequence of showing that Moses and Joseph are *repeatedly* described, by different persons, particularly the latter, as a saviour[9].

But the author of the "Anacalypsis" knew not the cause of this any more than the Abbé de Rocher, St. Jerome,

[9] Anacalypsis, vol. ii. p. 16.

or any one else; it is simply to be ascribed to the circumstance of every such name as Joseph or Moses happening, like the name Jesus, to mean water, whence it was found to mean saviour also.

It could not be otherwise, for the sun was regarded as God, as the source of all existence, as the essence of Being itself, after which grand idea water was called, because serving to support life. Hence, as M. Littré shows under *eau, water,* the verb *esse* had the same meaning, and this authority states also, under the verb être, the following: "Dieu, dans l'Ecriture sainte, s'appelle celui qui *est.*" That is, He calls himself existence.

Now the Rev. Dr. Adam Clarke, a man as remarkable for his great piety as for his extensive knowledge, from not knowing that the name Bacchus had anciently the meaning of water, and that this must have led to his having been confounded with Moses, whose name happens to have the same meaning, has, on perceiving the several points of resemblance in the history of those two characters, been induced to suppose that the history given of Bacchus must have been copied from that of Moses. These are his words:—

"Cicero reckons five Bacchuses, one of which, according to Orpheus, was born of the River Nile; but, according to common opinion, he was born on the banks of that river. Bacchus is expressly said to have been exposed on the river Nile; hence he is called Nilus, both by Diodorus and Macrobius; in the hymns of Orpheus he is named Myses, because he was drawn out of the water[1]."

Now the first name ever given in old times to all the rivers in the world was that of water. According to Parkhurst אר *ar,* means a *river,* a *flood.* And the

[1] See his comments on the Bible, art. "Moses."

same word, with the addition of an *i* (יאר *iar*) is also explained, "A river, a stream, a flux of water[2];" and Higgins, referring to the latter form, observes as follows: "The Nile was often called יאר *iar*, which is the Hebrew word for *river*, and was probably the Egyptian one also[3]."

But when Bacchus was called after the Nile, it was not because his name bore any resemblance in form to either *Nilus* or *Iar*, but because it meant a river, and consequently water. Hence in the *Bacch* of *Bacchus* we have the German word *Bach*, which is explained a *current*, a *stream*, a *rivulet*, &c. As in the *Mos* of *Moses* an *i* is understood with its *o*, this part of the name is equal to *mois*, and this is confirmed by the French of Moses, which is *Moïse* and not *Mose*. Now what do we perceive in *mois* if not the radical part of *moist*, which means *wet*, and it must have been called after water; and if we drop the *o* of *moist* we get *mist*, which is still but another word for water. Nor can the *mois* of *moist*, nor the *mis* of *mist* differ from the *Mys* of *Myses*, the name given to Bacchus in the hymns of Orpheus, as the Rev. Dr. Adam Clarke states. Another name given to Bacchus is *Misem*[4], of which the radical part *mis* cannot differ from the *mois* just noticed, for its *i* has *o* understood.

Let us now observe, what has been already shown several times, namely, that *m* and *b* do interchange; witness the Hebrew מריא *mria* and בריא *bria*, having each the same meaning—that of *fat;* and the Greek μορτός, *mortal*, being the same as βροτός; and the English word *brine* being for the *marine* of the French *mariner*, to *pickle*. According to this interchange the

[2] Lex., p. 29. [3] Anac., vol. i. p. 135. [4] Anac., vol. ii. p. 19.

mois noticed above cannot differ from the *bois* of *boisson*, which from its meaning drink must have been called after water, as we have already shown; and which is further proved by the interchange of *b* and *w*, which brings *boiss* equal to the *wass* of *wasser*, its *oi* making *a*.

It is thus made clear that the names Moses and Bacchus have each the meaning of water; and as water has been called after life, and life after the sun, and as the sun has been called a saviour, this will account for Moses, as shown above on the authority of St. Jerome, having also had this epithet applied to him. Bacchus, too, has been called a saviour as well as Hercules, Æsculapius, and others, which arose from their being the same as the sun.

Hence Higgins says, "Jupiter, Bacchus, Hercules, Apollo, Æsculapius, had each the appellation of saviour. They are all indeed the same person—Jehovah[5]. But when we observe that the Hebrew of Moses (משה *mse*) cannot, on account of the constant interchange in Hebrew as well as in Greek of *e* and *h*, differ from משח *msh*, which means to *anoint*, we can easily conceive why he was styled a saviour, this title and the Anointed being synonymous. When used as a noun משח *msh* means *oil*, so that to *anoint* means simply to *oil*, that is, to *smear* with *oil*. And as *oil* is a liquid substance, it must have been named after *water*. Hence in Sander and Trenel's Dictionnaire Hebreu-Français, one of the meanings given to this verb is *arroser*, that is, to *water*. Parkhurst does not mistake when he derives the name MESSIAH from the Hebrew noun משח *msh*, *oil*, for the MESSIAH is the Anointed. It was because *oil* was named

[5] Vol. i., p. 313.

after *water*, and was consequently easily traced to life, and to one of the names of the sun, that the belief first prevailed that it should be used for religious purposes. Hence *unction* is used in the sense of *oil*, and *extreme unction* means the anointing of a dying person with sacred *oil*.

It is usual to derive the word *oil* from the name of the tree that produces it, but this is a mistake; it is the tree—the olive—that was named after the liquid substance it yields. Let us notice the word *olive* itself. As its *o* has *i* understood it is equal to *oilive*, in which we see not only the word *oil*, but since *o* and *i* make *a*, the significant word *alive*, and which becomes with *s*—here a substitute for the aspirate—*salive*, which is also a liquid substance; and it is worthy of remark, that it has been often applied as a cure. It is also well worthy of remark that the Greek of *unction* or *grease*, σάλιον, means also *salive*. In the *sal* of these forms we see not only the *sal* of *salus*, health, *salvation*, &c., but in its root *al*, a name in Hebrew given to both the true God and the sun.

Now as the same word may signify *saviour*, *life*, and *water*, this were sufficient to suggest the belief that Bacchus was, like the sun, a saviour, and that from his name meaning *water* he was born on the banks of a *river*, this word being in Hebrew both *ar* and *iar*, of which the latter was the name of the Nile, the river from which Moses was also drawn. And as the Hebrew of Moses (משה *mse*) is radically the same as משך *msk*, it may, like this word, mean to *draw* as well as *saviour*, *life*, or *water*.

From what we have now seen, it is made evident that had Moses never lived, such a character as Bacchus is represented would be just as he is at present, and as he

ever has been. Dr. Adam Clarke does therefore mistake when he supposes that the account we have of Bacchus must have been borrowed from that which we have of Moses. The learned, from their knowing nothing of the origin of human speech, and the superstitious notions to which language has given birth, have been thus often led into very serious errors.

When the author of the "Anacalypsis" was travelling on the Continent, he found that the Saviour and the Blessed Virgin were in a great many churches painted black; and he therefore thought that the religion they symbolized must, in some way or other, have come from India, because Cristna, the Saviour of the Indians, is represented black. But the word Cristna, Crishna, or Creeshna, is allowed to mean *black;* and this were enough, even though he were naturally red or white, to suggest the belief, at a time when all men believed in the Word as in God, that he must have been black. And when Christ was painted black, may it not have also arisen from many of His earliest followers having out of their reverence for the *Word*, considered themselves bound so to represent Him? All the gods and goddesses were black and white by turns. Thus Higgins says, "The Alma Mater, the Goddess of Multimummia, the founders of the oracles, the Memnons, or first idols, were always black. Venus, Juno, Jupiter, Apollo, Bacchus, Hercules, Asteroth, Adonis, Horus, Apis, Osiris, Ammon—in short, all the wood and stone deities were black[6]."

But how are we to account for the heathen divinities not having been black every where? Because the word which with one people meant black may with another people have meant white. Thus in Saxon *blác* means

[6] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 286.

white, but without the accent it means *black*. But why should this be? Because darkness was called after night, and night after the moon, and the moon after the sun; by which we see that what is dark or black may be traced—but indirectly—to the sun, to which source all such ideas as light and white are also to be traced. Higgins further observes, "In my search into the origin of the ancient Druids, I continually found, at last, my labours terminated with something *black*. Thus the oracles at Dodona, and of Apollo at Delphi, were founded by *black* doves. Doves are not often, I believe never really, *black*[7]." This happened from the word for *dove* having, on this occasion, meant *black*, though it must on other occasions have meant *white*. The Gaelic word for *black* is *dubh*, which cannot differ from *duvh*, nor *duvh* from *dove*.

How strong must have been their faith in the doctrine of the WORD who first represented the image of Apollo as black; for, Apollo being the sun, their eyes must have told them that this divinity was never black! Though the first name ever given to the Nile must have been one for river, and consequently for water, which idea, as we have often shown, is through *life* traceable to the sun; yet its present name (Nilus) is said to mean black, and that its equivalent in many languages has the same meaning. One of its many names is the same as that of the Indian Saviour. Thus Higgins, on the authority of Maurice, says, "The river Nile, in Sanskrit books, is often called Crishna[8]." This accounts for the Nile having been also revered as a god.

[7] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 137.

[8] Anac., vol. i. p. 136; and Maurice, Bram. Fraud exposed, p. 80.

We might still add to the preceding etymologies relating to Bacchus many others, but a few more will, we presume, be found sufficient to convince every one that the whole of his history must have grown out of the different meanings of his name. Thus in *bos* and *bous*, to which the *Bac* of *Bacchus* is equal, we see the Latin and Greek of *ox*, and it must have been this suggested the idea that it was this god first taught men to plough with oxen. In *boc*, which is also equal to the *Bac* of *Bacchus*, we see the Saxon of *book*, and this accounts for Bacchus being called *Liber*, which has this meaning in Latin. Hence Godfrey Higgins, who saw not the cause of his being so called, says, "We have found Bacchus called Liber, and Boc or Book[9]." And as *boc* or *book* was so called from *boc*, that is, *beech* (still equal to the *Bac* of *Bacchus*), because the northern nations are said to have written on the bark of the tree so called, even so was *liber*, a *book*, so called because it means the *rind* of a *tree*, upon which the Latins anciently wrote. But this Saxon word for *book* happens to be, in the same tongue, equal to the *buc* of *bucca*, and to the *bek* of *bekos* in Greek; each meaning a *buck* or *he-goat*, and this accounts for Bacchus being represented in the skin of this animal. But *liber* having also the meaning of *free*, this led to the worship of Bacchus in all *free* cities, and also to his being styled by the Greeks the deliverer, *Eleutherios*.

As Bacchus was also called *Myses*, that is, *Moses*, and as this name cannot, from the interchange of *m* and *n*, differ from *Nises* or *Nusos*, he was hence styled *Dionusos*, that is, the god *Nusos*, by which is meant *Moses*, or the god of *water*. This, too, is the origin of the belief that

[9] Anacalypsis, vol. ii. p. 163.

he was educated on the mountain Nysa. And as the *nys* or *nus* of these forms cannot differ from either *nux* or *nox*, the Greek and Latin of *night*, this accounts for the sacrifices of Bacchus having been celebrated in the night, and also for his being called *Nuctilius*. And as *nus* or *nys* is still equal to the *nax* of *Naxus*, this was supposed by some to have been the place of his education.

The cause of Bacchus being represented with a staff or thyrsus must be also traced to his name, this being radically the same as both *baktron* and *baculus*, the Greek and Latin of *staff*.

In other respects the more we examine the name of Bacchus, the more this divinity appears to have been a genuine type of the Saviour of the world; and how acceptable this must appear to all the learned and pious Christians who receive so many of the heathen divinities as symbolical precursors of their Redeemer! But for the good Christian who knows nothing more of the origin of his religion than what he was told, when a child, by his priest or his grandfather to believe, and who has never deviated, nor has had the power to deviate, from all he then imbibed, this knowledge is never needed. But what would become of the learned Christian without it? He would look upon all he was taught in his childhood as a fable. He would say there has been ever and always a divine incarnation; the son of a god who was born of a virgin and crucified for the salvation of a sinful world, and that this happened every where over all the earth long anterior to the birth of Christ. But, thanks to the doctrine of types, he may not entertain so dangerous a belief any longer; but, like Parkhurst and Godfrey Higgins, live and die a very good Christian.

But there have been many characters of the heathen

mythology named Bacchus, whose lives and adventures can be all traced to the different meanings of their names; on these, however, we need not dwell. As we write only to prove our discovery of the origin of language and myths, and as this twofold discovery has, by all we have shown, been made already sufficiently evident, what has yet to follow is solely intended for the edification of such Christians as would fain believe in the religion of their forefathers, but who, from their happening to know something of the heathen mythology and, most unfortunately, nothing at all about symbols or types, find it impossible to bring down their reason to the level of such believers as have never inquired or reasoned nor intend to do so.

The reader will please to recollect that Bacchus is, in common with all the other divinities of the heathen mythology, the same as Sol, Helios, Jove, or Jupiter; and hence we need not wonder that the feasts given in honour of him, and called *Brumalia* after his name Brumius, have been also given in honour of the sun. "The Egyptians," says my authority, "celebrated the birth of the son of Isis on the 25th of December, or the eighth day before the calends of January. This Eratosthenes says was the god of day, and that Isis or Ceres was symbolical of the year. The son of the Holy Virgin, as they called Ceres, was Osiris; he was born on the 25th of December. At his birth Plutarch says that a voice was heard, saying, 'On this day is born *the supreme Lord of the universe*, the beneficent king Osiris.' On this day, at the same moment, the Romans began to celebrate the feast of the Brumalia in honour of the birth of the god of day, of the Sol invincible, *natalis Soli invicti*, described in vast numbers of very old pictures in

Italy, with the legend Deo Soli, perhaps mistaken by the monks, and thus retained; or perhaps having a secret meaning. Throughout all the ancient world we have seen that the birth of the god Sol, under different names, was celebrated on the 25th of December, the day of the birth of Jesus. Thus, in similar accordance with the history of Jesus, the god Sol, on the 23rd of March, was, by one means or another, put to death; and exactly three months succeeding the 25th of December, viz., on the 25th of March, he was believed to be raised to life again; and his resurrection was celebrated with great rejoicings. The reader has already seen that Jesus was mistaken for Iao, or the sun, and that all the gods, Bacchus, Osiris, Hercules, Adonis, &c., were all personifications of that luminary. As Jesus and Iao were born on the 25th of December, it follows that Jesus rose again on the 25th of March, after being cruelly put to death; so the different incarnations of Iao, from whom his birth was copied, should be found to have been put to death in a similar manner, and this we shall presently find was exactly the fact[1]."

Does not this writer forget himself when he here allows his readers to understand that the birth of Christ was copied from the different incarnations of Iao? Should he not rather say that the different incarnations of Iao were given to the whole world as so many types of the birth of Christ? This would have been in perfect accordance with the faith which we have shown him to profess, conjointly with Dr. Parkhurst, in the doctrine of types. But the present statement may have been made previous to his conversion to that doctrine; for no one in the least acquainted with the writings of Godfrey

[1] Anacalypsis, vol. ii. p. 100.

Higgins can for a moment suppose that their candid and learned author ever yet published a sentiment in collision with the opinions of others to which he was not prompted by conviction and a sincere love of truth. His "Anacalypsis," to which, on account of the extracts I have taken from it, I own myself so greatly indebted is, in its way, an invaluable production, and no respectable library should be without it. Indeed it is in itself almost a whole library, so useful, rare; and many are the works with which it is constantly bringing the reader acquainted. As for myself it were no exaggeration to declare, that from its drawing my attention so often to certain curious particulars in history and religion, and that from my own little stock of books being so very limited in number, I should feel myself at a great loss without it. It is seldom or never off my table.

In Noel's Mythological Dictionary, is the following: "Sabus, ancien roi d'Italie, qui apprit aux habitants à cultiver la vigne; ce bienfait le fit mettre au rang des dieux, et fit donner son nom au peuple qu'il gouvernait."

As this King Sabus is here said to have taught his people the cultivation of the vine, we may be sure that it was his name first suggested this belief, and that it must for this reason be radically the same as that of Bacchus. This becomes evident when we remark that the usual form of such a word in Greek would be *sabos*, the ending *os* in this language being equal to the ending *us* in Latin. But what is the meaning of *sabos?* It is explained in Greek, "a votary of Bacchus." The *sab* of *sabus* or *sabos* must have therefore been a word for *water*, as well as for things relating to it. Hence *sabaia* signified *beer*, and consequently *drink*, with the Illyrians; and its radical part, *sab*, is also the radical

part of *sabanoh* in Greek, and *sabanum* in Latin, each meaning a towel for wiping the body after *bathing*, that is, after coming out of a bath; so that each word has been named after *water*, just as *sudarium*, a *pocket handkerchief*, has been named after *sudor*, *sweat*, and *sudor* after *hudor*, Greek of *water*. Another word precisely equal to *sabanon* and *sabanum* is *sabina*, a dress worn immediately after being *baptized*; that is, after being dipped in *water*.

The *sab* here noticed is, when read as in Hebrew, the same as *bas*, and this cannot differ from the *Bac* or *Bacc* of *Bacchus*, which accounts for this divinity being also named *Sabazius* and *Sabadius*, neither of which forms can differ from *Sabaoth*, as the following serves to show: "The Ineffable Name also, which according to the Masoretic punctuation, is pronounced Jehóvah, was anciently pronounced Jaho, Jaō, or Jeuō, as was also Sabazius or Sabadius, which is the same word as Sabaoth, one of the scriptural titles of the true God, only adapted to the pronunciation of a more polished language. The Latin name for the Supreme God belongs also to the same root; Tu-pater, Jupiter, signifying Father Teu, though written after the ancient manner without the diphthong, which was not in use for many ages after the Greek colonies settled in Latium, and introduced the Arcadian alphabet. We find St. Paul likewise acknowledging that the Jupiter of the poet Aratus was the god whom he adored[2]; and Clemens Alexandrinus explains St. Peter's prohibition of worshipping after the manner of the Greeks not to mean a prohibition of worshipping the same god, but merely of the corrupt mode in which he was then worshipped[3]."

[2] Acts xvii.

[3] Stromat. lib. v. P. Knight, p. 195. Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 323, &c.

Let us bear in mind that Sabaoth is not only, like Sabazius or Sabadius, equal to the name Bacchus, but that it was also one of the scriptural titles of the true God; for there are several other words radically the same, and which I beg here to set down with their meanings as I find them in Parkhurst; and the intelligent reader will, I have no doubt, admit that they lead to an important discovery, namely, the origin of THE SABBATH.

"Sbo [sabo], sufficiency, satisfaction, saturity; to be satisfied, saturated, to have enough; to satisfy, saturate; satisfied, satiated, full; sufficiency, plenty, saturity, fulness." Parkhurst refers to the different places in the Bible where these meanings are to be found, but which places I consider it unnecessary to quote here.

"Sbo [sabo] as a number, he explains it by *seven*, giving it also the form *saboe* and *sabot*; and under this meaning he observes as follows: "The number *seven* was denominated from this root because on that day Jehovah completed or finished all His work, or made it *sufficient* for the purposes intended by it. The *seventh* day was also sanctified or set apart from the beginning, as a religious sabbath or rest, to remind believers of that rest which God then entered into, and of that *sabo*, *completion* or *fulness* of joy which is in His presence for evermore. Hence the very early and general division of time into *weeks*, or periods of *seven* days. Hence the sacredness of the *seventh* day, not only among believers before the giving of the law, but also among the heathen, for which they give the very same reason as Moses doth, namely, that on it all things were ended or completed. Hence also *seven* was, both among believers and the heathen, the number of *sufficiency* or *completion*, whence in Hebrew *sabo* is used indefinitely for *many*, *a good many*,

a sufficient number." Under these observations the following valuable note is given by Parkhurst: "We find from time immemorial, says the learned president Goguet, the use of this period among all nations without any variation in the form of it. The Israelites, Assyrians, Egyptians, Indians, Arabians, and in a word, all the nations of the East, have in all ages made use of a week consisting of seven days[4]. We find the same custom among the ancient Romans, Gauls, Britons, Germans, the nations of the North and of America[5]. Many vain conjectures have been formed concerning the reasons and motives which determined all mankind to agree in this primitive division of their time. 'Nothing but Tradition concerning the space of time employed in the Creation [Formation, says Parkhurst] of the world could give rise to this universal, immemorial practice[6].' The months (of the ancient Scandinavians) were divided into *weeks of seven days*, a division which hath prevailed among almost all the nations we have any knowledge of from the extremity of Asia to that of Europe[7]."

And to this note Parkhurst adds the following: "See Grotius, De Verit. Relig. Christ., lib. i. cap. 16, note 23, and following; and Mr. Cooke's Enquiry into the Patriarchal and Druidical Religion, p. 4, 5, 2nd edit., and the authors there quoted," p. 662.

Previous to our turning all these admissions to account, let us observe that Parkhurst gives to *sabo* the meaning

[4] See Scaliger de Emendat. Temporum. Selden de Jure Nat. et Gent., lib. iii. cap. 17. Mémoires de l'Academie des Inscript., tom. iv. p. 65.

[5] See Le Spectacle de la Nature, tom. viii. p. 53.

[6] Origin of Laws, &c., vol. i. book iii. ch. 2, art. 2, p. 230. Edit. Edinburgh.

[7] Mallet's Northern Antiquities, vol. i. p. 337.

of *week* also, and states that *saboe* and *sabot* are other forms of it; the former being its feminine, and the latter its form in what Hebrew scholars call its *regimine*. He also explains *sabot* thus: "*To cease, leave off*, or *rest from work*[8]." And at the end of the same page he assigns to it also the meaning of *sabbath*, and this was the last day of the week; that is, Saturday; and it is worthy of remark that the *satur* of this word is also the *satur* of *saturity*, the very word used by Parkhurst in the sense of completion, sufficiency, satisfaction, &c., though of this he saw not the consequence; that is to say, he little suspected that it was this circumstance suggested to the heathen the belief that on Saturday, Sabaoth finished or completed all.

The reader will please to recollect that the idea of tranquillity and consequently of repose, was, as I had occasion to show farther back, called after that of being *seated*, and which etymology we now find confirmed by the name of the day upon which the Lord is said to have reposed; in other words, *sat down* and rested after his labour; and which we call *Saturday;* that is, as the Saxons expressed it *Seaterdag*, or the day of the *seater*, or of him who *seats* himself and takes rest. And this idea of being *seated* is, we know, to be referred to *lowness*, it being the reverse of being *upright* or *standing*. And yet, as we learn from Parkhurst, the word signifying *repose* signifies also *complete*. Why should this be? Because the act of reposing or of being *seated*, is, as just stated, to be referred to *lowness*, and than lowness nothing can be lower, it being an adjective in the fourth degree: *low, lower, lowest, lowness;* miscalled a substantive. Hence *downright* is in English synonymous with *complete;* thus

[8] P. 664.

downright folly, *downright* madness, is the same as *complete* folly, *complete* madness, and to be *down* is to be *low*.

But Saturday was named the seventh day; and why should this be? The answer *seems* to be—because *seven* and *repose* are expressed in Hebrew by the same word, and Saturday was the day of repose. But this word, which is *sabo*, means also *complete;* and we may be asked why should two ideas so dissimilar as *seven* and *complete* be expressed alike? If we answer this question satisfactorily, we tell why *Saturday* and *seven* were named alike; for it is not a satisfactory answer to say that *seven* and *repose* are in Hebrew expressed by the same word. The question is, Why should they be so expressed? This problem I have found more difficult to resolve than I am willing to admit. But every one has, they say, some particular failing or other, and one of my many failings is that I can find out nothing difficult without long thinking on it. Here is how I have solved the present difficulty; that which is *complete* is that which wants none of its parts. Now no man was anciently with the Jews received into the priesthood if found deficient in any of the parts then believed to constitute a *complete* man. This custom prevails even still in the priesthood of the Christian religion. But which were those parts, and how many were there of them? They were the eyes, the hands, the feet, and the organ of generation; and these parts, which make seven, were taken as constituting an efficient member of society, or a man *complete*. Hence it was that the ideas *seven* and *complete* were expressed alike.

Quadrupeds and birds, which are, after man, the superior animals of creation, have also these seven parts—two eyes, four feet, and the organ of generation, constituting

a perfect quadruped; and two eyes, two wings, and two feet, with the organ of generation, constituting a complete bird from the eagle down to the sparrow.

We have now seen enough to convince us that when all the nations over the whole world believed that the Lord, on having completed his work on the seventh day, then rested, it must have been from his name having meanings sufficient to suggest this belief; for it prevailed, as we have seen it admitted, "before the giving of the law." How unreasonable then to assert, as the learned Goguet does, that "Nothing but tradition concerning the space of time employed in the creation of the world, could give rise to this universal, immemorial practice;" for if we grant this, what follows? That the heathen had been made well acquainted with "the *giving* of the law," long anterior to its having been yet given—even to the true believer.

How welcome these different meanings of the radical parts of the name Sabaoth must be to the Christian who believes that his religion had been typified by the heathen long previous to the coming on earth of his Redeemer! But how is the infidel likely to interpret these meanings? It is to be feared that they may confirm him in his incredulity, and that he will say it was from the same word signifying, under its several forms, *the Lord, completed, seventh day, satisfied, retired from labour, rested,* the belief arose that the Lord completed the formation of the world in seven days; and then, being satisfied with his work, took rest. Or the infidel may by these different meanings of the radical parts of the name *Sabaoth,* be happily converted from his infidelity to a firm belief in the doctrine of types, and so at last become a good Christian.

Something else, which may be found a little more startling than any thing we have yet seen remains to be said of Bacchus. It is reported of him that he was brought up by *panthers*, and hence this animal became sacred to him and also to the god Pan, who was made to act towards Bacchus as a foster-father. But why should the god of drink and *Pan* be in any way connected? Because Pan and the *pin* of the Greek *pinō*, to drink, must have been often confounded, for the two words are radically the same, and do not differ from each other but conventionally. Such too is the *pin* of *pinon*, a Greek word meaning *beer;* and *beer* too is but another word for *drink*, and not different from *boire* or *boisson* in French. This brings us to *br*, root of *Bromios*, a name of Bacchus, and not different from the Hebrew word *bar*, which, as we have seen, means not only *son* in Hebrew, but is also significant of *water*. And as *bar*, a *son*, is written also *ben*, because of the interchange of *r* and *n;* this were sufficient to show that the *pin* of *pinō*, to *drink*, is equal to *pir*, and consequently to *par*, and *par* to *bar*, which is the fuller form of the *br* of *Bromios*, this other name of Bacchus. It is thus shown that from *pinō*, *pinon*, and *Pan* being radically the same, and that from the two former being significant of *drink*, Bacchus, the god of drink, was thought to be allied to Pan. But this does not account for Pan being the foster-father of Bacchus, nor for the latter having been brought up by panthers, which are not fishes, nor in any way allied to water. This, however, can be accounted for, and it is by the explanation it requires we come upon what may be considered very startling.

Etymologists suppose that *panther* means *all wild*, because in Greek *pan* is explained by *all*, and *thēr* by *wild*

beast. But this is a mistake, as is shown by its other names in Greek, *pardos* and *pardalis*, as well as by *pardus* in Latin, and *pard* in English; the latter being the radical part of the other form, and not differing any more from *pand* than *bar* and *ben* differ from each other in Hebrew; and *pand* is as equal to *panth*, radical part of *panther*, as *burden* and *burthen* are to each other. *Thēr*, a *wild beast*, does not therefore form any part of the word *panther*.

The usual definition of *panther* is a *spotted animal*, and the radical part of *spot* is *pot;* and that this idea has taken its name from water is shown by the two Greek words *hudria* and *potēr;* for the former means a *water-pot*, its radical part being *hudr*, that is, *hudor*, *water;* and the latter means a *drinking-cup*. And it is worthy of remark, that in this word *potēr*, we have the word *toper*, when we make the ending *er* serve as a prefix, and then read as in Hebrew, and a *toper* is one addicted to *drink*. Let us now observe that by *spot* in the sense of *stain*, we mean any thing *moist* or *wet* that *discolours*. Hence though the *panther* has not been called after *water*, yet its name has this meaning, because called after *spot*. *Stain*, which is synonymous with *spot*, should be traced to the same source. Hence its radical part *tain* is equal to the *tein* of the French word *teindre*, and the *tin* of *tingere* in Latin; and that *stain*, *teindre*, and *tingere* are traceable to *water* is shown by *bapto*, which has the same meaning in Greek; that is, to *dip into water*, and also to *dye*. Such, too, is the origin of to *paint*. Hence *peindre*, in French, is but another form of *teindre*, just as *pingere* is but another form of *tingere* in Latin. And as *dye*, a colour, is *deag* in Saxon, just as *day* is *dæg;* the *y* in English being constantly represented by *g* in Saxon

and German; it is easy to perceive that it is the *teg* of *teggō* in Greek, which means to *moisten*, to *wet*, and to *dye*. Hence the ideas to *paint*, to *stain*, and to *dye* can be all traced up to water, as their primary source. The *panther* might be therefore defined a *painted* as well as a *spotted animal*. And Bacchus might for the same reason have been made the patron of *potters*, *painters*, and *dyers*, his name being suggestive of such characters. Have we not already quoted a passage stating that Jesus, whose name has several of the meanings belonging to that of Bacchus, "was said by some sectaries to be not a *carpenter*, but a *potter*"? And to this let us now add the following: "In one of the apocryphal Gospels, Jesus is said to have been the son of a *dyer* or a *painter*, another of a *potter*, in the four of a *carpenter*, and in all of an *artificer*[9]."

But it is never suspected that the meanings of the name Jesus have suggested these different opinions. The following is still more startling, though not so much so as something else that comes after it: "The Jews say in their Talmud, that the name of Jesus was Bar Panther, but that it was changed into Jesus[1]." This is, I say, very startling, though not so much so as something else; for *Bar* is the Hebrew of SON, and Jesus is called the *Son*. *Bar* is also the root of *debar*, the Hebrew of *word*, and Jesus is called the WORD. This *Bar* is also equal to the Hebrew *bra* to *create;* and it was, we are taught to believe, by His Son or Word that God *created* the world.

We may now mention the startling circumstance alluded to. We have seen more than once that in the *car* of *carry*, or in the *char* of *charrier*, we have a form

[9] Anacalypsis, vol. ii. p. 7.

[1] Ibid., vol. i. p. 325.

equal to *bear*, and consequently to *bar*, so that *Bar Panther* cannot differ from *Car Panther*, and when these two words coalesce they make *carpanther;* that is, *carpenter*, in Latin *carpentarius*. And if we drop the nasal sound of *panther* we obtain *pather;* that is, *pater*, or *father*. From this it was found necessary to make the Bar or Son have a panther for father; but this could not so easily be, since he was already believed to be the offspring of Jove. A panther was therefore made to be only his foster-father; so that he had, like Jesus, two fathers. This, I say, is very startling; but what follows may be found still more so.

Dr. Stukely, who was a learned antiquary, and a very pious and orthodox Christian, informs us that Panther was even the family name of Christ's foster-father, as the following will serve to show: "The name of Jesus was also Jesus Ben Panther." Jesus was a very common name with the Jews. Stukely observes that the patronymic of Jesus Christ was panther, and that panthers were the nurses and bringers up of Bacchus, and adds: "It is remarkable that Panther was the surname of Joseph's family, our Lord's foster-father. Thus the Midrashoheleth, or gloss upon Ecclesiastes: 'It happened that a serpent bit R. Eleaser ben Damah, and James, a man of the village Secania, came to heal him in the name of Jesus Ben Panther.' This is likewise," continues Stukely, "in the book called Abodozar, where the comment upon it says, 'This James was a disciple of Jesus, the Nazarene[2].'"

This statement from a very learned and pious Christian, showing that the family name of Jesus was Panther, must remove all doubt with respect to the truth of our

[2] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 315.

etymology, namely, that *Bar Panther* is equal to *carpenter*. Higgins continues thus: "No one will dispute the piety of Dr. Stukely. The similarity of the circumstances related of Jesus and Bacchus could not be denied; and, therefore, he accounts for it by supposing that God had revealed to the heathen part of what was to happen in future. This may be satisfactory to some persons as it was, no doubt, to the Doctor. The accidental manner in which the assertion is made, that the father of Jesus was called Panther, removes the possibility of accounting for it, by attributing it to the malice of the Jews." And a few lines farther on, Higgins continues thus: "And as the persons who brought up Jesus were called panthers, the name of an animal, so Bacchus was brought up by the same kind of an animal. When the reader reflects that the whole Roman Christian doctrine is founded, as the Roman Church admits, on tradition, he will have no difficulty in accounting for the similarity of the systems. The circumstance of Joseph's family name being allowed to be Panther, is remarkably confirmed by Epiphanius[3], who says that Joseph was the brother of Cleophas, the son of James, surnamed Panther. Thus we have the fact both from Jewish and Christian authorities[4]. It is very clear that Bacchus's Panther must have been copied from that of Jesus or *IHΣ*, or that of Jesus from Bacchus's. I leave the matter with my reader[5]."

It is not at all so very clear; and which this writer would at once admit, had he been aware that all mythological characters owe the histories we have of them to the meanings of their names. Thus, had Jesus or *IEΣ* never been heard of, the history of Bacchus would be

[3] Hœres, 78, Antidie, s. vii. [4] See Jones on the Canon, vol. ii. p. 137.
[5] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 315.

precisely what it is at the present hour. And if we were to suppose that the history of Jesus or *IEΣ* is only a myth, which no good Christian can think of allowing, His history too would have grown out of the different meanings of His name. Then to what conclusion is every good Christian bound to come? To this and no other, namely, that Bacchus served as a type of Jesus or *IEΣ*; in other words, that it had pleased God, as Dr. Stukely supposed, "to reveal to the heathen part of what was to happen in future." Hence, if the Christian cannot bring himself to believe in the doctrine of types—in which so many learned Christians do believe—he cannot, in his conscience, possibly escape considering himself a heathen; that is, so long as he calls himself a Christian. But why so? Because it is evident from what we have thus far shown, and from a great deal more that we might yet show if we thought it necessary, that we have in the leading circumstances and events in the life of Jesus and Bacchus the same history. And every Christian who is sufficiently enlightened, and sufficiently sincere to accept the truth of this statement, must at a glance, perceive the necessity for his believing in the doctrine of types, as he cannot else regard the religion in which he has been brought up, any way better than an idle fable.

Carpenter being in this inquiry a most important word, it should be analyzed and explained as fully as it possibly can be. Its Hebrew representative is חרש *hrs*, and in Sander and Trenel's Dictionnaire Hebreu-Français, it is simply explained "ouvrier, charpentier;" that is, workman, carpenter. Parkhurst's definition is: "a machinator, a mechanic, an artificer, or workman in brass, iron, wood, stone, &c. Also work or ware of the

artificer, particularly potters' ware[6]." Its Greek form is ἁμαξουργός, of which the literal meaning is a *cart* or *car-maker*, that is, a *cartwright*. Its Latin form *carpentarius* has, as well as *carpenter* in English and *charpentier* in French, the same meaning, that of *car-maker* or *cartwright*.

Be it now observed that the *penter* of *carpenter*, is when we drop its nasal sound, equal to *peter*, and consequently (according to my principles) to *pater* and *father*, by which it is shown that *pater* or *father* does not, in meaning, differ in the least from *maker;* and a father is a maker, the maker of his offspring. This confirms my etymology of the Latin *fiber*, a *beaver*, given farther back; this word not differing from *faber*, nor *faber* from *father*. But *father* and *beaver* are no otherwise related than by each having the meaning of *worker* or *maker*. That is to say, a beaver was never called after the idea *parent*, but after that of *worker*. Now as *panther* does not, when its nasal sound is dropped, differ from *pather*, we thus see how clearly it is the same as *pater* and *father*, though not called after this idea. Then why should father and panther be expressed alike? Because the word *panther* is, as shown above, traceable to the idea *water*, and *water* to the idea *life*, and consequently through life, to the name of the supposed author of life, the sun, who was also called the *maker*.

Let us now notice the *car* of *carpenter*. As it is the name of a vehicle, it has been called after the idea *carry;* and as *carry* was called after the *hand*, and as the *hand* was, like the sun, called a *maker*, it follows that the ideas *car*, *carry*, *hand*, *maker*, and the *sun*, must have, in all

[6] Lex., p. 203.

languages, names equal to each other, however different they may be in form.

In *cheir*, χείρ, Greek of *hand*, and in *har*, which in Sanskrit means to *carry*, and in the *har* of *harma*, ἅρμα, a *car*, it is easy to perceive (radically considered) the same word. We have also seen in the חר *hr* of חרש *hrs*, the same word; for, as shown above, it means a *workman*, a *carpenter*, or *potter's ware*. And according to Parkhurst, it was "from this root the ancient Greeks appear to have had the name of their god *EPOΣ* or *EPΩΣ*, by which it is very evident they intended the material light, considered as endued with a plastic or formative power; though, as usual, they decorated this idol with some attributes stolen from the *ineffable* and *eternal* light[7]."

But as the *h* of the Hebrew חרש *hrs* is the aspirate, and as it was as often rendered *ch* as *h*, it follows that *hrs* cannot differ from *chrs*, and this is equal to the *chrēs* or *chris* of χρηστός, or *Christus*. And this is confirmed by the following: "Drummond says, חרש *hrs* may be sounded *choras*, *chros*, *chrus*. This word signifies *faber*, *artifex*, *machinator*[8]." But חרש *hrs* meant also the *sun*. "The Chaldean name of the sun is חרש *hrs*, *Chris*, hinc et Persis Sol dicitur κῦρος, teste Plutarcho[9]."

Though we can now easily perceive the radical identity of the *Chr* of *Christ* and the Greek χαίρε, which means *save;* how are we to account for a form so different from the name Christ as Ἰησοῦς having also, as we learn from St. Matthew, this meaning? We need only observe that

[7] Lex., p. 204. [8] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 587.
[9] Vallancey Coll., vol. iv. p. 492, and Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 587.

the *s* and *r* often interchange, so that the *Ιησ* of *Ιησοῦς* cannot differ from *Ιηρ*, nor can *Ιηρ*, which on being aspirated becomes *hier*, radical part of *ἱερός*, which means *sacred, holy, divine,* &c., differ from such a form as *χείρ*, nor consequently from the *Chr* of *Christ*, nor from the *χαίρε*, meaning *salve* in Latin, whence *salvator* or *saviour*.

As to the well-known monogram of both Jesus and Bacchus, that is, *IHΣ*, and which is, in Roman characters, equal to IES, it happens to be the radical part of *ΊHΣOΥΣ* and also of JESUS; but it is not the root of either, which is *Ίη* (Ie). And this *Ιη* named also both Jesus and the sun. Hence, as we saw farther back (page 162), Parkhurst makes the following admission: "From this Divine Name יה *ie* the ancient Greeks had their *Ιη, Ιη*, in their invocations of the gods, particularly of Apollo, i. e. The Light[1]." And does not Jesus say of Himself, "He who followeth Me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the *light* of life[2]?"

Now as *IE* is the root of *IES*, that is, of *IHΣ*; it follows that the *s* might be replaced by any other consonant; hence, when instead of this *s* we use *k*, *Ies* will become *Iek*, which cannot differ from *Iak* or *Iach*, in which it is easy to perceive the radical part of Ἴακχος, a name of Bacchus, and not different from *Βάκχος* but from its I having been aspirated, by which means it must have first become *Βιάκχος*, the aspirate having been represented by *b*, and then by the dropping of the *i*, *Βάκχος*, and of which Bacchus is but another form.

But why should the *s* of *IES* (*IHΣ*) be represented by *k* or *ch*? I cannot tell why. I am equally at a loss

[1] Lex., p. 128.

[2] John viii. 12.

to know why in English the word *alas!* is also *alack!* and why the *bris* of the French word *briser* is *breche* and *breach*, and also *break*. The same change occurs in Greek, witness the adjective ἰάς being the ιακ of ἰακός, Ionian.

But when we do not replace the *s* of *IES* (*IHΣ*) by another consonant, and observe that it is equal to *ias*, we obtain by dropping its *i*, *as*, which is the Sanskrit of the verb to *be*, and this accords in meaning with the Hebrew היה *ie*, as shown above. And if instead of the *i* of *ies*, we drop the *e*, *is* will remain; and this also gives the verb to *be*.

It is also easy to perceive in this monogram (*IHΣ*) of Bacchus the word for water, for the *ak* of Ἴακχος does not differ from the *aq* of *aqua*; nor does the *as* of *Ias*, to which we have shown the *HΣ* of *IHΣ* to be equal, differ from the *as* of the German *wasser*; nor does the *as* of *wasser* differ from the *at* of *water*, any more than the *es* of *besser* does from the *et* of *better*. And this serves to show that the monogram *IHΣ* might as well end with a *T* as with *Σ*. And as it is equal to the *Iak* of Ἴακχος, it might end with a *k* also; in short, with any consonant whatever. It is therefore a mistake to suppose that *IHΣ* means *Jesus hominum Salvator*; which is, I believe, the usual explanation given of this monogram.

Another representative of *IHΣ* is *ΥHΣ*, and of which Higgins says, "These letters were anciently placed upon the temples or other buildings sacred to Bacchus or Sol[3]."

And so they might very well be, for existence was called after its supposed author, the sun; and *IHΣ* is

[3] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 328.

the same as the verb to *be*, and consequently means *existence*. The Greek word "Υης is thus explained by Donnegan: "one who sends rain, an epithet of Jupiter and of Bacchus." But Jupiter or Jove is the same as Sol or sun; and the Υ of "Υης being equal to the *Hu* of *Hudor, water*, we thus see how this meaning comes out under "Υης as it does under *IHΣ* and the *Iac* of Ἴακχος, and the *Bac* of *Bacchus*.

But why does not the name of every god of the heathen mythology mean *water* as well as that of Bacchus, since they all emanate from the same source—the name of the sun? It is because the roots of a language, though they are all equal to one another, are not expressed alike, and their different forms obtain conventionally different meanings. Thus the name Mercury might just as well as Bacchus mean water. And why so? Because it is expressive of motion, and so is water, because called after life; but it was in the sense of motion more than of water that the name Mercury has, conventionally, been taken. The divinity so named may however, for aught I, who am not learned in mythology, may know to the contrary, have something in his history relating to water.

This myth of Bacchus, of which we need now say no more, must appear a very important one to every true believer in the Christian religion; for if he be not already a disciple of the doctrine of types, he cannot, on seriously considering all he has just seen, help becoming one. How else is he to account for the two names Jesus and Bacchus bearing so many startling points of resemblance as to have even the same monogram; and for the one having been brought up by a person named Panther and the other by animals of the same name? And the latter

circumstance is the more deserving of serious reflection, as it is stated by persons of different creeds and of whom neither saw the consequence of his statement; not to mention that it is also made evident by the principles of this work, of which the truth has been already so often proved. Should Dr. Stukeley's explanation of this astonishing fact be found acceptable, namely, that it pleased God "to reveal to the heathen part of what was to happen in future," this cannot be regarded as a refutation of the doctrine of types; for if such characters as Crishna and Buddha are to be taken by the religious Christian—as I know they are—for genuine types of his Saviour, they surely cannot have served for this purpose independently of God's will.

But all who in religious matters care to trouble themselves about the discovery of truth—and they alas! are not many—must admit that in whatever light this myth may be viewed, it reveals at least sufficient to excite attention, even so much so as to suggest the necessity for further and closer inquiry.

CHAPTER XIII.

ITALY, ROME.—ROMULUS, REMUS.

THESE are very important words. Let us first notice Italy under its Latin form *Italia*. Its radical part *Ital* has, when read after the usual manner, no meaning that

will apply as the name of this country; but when read, as in Hebrew, from right to left, it will be *Lati*, which is the radical part of *Latium*, the ancient name of *Italia*, so called, say the learned, *à latendo*, because Saturn concealed himself in this country from his son, Jupiter. But this is a very old etymology, and as bad as it is old. When a country was first, in remote times, taken possession of, its name must have had no other meaning than such as we now apply to the word *land*. In short it must have been with countries as it was with seas and rivers, which had in the beginning no other meaning than that of water, the opposite of which was earth, ground, or land. Nor does the *lat* of *latendo*, or of its infinitive *latere*, differ from *lant*, that is, *land*, for its *a* may receive the nasal sound. But why should the idea expressed by a word meaning to be *hid* be equal to one meaning *land?* Because the two ideas are traceable to the same source—to that of lowness. And that the *a* of the *lat* of *lateo*, may, as above shown, take the nasal sound, is proved by its Greek equivalent *lanthanō* (λανθάνω), of which the radical part *lanth* is as equal to *land* as burthen is to burden.

Now from knowing, as we do, that the *Lati* of *Latium* and the *Ital* of *Italia* are letter for letter one and the same word, we are naturally led to suppose that if any other word be equal to either of these it must be equal to them both. And so it happens to be, for *Lati* is the radical part of *Latin*, and *Ital* is the radical part of *Italian*. Hence it follows that the languages called *Latin* and *Italian* have really the same name, and that so have the people called the *Latins* and *Italians;* and that when *Latium* appeared to take a new name—that of *Italia*—it was only the new manner of reading this

name, and not the name itself that underwent a change.

It may, however, be said that the *Lat* of *Latium* might just as well have meant *high* as *low*, for it cannot, when its vowel returns to its first place, differ from the *alt* of *altus*. And that such a word as *ground* might also mean *high*, we must admit, on comparing it with its German form *grund*, which is as equal to *grand, sublime*, as the German *und* is to its English equivalent *and*. By this we are led to discover a very ancient form of the word *ground*. We see that it is the same as *grund;* and as the *g* is here for the aspirate, and as this sign may be left out, because no radical part of a word, we reduce *grund* to *rund;* that is, since the nasal sound may be also left out, *rud*, which, when the vowel returns to its first place, becomes *urd;* and this form cannot, since the vowels are all equal to one another, differ from the *erd* of the German *erde*, and of which *earth* is but another form.

I am well aware that it must startle many an etymologist to be told for the first time that two words so dissimilar in form as *ground* and *earth* make, after all, when radically considered, but one and the same word. But since they are so much alike in meaning, and sometimes so in form, as we must admit on comparing their French equivalents *terrain* and *terre;* and since no etymology appears to have been hitherto given of *ground* or the German *grund;* and as such a word must, as well as all others, have an etymology, the one now given should be regarded as far better than none at all; that is to say, if it were a mistake, which I am sure it is not, the rules, by the applying of which it was made, having already, as the reader cannot forget, been often applied, and, I dare assert, not without some success.

Let us now, by the applying of the same rules, discover the original of *land.* Its nasal sound being dropped it becomes *lad,* that is, when the vowel returns to its first place, *ald;* which, from the interchange of *l* and *r,* makes *ard,* and this must have long preceded both *erde* and *earth.* We thus perceive that in ground, land, and earth, we have only one word under these different forms; and when we take the ending *de* or *th,*—as of *erde* and *earth,*—for an article that first preceded *er* or *ear,* we are at once led to the *ter* of *terra,* and consequently to the *tel* of *tellus.* But an older root than either *er* or *ear* must be the *ar* of *ard,* as shown above, and which is confirmed by ארץ *arj,* Hebrew of *earth,* of which *ar* is the root. But there must have once been a root of this root, for many persons cannot have allowed a consonant to be heard on sounding *a* or one of its representatives, such as *oi* or *ei;* in which case the *a* of *ar* would alone be heard. Hence the Hebrew word יו *io* has also, according to Parkhurst, the meaning of *earth;* for his explanation of it is—"a heap of *earth* turned up;" and also, "the heap or tumulus of a grave[4]." Hence, too, in Greek, the *er* of *era, earth,* appears to have been sounded without the *r;* for the γ of γῆ is for the aspirate, so that it may be left out, and then η alone will remain, which sign is equal to *a*: witness πρήσσω and θώρηξ, being also πράσσω and θώραξ. And as γῆ is represented also by *aῖa,* and *aῖa* by γαῖα, it is thus made evident that the γ in γῆ and γαῖα does here but replace the aspirate, and that consequently a single vowel, as the η of γῆ must have once meant earth, just as the combination of vowels in γαῖα does still.

Now as *ald,* one of the forms of *land,* as shown above,

[4] Lex., p. 467.

cannot differ from the *alt* of *altus*, this only confirms what we have already seen several times, namely, that the same word may signify both high and low, just as this word *altus* does in Latin. Hence though the idea lowness has been called after the earth, the German *grund* cannot differ from the English *grand, sublime.*

Though the Germans are well aware that *land* is a synonym of *grund*, they do not, however, suspect that the two words were once alike in form. Nor do French etymologists appear to be any wiser respecting their word *lande*, for the most they know of it is that it comes from the German *land*, which is no etymology. M. Littré's etymology of this word is as follows: "Provenç. *landa;* de l'allemand *land.* Champ, contrée. A cause du sens particulier que *lande* a aujour d'hui, Diez rejette l'allemand *land* et donne la préférence au Breton *lann*, buisson d'épines; mais l'historique semble montrer que primitivement *lande* a correspondu suffisament à l'allemand *lande.*"

M. Littré is right as to the identity of the German *land* and *lande* in French; but of what value is such an etymology, since it does not give us the primary signification of either word, or show us what its first form may have been?

We may now return to the word *Italy.* The following will serve to show how little has been hitherto known of its original meaning: "Mr. Niebuhr does not pretend to explain the meaning of the word *Italia;* but he informs us that the ancient Greeks referred it to the Heracleian traditions, and to a Greek word Ἰταλός or Ἰτουλός, signifying a bull[5]."

By this we see that neither the ancient Greeks,

[5] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 111.

nor Niebuhr, nor Higgins, had the least suspicion that the *Ital* of *Italos* was the *Lati* of *Latium;* and still less must they have thought that in *Latin* and *Italian* we have the same word, and in *Latins* and *Italians* the same name.

Now the name *Rome* will serve to illustrate our meaning as to what we have already said of words having suggested fables very much alike in different parts of the world, without any intercourse having ever existed between the nations to whose languages such words belonged. Thus this name *Rome* had in the beginning, as we shall see, the single meaning of *town,* and this was how every such place was at first designated by the founders of nations; that is to say, they called their city the *town.* When at a much later period the primitive meaning of this word was forgotten, it was believed to be a proper name, and from the changes it had with time undergone, it was perceived to be susceptible of several other meanings besides that of town, which seldom failed to suggest as many different fables, and hence the origin of the fabulous accounts given of all such places. The learned, never suspecting the words of a language to possess this power, have been led, on perceiving a similarity in the names and histories of nations never in any way related, to believe, however, that an intercourse must have existed between them, though how this could have been, especially at the remote times they chose to specify, it has been rather difficult to conceive. Gibbon was too accurate an historian to fall into so gross an error respecting the fabulous history of the origin of the Roman people; yet he has on this occasion fallen into one of a different kind, and to all appearance far greater. The Turks have, it seems, a fable similar to that of the

Romans respecting their origin, and this is ascribed to *accident* by Gibbon, which, if he had any regard for the doctrine of chances, he could have never done, the odds opposing such an hypothesis as this being absolutely countless. "Like Romulus," says he, "the founder of that martial people was suckled by a she-wolf, who afterwards made him the father of a numerous progeny; and the representation of that animal on the banners of the Turks preserved the memory, or rather suggested the idea, of a fable which was invented, *without any mutual intercourse*, by the shepherds of Latium and those of Scythia[6]."

Surely every one must, after a moment's serious reflection, come to the positive conclusion that so extraordinary a coincidence as the one here referred to could not have been the result of accident. It is also a great mistake to suppose there was invention in the manufacturing of all such fables, the basis and even minor incidents of them having been ever suggested by the meanings of the names out of which they grew, so that the persons who first related them to others, or took them down in writing, did little more than repeat or transcribe what these names seemed, as it were, to dictate. It should, moreover, be observed that the doctrine of the WORD being at this time regarded with as much reverence as every sincere Christian now regards the doctrine of the Trinity, it would of course be considered a very impious act either to add to or take from whatever it seemed to imply. There must have therefore been very little invention in the whole of the heathen mythology, the different stories that are sometimes told of the same character being more likely to have arisen from new mean-

[6] Decline and Fall, c. xlii.

ings which his name obtained with time, or in different places, than from the suggestions of fancy. Then how are we to account for the profound deductions and wise morals which the philosophers of all ages have deduced from those fables of old? We can very safely ascribe the whole of them, without a single exception, to the dreamy conceptions of such moralists, who could thus find in those fables what they never contained, nor even the most fanciful or extravagant of their first propagators ever imagined. And though it may be well doubted by many enlightened men, if the whole world could have been so very short-sighted as this; yet, unfortunately for its own peace and happiness, it has been even a great deal more so, as all the erroneous systems of religion, and which have proved the cause of so much division, hatred, and bloodshed among men, may be traced, without a single exception, to the same source.

CHAPTER XIV.

ROME.

THAT Rome is but another word for town may be thus shown: we see by comparing the Greek words *membras* and *mortos* with their other forms *bembras* and *brotos*, that from *m* thus appearing under its form *b*, there can be no difference between the *rom* of *Rome* or *Roma* and

rob; and this is so true that the Greek word *rhōmē* signifies not only the Latin *roma* but *strength,* that is, *robur,* of which *rob,* equal to *rom,* is the radical part. This *rob* becomes, when *r* falls behind the *o,* as it frequently does, *orb,* which is the same as the *urb* of *urbis,* Latin of *town, o* being equal to *u,* as we see by comparing the *o* of *one* and the *u* of *unus* or *un.* The following will confirm the above: "It is very certain the old traditions agreed that Rome was built on the site of a former city. The chronicle of Cuma says that the name of the first city was Valentia, and that this name was synonymous with Roma. Now, there was a Valentia in Italy and one in Britain; there is one in Ireland, and one in Spain[7]."

This passage confirms, we say, the above; for *Valentia* means *strength,* just as Rome does; and the circumstance of its belonging to several countries is a proof of its being but another word for *town.* In its radical part *val,* it is easy to perceive a form equal to *vil;* that is, *ville,* French of *town.* But why, it may be asked, should the word meaning *town* mean also *strength?* It does not arise from either idea having been called after the other; but from the one (*strength*) being traceable to *height* for its origin, and the other (*town*) being traceable to *lowness;* and from these two opposite ideas, high and low, being often, as already shown, expressed alike, just as the opposite ideas, white and black, are in Saxon. Town is but another word for station or place, and every such idea is to be traced to lowness or the ground. Hence *stadt,* German of *town,* cannot differ from the *stat* of *station,* nor either of these from *stand,* nor *stand* from

[7] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 375.

stop or *stay*. And as *stop* is the same as *step*, and as *step* is, when read as in Hebrew, equal to *pets* and *pets* to *pedis*, genitive of *pes*, Latin of *foot*, we thus bring *stadt* equal to *foot*, and consequently to *lowness* or the *ground*. Now as to *abide* means also to *stop* or *stay*, and as this word cannot differ from *abode*, and as *abode* means a *dwelling*, it follows that this idea must be also traced to lowness, so that *town* and *dwelling* may have been often expressed alike. The author of the "Anacalypsis" does not therefore mistake when he says, "Great numbers of towns in India are called Abad. This seems to be the same word as that used in the name of the fourteen Mahabads, who, we are told, lived before the flood: but I suppose it means the *abode* of, as Moorshed-abad, the abode or residence of Moorshed; or Amid-abad, the abode of Amid. I can scarcely doubt that the *abad*, when meaning *town*, is the English word *abode*[8]."

The Greek word *pedon* is another proof that the same word may mean *lowness*, the *ground*, *foot* and *abode*, as Donnegan gives it the several meanings of *earth*, *ground*, and *habitation*; and assigns for its etymology *pous* and *pes*, that is, the Greek and Latin of *foot*.

We now see that the English word *town* must be the same as *down*, which is, like the foot, significant of *lowness*, though it might as well mean *height*; and so it does, as is shown by certain hills in England being called the *downs*.

But the Greek word *astu*, a *town*, is referred to another word of this language, *histēmi*, which has not only the meaning of to *place*, but that of to *be* also. This may account for the *pel* of *pelō*, to *be*, not being different from the *pol* of *polis*, which also means *town*. We can easily

[8] Vol. i. p. 464.

conceive that any word having the meaning of the verb to *be* should be also radically the same as a word for town, since *stare* in Latin means both to *stand* and to *be;* and in *stand, station,* and *stadt* we have radically the same word.

On referring to my Bosworth for some proof of what I stated only awhile ago, namely, that the idea *town,* though traceable to the ground or *lowness,* may be also expressed by a word significant of *height,* I find that he explains *burh* by *town* and also by *hill.* And that *burh* might as well have meant an *abode* or *dwelling* as a *town,* is shown by the same authority, explaining *bur* —which cannot differ from *burh*—by "a bower, a cottage, a dwelling." And what have we in this word *bur* but the radical part of the noun *bury,* a *town,* as we find it in such words as Canter*bury,* Salis*bury,* Shaft*bury,* &c. *Burg, burough,* and *burrow* are but other forms of this word *bury.* And as the verb to *bury* means to *inter* or *put in the ground,* this affords additional proof that the idea *town* is traceable to *lowness* or the *ground.* And what have we in the radical part of *bury,* a *town,* that is, in *bur,* if not the radical part of *urbs,* its Latin form. This is seen by only allowing the *u* of *urb* to fall behind its *r,* and then by reading as in Hebrew. Now as we have already shown the *rom* of *roma* and the *urb* of *urbs* to be the same word, it follows that from the *urb* of *urbs* being the same as the *bur* of *bury,* we have even in England many a town named Rome, though this does not appear.

Why now, let us ask, were Romulus and Remus believed to be brothers? Because they had the same name, with only so slight a difference in form as to distinguish the one from the other. Thus one may have been named

Rom and the other *Rem;* and from these two words having been often confounded, hence came the belief in the relationship of the two persons so called. And as each of these names meant also *Rome,* this accounts for Rome having been called after them. But this was taking the derivative for the original; it is as if we were to say that London was called after a person named Londoner, or Paris after a person named Parisian. A proof that the two names must have been often used the one for the other is afforded by the fact that *Remus* is in Greek written *Romos,* and that *Romulus* was often in the same language named *Remulos.* But whether Romulus or Remulus, this word is but a different form of *Romanus,* just as *Romos* must have been a different form of the word *Roman.*

But why was either of the brothers regarded as having been the king of Rome? It arose from *rom*—which must have been a very ancient form of both Romulus and Remus—having once had the same meaning as *king,* and which, as shown under the German *könig,* was expressive of *height*—in short, another word for *chief* or *head.* Hence the Hebrew ראם *ram,* and which is exactly equal to both *rom* and *rem,* is thus explained by Parkhurst: "high, exalted[9]," and *strength,* as shown above, is in Greek the meaning of the word *Rome;* and as this idea was called after *height,* as we saw also farther back, it follows that between all terms expressive of strength, head, height, and king, there is no difference in meaning except conventionally, the primary signification of every such word being the same.

Why was Mars supposed to be the father of Romulus and Remus? Simply because the radical part of his name,

[9] Lex., p. 111.

Mar, cannot, when read as in Hebrew, differ from *ram*, nor *ram* from *rom*. And that the *a* of *ram* and the *o* of *rom* are here as the same sign, is shown by *Mars* being in meaning not different from *mors*, the god of *war* being the god of *death*. And of this etymology I have now a very curious and conclusive proof to offer:—

There was anciently a festival of the Druids in Ireland and other parts of the world, which answered in a great measure to the Festum Dei Mortis, or All Souls' day of the Christians. It was, says my authority [1], called Oidche Samma, or the night of Samhan. Hence this Samhan was named also by the Irish, Balsab, or Dominus Mortis; for, says General Vallancey [2], Bal is Lord, and Sab is death.

Now this Balsab or Lord of Death is allowed by the learned to be the same as the Baal-zebub of the idolatrous Jews, but which the Septuagint have translated the "God of flies" or locusts, *zebub* meaning in this instance, according to them, a *fly*. But Basnage, on perceiving that *zebub* bore a close resemblance to another word meaning *battle* or *war*, was led to suppose that the true meaning of Baal-zebub is the god of war. At this Gen. Vallancey expresses his surprise; "Because," says he, "our Hiberno-Druids retaining Balsab, synonymous to Samhan (each meaning Lord of Death), it is evident that Baal-zebub is Dominus Mortis." By this he allows us to understand that because *Balsab* literally means *Lord of Death* it cannot possibly mean the god of war, he not suspecting any more than Basnage that Mars and Mors are one and the same. And this, be it observed, is the only objection Gen. Vallancey has to raise upon this occasion; for, according to his own showing,

[1] See Anacalypsis, vol. ii. p. 82. [2] Coll. Hib., vol. iii. p. 444.

sab means not only *death* but also *strong, potent, valiant,* in the Irish or Hiberno-Celtic, whilst he finds meanings in accordance with these in both Hebrew and Arabic. And thus it ever is; all words significant of lowness may have the contrary meaning, and consequently serve to designate the sun, and hence the Deity. But had it been otherwise, words could have never given birth to superstition. Thus, had the name Mars meant death only, no one would have made a god of the character so called; but from its being found to mean the sun also, he was hence deified, and, thanks to this name of his, was styled the God of Death. We are not, therefore, to consider this word Mars as meaning merely death or war, but the sun also. It is worthy of remark that in Irish *sab* means *death,* in whatever way it is read. It is easy to perceive that it is the same as *bas, low,* and *sub, under;* and also the same as the *sup* of *super, above.*"

The above passage, taken from my work on the "Origin of Myths," serves to show that Vallancey and Basnage were in their explanation of Balsab both wrong and both right. Vallancey was right when he said it meant the Lord of Death, for it has in truth this meaning; and Basnage was right when he said it meant the god of war, for it has also this meaning. But both these very learned men were wrong by not knowing that war and death have been named alike[3].

It is particularly deserving of notice that *sab* means, according to Gen. Vallancey, not only *death,* but also "*strong, potent,*" which is also the meaning of the word

[3] This etymology of Mars is confirmed by M. Max Müller, from whom I learn that *mar* is the Sanskrit of *death;* which has led this learned professor to the rather strange conclusion that *mare,* the Latin of sea, must mean *dead* water. See vol. i. p. 191, of the present work.

Rome in Greek. And this shows further—since *sab* when signifying death must be but another word for *low*, answering to *sub* in Latin—how the same term may mean both *high* and *low*.

As in M. Max Müller's etymology of *sea* under its Latin form *mare*, we are told that *mar* means in Sanskrit to *die*, and this affords further proof that Mars, which is radically the same as this Sanskrit word *mar*, must mean *mors* or *death;* and as *m* in Latin is *v* in Sanskrit, this also proves the identity of the *Mar* of *Mars* and its English equivalent *war*. Another form of the *Mar* of *Mars* is *bar*, as we have shown in our etymology of *barracks*, which is for war-οἶκος, that is, *war-house*. But we now see that *war house* has the literal meaning of *dead house*, that is, *death's house* or *the house of death*, and that for the same reason a *warrior* means a *death's man*, which would do very well as a name for the common executioner; and though such a person is in English called a *hangman*, he has as much right as any gentleman in military service to style himself a son of *Mars* or a *warrior;* and as a warrior means a son of *Mors* or a *death's man*, the occupation of such a person—the taking away of human life—does not differ from that of hangman.

It is therefore much to be regretted that the primary signification of warrior was ever lost, for if it remained so well known that every one could see that such a word was a synonym of executioner or hangman, this might have prevented many a man from choosing a profession signified by so opprobrious a title. By this we see that *guerre*, French of *war*, is the same as the *Mar* of *Mars*, and consequently as the *mor* of *mors*, and that it is significant of death, equal to the *mour* of *mourir*, *bour* of *bourreau* in French, and to the *mor* of *morior* in Latin.

But as its *gu* is for *w*—witness Guillaume and William—and as *w* is for the aspirate *h*, and as it must be left out, it follows that the root of *guerre* is *err*, and that from *err* being equal to *arr*, we obtain the root of Ἄρης, Greek of *Mars*. But *arr* is reducible to *ar*, and this form is, when aspirated, equal to *har*, and on replacing the aspirate by its substitute *w*, we see that *har* cannot differ from *war*, nor *war* from the *Mar* of *Mars*. If we change the aspirate *h* for *b*—which is another of its substitutes—we shall get the *bar* of *barracks*, whilst if we change it for *g*, we shall get *gar*, which is but a different form of *guerre*. This knowledge leads us to the primary signification, hitherto unknown, of *Gradivus*, a name given to Mars, and which is we now see for *Gardivus*; that is, the *War god*. Philologists, from not knowing that the *a* of the *Gra* of *Gradivus* must have first preceded the *r*, have been led to regard the *d* of this word as belonging to *gra*, and through this mistake some have traced the *Gra* of *Gradivus* to *gradiendo* and others to κραδαίνειν, to *shake*; and from this it was thought that to *shake* must have here referred to a *lance*, and hence Mars was under his name of Gradivus explained by *hastam vibrare*.

This etymology of *Gradivus* leads me to suppose that this single word must have once made two, and that it then stood thus, *gar divus*, and that every one at that time knew very well that *gar* meant *war*, and that *divus* meant *God*. But it would seem that at the remote period now referred to, the word Mars, or its Greek equivalent Ἄρης, was not so well known, and that for the instruction of the less enlightened, both words, or at least one of them, were explained thus in a mythological dictionary of those distant times: Mars or Ἄρης, *Gar divus*. Supposing such a dictionary as this to have once

existed, and that a copy of it could now be found, such a work, however heavy it might be, would be worth at least one hundred times its weight in gold. Had it come down to us, the whole world would not, as it has been, ignorant for so many ages of the primary signification of Gradivus. It is evident that neither Festus nor Flaccus knew any thing of its etymology, since the former, who appears to have been the first to derive it from *gradiendo*, abridged a work of the latter, entitled "De Significatione Verborum." Scaliger says, however, that Festus is an author of great use to those who would attain the knowledge of the Latin tongue with accuracy. But with all his accuracy he knew not that Gradivus is for *Gar divus*, and that its literal meaning is *War god*.

The fable goes on to say that Rhea Sylvia was surprised by Mars in a wood, and that she consequently became the mother of the twins Romulus and Remus. How must this important event be explained? By first observing that when we drop, according to the rule we have already so often applied, the nasal sound of *Rom* and *Rem* (these ancient forms of Romulus and Remus), we shall have *ro* and *re*, which are as equal to each other as are *rom* and *rem;* and this becomes evident when we give to the *o* of *ro* its *i* understood; for the *roi* thus obtained happens to be the French of *re*, Italian of *king*, and an ancient form of the Latin *rex*. The latter must have obtained its present form from some persons having ended their pronunciation of *re* with a guttural sound, just as some persons do even still pronounce *oh* and *ah* as if written *och* and *ach*. Now there being no difference between *ro* and *re*, these other forms of the *Rom* and *Rem* of *Romulus* and *Remus;* and the *Rhe* of *Rhea* being still the same word, and this name being feminine, as its

ending sufficiently indicates; the person so called was regarded as the mother of the twins, from whose name her own did not differ except by its signifying a female. But where is the resemblance, I may be asked, between Rea (Rhea) and Mars? In order to return a satisfactory answer to this question, we should first observe that the *M* of *Mars* does here but replace the aspirate as can be thus shown. The Greek of this name is *Arēs* (Ἄρης), of which the *A* must, like all initial vowels, have been often aspirated though it is not so under its present form. But in this there is nothing surprising, since in our own times many persons aspirate certain vowels which others never do. A plain proof that the A of Ἄρης must have been often aspirated can be thus shown. With the H this word will become Hares, and as the *hodiern* of the Latin *hodiernus* cannot differ from its English form *modern*, neither can *Hares* differ from *Mares*, which by the dropping of its *e* is now written *Mars*. Another plain proof that Ἄρης must have been aspirated is afforded by Ἥρως, Greek of *hero*, and which I cannot help regarding otherwise than as a different form of Ἄρης, for any one so named is a man of war, a warrior, a follower of Mars, or Ἄρης.

Now from the natural tendency that prevails of prefixing vowels to initial consonants, *Rhea* cannot differ except conventionally, from *Arhea*, nor *Arhea* from *Arēs*, Greek of *Mars*.

But the mother of Romulus and Remus was named not only Rhea but Rhea Sylvia; and this suggested the belief that it was in the wood Mars surprised Rhea, Sylvia and Silva being radically the same word. Hence if she had been named Rhea Montana, we should be told that it was on a mountain Mars surprised Rhea.

But why was Rhea made to bring forth twins? Because her name must at the time have signified two; indeed its radical part *re* (equal to *rhe*) has in Latin and other languages this meaning even still when used as a prefix, for it then generally implies a *repetition* or *doubling* of the idea expressed. Thus to have been *re*vived is to have been restored to life; that is, to have lived, as it were, twice. In the beginning *re* had always, as a prefix, this meaning of doubling, but it has since often lost it. Thus though *re*commence means to commence a second time, and consequently twice, yet *re*commend does not now mean to commend twice, though at first such must have been its meaning.

Why was Rhea Sylvia buried alive? Because the root of her name, that is, *rhe*, being also the root of *rheō* to *flow* or *run*, is significant of *motion*, and such is also the meaning of *life*. But *rhea* happens also to mean the *earth*, and to *bury* having been thence called—witness to *inhume*, to *inter*—Rhea was therefore supposed to have been *earthed* alive.

Now the ancient name of the Tiber being, as every one knows, *Rumo*, we see that in its radical part *Rum*, we have a form equal to Rome, and consequently to the *Rom* of *Romulus* and the *Rem* of *Remus*. And further be it observed, that the *Rum* of *Rumo* must, from its being equal to Rome, be equal to Mars and mors also, that is, radically; and from this we may conclude that Romulus and Remus were not only doomed to die (*mori*) but to die in the *Rumo* or Tiber. When we observe that the *rum* of *rumo* is the *mur* of the Greek *murō*, to *flow*, it is easy to perceive that its primitive meaning must have been *river*, and which is further confirmed by *rheuma* and *rhumē*, each of which means in Greek a *current* or *stream*, and has *rheō*

for its root. Every ancient river in the world meant in the beginning *river*, and nothing more. And this idea was called after water, and water after life or motion. All this was fully explained and illustrated in the "Myths" many years ago.

Why were Romulus and Remus suckled by a she-wolf? Because their name and the name of the wolf were, as we shall see presently, radically the same. But why was not the wolf made to devour them instead of suckling them? They must have still owed their lives to their name. Thus *ruma, rumen,* and *rumis* are words for *teat* or *dug;* and *rumare* means to *suckle,* or to *give the teat or dug to a child;* and all these words are radically the same as the names Romulus and Remus. Even the fig-tree, under which we are told they were suckled, was not chosen before any other tree but from its name (*ruminalis*) being perceived to be radically the same as that of Romulus, and consequently of Remus. As to why the fig-tree should be so called, it seems to have been from its fruit resembling in shape a teat or dug, that is, *ruma, rumen,* or *rumin,* as it is named in Latin.

But why should a teat or dug have been so named? It was because such a name must at the time have meant *suck;* and hence it is that *rumo* means to *give suck.* Nor is it difficult to trace *ruma, rumen, or rumin* to such a source. Thus it is radically the same as *rumē,* Greek of *current,* and of *rheō* to *flow.* And every such idea must have been named from a word meaning *water,* after which drink and liquids in general have been called, and milk and suck are both drinks.

And the children were, we are told, thrown on dry land from the river (*Rumo,* ancient name of the Tiber)

having *overflowed* its banks, and the *wolf* was drawn by their cry to the spot where they were. Let us now see if all this be very true according to the doctrine of the WORD.

Bru means in Greek "the cry of children expressing a desire to drink," and of which the Latins have made *bu* by dropping the *r*, both having precisely the same meaning. Now in *bru* we have, when reading it as in Hebrew, the *urb* of *urbis*, a *town*, which we have already proved to be the *Rom* of *Rome*, and to be consequently radically the same as Romulus and Remus. Nor does this word *bru* differ from *rhu*, nor *rhu* from the *rhe* of *rheō* to *flow*, this *rhu* being the radical part of *rhumē*, a *current*, and which is proved by *rheos* having also this meaning. Let us now observe that as the aspirate sound in Greek may be replaced in other languages by *b*, *f*, *v*, or *w*, and that any of these signs may precede instead of following the *r*, as is shown by the *rheg* of *rhegnumi* becoming *f* in the Latin *freg* (root of *fregi*, preterite of *frago*, ancient form of *frango*), and *b* in the English word *break*; it follows that *rhu* is precisely equal to *bru*, which allows us to perceive that the latter must, beyond all doubt, be radically the same in meaning as *rheō*, *rhumē*, and *rheos*. We may therefore conclude that though *bru* is explained in Greek by "the cry of children expressing a desire to drink," its literal meaning must be *drink*; and though suck is conventionally the *drink* understood, it might just as well have meant *water*.

Now *bru*, which we have found to have radically the same meaning as *rheō*, *rhumē*, and *rheos*, and to which we can add *Rumo*, the ancient name of the Tiber, happens to be letter for letter the *bru* of *bruō*, Greek of to *overflow*; that is to say, we have shown how the same

word means *river* (*rumo*) *overflowing*, and the cry of children for *drink*. Let us now find the *wolf*.

And this is not difficult; for *bruō*, to *overflow*, is also written, as every Greek scholar is well aware, *phluō*, whence the Latin *fluo* and *flow* in English; this arises from *br* becoming *fl*. Thus in the *bru* of *bruō*, to *overflow*, and the English word *flow*, though there is not a letter in common, there is, however, one and the same word. Then what have we in *flow* when we read it from right to left, but *wolf*.

But why should the wolf have been so named? Because it being an animal remarkable for its swiftness, it was, like the idea to *flow*, named after *motion*. And what is *flux*, this other form of *flow*, but *felux*, that is, *velox*, Latin of *swift?* As to the *lup* of *lupus*, and the French *loup* and *louve*, none of them can (since *p* is constantly taking its form *f*) differ from *lauf*, radical part of *laufen*, which in German means both to *run* and to *flow*.

Since what precedes respecting the primary signification of the word *wolf* was written, I have by mere chance met with the following in Parkhurst: "זאב *zab* denotes not only a *wolf* but also *impetuosity*, to *hasten*, to *move with swiftness*, festinavit in incessu[4]." We thus see fully confirmed the etymology I have given of this animal's name. M. Littré gives a great many forms of the word *loup*, but of its primary signification he says nothing[5].

Why were the children brought up by Faustulus? It must have arisen from his name having at the time the fable was being composed suggested this belief. Hence the *Faustul* of *Faustulus* cannot differ from the *foster* of

[4] Lex., p. 137.

[5] See my etymology of *loup* given farther back, vol. ii. p. 82.

foster-father, who is one that brings up the children of others; nor can either *faustul* or *foster* differ from *pastor,* and Faustulus was, we are told, one who had the care of cattle, that is to say, he was a pastor. Hence it is that Faustitas, the name of the goddess that presides over cattle, is radically the same as the name Faustulus.

The wife of Faustulus was named Acca Laurentia. In *Acca,* when we aspirate its first letter, we see *Hacca,* which cannot differ from *vacca* any more than *hesper* can from *vesper;* and as *vacca* means a *cow,* this may account for any one so called being the wife of a *pastor* or *cowkeeper.* As to the *Laur* of *Laurentia* (the other part of her name), it cannot differ from *lauf* or *lauv,* that is, *louve* or *lupa.* It is reported that the story of Romulus and Remus having been suckled by a she-wolf is to be ascribed to the bad character of Acca Laurentia, as *lupa* means in Latin not only a *she-wolf* but also a *debauched woman.* This confirms the etymology just given of the name *Acca,* since *vacca* has not only the meaning of *cow,* but also the very bad one assigned to *lupa.*

And Romulus, we are told, slew Remus, because the latter despised the walls of Rome. We have already shown that the *Rem* of *Remus* is the same as *Rom,* as is made evident by the Greek of this name being always *Romos;* and we have also seen how *Rom* cannot differ from the *Mar* of *Mars,* nor *Mars* from *mors, death;* and as both the *Mar* of *Mars* and the *mor* of *mors* are equal to the *mur* of *murus,* Latin of *wall,* we thus see how the name *Remus* may mean both *death* and *wall:* and this were sufficient to lead to the belief that he who was so called met his death by his making light of the walls of the new town.

So much for the origin of the fable with which the history of Rome opens; I have, in the course of analyzing the words out of which it has grown, omitted, in order to be brief, several other etymologies besides those I have given; and which the intelligent reader may not only perceive, but probably many others of which I have had myself no idea.

From its being now fully admitted, as shown in the Introduction to this work (page xxvii, &c.), that Moses has been "rightly stripped before the tribunal of physical science, of his claims as an inspired writer," no blame can attach to me or to any one else, for daring to investigate the history he has left us of ADAM and EVE, for if he wrote not under the influence of divine inspiration he was, however great he may have otherwise been, in common with all other mortals, liable to error.

CHAPTER XV.

ADAM AND EVE, MAN AND WOMAN, AND THE SERPENT.

AND the inquiry under this heading being of all others the most important, I may be excused for allowing it a considerable space in this work. But as I find that the learned make unwittingly several important admissions respecting the word *Adam*, I am consequently spared the trouble of proving, by the application of the principles of

my discovery, that the meanings of this name might have suggested many things in the history of the person so called. Thus Parkhurst[6] says that its root *dam,* means both *earth* and *man,* and at page 114 he shows how, with the formative *a,* this root means not only *man* but even the *first man.* I then find the following in a writer who does not entirely perceive the consequence of his admission. "*Adm*—that is, with the *a* supplied, *Adam*—of India, which in Sanskrit means *first,* is plainly the Adam of the first book of Genesis[7]."

There are still other important meanings respecting the name Adam, which I need not take the trouble of discovering by the applying of my principles, for they are, I perceive, already admitted, but *unwittingly* by the learned. Thus Parkhurst (p. 14) admits that Adam means a *similitude* or *likeness*[8]. And this he illustrates by the passage in Genesis, which says, "Let us make man in our form or image, according to our *likeness.*" He even considers this meaning of *image* or *likeness*[9] to be the true derivation of the name *Adam,* that God made him in his *image* or *likeness.* We thus find it admitted that a single word has these several meanings, *Adam, first man, made of earth,* and in God's *likeness.*

Let us now read the following: "Stephanus, Περὶ πολέων on Adana, tells us that Κρόνος or Saturn was called Ἀδάνος; and that this Ἀδάνος was the son of heaven and earth, which is a perfect description of Adam's production by God out of the earth. And, indeed, the very name *Adanos* seems to be the same with Adam (*Adamus*); for the Greeks having no words terminating in *m,* for *Adam* they pronounced *Adan.* Adana, an ancient city

[6] Lex., p. 5.
[7] Anacalypsis, v. i. p. 420.
[8] Lex., p. 115.
[9] Ibid.

of Cilicia, built by the Syrians, was called in memory of the first man, Adam[1]."

And the circumstance of a city having been so called is an additional proof that *Adam* is the same as *Adan*, and consequently with the common ending, *os*, as *Adanos*. But this *Adanos* is precisely equal to *Adonis*, and, as every one admits, *Adonis* cannot differ from *Adoni*. Thus Parkhurst: "*Don*, a ruler, a director, a lord, spoken of God or man; as a noun with a formative *a* and *i* both, *Adoni*. Hence the idol Adonis had his name[2]."

We have already shown how the radical part of this word, that is, *don*, may mean either *high* or *low*, it being equal to not only the Saxon of *hill*, *dun* or *dune*, but also to the English word *down* (hence the hills in England called the downs); and from this it must signify both *heaven* and *earth*, and be equal in meaning to *high* and *low*. Hence any mortal named *Adanos*, or, which is the same thing, *Adamus*, was believed to have been made of earth; and if this word *Adanos* happened at the time to name the Deity—as it appears to have done—then the belief was suggested that the earthly being *Adanos*, or Saturn, was made by *Adanos*, *Adonis*, or *Adoni*, the Divine Being. But Adanos is said to have been the son of heaven and earth; that is to say, heaven was his father, and earth his mother. But this is exactly the same story; for every word meaning the heavens must, as we already shown, have been once a name of the sun, and consequently of God. And as to the earth being his mother, this too is signified by the *dam* of *Adam*, for a *dam* is a *mother*; and when we read *dam* after the Hebrew manner from right to left, we shall have the *mad* of *madre*, and which *mad* is also equal to the *mat* of the

[1] Gale's Court of the Gentiles, b. ii. chap. 1. [2] Lex., p. 116.

Latin *mater* and the *moth* of *mother*, not to mention other forms of equal value. And what do we see in the *am* of *dam* but the Hebrew of *mother*, and when read as in Hebrew, the *ma* of *mamma*. In *am* we see also an inflection of the verb to *be*, a word expressive of *life;* and Eve was, we are told, "the mother of all living.[3]" In the ειμ of εἰμί, and the *um* of its Latin equivalent *sum*, we have but other forms of our English *am*. And as the Latin *m* is the Sanskrit *v*, it follows that *am* is the same as *aw*, and as double *v* (*w*) is reducible to a single *v*, *aw* cannot differ from *av*, nor *av* from the *Ev* of *Eve*.

But is not this *av*, I may be asked, the same as *ab?* Certainly it is. Hence among the different words for *water* (*eau*) given by M. Littré we see not only *Eve* but *ab* also. And as the name *Eve* means *life* or *living*, we must consider *ab* as *ba*, and *ba* as the verb *be*, which is also expressive of *life* or *existence*. *Ewe* is also among M. Littré's words for *water*, and is therefore equal to *Eve;* and as a single *u* is, as every one must know, frequently used for *l* (witness veau and veal, faucon and falcon, &c.), such a word as *ewe* cannot differ from *elle* any more than the Scotch word *aw* can differ from its English equivalent *all;* and we are therefore obliged to admit that *ewe* is the same as *elle*, and as *elle* is the French of *she*, it would seem that the *ewe* or *female* sheep was named after its sex, and from this it follows that *Eve* has also the meaning of *she;* and is not this beautifully confirmed by the fact that this English pronoun *she* is rendered into Sanskrit by *Iva*[4]?

But as the *w* of the word *ewe* cannot differ from *m*, as Sanskrit scholars admit, it follows that *ewe* is equal to *eme*, and that this word might have therefore served to

[3] Gen. iii. 20. [4] See Asiatic Researches, vol. v. p. 247.

signify *Eve*. This, too, is confirmed by the following passage which I transcribe from Richardson's great dictionary:—"An *eme*-Christian, or *even*-Christian, is a fellow-Christian, an equal Christian." This affords very plain proof that *Eve* is equal to *eme*, for *even;* the close of day, is also written *eve*. But why should the name *Eve* have such a meaning? Because it means *one*, and *one* means *even*. Thus the *un* of *unus* was first written *vn*, which with vowels supplied gives *even*, and the French word *uni* means *even*. But why should *Eve* mean one? For the same reason that *man* means *one*, for *homo* serves to name either man or woman, and the word *eve* means *woman*. Thus the learned Pasor states as follows:—'*Αδάμ*, nomen Hæbræum proprium primi nostri parentis. Est etiam appelativum, et valet idem quod *homo*, tribuiturque non solùm *viro* sed etiam *fœminæ*[5]." In Sanskrit also the name *Adima* means not only the *first male* but even the *first female*[6].

Now though the word *ewe* is in English wholly feminine, its Latin equivalent *ovis* is, like *homo*, both masculine and feminine. Hence in its part *ov* we see a word equal to the *ev* of *Eva, Eve*. But why should *Eve* have a name not different from that of a *sheep?* Because *Eve* means *life*, as we have already seen, and a *sheep*, because its flesh serves to support existence, is signified by a word traceable to the same source, that is, to *life*. Hence in *meat*, which we have already shown to be equal not only to *wheat* but also to the *vit* of *vita*, we see a form not different from the *mut* of *mutton;* and that this word must have named a *sheep* is shown by its French form *mouton*, which has this meaning. Such a word as *mutton* or *mouton* is therefore equal to such

[5] Lex., *sub voce*. [6] See Asiat. Res. and Ana., vol. i., p. 277.

assumed forms as *viton* or *meaton*, or to any word whatever meaning either *life* or *food*. Hence if we give to the *t* of *meat* its form *l* (witness *langue* and *tongue*) we shall have *meal*, and *meal* is food. Nor can *meal* differ from the μηλ of μῆλον, which means in Greek not only a *sheep* but an *apple* also, and an apple is food, and it was, we are assured, by the eating of an apple that *Eve* "brought death into the world and all our woe." But as Moses did not any more than Milton write under the influence of divine inspiration, we may be allowed to call in question the truth of so strange a history, and to suspect that it was out of his great reverence for the doctrine of the WORD he was led to make such a statement, for it it seems to have been suggested by the meaning or rather the meanings of the word for apple. According to Holyoke אב *ab* is the Hebrew of *apple*, and according to Parkhurst, אבי *abi* means *fruits*. But *ab*, as we have already shown, cannot differ from *av*, nor *av* from the *Ev* of *Eva* or *Eve*. And the latter authority is of opinion that אוב *aub*, which is still but a different form of *ab*, must on several occasions specified by him[7] mean "the *evil* spirit himself." But when Eve was tempted by the serpent, we are taught to believe that the serpent was the *devil*. Here we should not fail to observe that in *Eve*, *evil*, and *devil* we have radically the same word. Even the English word *apple* cannot differ from *evil*, as we must perceive on giving to the *v* of *evil* its form *p* (witness Avril and April) as *evil* will then become *epil*, which, from *e* being equal to *o*, and *o* to *oi*, and *oi* to *a*, is the same as *apil*. The Welsh of *apple* being *aval* allows us to see still more clearly that the same word may signify both *evil* and *apple*. But is not

[7] Lex., p. 1.

the Latin *malum* a still more startling instance, since it means not only an *apple* but *evil* and *wickedness* also. But how can we account for two ideas so opposite as *apple* and *evil* being expressed by the same word? It cannot be accounted for except by the application of my principles. Let us therefore apply them. We have often shown that the idea *one* was called after the *sun*, and we have also shown that such a word as *one* may be either affirmative or negative. It is a negative in the word *unjust*, and also under its form *in* in the word *injustice*. But the *in* of *inhabitant* is in English an affirmative, though in French such a word would be a negative. *No* is a negative, but when read as in Hebrew it can be either affirmative or negative, for it is then equal to *on*, the well-known name of the sun, and in the locution *on dit*, it is also an affirmative; but when we make it appear under its form *un*, and use it as a prefix, it is always a negative. Now as initial consonants have vowels understood before them, it follows that the *mal* of *malum*, an apple, is for *imol*, and here the *im* is not a negative any more than it is in *improve*, but an affirmative, and it has the meaning of an article definite or indefinite, for it is only conventionally that such an article may stand for *the* or *a*, its meaning being always *one*.

Now as *al* in Hebrew means both the true God and the sun, and as *life* may be traced to either of these ideas, and *food* to life, and *fruit* to food, we thus see how it happens that the *mal* of *malum*, an apple, has a good meaning since it is but another word for food; but when *malum* means *evil*, its *mal*, which is still equal to *imal*, is for *un-al*, that is, *no-al*, no God, *no-sun*, and consequently *no-good* but *evil*. We can now tell why *eve* means the close of day; we see that in this case it is

a negative just as it is under its form *ab* in *absum*, and that its meaning is *no-sun, no light.*

From what we have thus far seen of the name *Eve* we can account for several circumstances in the history of the person so called, which until now lay wholly beyond our reach. From knowing that it is equal to *eme, even*, we see that it must be also equal to *ame*, of which the root *am* is the Hebrew of *mother*, and in which it is easy to perceive the *ma* of *mater* and the *mo* of *mother;* and as *m* is the Sanskrit *w*, the *mo* of *mother* cannot differ from the *wo* of *woman*, by which we see that *wo* should now be taken in the sense of *female*, and that from *man* having the meaning of *one*, as we have shown under *homo*, the word *woman* should be explained the *female one*, or we may with equal propriety say that it means the *she-one*, for *wo* is here but another word for *Eve*, and *Eve* under its form *Iva* stands in Sanskrit for *she*, as we saw farther back. And as we have traced *wo* from *mo*, and *mo* from *am*, Hebrew of *mother*, we see that *woman* and *mother* have, when primarily considered, exactly the same meaning. This is confirmed by the following given by Armstrong in his Gaelic dictionary: "A Gael, in speaking to his mother, says, '*a bhean!* woman! and not *a mahathair!* mother!'" The *a* here used before *bhean* and *mahathair* is in Gaelic a sign of the vocative.

Let me now set down, as it were at random, a few other circumstances and proofs relating to Eve. We have seen how this name is equal to *eme*, as in the instance an *eme*-Christian; and in *eme* what do we see when its initial vowel is aspirated but *feme*, in which we have the *fem* of *femina*, a *woman*. And this *fem* cannot differ from *fom*, nor *fom* from the *pom* of *pomum*, an

apple. We have therefore in *femme* (French of *femina*) a form precisely equal to *pomme*, an *apple*. And the *fo* of the *fom* here noticed is but a different form of the *wo* of *woman*, just as *wo* is but a different form of *Eve*. And as *wo* is equal to *woe*, so is *fo* equal to *foe*; and a foe is an adversary, and such is, say the learned, the meaning of *devil*, and, as we have already stated, are not the names *Eve*, *devil*, and *evil*, radically the same word?

When farther back I was tracing *bean* to its original source by showing it to be equal to the verb to *be*, and to signify both *life* and *food*, and that its French equivalent *fève* did not when its substitute for the aspirate was left out differ from the name *Eve*, I was not aware that this very word *bean* was the Gaelic of *woman*. And how easily now we can account for the same word signifying both *woman* and *bean*, which it was not possible without the knowledge obtained through the use of these principles. But as a bean was called after food, and food after life, and as the name *Eve* means *life*, and *woman* also, we thus see why *bean* and *woman* may be expressed by the same word, though two such words might, from roots different in form though not in meaning being used, have had not so much as one letter in common.

From the name *Eve* having the meaning of *life*, we see that it is equal to the verb to *be*, and that this verb might consequently replace the word *Eve*. And this happens, for instead of saying an *Eve* duke or an *Eve* prince, that is, a *woman* duke or a *woman* prince, or, which is the same thing, a *female* duke or a *female* prince, do we not say a duchess, a princess, the ending *ess* of such words being for the Latin *esse*, as we see more clearly by the French equivalents duch*esse* and princ*esse*. But as the initial *e* of *esse* is equal to *o*, it follows that *esse*

cannot differ from *osse*, which is allowed to have been the ancient form of *os*, Latin of *bone*; and this will account for Adam's saying of Eve that she was the *bone* of his *bones*. And we should not fail to observe that in *ban*, which is the Irish of *woman*, we have a form not different from *bone*, and that *bean*, the Gaelic of *woman*, is still the same word.

When we now write Eve thus, *oive* (and it must have been once so written), and when we then drop the *o*, instead of *Eve* we shall have *ive*; which when its *i* is aspirated and its aspirate changed, as it frequently is for *v*, *ive* will become *vive*, in which we see not only the radical part of *vivere*, to *live*, but also a form exactly equal to *wive*, that is *wife*. This will account for the French word *femme* having the meaning of both *woman* and *wife*.

Now according to three learned authorities—men who saw not the consequence of their admissions—the word *Eve* means a *serpent*. Thus Higgins states as follows: "חוה *eue* or חיוא *hiva*, or, as we miscall it, *Heva*, but correctly *Hiva*, was the name of *Eve*, and of a serpent[8]."

Another writer equally unconscious of the consequence of his admission, observes as follows respecting *Eva*: "Clemens Alexandrinus says (and Epiphanius says the same) that this term signified a *serpent* if pronounced with a proper aspirate."

These writers never suspected that it was from the two names being alike, the serpent was thought to have tempted Eve.

Let us now hear what a very learned minister of the Gospel has to say of the *serpent*.

[8] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 523.

CHAPTER XVI.

DR. ADAM CLARKE ON THE SERPENT.

"We have here one of the most difficult as well as the most important narratives in the whole book of God." And a little lower down he adds, "Here is a great mystery, and I may appeal to all persons who have read the various comments that have been written on the Mosaic account, whether they have ever yet been satisfied on this part of the subject, though convinced of the fact itself. *Who was the serpent? Of what kind?* In what way did he seduce the first happy pair. These are questions which *remain yet to be answered.* The whole account is either a *simple narrative of facts,* or it is an allegory. If it be an historical relation, its literal meaning should be sought out; if it be an allegory, no attempt should be made to explain it, as it would require a direct revelation to ascertain the sense in which it should be understood, for fanciful illustrations are endless. Believing it to be a simple relation of facts capable of a satisfactory explanation, I shall take it up on this ground, and, by a careful examination of the original text, endeavour to fix the meaning, and show the propriety and consistency of the Mosaic account of the fall of man. The chief difficulty in the account is found in the question, Who was the *agent* employed in the seduction of our first parents?

"The word in the text which we, following the Septuagint, translate *serpent*, is נחש *nachash;* and according to Buxtorf and others, has three meanings in Scripture. 1. It signifies to *view* or *observe attentively*, to *divine* or *use enchantments*, because the augurs *viewed attentively* the *flight of birds*, the *entrails of beasts*, the *course of the clouds*, &c.; and under this head it signifies to acquire knowledge by experience. 2. It signifies *brass*, *brazen*, and is translated in our Bible not only *brass*, but *chains*, *fetters*, *fetters of brass*, and in several places *steel;* see 2 Sam. xxii. 35, Job xx. 24, Ps. xviii. 34; and in one place at least, *filthiness* or *fornication*, Ezek. xvi. 36. 3. It signifies a *serpent*, but of what kind is not determined. In Job xxvi. 13 it seems to mean the *whale* or *hippopotamus*. 'By his spirit he hath garnished the heavens; his hand hath formed the crooked serpent,' *nachash bariach*. As *barach* signifies to *pass on* or *pass through*, and *beriach* isused for a *bar* of a gate or door *that passed through rings*, &c. the idea of *straightness* rather than *crookedness* should be attached to it here; and it is likely that the hippopotamus, or *sea-horse*, is intended by it.

"In Eccles. x. 11, the creature called *nachash*, of whatever sort, is compared to the *babbler:* 'Surely the serpent (*nachash*) will bite without enchantment; and a *babbler* is no better.'

"In Isa. xxvii. 1, the *crocodile* or *alligator* seems particularly meant by the original: 'In that day the Lord shall punish leviathan the piercing serpent,' &c. And in Isa. lxv. the same creature is meant as in Gen. iii. 1, for in the words, 'And dust shall be the serpent's meat,' there is an evident allusion to the text of Moses. In Amos ix. 3, the crocodile is evidently intended: 'Though they be hid in the bottom of the sea, thence will I command the

serpent (*hannachash*), and he shall bite them.' No person can suppose that any of the *snake* or *serpent* kind can be intended here; and we see from the various acceptations of the word, and the different senses which it bears in various places in the Sacred Writings, that it appears to be a sort of general term confined to no one sense. Hence it will be necessary to examine the root accurately, to see if the ideal meaning will enable us to ascertain the animal intended in the text. We have already seen that *nachash* signifies to *view attentively*, to *acquire knowledge or experience by attentive observation*; so *nichashti*, Gen. xxx. 27, '*I have learned by experience*;' and this seems to be its most general meaning in the Bible. The original word is by the Septuagint translated ὄφις, a *serpent*, not because this was its *fixed* determinate meaning in the Sacred Writings, but because it was the best that occurred to the translators; and they do not seem to have given themselves much trouble to understand the meaning of the original, for they have rendered the word as variously as our translators have done, or rather our translators have followed them, as they give nearly the same significations found in the Septuagint: hence we find that ὄφις is as frequently used by them as *serpent*, its supposed literal meaning, is used in our version. And the New Testament writers, who seldom quote the Old Testament but from the Septuagint translation, and often do not change even a word in their quotations, copy this version in the use of this word. From the Septuagint, therefore, we can expect no light, nor indeed from any other of the ancient versions, which are all subsequent to the Septuagint, and some of them actually made from it. In all this uncertainty it is natural for a serious inquirer after truth to look every where for information. And in

such an inquiry the Arabic may be expected to afford some help, from its great similarity to the Hebrew.

"A root in this language, very similar to that in the text, seems to cast considerable light on the subject. *Chanas* or *khanasa* signifies *he departed, drew off, lay hid, seduced, slunk away;* from this root came *aknas, khanasa,* and *khanoos,* which all signify an *ape,* or *satyrus,* or any creature of the simia or *ape* genus. It is very remarkable also, that from the same root comes *khanas,* the DEVIL, which appellative he bears from the meaning of *khanasa, he drew off, seduced,* &c., because he *draws* men *off* from righteousness, *seduces* them from their obedience to God, &c., &c., See Golius, sub voce. Is it not strange that the *Devil* and the *ape* should have the same name, derived from the same root, and that root so very similar to the word in the text. But let us return and consider what is said of the creature in question. Now the *nachash* was more subtle, ערום *arum* [*orum*], more wise, cunning or prudent, *than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made.* In this account we find, 1. That whatever this *nachash* was, he stood at the *head* of all inferior animals for wisdom and understanding. 2. That he *walked erect,* for this is necessarily implied in his punishment,—*on thy* belly (that is, on all fours) *shalt thou go.* 3. That he was endued with the *gift of speech,* for a conversation is here related between him and the woman. 4. That he was also endued with the *gift of reason,* for we find him reasoning and disputing with Eve. 5. That these things were *common to this creature,* the woman no doubt having often seen him walk erect, talk and reason, and therefore she testifies *no kind of surprise* when he accosts her in the language related in the text; and indeed from the manner in which this is introduced it

appears to be only a part of a conversation that had passed between them on the occasion: "Yea, hath God said," &c.

"Now I apprehend that none of these things can be spoken of a *serpent* of any species. 1. None of them ever *did* or ever *can* walk erect. The tales we have had of two-footed and four-footed serpents are justly exploded by every judicious naturalist, and are utterly unworthy of credit. The very name *serpent* comes from *serpo*, to *creep*, and therefore to such it could be neither *curse* nor *punishment* to go on their bellies, that is, to *creep on* as they had done from their creation, and must do while their race endures. 2. They have no *organs* for *speech*, or any kind of articulate sound; they can only *hiss*. . . . God did not qualify this creature with speech for the occasion. On the contrary, the text intimates that *speech* and *reason* were natural to the *nachash*. Nor can I find that the *serpentine* genus are remarkable for intelligence. It is true the wisdom of the serpent has passed into a proverb, but I cannot see on what it is founded, except in reference to the passage in question, where the *nachash* which we translate *serpent*, following the Septuagint, shows so much intelligence and cunning. All these things considered we are obliged to seek for some other word to designate the *nachash* in the text than the word *serpent*, which on every view of the subject appears to me inefficient and inapplicable. We have seen above that *khanas*, *akhnas*, and *khanoos*, signify a creature of the *ape* or *satyrus* kind. We have seen that the meaning of the root is, *he lay hid, seduced, slunk away*, &c.; and that *khanas* means the *devil*. It therefore appears to me that a creature of the *ape* or *ourang-outang* kind is here intended. Such a creature answers

to every part of the description in the text. The subtlety, cunning, endlessly-varied pranks and tricks of these creatures show them, *even now*, to be more subtle and intelligent than any other creature, man alone excepted. Being obliged now to walk on all fours, and gather food from the ground, they are literally obliged to *eat the dust;* and though exceedingly cunning and careful in a variety of instances to separate that part which is wholesome and proper for food from that which is not so, in the article of cleanliness they are lost to all sense of propriety." Dr. Adam Clarke further supposes that creatures of this kind had once the use of speech, and of which they were deprived "at the fall as a part of their punishment."

The Doctor concludes by stating as follows: "I have spent the longer time on this subject, 1. because it is exceedingly obscure; 2. because no interpretation hitherto given of it has afforded me the smallest satisfaction; 3. because I think the above mode of accounting for every part of the whole transaction is consistent and satisfactory, and in my opinion removes many embarrassments, and solves the chief difficulties. I think it can be no solid objection to the above mode of solution that Satan in different parts of the New Testament is called the serpent, the serpent that deceived Eve by his subtlety, the old serpent, &c., for we have already seen that the New Testament writers have borrowed the word from the Septuagint, and the Septuagint themselves use it in a *vast variety and latitude of meaning;* and surely the *ourang-outang* is as likely to be the animal in question as נחש *nachash* and ὄφις *ophis* are likely to mean at once a *snake*, a *crocodile*, a *hippopotamus*, *fornication*, a *chain*, a *pair of fetters*, a *piece of brass*, a *piece of steel*,

a *conjuror,* for we have seen above that all these are acceptations of the original word. Besides the New Testament writers seem to lose sight of the animal or instrument used on the occasion, and speak only of Satan himself as the cause of the transgression, and the instrument of all evil."

It will be now necessary to bear well in mind that Dr. Adam Clarke concludes with saying: "I have spent the longer time on this subject, 1. because it is exceedingly obscure; 2. because no interpretation hitherto given of it has afforded me the smallest satisfaction; 3. because I think the above mode of accounting for every part of the whole transaction is consistent and satisfactory, and in my opinion removes *many* embarrassments, and solves the *chief* difficulties."

This improvement consists, as we have seen, in the substitution of a monkey for the serpent that tempted Eve; but, however happy and ingenious this discovery may be considered by Dr. Adam Clarke's numerous admirers, it only "removes," in his own words, "*many* embarrassments, and solves the *chief* difficulties" of the subject; which is clearly telling us that it does not remove *all* the embarrassments and *all* the difficulties with which "this great mystery," as he calls it, is surrounded. Hence the necessity for further inquiry, and to this no lover of either truth or religion can object; for how can he possibly do so when he is told by so high an authority as Dr. Adam Clarke that the subject is "exceedingly obscure," and that "no interpretation hitherto given of it has afforded" this enlightened divine "the smallest satisfaction"?

And though the result of this inquiry may be considered as calculated to disturb certain very old opinions,

yet no truly religious mind can object to it on this ground, or find fault with its author for making it known. Dr. Adam Clarke's alteration of the third chapter of Genesis is opposed to the opinions of not only all preceding commentators of the Bible, but even to those of the Evangelists themselves, who, whenever they allude to the animal that tempted Eve, speak of it as a serpent, and not as an ape or a monkey; yet so great a mass of opposing authority could not induce the Doctor to turn aside from what *he* conceived to be his duty as a minister of God. And so should it ever be: that is, we should ever, no matter by whom we are opposed or what the consequence may be, tell what we believe to be the truth, and especially in matters of religion and science.

Nachash is, according to Dr. Adam Clarke, the name of the creature that tempted *Eve*. This name is represented in Hebrew by these three signs נחש *nhs*, which are allowed to be equal to the seven signs composing *nachash*. Now, no one perceives the least resemblance between this word and one in English of similar import, and yet there is such a word. Its radical part *nach* is as equal to *nak* as *breach* is to *break;* and as there is a euphonical tendency to sound an *s* before *n*, as we have shown several times, this *nak*, which is equal to the *nach* of *nachash*, is the same as *snak*, and *snak* is *snake*, and a *snake* is a *serpent*. This etymology has been already given in this work[1]. *Nachash* is therefore equal to *snake-ash*, that is, *snake-ish*, which, if there were such a word in English, would pass for a diminutive of *snake*. But the root of this word is *ak*, and this root cannot differ from any other except conventionally. One by which it must have been often replaced is *ag*—witness *partake* and *partage*—and this root *ag* must as well as *ak*

[1] Vol. i. p. 129.

have served as a name for the serpent long previous to such a form as *nachash* or *snake*. This view is confirmed by the following from Higgins:—"The head of the Serpent Temple at Abury is called *Hack-pen*. This is evidently the Pen *head*, and *Hag*, the old English word for *serpent*[2]." When we therefore drop the aspirate of *hag* we get *ag*; but if we replace the aspirate by its common substitute *s*, *hag* will become *sag*, in which we see the *sag* of *sagax*, *sage*, *wise*, and the wisdom of the serpent has passed into a proverb; but Dr. Adam Clarke says he cannot see upon what this proverb is founded, nor can any one else, except such a person as can be brought to believe in the truth of these principles, and he will see at a glance that the proverb is to be ascribed to the fact that there was a time when the word for *serpent* and the one meaning *wise* happened to be alike, as we have just shown by the word *hag*, of which the root *ag* cannot differ from the *ach* of the *nach* of *nachash*. But how is the *nachash* rendered into Greek? The Septuagint represent it by ὄφις, of which *oph* is the root, and when this *oph* is aspirated, and the aspirate replaced, as in *hag*, by its substitute *s*, we shall instead of *oph* get the *soph* of *sophos*, Greek of *wise*. The serpent could not therefore escape having been thought a very wise animal, however foolish by nature he might have been. Nor is this meaning of the creature's name in any way opposed to one of the explanations given by Dr. Adam Clarke of the word *nachash*, and which is "to acquire knowledge by experience;" for to acquire knowledge, in no matter what way, is to become *wise*. Here, too, we should observe that such a form as *soph* is precisely like the *sap* of *sapere* to *know*, nor less so to the *sav* of its French equivalent *savoir*. And that

[2] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 518.

the roots of these words, that is *oph*, *ap*, and *av*, are each of them equal to the *ach* of *nachash* is made evident by the participle present of *savoir* being *sachant*, and which does not differ from *savant* but by the latter being used as a noun. This serves to show that the *ach* of *nachash* cannot differ from *av* any more than *sachant* can from *savant*.

Here, too, we see why the *serpent* has in all times been regarded as a *saviour;* we see that the animal is indebted to his name for so great an honour. Thus ἑρπω and its Latin form *serpo*, of which the meaning is to *creep*, are allowed to be the same as the *serp* of *serpent;* and as *serpo* cannot differ from *servo*, to *save*, this accounts for the serpent having been revered as a *saviour*. It is also evident that the *serv* of *servo* cannot differ from *sarv*, nor *sarv* from the *salv* of *salvator*, which means a *saviour*. And though this is fully explained in this work[3], there is one important circumstance relating to the *serpent* which I did not then explain. The sun was, as the learned now admit, known in ancient times by the name of *saviour*. But, as we have seen in our etymology of the Trinity, the same word may signify both *high* and *low*, and consequently the *sun* and *no sun;* in other words, the *saviour* and the *destroyer*. The serpent's name may have therefore often had a bad meaning as well as a good one. *Sōter* (Σωτὴρ), the Greek of *saviour*, does not differ but conventionally from *Satan*. This will account for some people having worshipped the *devil*, as it will for others having represented him white, which idea is traceable to the sun; even this bright luminary has been made black, which arose from its appearing to have had then a negative meaning, and for the reverence paid to the doctrine of the WORD.

[3] Vol. i. pp. 129, 130, 132.

And that the author of the Pentateuch was a firm believer in this doctrine of the WORD, I beg to give here a very plain instance from Cruden's Concordance, where I find the following:—"Among other kinds of serpents mentioned in Scripture, are those fiery, flying serpents, that made so great a destruction among the Israelites, and were the death of so many people in the desert, Num. xxi. 6. The Hebrew word here used for *serpent* is *saraph*, which properly signifies to *burn*; and it is thought this name was given to it, either because of its colour, or because of that heat and thirst which it creates by its biting. It was upon this occasion that the Lord commanded Moses to make the brazen serpent, or the figure of the serpent, *saraph*, and to raise it upon a pole, that the people who were bit by the serpents, by looking upon this image, might be presently healed. Moses did so; and the event was answerable to this promise."

The word for *serpent*, here named *saraph*, is exactly equal to the *serv* of *servo*, to *save*, and which we have shown not to differ from the *salv* of *salvator*. It may very well signify to *burn* as Cruden states, and which also corresponds with the meaning given of it by Parkhurst; for as the sun was called a saviour, and as this orb was supposed to be composed of fire, the *saraph* may have been very well named after the verb to *burn*. But the meaning given to the name of this serpent by Moses was not significant of burning, but of saving or healing. But why did Moses order the serpent to be made of *brass*? It was not because *brass* meant to *save* or to *heal*, but because it *seemed* to have this meaning. And why should this be? Because *brass* was called after *brightness*, and *brightness* after the *sun*; so that from the sun having been worshipped as a saviour, the idea *brass*

was signified by a word meaning to *heal* or to *save*, though not called after such an idea. And when we reduce the double *s* in *brass* to a single one, and then read as in Hebrew, we shall have *sarb*, and *sarb* cannot differ from *sarv*, nor *sarv* from the *serv* of *servo*, to *save*. And that there should be only one *s* in *brass* is shown by Dr. Johnson, who gives *bras* as its Saxon equivalent. From the same authority I learn that in the Welsh tongue, which, according to some learned men, contains, like Irish, a great many Hebrew words, the word for brass is *pres*, and *pres*, when read from right to left, gives the *serp* of *serpent*, without submitting it to the least change. Dr. Adam Clarke does not, therefore, mistake when he numbers among the several meanings of *nachash* that of *brass*. But does he not also number *steel?* He does; and this metal was, no doubt, named also with reference to its brightness when compared with iron. Steel highly polished reflects like a looking-glass. And as to the root of this word in English, which is *eel*, it happens to be the name of a serpent, Dr. Johnson's definition of it being "a *serpentine* slimy fish." According to M. Littré, the *eel* (*anguille*) has not only the form of a serpent, but its Italian *anguilla* is, according to this authority, the diminutive of the Latin *anguis*, a *serpent*. If we now regard the *an* of *anguis* as only an article that coalesced with its noun *guis*, and if we remark that the *gu* of *guis* cannot differ from *w* any more than the *Gu* of *Guillaume* can from the *W* of *William*, we shall instead of *guis* obtain the *wis* of *wisdom;* and as the *wis* of *wisdom* is for *wise*, we see that *anguis* or *guis-an* may be said to mean the *wise-one*. This etymology suggests another. The *wis* of *wisdom* is here for *wit*, and as *wit*, when its *i* receives the nasal sound, becomes

wint, and as *wint* is for *wind* (*spiritus*), and as *wind* is, when its *w* takes its form of *m*, equal to *mind*, a similar result may be obtained by the analyzing of the *wis* of *wisdom*: thus by giving to its *w* its form *m*, and to its *i* its nasal sound, we shall obtain *mins*, and *mins* cannot differ from *mens*, the *mind*. But why is it not *mins* instead of *mens*? It is not difficult to tell why. *Mins*, we know, must have once been *moins*, *o* being always understood with *i*, and when this *o* was dropped *i* remained; but when the *i* instead of the *o* was dropped, *moins* became *mons*, and when *o* took its form of *e* as it does very often, *mons* became *mens*.

These etymologies suggest still another. The *wis* of *wisdom* has *o* understood with its *i*, and it is therefore equal to *wois*, which cannot differ from *vois*, nor *vois* from *vox*, nor *vox* from *voice*, and the *voice* is a *breath*, is a *wind*, a *spiritus*, so that it does not differ from mind, though the meaning is somewhat different, is even very different, yet the source is the same.

But how is the Greek of *voice*, *φωνη*, to be accounted for? By observing that its *φ* does but replace the aspirate *h*, and that from all the substitutes of the aspirate being equal to one another, we are at liberty to choose from amongst them the one that will suit our purpose best; that is, the one which will make good sense. Now the root of *φωνὴ* is *ων*, because the *φ* being left out, and because the *η* at the end being only a common suffix, is consequently not to be counted. Let us now observe that *ων*, this root of *φωνὴ*, is equal to *oon* in Roman characters, the omega being for double *o*. Now the best representative for the *φ* of *φωνὴ* appears to be *s*, for *oon* will by this means become *soon*, and *soon* is by contraction the same as *son*, in which we see the radical

part of *sonus*, and the French *son*, and as *sonus* and *son* have each the meaning of *sound*, this makes good sense, for the *voice* is a sound. Nor do we fail to discover among these forms the Greek of *spiritus* or *mind*, for when we read *soon* after the Hebrew manner, we get *noos* (νόος) which is the Greek of *mind* or *spiritus*.

Let us now take notice of some words for serpent. According to Dr. Johnson, a worm is a serpent, his definition of it being "a small harmless serpent that lives in the earth." But why does not this English word *worm* signify knowledge of some kind or other, since, according to Dr. Adam Clarke, the Hebrew *nachash* has for one of its meanings "to become *wise?*" But it may have once had some such meaning, since it has this meaning still in Hebrew. Thus Parkhurst refersto several places in Scripture where the word for *worm* means *quick-witted, cunning, subtle, sharp*, and tells us to compare those places with Genesis iii., which opens with "Now the *serpent* was more *subtle* than any beast of the field." By which we see that he compares the craftiness of the *worm* to that of the *serpent*. The Hebrew of *worm* is תולע *orm*, which by means of the aspirate became *worm*, and whence, as Parkhurst shows, comes the Latin *vermis* and *vermin* in English. And as *b* and *m* interchange in Hebrew, *bria*, *fut*, being in this tongue written also *mria*, it follows that the *verm* of *vermis* or *vermin* cannot differ from the *verb* of *verbum* any more than it can from *verd*, which is the same as *word*, and this accounts for the very simple belief that the serpent could speak, and that it did converse with *Eve*. And though we are now in the nineteenth century, there are still persons to be found who entertain so strange an opinion. But serpents have, as Dr. Adam Clarke justly observes, "no organs

for speech or any kind of articulate sound; they can only hiss."

Nor are we to suppose that it is only such a form as *verm* or *worm* can be shown to be equal to *verb* or *word*, for neither the *erp* of the Greek ἑρπω, nor of the Latin *serpo*, can differ from *verp*, nor *verp* from the *verb* of *verbum*; for the aspirate of the Greek *herpo*, though represented by the *s* of *serpo* might as well have been represented by *v*, all the substitutes of this sign being equal to one another. And it was no doubt from the aspirate having been often replaced by *v*, the belief first arose that serpents had at the creation the faculty of speech. And what can show more clearly that letters do often change places than this *erp* we are now noticing, for when its *e* falls behind its *r*, we shall get the *rep* of *reptile*. In this *rep* we can perceive something else. When read after the Hebrew manner it is *per*, and *per* cannot differ from the *par* of *parole*, nor *par* from the *bar* of *debar*, which is the Hebrew of *parole*; and this is as plain as that in *debar* we have *barde*, and consequently, from the identity of *b* and *w*, *warde*, that is, *word*. It was in this way, while language was yet in its infancy, that its letters and terms were made to change their positions in order to obtain different acceptations. The ancient cabalists must have been wonderfully clever in their arranging and interpreting of words. Witness their finding in three verses of the Bible about as many names of the Deity as these verses contain syllables. But so it ought to be, for syllables are the roots of language, and as they have grown out of *one* root and out of one another, they are consequently but so many names of the sun, then the type of the true God; and as the wise men of ancient times could see only one sun, they could not for the same

reason see more than one God. But these were only the *very* wise men, for such as saw in every root a name of the sun were led to believe that there were as many Gods in heaven as there were words in their language. That which confirmed the very wise men the more in their belief appears to have been the additional circumstance that there was not only *one* sun to be seen, but that its name meant *one*, and that this word must, in common with all words, have emanated from the sun, which was then revered as God, and God as the origin of the WORD.

The serpent was also condemned to eat *dust* all the days of his life, though he has not yet been known to eat so much as one mouthful of it. We may therefore safely conclude that it must have been from the name of the *serpent* and that of *dust* being alike at the time this belief began to prevail, that an idea so wholly destitute of truth and reason arose. It has been urged that as he picks up his food from off the ground, he must often swallow grains of dust with it. But so do all animals swallow grains of dust, man himself not excepted, even when the food has come from trees instead of the ground. But are there, I may be asked, any two words so much alike as to signify both *serpent* and *dust?* There are two such words; witness *nachash*, which, as we have seen, is the same as the *snak* of *snake;* and what is *snak*, when read after the Hebrew manner, but *kans*, that is, *kanis*, which cannot differ from *konis* (κόνις), and this happens to be the Greek of *dust*. Nor can it differ from the Arabic word *kanis*, which according to Dr. Adam Clarke is the word for *devil* in Arabic, and Hebrew is allowed to be radically the same language. But as *dust* is traceable to the *earth*, and consequently

to *lowness*, after which *badness* has been called, we can easily account for such a word signifying both *devil* and *evil*. The Greek particle *dus*, and which is the Gaelic of *dust*, has also this very meaning, even that of *evil*; thus Holyoke: "δυς apud Græcos ferè *malum* significat." And *Dusius*, which is radically the same word, was, according to Junius, "a certain species of *evil* spirits." And St. Augustin says: "Quosdam dæmones quos dusios Galli nuncupant." The *Dis* of the Romans was still the same personage by whom was meant not only the *devil* or *Pluto*, but, as Parkhurst observes, the *earth* also, which serves to show that *lowness* is now the meaning of the word. But as *Dis* was with the Greeks the same as *Zεὺς* or *Jupiter*, it must in this case have been a name of the *sun*, and have consequently signified the reverse of *lowness*.

I beg here to quote the following interesting passage from Parkhurst under דש *ds*. "From דש *ds* may be also deduced the *Dysæ*, who were inferior goddesses (of our Saxon ancestors), the messengers of the great *Woden*, whose province it was to convey the souls of such as died in battle to his abode, called *Val-Hall*, that is, the *Hall of Slaughter*, where they were to drink with him and their other gods *cerevisia*, a kind of malt liquor (ale), in the skulls of their slaughtered enemies. On the contrary, those who died a natural death were by the same *Dysæ* conveyed to *Hela*, the goddess of Hell, where they were tormented with hunger and thirst, and all kinds of evils. Of these goddesses mention is made in an ancient Danish monument, from which they [the authors of the Universal History] cite some lines, containing so curious a specimen of the theology of our heathen ancestors, that I am persuaded the reader will not be

displeased at seeing the English translation of them in this place. They are the conclusion of a wounded warrior's dying song:—

'With the dead I long to be;
Now the Dysæ beckon me,
Whom great Woden from his hall,
Sent, and ordered me to call.
In the Asæ's lofty house
I shall sit and ale carouse.
Hours of life already fly:
Let me laugh and laughing die.'

From these *Dysæ*, or from *Dusii*, a kind of demons among the Gauls, we still retain the word *deuse* for the *devil*[4]."

We have now seen sufficient to feel convinced that such ideas, as *Eve, evil, devil, dust,* and *lowness,* are all traceable to the same source; but they might have meanings just the contrary of those we have shown them to have; and which is made evident by *Dis* being with the Greeks the same as *Ζεὺς* or Jupiter, and with the Romans the same as *Pluto;* the one being, as then supposed, the god of heaven, and the other the god of hell —high and low by the same word.

It was when the word for *serpent* happened to mean *high* that this animal was revered as a *saviour,* and so much so that persons stung by it did not dare to hurt it; for its name was then found equal to one of those by which the sun—the supposed god of the world—was known. Hence Æsculapius, the god of medicine, and Salus, the goddess of health and safety, are each represented with serpents, and for no other reason than that the name of the serpent meant also saviour, whence the ideas *salvation, healing,* and *health.* But when the serpent

[4] Parkhurst, p. 140, ed. 1823.

was first made sacred to Mercury, it was, it would seem, because its name was then perceived to have the meaning of the WORD, of which Mercury was the chief divinity.

Good Christians have been always greatly horrified on learning that the serpent was, in ancient times, worshipped all over the world as a god, which superstition they do still ascribe to the artifice and wickedness of the devil, never suspecting that at first this worship was suggested from the serpent's name happening to have with its other meanings that of saviour also, and that from the doctrine of the WORD being then strictly enjoined to all men as an article of faith, no one could, without being accused of acting in contradiction to the prevailing religion, deny whatever it inculcated, and of which the principal precept seems to have been a constant and firm belief in the different meanings expressed by that wonderful faculty human speech, which was then thought by every one to have come down direct from heaven, not only as from God but even as God Himself.

Hence "to give the devil his due," we are in conscience bound to admit, that however naughty his majesty of the place below may have been at other times, it was not he on the present occasion, but merely the word *serpent*, that must have first led men so far astray as to induce them to pay divine honours to this animal.

Now, though Dr. Adam Clarke did verily believe that Eve was through the instigation of some evil creature or other tempted to eat of the forbidden fruit, he could not, however, for the reasons he has assigned, and which we have seen, suppose that the serpent had any thing to do with the transaction. He therefore looks out for some more suitable object, and he adopts the *ape*, not failing to

assign several plausible reasons for his preference, and which reasons we have also seen. The difficult problem we have now to solve is to know if the *ape* could possibly achieve what the serpent is reported to have accomplished.

According to Calmet *koph* or *kuph* means in Hebrew an *ape;* but when we drop its *k*, which is here for the aspirate, we shall have the *oph* of *ophis,* which is the Greek of *serpent.* Hence *ape* and *serpent* may have been often expressed by the same word, and, for this reason, have suggested superstitious notions of similar import; and of this the following passage affords a very plain proof: "The inhabitants of Goa," says Calmet, "did not dare to kill *apes,* any more than *serpents;* because they believed them to be the residences of spirits created by God to afflict mankind in punishment for their sins[5]." Now as the spirit that had its residence in the serpent was said to be no less a personage than Satan himself, it follows that such too must have been the spirit supposed to have taken up his residence in the ape. It is easy to perceive that the word *ape* cannot, from the identity of *p* and *v*, differ from *ave,* nor *ave* from *Eve.* Hence all we have said of Eve, and consequently of Adam, will apply to the *ape.* But this animal, I shall be told, was not called after Adam or Eve, or, which amounts to the same, after *man* or *woman,* but after its *flat* nose, as all learned men admit, and that this etymology is confirmed by its Latin name *simia,* which is radically the same as *simus* and σιμὸς, each of these words having the meaning of *flat-nosed.* But as there is in no part of *simia* a word for *nose,* we may be allowed to question the truth of this old etymology. Let us only observe that *sim* is the radi-

[5] Art. Ape.

cal part of *simia,* and that so is it of *similis* and *similar;* and on writing it in full by supplying the *o* understood with the *i,* and by then making the *o* and *i* (composing *a*) to meet, we shall bring *sim* equal to the *sam* of *same,* and so discover that the name of the *ape* is traceable to *sameness.* How now are we to derive a name for the evil spirit supposed to have taken up its residence in both the serpent and the ape, and which must have been no other than *Satan* himself, since this belief prevailed respecting the *serpent,* and since the *serpent* and the *ape* are now to be considered as one and the same character, this arising from the identity of their names in meaning but not in form? It is not difficult to trace the word *same,* which is equal to the *sim* of *simia,* an *ape,* to one for the *flat* of *flat-nosed;* for *sameness* is *evenness,* and *evenness* is *levelness,* and *levelness* is *flatness,* and *flatness* is *lowness,* and it is to a low place the devil or evil spirit is said to belong. Let us now observe that nothing being more common in language than the transposition of letters, we may make the *f* and the *l* of *flat* change places, and when we here do so, and then read this word after the Hebrew manner, we shall instead of *flat* have *tafl,* and as a single vowel is equal to a combination of vowels, *tafl* cannot differ from *teufel,* nor *teufel* from its English equivalent *devil.* If we now, in order to confirm this etymology, remark that *flat* is, from the common interchange of *f* and *p,* the same as *plat,* and which becomes evident when we observe that *plat* is the French of *flat;* we shall get another word for the god of hell, for *plat* can no more differ from the *Plut* of *Pluto* than farther can from further. We have therefore, when radically considered, in Teufel, Devil, and Pluto the same word; for as to devil we need only make its *d* take its

very common form of *t*, in order to see that *devil* will by this means become *tevil*, which is clearly the same as the German *teufel*, a word we have derived from *flat, low.*

From what we have now just seen can we say that the *ape* was called after his flat nose? We must admit that his name does not differ in meaning from the word *flat*, but this affords no proof that he was called after the *flatness* of his nose. And why so? Because the *sim* of *simia* is, as we have seen, the English word *same*, and the root of *same* is *am*, and *am* must have first been *oim*, which with the aspirate becomes *hoim*, and *hoim* when its *i* is dropped becomes *hom*, and this is the radical part of *homo*, and that I make no mistake in deriving it from *same* is made evident by the Greek word *homos*, ὁμος, of which *same* is the meaning. If we now write the *hom* of *homo* in full it will be equal to *hoim* (*i* being understood with the *o*); and when we now drop the *o* we get *him*, which, when the aspirate is represented by its substitute the *s*, becomes *sim*, radical part of *simia*.

It is therefore evident that in the *sim* of *simia* and in the *hom* of *homo* we have the same word. Nor is it less evident that we have also a word of the same meaning (as just shown) in the *flat* of *flatness;* whence *teufel*, *devil*, and *Pluto*, the god of the place *below*. What is now the original meaning of *ape?* Has the animal been called after its *flat* nose or after *man?* Every one will believe the latter to have been the real original of its name, the resemblance in many respects between *man* and an *ape* being so very close. But as in our etymology of *homo* we have shown it to mean *one*, it may be raised as an objection that *one* cannot, like *flat*, be shown to mean either *evil* or the *devil*. It is, however, very wrong to think so; for though *un*, which is the root of

unus, means *one,* it is when a prefix used negatively, and then it has a bad meaning. Thus such words as *unhappy, unhealthy,* are rendered into French by *malheureux, malsain,* and *mal* is the radical part of the Latin *malum,* which means *evil* and an *apple* also, and *evil* and *devil* are radically the same. It is thus made evident that a word signifying *unity* might also serve as a name for the devil, and consequently for the *serpent,* in whom the devil was supposed to reside. Let us now see if *unity* can have ever had this meaning. Its Latin form *unitas* cannot differ from either *bonitas,* or *sanitas,* or *vanitas,* for the aspirate to which its *u* is entitled may be replaced by *b, s,* or *v*. When we replace it by *b* and so get *bunitas,* it is easy to perceive that this is for *bonitas,* by which we see that goodness was called after *unity;* and this ought to be, for *sol*—the type of the Deity—means *one,* and stands for *unity;* and this etymology is confirmed by the word *God,* of which the root *od* is for *odd,* and *odd* means *one. Bonitas* cannot therefore serve as a name for the evil spirit. And can *sanitas* signify the evil spirit? It cannot, for it means *health,* and this idea also is traceable to the name of the sun, for under its verbal form it means to *heal* and to *save,* and the sun was called a saviour. And can *vanitas* mean the evil spirit? It cannot, for it does not differ from *ventus, wind,* a vowel being understood between the *n* and the *t* of this word, so that it is the same as *venitus,* which is but a different form of *vanitas;* and this idea also is traceable to the *sun,* the supposed author of life; and *wind, air,* or *breath* is life. Vanity has been therefore called after a *puff* of wind; hence to be puffed up with pride is to be full of *vanity;* that is, of nothing substantial, of nothing solid, only of *wind.*

Now in the three words we have just passed over, *bonitas*, *sanitas*, and *vanitas*, and which are all traceable to *unity*, and consequently to the sun, there is only one of them that can be shown to mean the evil spirit. And which is that one? It is *sanitas*, an idea traceable to the sun, when the latter was known by the name of saviour. But in order to see in *sanitas* the name of the evil spirit we must read it after the Hebrew manner, that is from right to left, and then it will be *satinas*, that is, *satanas*, which is both the Greek and Latin of Satan. Its Hebrew equivalent is שטן *sthn*, that is, with the vowels supplied, *sathan*, which when read from right to left gives *nathas*, and this is but a different form of *nachash*, the *serpent*, which accounts for the belief that the creature which tempted *Eve* was *Satan*. This belief happens to be further confirmed by the sense in which *nick* is taken when we say "Old *Nick*;" for though *nick* when so used means the *devil*, it cannot, however, differ from *nack*, nor *nack* from the *nach* of *nachash*, the *serpent*.

Let us now notice Διάβολος, which is the Greek of *devil*. Its first syllable *di* is the *di* of *dies*, Latin of *day*; and because the day was called after the sun, *dies* is but a different form of *Deus*, *God*, of which the sun was the type. As to the *abol* of *diabolos*, it cannot differ from *avol*, nor *avol* from *evil*, according to which etymology *Diabolos* will mean *the evil god*; but it might just as well mean *the fallen god*, or *the god below*. This difference in meaning arises from such ideas as are expressed by *evil* and *fallen* being traceable to *lowness*.

In the *abol* of *Diabolos*, we can see not only *apple* but Eve also, and consequently the other forms to which we have shown this name to be equal. Nor can *abol*

differ from the Hebrew word אבל *abl*, which, according to Parkhurst, means "to be *desolate, waste;*" and when a verb, he explains it thus: "to *lay waste*, to *make desolate.*" And these are meanings which correspond with those given of Satan, for they are also traceable to lowness. Indeed the *Sat* of *Satan* shows even in English that this name signifies *low*, for to *sit*, which is the infinitive of *sat*, is to put one's self *down*. Hence Parkhurst explains the Hebrew word שת *st* as follows: "that part of the body upon which men *sit*, the buttocks," and he gives for its derivatives "*set, sit, seat,*" &c.

Nor can the Hebrew word אבל *abl* differ from *Abel*, Cain's brother, and as his name is the same as *evil*, and as *evil* and *Eve* are radically the same word, we are hence led to suppose he was called after his mother. But, according to the learned, what is the etymology of his name? "*Vanity, breath*, or *vapour.*" And though *Abel* was never called after any of these ideas, yet as *breath* or *vapour* is but another word for *wind*, and as *vanity* is also *wind*, as we saw only awhile ago, and as this idea is traceable to *life*, and as *life* is the meaning of the name *Eve*, as we have also several times shown, it follows that the name *Abel* might be very well said to have such an origin if it corresponded—which it does not—with the character of the person so called. But *Abel*, when the name of a city, receives for its primary signification that of *mourning;* and so it well may, for any word signifying *life*, such as *Eve*, may also signify *lowness*, and even *death*. Hence *evil* and *devil* are each, as we have seen, traceable to *lowness*, and Eve is radically the same word. And this is no more to be wondered at than that the same word should mean as *altus* does in Latin, both *high* and *low*. As to the word

mourning, it is radically the same as *mourir* and *morior*, each of which means to *die*, and to which we may add the *mor* of *mort* and *mors*, and these words mean *death*.

These latter views cannot but lead the reader to suppose that what we are told of *Abel*, must in the author's opinion, have been suggested by the meaning which his name was once perceived to have. So far the reader will be right. But though the name *Abel* means the *fallen*, it might have very well had the opposite meaning, and so have signified one who *kills* instead of one who is *killed*. Thus in Greek, *dunatos* (δυνατὸς) means *able*, but we may say that it is letter for letter the same as *thanatos* (θάνατος), which means *death*. In short, there is no more difference between *dunatos* and *thanatos* than there is in English between *hill* and *hell*, which are but other words for *high* and *low*. And when we bear in mind that the name *Abel* is equal to *evil*, and that *evil* is radically the same as *devil*, and then observe that the name *Cain* cannot differ from *can*, what do we discover on reading this form of *Cain* after the Hebrew manner, but *nac*, which is the radical part of *nachash*, the *serpent*, and the serpent was, we are assured, the devil. It is true that Moses does not say so, but in Revelation xii. 9 it is said, "That old *serpent*, called the *Devil* and *Satan*." Thus though the two names Cain and Abel differ widely in form, they are, however, in meaning alike. And that Cain should murder his brother is signified by his name in Greek (καίνω), which means to *kill*. And as this word is reducible to *kan*, it is when read as in Hebrew not only the same as the *nach* of *nachash*, the *serpent*, but as the *nec* of the Latin *neco*, which also means to *kill*; for as the *e* of *neco* is for *o* and consequently for *oi* or *a*, we see very

clearly how close is the resemblance between it and the *nach* of *nachash*. And what do we see in the word *kill* itself when we drop an *l*, and give to the one that remains its form *n*—witness *sol* and *son* or *sun*—but *kin*, and what is *kin* when read as in Hebrew but *nik*, that is, the *nick* of Old *Nick*. Thus examine his name as you will, Cain could not but kill his brother; his name has made him a fratricide; or it was rather the serpent or the serpent's name that did it, *Cain* and the *nac* of *nachash* being radically the same word. But as the body of the *nachash* serves as a residence for the *devil*, the latter was, after all, the real murderer, and which is confirmed by St. John, who referring to him, says: "He was a *murderer* from the beginning;" viii. 44; that is, from the day he brought death into the world by his having tempted the mother of all living to eat of the forbidden fruit.

Of Dr. Adam Clarke's several reasons in support of his belief that it was really an *ape* and not a serpent that tempted Eve, the most effective certainly appears to be his having found that in Arabic *chanas* or *khanasa* means an *ape*, the *Devil*, and *seduced*. To this circumstance he refers twice as to something very remarkable. His own words are: "It is very remarkable that also from the same root [as *nachash*] comes *khanas*, the *devil*, which appellative he bears from that meaning of *khanassa*, *he drew off*, *seduced*, &c., because he *draws* men off from their righteousness, *seduces* them from their obedience to God, &c. &c. Is it not strange that the *devil* and the *ape* should have the same name, derived from the same root, and that root so very similar to the word in the text?" that is, to *nachash*, the word for *serpent*. But had Dr. Adam Clarke been acquainted with these

principles of which we have already so often seen the advantage, he would not have been under the necessity of going to Arabic or any other language to find that the radical part of *nachash*, that is, *nach*, and the radical part of *chanas*, that is *chan*, are letter for letter the same word, with this immaterial difference, that the former is read from right to left, and the latter from left to right. Hence it is not only in Arabic that the word for serpent means the devil, but in Hebrew also, and of this very important fact the learned have hitherto had no suspicion.

How now are we to account for the origin of the form of the word *singe*, which is the French of *simia* or *ape?* By first observing that there is nothing more common in all languages than the relationship of *m* and *n*, only witness the great many words in Latin which terminate in *m*, having instead of this sign an *n* in Greek. It is, perhaps, on this account that like *u* and *v* in English they have been placed next to each other. Hence it is that in French such syllables as *im* and *in* are, when not followed by a vowel, pronounced exactly alike. Thus if instead of *im*possible we were through mistake to write *in*possible, no Frenchman could here perceive between these syllables *im* and *in* the least difference in sound. Hence many persons must—when *sim* was used instead of *simia*, because its radical part—have represented it by *sin*, there being *in French* no difference in pronunciation between *sim* and *sin*. Let us now observe that in old French the *n* was frequently represented by *ng*, such words as *coin* and *soin* having been anciently *coing* and *soing*, as every one knows. Hence the *sim* of *simia* became not only *sin* but *sing* also; and as many persons must have

then given to the *g* of *sing* a sound similar to that which they now give to it in such words as *langue* and *harangue*, this word must have therefore become *singue*, and then, by the dropping of the *u*, *singe*. Now as the *sim* of *simia* is also equal, as we have seen, to *soim*, and *soim*, by the dropping of its *i*, to *som*, that is, *hom*, of which the *h* is the original of the *s*, and as this *hom* represents *homo*, it follows that in *singe* and *homo*—though they have not a letter in common—there is but one and the same word. The *singe* and the *ape* were therefore each called after man. And is not this etymology fully confirmed by the word *monkey*, which is also the English of *simia* and *singe?* for its radical part *mon* is for *man*, in which sense it is, as well as the word *man* itself, used in Saxon. The English word *monkey*, is therefore, like *manikin*, the diminutive of *man*. Hence Skinner says that "monkey is clearly enough *manikin* vel *mankin*, *homunculus*, a little man; *nihil enim homini similius.*"

So much for Adam and Eve, man and woman, and the serpent.

I have, of course, omitted many important points during this inquiry; but I have, however, shown enough to suggest a great deal more than has been omitted.

APPENDIX A.

VOLUME THE FIRST REVIEWED, AND THE REALITY OF ITS RESULTS CONFIRMED BY OTHER PHILOLOGICAL DISCOVERIES.

As the author may expect to hear of objections to some of the statements contained in this volume of his work, and as he can, he imagines, foresee a few of them, he considers that such may be answered and refuted previously to their being brought under his notice. The first objection likely to be raised is that which makes light of the opinion that signs must have preceded the use of speech. This will be M. Renan's objection. But M. Renan is a spoiled child with his countrymen. He imagines because he is a very learned linguist that his reasoning powers must be proportionately great. Hence when he states his opinion he seems to be impressed with the firm belief that no more should be required of him, even though this opinion of his should be found opposed to that of men who have been long looked up to by the most enlightened of modern times as very profound and close thinkers—I mean the two celebrated Scotch philosophers Reid and Dugald Stewart, not to mention Condillac, a man also celebrated for his depth of thought and wonderful acuteness of observation. Though no one should be censured for thinking differ-

ently from others, even when he finds himself opposed to men allowed to be in many respects greatly superior to himself; he should at least condescend to assign a reason deserving of notice for the boldness of his opinion. But M. Renan places himself far above such condescension. As soon as men began to think they must have begun to speak; such is his argument; which is equal to his asserting that men must have always had the use of speech, and that they can have never made a sign before speaking.

When I first entertained this opinion that signs must have preceded speech, I was under the impression that I had made a grand discovery; but when I afterwards accidentally met with the same opinion in Condillac, I saw that mine would be no longer regarded as original. I was, however, glad to find it supported by so high an authority; and when in the year 1856 I stated my conviction that man must have first expressed his thoughts by signs, I did not fail to quote Condillac in support of this belief. But why did I not at the same time quote Reid and Dugald Stewart? Because I was not yet aware that it was also their opinion. I had read their works some thirty years previously, and as I then little thought I should ever inquire into the origin of language, what they wrote on this subject left no impression on my mind. But their belief in addition to my own *bonâ fide* opinion and to that of Condillac's, has so thoroughly convinced me man's first language must have been that of signs, that it is not now in the power of all the sophists in the world to make me think otherwise.

If we now suppose that man's first word may have grown out of a sign, we are, since a word is a sound, induced to ascribe such a sign to the mouth, it being

with this organ, and not by means of gestures or attitudes of the body, that vocal sounds are produced. And when we observe that the mouth cannot, however we may gesticulate with it, represent any thing in nature except what is circular, we are at once led to think of the sun, and not only from its form being that of a circle, but from its being of all other natural objects by far the most noble and attractive.

It is now in every one's power to convince himself that man's first word must have come through a sign made by the mouth. For acquiring this conviction no more is needed than to make the mouth take a circular form, so as to represent that of the sun, and then for the sole purpose of drawing attention to the sign so produced, to utter a sound; by which means the first significant word ever known, and the parent of all other words, will be heard. And as this word served to name the sun, and as this great object was then revered as God, hence the belief even with the heathen that "God was the Word;" and this too explains why with all people language was anciently believed to have had a divine origin. And is not this single circumstance very powerful proof that the faculty of speech must have been acquired after the manner just stated? When all words were of no more than one syllable each, just as they are at present in China, and as they ever have been; it was not difficult for the priests of the sun to perceive that they were all but so many modified forms of the name of the object they then worshipped. This great object was the sun, and as the sun was their God, hence, I say, their belief in the divine origin of words; by which they meant that all words could be derived from their name of the sun; and this was true, literally and strictly true—nothing could

be more so. And if the priests of those far times were now allowed to revisit the earth, could they not, if their origin of the WORD was disputed, confound the learned of the whole world by defying them to show the idea after which the sun itself was called. And as the learned of the whole could not, with all their combined efforts, tell what this idea was, would not that go to prove that the impossibility of finding such an idea arises from the fact that the name first given to the sun being itself the source out of which language has grown cannot, for this simple reason, have an original? And is not this origin of the Word beautifully typical of what St. John is made to say in the opening of his Gospel? That it is heathenish must be allowed; but does not Bishop Marsh admit, as we have shown, in this work (p. 23) that the Logos of St. John can be traced to an idolatrous source, to "the Oriental or Zoroastrian philosophy"? Yet all good Christians believe in the words of St. John; so that a type is nothing the worse for its having had such a beginning. And is not Buddha, as shown farther back, regarded as an excellent type when Jayadeva describes him "as bathing in blood, or sacrificing his life to wash away the offences of mankind, and thereby make them partakers of the kingdom of heaven"?

Yet Buddha never lived any more than Jack the giant-killer; but though an imaginary character, he served as a type of the truth to be one day revealed; at least so thinks every good Christian who believes in the doctrine of types.

Another proof serving to confirm all these just shown can be thus obtained: men acquainted with many languages have often expressed their astonishment at finding that when radically considered they bear, in many re-

spects, so close a resemblance to one another as to suggest the belief that they must have all had the same origin, though what that was no one could ever tell. But now it can be told, and this is another powerful proof that the origin I have assigned to language must be real, since it can account for so many different idioms over the world having, to all appearance, sprung from the same source.

The solution of another apparently inexplicable difficulty will afford another strong proof in favour of my pretensions, as may be thus shown: when man first began to use articulate sounds instead of signs, he could not in point of intelligence have been scarcely above the brute creation, since there are still whole nations so low in this respect as not to have yet their mental faculties sufficiently developed for enabling them to count beyond duality, as has been already stated in this work (p. 4) on the authority of the late M. Crawford, F.R.S. Now the difficult problem to be solved is this: how could nations so low in the scale of humanity have been able to make each a language of its own, not only skilfully but, as M. Crawford observes, "completely constructed; and not in one place only, but in several thousand separate and independent localities," as the same high authority observes.

Now to be able to show by means of my discovery how nations so unenlightened, so totally incapable of inventing, could have made each a complete language of its own, will, I have some reason to hope, be regarded by all persons capable of forming an opinion of their own, that my pretensions cannot but be real. And that I have solved this *apparently* difficult problem, the reader will see by first reading Mr. Crawford's statement which

he will find in this work,[1] and then by reading the solution itself, which is in the same volume[2].

The intelligent reader who can easily conceive that the language of signs must have preceded that of articulate sounds, will excuse, I hope, my referring so often to what must appear to him so evident and natural. But what reason does M. Renan assign for believing that speech is more natural than that of signs, and that it must consequently have been the first means of communicating thought? He assigns no reason whatever. He is, I say, a spoiled child with the French public; too much so to condescend to reason upon whatever he chooses to state, and of which I beg to give here two very flagrant instances in his "Vie de Jésus."

Referring to the testimonies by which he is supported in this strange work, and which has in France been so favourably received, he dwells particularly upon the works of Philo Judæus and those of Josephus; neither of which authorities has, however, ever said a word about Jesus. Hence when M. Renan founds his statements upon the writings of Philo, for instance, his "Life of Jesus" is then based upon a gross fiction. The Logos or Word, by Philo, must not be confounded with the second person of the Christians. The Logos mentioned by this writer is never represented as having come in the flesh, or as having been crucified. This character is therefore nothing more than a myth, and there are no doubt many good Christians who regard it as a type of their Saviour. And has it not as much right to be so regarded as any of the other myths of the heathen mythology? But Philo "could not," says a high authority, "bring himself to believe that the Word could be made flesh, and a

[1] Vol. i. chap. iii. p. 4. [2] Chap. vi. p. 12, &c.

suffering Messiah and Christ crucified was past his comprehension [3]."

This is only assumed by Bryant; and from the way it is expressed one might suppose that Philo has somewhere noticed and rejected the doctrine of the Logos in the flesh and crucified; but there is not so much as a single line in his work implying that he had ever heard of such a doctrine. Bryant makes also the following statement: "As to the operations of our Saviour upon earth they were too numerous to be denied. Philo says therefore nothing in opposition, but passes over the whole in mysterious silence. Hence not a word is to be found in him about Christ Jesus the Messiah, nor of his mighty operations; which is extraordinary [4]."

It cannot be so extraordinary if he had never heard of Christ, and there is nothing to show that he ever did.

According to the following passage from M. Renan's "Vie de Jésus," Philo was sixty-two years of age when the prophet of Nazareth was in the most active state of his mission, and he survived Jesus, says the same authority, at least ten years. But does not M. Renan make a rather serious mistake—as the passage I am about to quote will show—when he allows his readers to believe that the religious questions then treated by Philo were those of the Christians? For if it were so, would not Philo in his work on the Logos have named somewhere either those Christians or their Founder, which he never does? But M. Renan may state whatever he thinks fit, and especially in ecclesiastical history, of which, if we except the priesthood, his countrymen seem to know very little; no proof in support of his assertions will be ever

[3] Bryant's translation of Philo on the Logos, p. 16.

[4] Ibid., p. 17.

demanded of him. His bare word will be always sufficient. Now for the passage.

"Je crois n'avoir négligé, en fait de temoignages, aucune source d'informations. Cinq grandes collections d'écrits, sans parler d'une foule d'autres données éparses, nous restent sur Jésus et sur le temps où il vecu. Ce sont: 1° Les évangiles et en général les écrits du Nouveau Testament; 2° Les compositions dites 'Apocryphes' de l'Ancient Testament; 3° Les ouvrages de Philon; 4° Ceux de Josèphe; 5° Le Talmud. Les écrits de Philon ont l'inappréciable avantage de nous montrer les pensées qui fermentaient au temps de Jésus dans les âmes occupées des grandes questions religieuses. Philon vivait, il est vrai, dans une toute autre province du Judaisme que Jésus; mais, comme lui, il était très dégagé des petitesses qui régnaient à Jérusalem; Philon est vraiment le frère aîné de Jésus. Il avait soixante-deux ans quand le prophète de Nazareth était au plus haut degré de son activité, et il lui survécu au moins dix années. Quel dommage que les hasards de la vie ne l'aient pas conduit en Galilée! Que ne nous eût-il pas appris[5]!"

Might not any one suppose, from the way M. Renan here refers to the works of Josephus, that he is largely indebted to the great historian of the Jews for the materials that have served him in writing his "Life of Jesus"? He is, however, never alluded to in Josephus but on one occasion; and this single passage is now admitted, by the best ecclesiastical authors to be a very gross interpolation. Bishop Warburton styles it in his Divine Legation, "a rank and stupid forgery." The rest of his condemnation I cannot now call to mind, but that these words form part of the sentence he passes on

[5] Introduction, p. ix.

this passage I have perfect recollection. The "Divine Legation," which is in two volumes, has, unfortunately, no index, and as it must be now some twenty years since I read this work, I cannot find any part I may wish to see without running through the two large volumes from beginning to end. Lardner also, in his "Credibility of the Gospels," regards this passage in Josephus as an interpolation, and gives for doing so the following reasons, which are certainly very conclusive. No ecclesiastical writer has, however, displayed more zeal in his endeavours to support the Christian cause than Lardner:—

"1. I do not perceive that we at all want the suspected testimony of Josephus, which was never quoted by any of our Christian ancestors before Eusebius;

2. Nor do I recollect that Josephus has any where mentioned the name or the word Christ, in any of his works except the testimony above mentioned, and the passage concerning James, the Lord's brother.

3. It interrupts the narrative:

4. The language is quite Christian:

5. It is not quoted by Chrysostom, though he often refers to Josephus, and could not have omitted quoting it, had it been there in the text.

6. It is not quoted by Photius, though he has three articles concerning Josephus.

7. Under the article Justus of Tiberias, this author (Photius) expressly states that this historian (Josephus) being a Jew, has not taken the least notice of Christ.

8. Neither Justin in his dialogue with Trypho the Jew, nor Clemens Alexandrinus, who made so many

extracts from ancient authors, nor Origen against Celsus, have ever mentioned this testimony.

9. But on the contrary, in chapter xxxv. of the first book of that work, Origen openly affirms that Josephus, who had mentioned John the Baptist, did *not acknowledge Christ.*"

We need now only observe that Eusebius was the first to draw attention in his Ecclesiastical History to this interpolation, though not regarding it as such; but he died in the fourth century (338), whilst Origen died in the third (254).

We may, therefore, with safety affirm that Josephus never mentioned Christ; and as the interpolation here referred to was first found in Eusebius, this writer has been accused, but perhaps unjustly, with having himself been the real interpolater.

Now what reason does M. Renan assign for receiving this glaring forgery as authentic? The same reason he assigns for treating with so much indifference the opinion of the three eminent men (Reid, Dugald Stewart, and Condillac) when they assert that the language of signs must have preceded the use of speech; that is to say, M. Renan assigns no reason at all. His only words are "Je crois le passage sur Jésus authentique[6]."

But I was forgetting to note this famous passage, about which so much has been written and said from its first appearance in Eusebius down to the present day. It is as follows:—

"About this time appeared Jesus, a wise man, if indeed it be right to speak of him as a man, for he was a performer of wonderful works, a teacher of such men as receive the truth with pleasure. He drew after him

[6] Introduction, p. x.

many of the Jews, as well as of the Gentiles. This same was the Christ. And though Pilate, by the judgment of the chief rulers among us, delivered Him to be crucified, those who from the first had loved Him fell not from Him, for to them at least He showed Himself again alive on the third day; this and ten thousand other wonderful things being what the holy prophets had foretold concerning Him; so that the Christian people, who derive their name from Him, have not yet ceased to exist[7]."

Referring to this passage some one—I believe that it was, as well as I can recollect, Bishop Warburton—has written to the following effect: "If Josephus was the author of the passage respecting Jesus, he would have become a Christian; but he was as staunch a Jew as the law of Moses could make him, and it was in this faith he both lived and died."

The contents of Philo's work on the Logos must be very startling for all Christians who do not believe in the doctrine of Types; but he who is blessed with this belief will meet with nothing in Philo to cause him the least alarm. But is it not surprising that Bryant, during his remarks on the Logos, is ever trying to make his readers suppose that Philo borrowed all his ideas of this doctrine from the Christians of the period? If it were so, would he not have somewhere spoken of Christ in the flesh, and the Christ crucified? But this he never does. That the Logos spoken of by Philo and that of the Christians are not one and the same person is admitted by Bryant himself, when he says:—"In whatever Philo has advanced to our present purpose, he was influenced solely by the force of reason and truth. And wonderful those truths must have been which could procure the assent of one who has

[7] Josephus, A.D. 93, book xviii. c. iii. s. 3.

taken not the least notice of their author, and probably held him in contempt," Preface, pp. v and vi. This is all mere assumption, there being nothing whatever to show that Philo had ever heard a word about either Christ or the Christians.

But by far the most wonderful circumstance connected with Philo's work on the Logos is the fact that it contains numerous passages to be found in the Gospels of the Christians, though in Philo's time no Gospel had yet been written. Dr. Adam Clarke, in his comments on the Gospel of St. John, expresses his astonishment at so extraordinary a coincidence, and he gives the following

"List of *some* of the particular terms and doctrines found in Philo, with parallel passages from the New Testament."

"1. The Logos is the Son of God—compare Mark i. 1; Luke iv. 41; John i. 34; Acts viii. 37.
2. The second Divinity—compare John i. 1; 1 Cor. i. 24.
3. The first begotten of God—Heb. i. 6; Col. i. 15.
4. The image of God—compare Col. i. 15; Heb. i. 3; 2 Cor. iv. 4.
5. superior to angels—Heb. i. 4, 6.
6. superior to all the world—compare Heb. ii. 8.
7. By whom the world was created—compare John i. 3; 1 Cor. viii. 6; Heb. i. 2, 10.
8. The substitute of God—compare John i. 3, and xvii. 4; Eph. iii. 9; Phil. ii. 7.
9. The light of the world, and intellectual sun—compare John i. 4, 9, and viii. 12; 1 Pet. ii. 9.
10. Who only can see God—compare John i. 18, and v. 46.
11. who resides in God—compare i. 18, and xiv. 11.

12. The most ancient of God's works, and before all things—compare John i. 2, and xvii. 5, 24; 2 Tim. i. 9; Heb. i. 2.
13. esteemed the same as God—compare Mark ii. 7; Rom. ix. 5; Phil. ii. 6.
14. the Logos is eternal—compare John xii. 35; 2 Tim. i. 9, and iv. 18; Heb. i. 8; Rev. x. 6.
15. behold all things—compare Heb. iv. 12, 13; Rev. ii. 23.
16. He unites, supports, preserves, and perfects the world—compare John iii. 35; Col. i. 17; Heb. i. 3.
17. Nearest to God without any separation—compare John i. 18, and x. 30, and x. 11, and xvii. 11.
18. Free from all taint of sin, voluntary or involuntary —compare John vii. 46; Heb. vii. 26, and ix. 14; 1 Pet. ii. 22.
19. who presides over the imperfect and weak—compare Matt. xi. 5; Luke v. 32; 1 Tim. i. 15.
20. The Logos the foundation of wisdom—compare John iv. 14, and vii. 38; 1 Cor. i. 24; Col. ii. 3.
21. A messenger sent from God—compare John v. 36, viii. 29, 42; 1 John iv. 9.
22. The advocate for mortal man—compare John xvi. 16, xvii. 20; Rom. viii. 34; Heb. vii. 25.
23. He ordered and disposed of all things—compare Col. i. 15, 16; Heb. xi. 3.
24. The shepherd of God's flock—compare John x. 14; Heb. xiii. 20; 1 Pet. ii. 25.
25. Of the power and royalty of the Logos—compare 1 Cor. xv. 25; Eph. i. 21, 22; Heb. i. 2, 3; Rev. xvii. 14.
26. The Logos is the physician, who heals all evil—compare Luke iv. 18, vii. 21; 1 Pet. ii. 24; James i. 21.

27. The Logos is the seal of God—compare John vi. 27; Eph. i. 13; Heb. i. 3.
28. The sure refuge of those who seek Him—compare Matt. xi. 28; 1 Pet. ii. 25.
29. Of heavenly food distributed by the Logos equally to all who seek it—compare Matt. v. 6, vii. 7, xiii. 10, xxiv. 14, xxviii. 19; Rom. x. 12, 18.
30. Of men's forsaking their sins, and obtaining spiritual freedom by the Logos—compare John viii. 36; 1 Cor. vii. 22; 2 Cor. iii. 17; Gal. v. 1, 13.
31. Of men's being freed by the Logos from all corruption, and entitled to immortality—compare Rom. viii. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 52, 53; 1 Pet. i. 3, 4.
32. The Logos mentioned by Philo, not only as the Son of God; but also His beloved Son—compare Matt. iii. 17; Luke ix. 35; Col. i. 13; 2 Pet. i. 17.
33. The just man advanced by the Logos to the presence of his Creator—compare John vi. 37, 44, xii. 26, xiv. 6.
34. The Logos, the true High Priest—compare John i. 41, viii. 46; Acts iv. 27; Heb. iv. 14; vii. 26.
35. The Logos, in His mediatorial capacity. I am astonished to see the Holy Logos running with so much speed and earnestness, that He may stand between the living and the dead—compare 1 Tim. ii. 5; Heb. viii. 1—6, ix. 11, 12, 24."

"These testimonies," says Dr. Adam Clarke, "are truly astonishing; and if we allow, as some contend, that Philo was not acquainted either with the *disciples* of our Lord, or the writings of the New Testament, we shall be obliged to grant that there must have been some measure of divine inspiration in that man's

mind who could, in such a variety of cases, write so many words and sentences, so exactly corresponding to those of the evangelists and apostles."

Dr. Adam Clarke finds those testimonies "truly astonishing;" and he is of opinion that Philo must, to a certain extent, have been divinely inspired, because of the close resemblance between his sentiments and those of the evangelists and apostles. But there is nothing more astonishing in this resemblance than there is between Crishna, Buddha, and Christ; nor, as we shall see presently, than there is between any of these and certain parts in the accounts yet to be given of Mercury and Bacchus, not to mention a long list of other heathen divinities. It might therefore be said of any one writing the life of such a character that his mind must, like that of Philo's, have been endowed with no trifling share of divine inspiration, since he could not fail to show some very striking traits of resemblance between what he would have to state and the doctrines of the Christian religion. But these were all myths, and myths were, as all the good Christians whose faith in the doctrine of types is sincere must admit, as so many divine foreshadowings of the truth to be one day revealed.

Now what does M. Renan show of all this in his "Vie de Jésus"? Nothing at all. His work has been styled "a blasphemous romance;" it has been even so styled in print. But the accusation will not apply. There is no more blasphemy in it than there is in a Radcliffe romance, for it is a myth founded upon a myth, and it is consequently far less allied to truth than an historical novel, and it has not half so much merit as a composition; that is, if its style be excepted, which, as far as a foreigner may be allowed to judge, appears remarkably good. In

all other respects it is extremely superficial, even as much so as his work on the origin of language. How well it becomes M. Renan to express his astonishment that psychologists like Reid and Dugald Stewart could believe speech to be less natural than that of signs; and such an idea he regards as *superficial*[8]!

It happens to be, however, the superficial idea of three very remarkable men; and if M. Renan's powers of mind are superior to theirs, I envy him the advantage he has of me and thousands of others. But where are the fruits of M. Renan's superiority? Has his work on language so enlightened his friends Messrs. Littré, Max Müller, and Adolphe Regnier as to prevent them from making the many serious mistakes of theirs which they could have never made had they first entertained only the *superficial* idea that signs must have been man's earliest mode of conversing? Yet I have had the same superficial idea as the Scotch philosophers and Condillac, and from having followed it up, which they neglected to do, I have succeeded in discovering even the first word that man ever spoke. And then by following up this second advantage, I have gone so far as to open the way to others for the discovery of the origin of all the languages ever known; in short, to the origin of human speech all over the world. So much for having turned what M. Renan regards as a superficial idea to some account. But when these great men are no more—I mean when Messrs. Littré, Max Müller, Adolphe Regnier, and Renan are all dead and gone—this twofold discovery of mine

[8] "Il est surprenant que des psychologues comme Th. Reid et Dugald Stewart aient pu insister sur une distinction aussi *superficielle*, et croire que l'expression par la parole est moins naturelle que l'expression par le geste."—*De l'Origine du Langage*, p. 79.

which they now affect to despise, and which from their souls they will hate as long as they live, must be then well-known, and not merely to every philologist, but to every philosopher over the whole civilized world. And however sanguine my present anticipations may be of this discovery, they cannot but fall short of the future results and the changes to be brought about through its means on the human understanding. And what reason have I to think so? Because I cannot help regarding this discovery otherwise than as a very important one, and all important discoveries must sooner or later produce important results.

But has M. Renan in his own work on the origin of language suggested any thing better than this *superficial* notion of the two Scotch philosophers? He is so far from having done so that he suggests nothing at all; for to tell us that man, by calling on the combined forces of his mind spoke when he wished to speak, is equal to his asserting that man must have always had the use of speech, and that there was never such a language as that of signs. But though these Scotch philosophers and Condillac went no farther towards discovering the origin of speech than by declaring that signs must have been man's first language, yet there can be no doubt but they would have made the discovery to which I now lay claim, had they taken advantage of their *superficial* idea, as M. Renan is pleased to call it. And what has prevented them from doing so? The difficulty of conceiving how a word could have grown out of a sign. And this, it appears, is far more difficult to conceive than most people imagine, since even a body of learned men, after so long a space as twenty years left them for reflection, cannot yet conceive it, though it has on many occasions been

exemplified, and the advantages accruing thereby made, as it were, self-evident. Now as to know that signs must have preceded the use of words forms the fundamental principle of the discovery of human speech, it cannot for this reason be made too evident.

But there are so many pertinent questions to be answered, and so much argument and reasoning required before certain minds can be brought to believe that the discovery of the origin of human speech is at all possible; and as many of the objections thus raised are left in the present work unnoticed, and as most of them have, I presume, been satisfactorily answered in "Myths traced to their primary Source through Language;" it will be now necessary to repeat not only several of the conclusions to which I then came, but even to show in what way I discovered man's first word. And though this repetition may be tiresome for such readers as do already admit the reality of what has been thus far laid down, it cannot, however, be unwelcome to others whose minds, though not unprovided with a certain amount of knowledge and quickness of apprehension, have not the power of admitting the possibility of so important a discovery as the origin of language and myths without its being often explained. Thus on having shown in this work on myths that speech never comes naturally to man, I continue by observing that it could not have been "the first means to which he had recourse for expressing his ideas, and that his earliest language must have therefore been that of signs, the use of which prevails even still, in the absence of speech, over the whole world. Thus if we observe how any two persons speaking no language in common try to signify their thoughts to each other, this we shall find them endeavouring to do—nor will their endeavours prove in

vain—by certain movements and gestures made with the hands, feet, eyes, and mouth. Whether two such persons belong to the most civilized or to the rudest of the human race, they will ever, on perceiving that they know not the meaning of each other's words, signify their thoughts after the same manner. The man born deaf—and who, from speech not coming naturally to him, consequently remains dumb—converses in the same way. Even the infant in its mother's arms will frequently signify its wants and desires by signs; and of this the mother is so well aware, that she has sometimes recourse to the same means for conversing with it. The author once saw a child—not yet old enough to speak—signify to its mother on its return home from a walk with its nurse, that it had received while it was out both a fall and a hurt, and which it did very plainly, by first pointing sorrowfully to its little knee and then to the ground.

"A mode so very simple and intelligible of expressing thought as this, and which comes so freely to persons of all ages, classes, and countries, cannot but be man's natural language, and the only one in use over the whole world, while speech remained as yet undiscovered. And this too is so very evident as to be perhaps questioned by no man of little more than ordinary intelligence who has ever bestowed a serious thought on the origin of language. But the author's plea for submitting to his readers—as if it were any thing new—a fact so generally well known, is the necessity he feels himself to be under of rendering the opening to the following important inquiry as elementary, clear, and conclusive as he possibly can.

"THAT DRAWING, WRITING, AND READING MUST TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, HAVE PRECEDED THE USE OF SPEECH.

"Now while men conversed thus silently by signs, never upon such occasions making use of their voice except for the purpose of calling attention by the noise it made to what they were endeavouring to signify, they must have often traced the images of things upon rocks, the bark of trees, the sand of the sea shore or desert, or upon any thing else within reach, susceptible of receiving impressions. Hence while they were yet no better than dumb creatures, the art of drawing must have been constantly practised, so that it may, for so rude a period, have been considerably well known. And, for the same reason, so must both writing and reading have been in use; for what is it constitutes the former but the ability to trace, no matter how, significant signs upon any substance, no matter what? and what is it constitutes the latter, but the ability to decipher these signs, and know what they mean?

"Even at that remote period—that is, ere a word had yet been uttered, or the human voice could produce any other kind of sound than such as we now hear with the deaf and the dumb—several of the numeral and alphabetical signs at present in use must have been well known. Thus it was, we can conceive, customary then, as it is even still, to count upon one's fingers; and as a finger signified one, and was represented by a straight line, this gave both the letter I and the first of the ten numeral signs. And as a circle must have been made to represent the sun or the moon, or any thing round, this gave the letter O, and consequently a nought, or the last of the ten numeral signs. And as I and O

could be variously modified and combined, many other characters both simple and compound may, while man was yet dumb, have grown out of them.

"And these observations and conclusions point to the origin of hieroglyphical writing—a very clumsy and tedious mode of transmitting ideas, and which could have never existed, as we shall see farther on, had the language of sounds preceded that of signs.

"THAT MAN MUST HAVE HAD A RELIGIOUS BELIEF ERE HE HAD YET DISCOVERED THE USE OF SPEECH.

"As neither the religion of the Old or New Testament was, according to the history we have of it, of so universal a tendency as the discovery of astronomy or any other science obtained through man's wisdom and research, but was rather a peculiar dispensation sent down, as it were, from heaven, to a chosen few of earth's inhabitants; it follows that however commendable it may be in other respects, it lies within the limits of a sphere too confined to be noticed in a treatise like this, which has to consider human nature in general, and nothing either above or beyond it. It should, moreover, be observed, that, in every philosophical inquiry, the principles by which we are guided should repose upon as broad a basis as possible, so as to come within reach of the common-sense views, not merely of a handful of our species, but of all mankind, being accessible to both the just and the unjust, nor more so to the Christian than to the Jew, the infidel and the heathen.

"They who first began to reason, and to trace effects to their causes, must have been the people who had first a religion. And why so? Because man in a rational state is ever prone to inquire and investigate concerning the ori-

of things, and this disposition must, on his discovering the infinite wisdom and beauty displayed in the works of nature, have soon led him to look beyond himself for an efficient cause of what he beheld and so much admired. And why beyond himself? Because he could not fail to know that no mortal, however powerful he might be, could produce any thing of the kind, not make so much as a blade of grass, nor give life to the meanest insect that crawls.

"If it be asked, Might not man when he began to inquire into the origin of things, have attributed the works of nature to what is termed accident or blind chance? we may answer that he is ever, when in a primitive state, much too simple a philosopher to come to so extraordinary a conclusion. His arguments and illustrations are then very homely, though they are often found to be very effective and conclusive, perhaps as much so as those of many a pompous reasoner, if not sometimes a little more. 'A poor and ignorant native of the desert,' says Bernardin de St. Pierre, 'being once asked how he knew that there is a God, answered, The same as I know when I meet a track on the sand, whether it was a man or a beast passed by.' Now, if this child of nature were to be asked how he knew that those wonders of creation he so much admired were not the result of accident, is it not easy to conceive that he would return some such answer as this: 'The same as I know when I track my foe or the deer across the desert, that the foot-marks which I then note in the sand cannot be the result of accident.'

"It is thus man reasons while yet uncivilized, and so too may he have often done before he had yet known how to utter a word; for to judge from the acuteness and intelligence constantly displayed by deaf and dumb persons, we should say that the want of speech rather tends

to quicken and advance the reasoning powers than to keep them back.

"If we now ask, to what man, while in this state, looked up as the author of creation, is it not easy to conceive that it could be to nothing less than the most noble and powerful object he ever beheld, namely, our glorious sun; this great luminary seeming more than any thing else to give life and joy to all nature? Nor can this belief appear so extraordinary, when we observe, that at this infant period of the world men knew more of the solar system or of the wise laws by which the universe is governed than even the inspired writer of the Jewish dispensation. It is not necessary to show from history what no one now seems to deny, namely, that 'all the religions of antiquity, at least in their origin, are found to centre in the worship of the sun, either as God the Creator Himself, or as the seat of or as the emblem of the Creator[9].'

"Hence the day which the ancient Saxons set apart for divine worship, was, as our word Sunday shows, called after the sun. But if they had used God-day in its stead, the meaning would be still the same; for even this great word was in the beginning nothing more than a name for the sun, as it cannot differ from Gad (the Sun)[1], any more than the English words *o*ne, b*o*ne, st*o*ne, can differ from their more ancient form, *a*ne, b*a*ne, st*a*ne.

"Hence also the ancient Greeks and Latins had their

[9] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 43.

[1] "Mena approaches most nearly to a word used by the prophet Isaiah, which has been understood by the most learned interpreters as meaning the moon. 'Ye are they that prepare a table for *Gad*, and that furnish the offering unto Meni.' Isa. lxv. 11. As *Gad* is understood of the sun, we learn from Diodorus Siculus that Meni is to be viewed as a designation of the moon."—*Jamieson's Dictionary*, Article *Moon*.

ἡ τοῦ ἡλιοῦ, and dies solis; that is, literally, the day of the sun, when they worshipped this luminary as the Deity. Even Al or El, the well-known name of the Lord with the chosen people of God, was, as the learned and orthodox Parkhurst admits, nothing more than another word for the sun.

"'Al or El was,' says he, 'the very name the heathens gave to their god Sol, their Lord or ruler of the hosts of heaven[2].'"

"And though it may now shock our religious feelings to regard the terms God and Sun as of precisely equal import, yet it is no more than what we do every time we call the *Lord's* day by the name of *Sun*day.

"And this belief, erroneous as the science of astronomy has shown it to be, was, nevertheless, a very rational one for man in the beginning of the world to conceive and follow. It did not, we may assume, invest the supposed Creator of the universe with such attributes as would, from their being so repugnant to every kind feeling in the human breast, disgrace even a monster of the earth: whilst from the few clear principles it must have owned it could not but be far less productive of dissension, with its consequent train of frightful evils, than many other modes of worship since adopted, which we need not name. But at a much later period, when the wonderful and dangerous art of communicating ideas by articulate sounds became well known, and when, as we shall see, a misapplication of the meaning of words gave birth to the grossest superstition, many of the ancient religious practices must have been perverted from their primitive simplicity, and among them we are forced to class the natural and innocent worship of the sun.

[2] Lex., p. 20.

"DISCOVERY OF THE USE OF SPEECH—MAN'S FIRST WORD.

"Now speech not being natural to man, as has been already clearly shown, the question to be resolved is this: How did he come by it? There appears to be nothing in nature—the source whence man derives all his ideas—that could afford the least hint of it. When we now suppose that animals and birds have a language of their own, and that the first notion of articulate sounds may have thence originated, this supposition arises from our being already acquainted with speech; for, had we not this knowledge, we could not possibly suppose any thing of the kind. But the mere cries of such creatures cannot, however significant they may sometimes appear, be called articulate sounds, or be said to constitute what is understood by speech. Man ere he had yet learned how to utter a word, that is, while he was yet perfectly dumb, must have had cries fully as significant. As well do all such noises deserve to be called language, as a sigh, a laugh, the clapping of our hands, or a knock at a door; these and all similar demonstrations being not less significant.

"It may be also supposed that human speech had its origin in the custom which must have once prevailed of signifying certain animals and birds by an imitation of their cries. But this supposition is not at all supported by experience; for the several human beings found in a wild state were all very familiar with such cries, and could, it appears, copy them with wonderful precision; yet this knowledge gave them no facility whatever towards either making or acquiring speech.

"It is needless to turn in this inquiry from the consi-

deration of animate to that of inanimate nature; the noises which are made by winds, waters, and all similar ones, being evidently too obscure, too indistinct, and remote from articulate sounds, to have ever suggested the idea of them.

"But of all the conjectures ever made respecting the origin of speech, that is certainly the weakest which would lead us to believe that it is natural to man: this being so easily put aside by the twofold proof afforded by experience, as already shown; namely, that persons found in a wild state, as well as those born deaf, know nothing of speech, though having no defect in the formation of the mouth.

"We cannot for an instant suppose that speech was ever invented—that man ever said to himself, Let me find out a means of communicating thought by sounds instead of signs. This would be to place a human being almost on a level with God Himself; to raise his wisdom to an eminence immensely beyond its reach; and the more so, as there was nothing either in nature or the ways of the world, while yet in its infancy, to suggest an idea at once so very original and extraordinary.

"It therefore follows that speech, since it is neither a natural gift nor an invention, must have come to man accidentally or unawares; that is, without the least effort on his part towards attaining it, or his even suspecting that either in his own time, or at any future period of the world, such a mode of communicating thought might be discovered.

"Having come to this conclusion, we have only now to find out in what way the use of an articulate sound might be acquired unawares; for, in finding out merely this much, we are necessarily led to the discovery of the

origin of speech itself, even to the discovery of the first word the human voice ever uttered.

"After long and patient thinking, and many fruitless conjectures, in endeavouring to solve the present difficult part of this inquiry, I cannot help feeling impressed with the firm belief that I have at length got the mastery over it; and, as well as I can now recall and condense past reflections, it would seem that I made this discovery and obtained my conviction by some such train of thought and reasoning as the following:—

"Speech is not a natural gift, and as there is nothing in nature to suggest the idea of it, it cannot have been invented. These two views I have so long and seriously considered, that I may now pass to something else. Did speech come unawares or accidentally? If so, in what way did this happen? or how could we in this case distinguish it from a natural gift? Thus, if some men in a civilized state gave names to things by accident, so might all men have done, even those in a wild state, as well as deaf and dumb persons. Yet as this is not confirmed but contradicted by facts, it follows that speech was not discovered in such a way; and this is the more evident, as it could not then be distinguished from a natural gift, which, I have every reason to believe, it cannot be. Yet since speech is neither the gift of nature, nor a thing invented, it must have been obtained somehow or other through accident, that is, unawares. As persons deprived of the use of speech, such as the deaf and the dumb, as well as those found in a wild state, are accustomed to make sounds with the mouth as well as they can, for the purpose of calling attention to themselves or their signs; might not speech have originated in this way? It might, if the sounds so produced could

be the forms of things; for then such sounds would be preferred to their corresponding figures made by the hand, for the reason, that in the latter case, the process of communication would be very slow compared to the former. But as a sound cannot be the form of a thing, it follows that it cannot have suggested the idea of speech. Could speech have grown out of a sign? It could, if the hand while employed in making a sign had the power of producing a sound peculiar to that sign, for then the sound would be soon preferred to the sign itself, for a reason just given, namely, that it would be found a more expeditious mode of conveying thought. But as the hand in making a sign gives forth no sound—at least, not a sound peculiar to one thing more than another—it follows that speech cannot have been suggested in this way. But as signs can be made by the mouth, and as sounds might be uttered at the same time (such as we hear with deaf and dumb persons), for the sole purpose of drawing attention, by the noise so produced, to the signs; might not a sound thus obtained be found peculiar to the thing represented by the mouth? It might; and in this case the sound would, for the reason already twice stated, be soon preferred to the sign to which it was found peculiar, and then man would have, in this significant sound, the first word the human voice ever uttered, or the human ear ever heard. But the mouth cannot, like the hand, give the images of things. Thus, in whatever position we put it, however we may twist it, or make it gesticulate, we cannot give to it the form of a man, an animal, a bird, a tree, or any thing of the kind; all of which the hand can trace very easily. But there is, however, a well-known figure, yet only one, which, it is allowed, the mouth has the power

of representing. Thus orthoepists say that, in order to obtain the sound peculiar to the O in the alphabet—for it has several other sounds—we must form the mouth similar to the letter itself; that is, make it take a round or circular form. Yet this is the figure of the sun, the most attractive of all objects, as well as the most revered in ancient times; it being then, as already shown, universally adored as God. Now, I have found it, after years of almost incessant thinking; and this I hope to render so evident as to remove all doubt of its reality, not, however, from the mind of shallow or limited views, which, whatever its stock of acquired knowledge may be, has no more the power of either receiving or admitting the discovery of an original truth, unless carried along by others, than it has the power of making one.

"Though man must have often, while yet conversing by signs, signified the sun otherwise than by a circular form given to the mouth, still this organ must have been sometimes employed for such a purpose. We can even conceive that while employed in tracing the image of the sun with his hand, he may have often, unknown to himself, made his mouth take a similar form; just as a child will sometimes do while in the act of making an O. And when on those occasions he endeavoured to draw attention to the sign he was tracing, by merely uttering such a sound as a deaf and dumb person utters for the same purpose, he would necessarily pronounce O; and as he could not do this for a great length of time without observing that he never heard this peculiar sound but on the same occasion; that is, while he was, after his usual manner, drawing attention to the form of a circle, he would be necessarily led to consider it as signifying this figure, and consequently the sun. Thus he would obtain

a word—the first ever uttered by the human voice—and as he would employ this word instead of the sign out of which it grew, he would consequently begin to speak ere he could yet have any idea of what speech was, or in the least anticipate the wonderful result to which his act, in itself so very simple, was then giving birth.

"But might he not, it may be asked, continue to signify the sun, as before, by signs? Doubtless he might, and he would do so. But this could not hinder him from having also recourse to the sound, and preferring it on several occasions to its corresponding sign; for the latter might be sometimes found less expeditious, or not be seen when the former could be heard; as, for instance, in the dark, or when something intervened between the parties conversing; or when the one stood at too great a distance from the other to allow a circle, whether formed by the mouth or traced by the hand, to reach the eye it was intended for.

"And in this way, while the use of signs was as yet far from being forgotten, must the sun have been often signified by sound; and not only the sun but many other things relating to it, or of which it suggested the idea; such as goodness, heat, light, roundness, the heavens, height, greatness, &c. &c., the particular object alluded to being easily distinguished from any other by a difference in the sound of the O, which must, while it yet served as a whole alphabet, have been pronounced in a great variety of ways.

"The moon also, from its being another orb of light, and of a circular form, must have been signified in the same way; another variation in the sound of the O still serving to distinguish its name from that of the sun. And thence another and opposite class of ideas must

have been signified by sound, such as night, darkness, coldness, badness, repose, silence, lowness, the ground, death, &c. &c. But might not, it will be asked, considerable confusion and misunderstanding sometimes arise from ideas so opposite having radically the same name? Might not, for instance, the word which signified *light* with one people, signify *darkness* with their neighbours? This might very well happen, and not only in different countries, but even in the same country, from the inhabitants of its distant parts intermixing. And it is to this unfortunate circumstance, trivial as it may now appear, we are to look for the source of at least nine-tenths of the dissensions, crosses, and troubles, with which the whole earth has been visited. Speech was certainly a most noble and useful acquisition, but it has also proved a great misfortune. Without it man might have never risen to the proud eminence to which he has attained; but neither could he have ever sunk to so low and perverse a state as he has done with it. It is not, however, here we can well expect such an assertion as this to be received as true, since it belongs rather to that part of this work which accounts for the origin of myths. A similar observation will also apply to the words mentioned above as those coming next to the first name given to the sun and the moon. That is to say, it is scarcely here, but farther on, that the truth of the statement alluded to may be clearly perceived.

"QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIONS REFERRING TO THE ABOVE ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OF SPEECH, SUGGESTED AND ANSWERED.

"If it be true that speech did not at first come natu-

rally, but accidentally, are we hence to infer such a faculty was not originally intended for man? By no means; for it is evident from the formation of his mouth, in which respect he is allowed to differ from all other animals, that man was predestined to have the power of signifying his ideas by sounds, his organs of articulation being wisely and peculiarly contrived for this purpose. But this admission does not go to prove that speech came naturally to him, or otherwise than after the manner already shown. But is it not likely that man drew attention to his signs or symbols by the touch? Nothing can be more likely, because he is in the habit of doing so even still. Then how could he in this case, when in the act of forming a circle, hear the sound of O, as there would be no necessity for his making a noise with his mouth, such as the deaf and the dumb are accustomed to make, in order to draw attention to what he was doing at the time? It does not follow that because he had recourse to the touch upon such an occasion, he did not make use of his voice also, since even still when one person wishes another to be attentive to his remarks, he will often, while laying his hand on his shoulder or his arm for this purpose, make use of some such expression as, 'Please to observe.' But a simple emission of the voice must, while man was dumb, have been often preferred to the touch when it was found necessary to call attention to any thing in particular; for if both hands were engaged, as they must have often been, in cutting upon a rock or a tree the image of something, neither of them could be very well spared every two or three minutes for a different office. Besides, when a man was in a cumbent or kneeling posture, tracing characters upon the sand, while several of his companions were standing around, it would be very

inconvenient for him, every time he needed their particular attention, to rise up and lay his hand upon them; whilst by the sound of his voice, however imperfectly uttered, he could reach them all at once, and this too without interrupting his work or changing his position. It is therefore evident that man must, while he was dumb, have often employed his voice for attracting attention, even oftener than he must have employed his hand.

"But if man never uttered a sound while his mouth retained the circular form, could speech have been discovered? Never.

"Or if he had not the power of making his mouth take such a form, what would be the result? The same; that is to say, he must have remained for ever dumb, never having so much as a remote idea of what speech is.

"Then what might be man's position upon earth? It would be just what it is at present; that is, he would be still the lord of the creation; with this difference, however, that from his being so much addicted to silence and meditation, he might be far more intellectual than he has ever been with speech. Would he continue to worship the sun? By no means; his profound knowledge of astronomy, of which he would soon discover the science, could not fail convincing him of his error in that respect.

"If the O named not only the sun but the numerous ideas alluded to above which were called after it, does it not follow that it was then pronounced in a great variety of ways? When this character named only a few things, it had of course only a few different sounds; but as the objects designated by it increased, so must its sounds have increased also, and with time to such an extent as

to lose at length all resemblance to what they were at first. If this be true, the O may have then been sounded as we now sound other letters? Doubtless it must. There were consequently other letters at this time? That does not follow. Then why admit that the O must have been once sounded as other letters? In order to make it be understood that this sign must have once had such sounds as we now give to those signs which are considered as so many different letters, whilst they are really but so many different forms of the same letter, as we shall see presently. As signs traced by the hand must have continued to signify ideas long after the voice began to fill the same office, it may be asked how could the O, which is a single character, be made to represent its different sounds, or, in other words, the different names of the ideas signified by it? Simply by making it to take a number of forms about equal in amount to its sounds, which served as so many names. At first these forms would, like their corresponding sounds, be few; but as the names continuing to grow out of this sign would increase, it would of course be found necessary to make these forms, for the sake of distinction, increase also. And as both names and forms would thus continue to multiply in about the same proportion, the result would be that the O would, in the course of time, be made, both with regard to its pronunciation and shape, to differ from its original state very considerably; so much so, that on the origin of speech being forgotten, most of its sounds and forms would be considered as belonging to so many separate and distinct characters, whilst they would, in truth, be only so many various sounds and forms of the same character; that is, of the O itself.

"Can it be shown from any language, either ancient or modern, that a single sound may have a great many variations? Yes; the author of a late book of travels, in speaking of a language still extant, makes this admission:—'Nearly all the vowels [of the Dyak tongue] have been found of equal value; and as they have but one general Malay name, so it happens (for instance) the consonants *b*, *d*, might be pronounced with the intervening sound, bad, bed, bid, bod, bud, and sundry variations besides, unknown to the English tongue[3].'

"Now, this is proof the most conclusive, that a single sound may be regarded as equal to not only the whole of our vowel sounds, but even to many others unknown to the English tongue. Yet this instance is not needed in order to lead us to the conviction that an alphabetical sign may have had anciently a great many more sounds than it has at present. It is enough for us to know that such a sign may very well obtain more or less sounds in one age of the world than in another; and that it is not like a number composed of so many units, of which the power or value is so fixed and certain as not to be more or less now than it was many thousand years ago, or than it will be many thousand years hence. For, knowing this much, we are at liberty to conceive that such a sign as the O being now allowed to have in English six different sounds, may very well have had in ancient times some ten or twenty times as many. But why more of these in ancient times than at present?

"Because this sign standing then almost alone, it was obliged to serve in the place of other signs not yet known, and to which we now attach many of those sounds it

[3] The Expedition to Borneo, by Captain the Hon. Henry Keppel, R.N. See Appendix XII.

then had. Thus was it also with regard to words; for while there were but few of them, these few were made to serve for a great many that became afterwards known. Hence had not the Hebrew died, as it were, in its infancy, we should not now find in this tongue a single term having as many as two hundred different meanings, as almost all these meanings would have been divided amongst a host of new terms, had the Hebrew lived long enough to bring them forth.

"But if we admit all the vowel sounds to have grown out of the O, how can we assign to those of the consonants—so very different from them—a similar origin?

"Very easily. At the close of a vowel sound, when the organs of articulation come in contact, the sound of a consonant is always obtained. Thus if it be the lips that meet, as we finish the sound of O, we obtain *ob*, *op*, *ov*, or *om*, and consequently *b*, *p*, *v*, or *m*. But if the contact takes place towards the root of the tongue we hear *oc*, *ok*, or *og*; and thus *c*, *k*, and *g* come into existence; whilst if it be the teeth that meet, we obtain *od* or *ot*; that is, *d* and *t*. And thus it is with respect to all the other consonant sounds, the difference between them arising out of the different powers of the organs of articulation. We are not, however, to suppose that when those sounds first became known, they were regarded otherwise than other variations of the O.

"Is it not difficult to believe that the same sign may have thus had the power of both a vowel and a consonant? Why should this be, since instances are not wanting of such being the case even still? Thus, not to go beyond the English tongue, are not W and Y considered vowels when they end words or syllables, and consonants when they begin them? And were not I and J

until a late period represented by a single sign, but which filled the twofold office of both a vowel and a consonant? And the same may be said of both U and V. It is not, therefore, difficult to conceive that when a language was in its infancy, the same sign may have very well served as both vowel and consonant, since this happens even in our own days; and if it does not happen now to the extent it did anciently, this arises from signs having with time so increased, that a vowel and a consonant sound can be now afforded each a sign peculiar to itself.

"Are these signs to be considered as so many separate and distinct letters? They are considered as such; but this should not be, since they are, as we shall see, only so many different forms of the same sign.

"Can any proof be given that the O (the sign alluded to) ever varied to so great an extent? Yes; of this fact proof the most conclusive can be adduced. Since I first published on this subject some crude opinions, as far back as the year 1844, when I stated it to be my conviction that all alphabetical signs must have had the O for their parent, my attention has been drawn by two separate travellers to a language still extant, which is called the language of Oes, it being composed, as geographers observe, 'of circles and segments of circles variously disposed and combined.' This is the language which is spoken in the Birman Empire throughout Ava and Pegu; and that it is not a very modern one, may be inferred from a belief which prevails that the people who speak it are said to be the founders of the human race. But we need not this proof to be convinced that the O may have anciently had a great many different forms, even enough to compose a whole alphabet. The observation made farther back, respecting the sound of

this letter, will also apply to its form. It is enough for us to know, that as the O still appears in some languages under a few different forms, as in Greek, for instance, it may very well have had a great many of them anciently, when it signified so many different things. But there is a very plain and short method of ending all doubt and discussion on this nice point. If there are really, as we are taught to believe, different letters, let any body convinced of this fact please to tell us what it is that constitutes this difference. Is it a difference in form? Impossible; because almost every alphabetical sign in the world has several forms; and yet it is not for this reason considered more than one letter under different forms.

"Is it a difference in sound? Equally impossible; because almost every letter has more than one sound, though it is not for this reason allowed to be more than one letter. If a difference in sound and form constituted different letters, then every alphabet would be much longer than it is. Thus, instead of there being only one letter in the A of these three English words, Ate, at, *a*ll, we should have three letters, as they differ very considerably from one another in both sound and form. It is, however, a difference in these respects—sound and form—that must have hitherto led to the erroneous conclusion that there are really some twenty-four or twenty-six letters in an alphabet. 'Our letters,' says Dr. Johnson, 'are commonly reckoned twenty-four, because anciently *i* and *j*, as well as *u* and *v*, were signified by the same characters: but as those letters, which had always different powers, have now different forms, our alphabet may be properly said to consist of twenty-six letters[4].'

[4] See his Grammar of the English Tongue, preceding his Dictionary, p. 1.

According to this doctrine, a letter ought to obtain different forms when it has different powers, and so become two letters instead of one. We should, it is true, give to a letter as many different forms as it has different powers, if that could be done, as this plan would greatly facilitate the means of becoming well acquainted with the several sounds of a letter; but we should not then consider these separate forms as so many different letters, but simply as so many different forms of the same letter. Nothing can retard the progress of science more than false definitions and wrong notions about its principles. Hence a single letter is a single letter, and neither more nor less; just as a square is a square, and a triangle is a triangle; and if it should with time obtain fifty other forms in addition to its original one, it is still only a single letter under so many different forms. The same observation will apply to a letter obtaining, with time, a great variety of sounds; that is to say, it will be still only a single letter with all these sounds; just as the letter A is only the letter A, however variously we may make it or pronounce it. Perhaps the strongest proof of the truth of the proposition that there are not different letters, but only one letter under different forms and having different sounds, is this, that it is not possible to prove that A and B are two distinct and separate letters; yet if they were, this might be as easily shown as that one and two are very different numbers.

"But how does it happen that in the Greek tongue a single letter is *sometimes* considered as two, when it has two forms and two sounds? In this question the qualifying term *sometimes* clearly shows that nothing certain has been hitherto known respecting the number of letters. If it be proper on *some occasions* to consider a single

letter as equal to two, simply because it appears under two forms and has a long and a short sound; surely it ought to be proper to do so upon *all occasions*, and not only throughout the Greek alphabet, but all the alphabets in the world. Yet there is not one of them in which this practice is adhered to as a regular rule, and simply for this reason: because there is not a shade of truth in it. Surely if it be proper to consider the O in Greek as two separate letters, because it has both a long and a short sound, it ought to be equally proper so to consider the A, which is sometimes long and sometimes short. And if it be on account of a difference in its form that this letter is so considered, then surely this other form (ω) of Ω, or the great O, ought to be another letter.

"But why, it may be asked, should this be, since Ω is only the capital of ω, just a *A* is the capital of *a*? Precisely so; but still they differ in form; and as such a circumstance does not in this instance constitute different letters, neither should it do so any where else.

"IN WHAT WAY THE DIFFERENT SIGNS COMPOSING AN ALPHABET HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE O. ORIGIN OF I AND THE SIGNS *a*, a, AND A.

"It was observed farther back, that the idea *one* must have been signified by a straight line, or the image of a finger, before the use of speech was yet discovered; we have now to find out how this was done at a later period by an articulate sound. Is there any reason for supposing that *one* was named from the sun? There is, and it is this: the sun appears *alone* in the heavens, and consequently as *one;* and it was this induced Cicero to

incline to the opinion that *sol* came from *solus*[5]. But this was a mistake, and such a one as etymologists are constantly guilty of, that of taking the derivative for the original. Had he said that *solus* came from *sol*, he would have been right. If this were the proper place to enter upon the analyses of words, it would be easy to show that *sol*, *sun*, and *unus*, and consequently *solus*, are radically the same.

"Now, if the O was the first name of the sun, and if the sun served as a name for *one*, it follows that O also signified *one*. Hence the latter idea must have been expressed not only by a straight line resembling a finger or the letter I, but also by an O; that is, it must have obtained two names. Let us now see in what way these two names must have been employed for meaning the same thing.

"As the idea *one* must have been signified by the numeral I, before the sound O had yet been discovered, it is reasonable to suppose that this I must have continued to fill the same office whenever signs or symbols replaced speech. The O, however, from its standing for a word of such frequent occurrence as *one*, must, after some time, have been often made to represent I; that is, it must have been used in this sense not only orally, but also as a written sign. But this circumstance of its having obtained a new meaning of more constant use than all its previous meanings put together, could not fail, in written communications, to give rise to considerable confusion, as it must have been difficult, on certain occasions, to determine whether the O stood for *one*, or was to be considered as having one of its old meaning, such as the sun, light, heat, &c. &c. This

[5] De Natura Deorum, lib. ii.

ambiguity was, however, very simply obviated, and this appears to be the way in which it was done: when it was intended to give to the O one of its former and usual meanings, it was set down just as before; but when it stood for *one*, an I was made to accompany it thus, OI, as an explanatory sign; that is, for the sole purpose of determining the sense in which the O was then to be taken, and about which there could not, of course, be any longer the least doubt, it being universally known that this I or finger stood for *one*. Hence, at this remote time, the combination OI signified *one*, even as it does at the present hour, when arithmetically considered.

"But these two signs (OI) could not have thus gone side by side for a great length of time, without having fallen together thus O*I*, which is the original of *a*, the first letter of the alphabet. Hence we discover why *a* has with all people signified one; and as one is the first of numbers, this too accounts for *a* being the first of letters. Now, in order to discover how the capital of *a* was obtained, we must observe that it is composed of two signs, each meaning *one*, connected thus **A** by a hyphen, just as the words *pen* and *knife* are connected in the compound *pen-knife*. For when this is observed we perceive that, considered with regard to the meaning of their parts, there is not the least difference between *a* and A, the O and the I of the former having each the meaning of *one*, as already shown, just as the I and the I that compose A have.

"As to the other form of A and *a*, namely, a, it is easy to perceive that it is also like *a*, composed of the O and the I placed differently; thus, Oı. Of these three signs, the oldest in form is certainly *a*; after which comes a, and then A. But antiquity of form does not prove antiquity

of birth, either as to words or letters. Thus the capital A, though preceded by *a*, may, however, if belonging to a very ancient people, be several centuries older than the sign *a*, if the latter has been composed by a modern nation.. But as the sign *a* is composed of *o* and *i*, we may say that the oldest form of the first letter of the alphabet is the combination OI, though this is not received as a single sign, nor indeed suspected to have had any thing to do with the formation of *a* or A.

"According to this account of the origin of the first alphabetical sign, the nearer the A of any language resembles a circle and a straight line connected, the nearer it approaches nature and truth. But as the first friends of learning in all countries appear to have been the priesthood, and as these good men were anciently much addicted to mystification and secrecy, and sought to have a language of their own, apart from the vulgar, they rarely ever allowed letters to retain their original forms. And though the learned are well aware of this fact, they appear in a great measure to lose sight of it, when they favour us with their comparative views of certain ancient languages, the alphabets of which they comment upon as seriously as if they believed them to be still in a pure and primitive state. The Sanscrit is allowed to be a very ancient tongue, yet its letters are so artificially distorted and combined, so very different in aspect from what they must have first been, that it is difficult to conceive they have not been remodelled by a body of modern pedants. This I observe to show, that it is not always those languages which are supposed to be the oldest that have the plainest letters, but those which were used the least for religious purposes.

"These three signs, A, *a*, a, belonging as they do to

many different languages, may be regarded as very fair specimens of the first alphabetical character.

"The same sign in the Samaritan, Chaldee, and Hebrew languages, which are so closely allied and so very ancient, is not near so primitive; the Hebrew A, for instance, made thus ℵ, being clearly deducible from a variation of *a* made thus OI, and still extant, both of which must have come long after their original *a* or a, just as both of these must have followed O, and as OI must have followed OI, the parent of them all. Hence one or more of these various forms of the same sign, must have belonged not only to the Samaritan, Chaldee, Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Saxon, &c., but to all the languages ever spoken. That with some people no trace of their ancient existence now remains, is no argument of any weight against a system based upon principles so clear and logical as this.

"But how, it may be asked, are we to account for no sign like any of these three A, *a*, a, being discernible in an alphabet so very primitive as that must be which belongs to the language of the Oes alluded to above? We are to account for so strange a circumstance in this way; the people speaking this language must, as well as all others, have signified *one* by a straight line, or the symbol of a finger, previously to their having discovered how to do so by the sound of O. That is to say, this people must have once had the letter I. Then how did they lose it? By having taken a segment or variation of the O to fill the same office, so that the I must, with time, have been forgotten. But if they had forgotten the O instead of the I, what kind of an alphabet might they then have? One composed of straight lines; that is to say, of characters made out of straight

lines or the letter I. And than this nothing can be more possible, since such a language exists, and that too with the very same people; that is, with those who speak the language of the Oes.

"And strange to say, this very language is, in all probability, with its two alphabets so opposite in form, nothing more than a dialect of the Sanscrit. Here is an opinion of some weight to that effect; 'It has been the opinion of some of the *most enlightened writers on the languages of the East*, that the Pali, or sacred language of the priests of Boodh, is nearly allied to the Shanscrit of the Brahmins. The character in common use throughout Ava and Pegu is a round Nagari derived from the square Pali, or religious text; it is formed of circles and segments of circles variously disposed and combined, whilst the Pali, which is solely applied to purposes of religion, is a square letter, chiefly consisting of right angles[6].'

"Here we have clear proof of the cleverness of the priesthood in ancient times, and how prone they were to form alphabets after their own fashion. Of the two signs O and I, they took away the latter to make a sacred or rather *secret* language for themselves, and they threw the former to the vulgar, with whom it still remains. And to heighten their cleverness, they have succeeded in persuading not only the vulgar, but, as we may see from the passage just quoted, even the learned, that the language of the O is derived from, and is consequently inferior to, the language of the I. But in this statement there cannot be a particle of truth; and for this reason, namely, that the first sound ever uttered must, as has been already clearly shown, have grown out of the O, and that from this sign numerous variations must

[6] Rees's Cyclopedia, art. Birman.

have sprung, and consequently numerous words even before the I could have been as yet received with it. Indeed a language might very well begin and exist without this sign, but it could not so much as come into existence without the O; but the I having once obtained a footing, a square letter, chiefly consisting of right angles, might be very easily formed from it, and then the O might be discarded, and after some time be wholly forgotten as an alphabetical sign.

"But how is it that some people have no letters at all, nor any notion of them? This is very easy to conceive, and it can be accounted for thus: when a people had obtained, after the manner already laid down, a number of words sufficient for the common uses of life, they might, either through indolence or want of leisure, be hindered from proceeding any farther; and in this case the way in which they had begun and acquired their language, could not fail, after an age or two, to be wholly forgotten. Hence an enlightened traveller might, on visiting such a people, be induced to believe that they had not yet formed an alphabet, whereas they would have already forgotten one. It is even possible for a people who had made very considerable progress towards the complete formation of a language, to forget, after a few centuries, all knowledge of letters. This might happen in two different ways; as, for instance: a people having subdued all their neighbours, and acquired immense power and wealth, might, on having no longer any thing to desire or to dread, so abandon themselves for ages to frivolous or idle pleasures, as to neglect every useful and intellectual pursuit, and thus allow themselves to sink from an enlightened state into one of profound ignorance, and thence gradually into such utter barbarism as

to lose with time every trace and recollection of all the knowledge they once possessed—even their knowledge of letters. Or a nation already advanced towards a high state of civilization, might, on their being invaded by a foreign and merciless power, be compelled to seek refuge elsewhere. And as some might settle in uninhabited places, where they could only live by the chase, and find no leisure for other pursuits; from them in time might arise a nation of semi-barbarians, a people so depraved or ignorant as to have no knowledge whatever of letters, though still speaking with ease and fluency the cultivated language of their ancestors."

This much of the present review serves to confirm still further the reality of the discovery of the origin of human speech. And should M. Ernest Renan regard it as *superficial,* I defy him to accept the challenge which his colleague M. Littré has not dared to meet. This challenge is now left equally open to M. Adolphe Regnier and M. Max Müller, should either of these gentlemen be so rash as to accept it. Nor let it be supposed that it is courage they stand in need of on this occasion, but of something else which is much more easily found than courage. And what is that, pray? It is *foolishness;* for if these four gentlemen were to take up this challenge they could not escape being regarded by every enlightened man acquainted with this work and its many proofs, as four of the greatest simpletons in all Christendom, seeing that their discomfiture would to all except themselves appear self-evident. As stated in the Introduction to the first volume, page xxx, the wager is one thousand francs to one hundred that I have made the discovery of the origin of language, and the name and residence of the stockbroker in Paris, with

whom this sum of one thousand francs is lodged are given in full in the last of the four works sent to the French Institute, with as plain an exposition of my discovery of the "Origin of Language and Myths" as I could *then* give, but which is *now* made far more evident. The first of these works was presented in the year 1850, the second in 1856, the third in 1869, and the fourth in 1870. But the gentlemen in question are above noticing so very paltry a trifle as one thousand francs. However paltry this trifle may appear to them, it is nevertheless for me a very large sum. But they need not receive it, I mean they need not put it in their own pockets; but hand it over to one of the desolate widows or poor fatherless children, of whom (it grieves me to know) there are so many now to be met with every where in France. Why, therefore, does not one or do not all of these learned gentlemen accept this challenge of mine? Were it only for charity's sake they ought not to refuse it. A thousand francs would be almost a little fortune for the desolate widow or the poor fatherless child. But these gentlemen are not, at least on the present occasion, so very simple as to engage in a contest, of which the end, as they know very well, would be for them a shameful and signal defeat, whilst for me and the cause of truth and science, it could not prove less than a glorious triumph. These gentlemen of the Academy and the Institute will, of course, say *No, no, no;* but I say, *Yes, yes, yes;* and I defy them to prove their denial by an argument of any weight whatever. And their first great argument must go to find the etymology of the name of the sun; that is to say, the word to which the name of the sun can be traced, in no matter what language; they have therefore all the languages of the world to choose from, and of the

millions upon millions of words contained in all those languages, they have only *one* word to find, and it is that *one* which names the idea after which the sun was first called. And the man profoundly acquainted with as many as fifty languages has not more chance of making this grand discovery than he who knows only one language. Thus may not any one ask himself if the name of the sun can be traced to such a word as signifies light or heat, which is the only source hitherto found, and, unless he be out of his mind, he will answer, *No;* for though he can easily conceive that a word expressive of light or heat may be traced to a name of the sun because such an idea emanates from this source, unless he conceive that which is wholly inconceivable, namely, that the light of the sun must have been seen and its heat have been felt so long anterior to the sun's existence as to have each obtained its name, he cannot, unless he be some very learned member of the French Academy or the Institute, even as learned as M. Adolphe Regnier, for a moment suppose that the sun was called after either light or heat. In justice to the eminent Greek scholar I have just named, it should be observed that when he gives ἑλη as the original of Ἥλιος—and in which he is supported by all other Greek scholars—there is a sign (?) significant of doubt appended to this etymology. There should, however, be no doubt at all expressed; to derive the name of the sun from a word signifying either light or heat being too absurd to deserve any thing like serious attention. Then what should M. Regnier say? That it is ἑλη comes from Ἥλιος, and not Ἥλιος from ἑλη. The blunder of deriving the name of the sun from a word meaning light or heat is equal to our saying that the fire before which we are sitting comes from the

heat it throws out, instead of saying that it is the heat comes from the fire.

Had M. Regnier said that it was a great mistake, nay, a great blunder, to derive, as philologists generally do, the name of the sun from a word meaning light or heat, and that no one knew after what idea the sun was named, in no matter what language, he would have made an important statement; for this would have led people to ask how does it happen that the name of the most wonderful object in nature cannot be traced to any other name or word signifying an idea beyond itself? And had M. Regnier added to this statement that though the name of the sun cannot be traced for its origin to any other name, there are, however, many words derived from it, and as some of the most learned and orthodox authorities admit, the names of all the heathen divinities can be traced to this source. Only see page 19 of the present volume, and Bryant's statement on the following page, which is as follows: "Mr. Bryant's opinion is, that all the various religions terminated in the worship of the sun. He commences his work by showing, from a great variety of etymological proofs, that all the names of the deities were derived or compounded from some word which originally meant the sun[7]."

Here is an admission that a vast number of proper names, which, like all such words, must have first been appellatives, are traceable to the same single source, that is, to the name of the sun. Now what may we hence infer? That so many words cannot be derived from only one without all other words having emanated from the same source. This will be confirmed by the following from a learned mathematician: "Nothing whatever

[7] See the Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 50, &c.

could be inferred, with respect to the relation of two languages from the coincidence of the sense of any single word in both of them; that is, supposing the simple and limited combination of sounds to occur in both, but to be applied accidentally to the same number of objects without any common links of connexion: that the odds would be only three to one that they must be derived in both cases from some parent language, or introduced in *some other manner from a common source.* Six words would give near 1700 chances to one, and eight near 100,000; so that in these last cases the evidence would be little short of absolute certainty[8]."

The author of the Anacalypsis quotes this passage as a proof that languages having some words in common must be derived from one another, and it must be admitted that this doctrine would be a fair means—if there were no other—of accounting for the resemblance one language bears to another. But there happens to be another means—that of all languages having grown out of a single word—the name first given to the sun. There is perhaps no language in the world of which eight words cannot be shown to be radically the same as eight words of every other language; but it does not follow that there are 100,000 chances to one that any two such languages so related made ever at any time one and the same language. This could not even be said if they were to have, when radically considered, so many as a hundred words in common; for their having so large a number alike could be still accounted for from their having each emanated from the same single source—man's first word. But when any two languages are so very

[8] Dr. Young's Essay on Probabilities, published in Philosophical Transactions.

much alike as Saxon and English, we cannot say that they make two distinct languages, but one and the same, English being evidently a modernized form of the Saxon tongue.

It may now be asked how does it happen, if all languages can be traced from one to another, and ultimately to a single sign, that is, the O, the parent of them all, that they differ, on many occasions, so widely from one another in the forms of their words? It is as if I were to be asked, how does it happen that in A, *a*, and a we have the same sign, since their difference is so very distinct? The answer must be that it is not a difference in shape constitutes a difference in letters, and the same may be said of the roots of a language, and consequently of its words. Thus what two words can differ more widely from each other than *homo* and *vir*, since they have not so much as a letter in common? Yet they have when analysed precisely the same meaning, that of *one*, and which is clearly shown by my etymology of *homo* and *virgo*.

But if all words can be derived from a single sign, may we not say that there is only one language in the world? Certainly we may. Why now have words been made to differ as they do so considerably in form? To avoid confusion and obtain different meanings. Thus in the *un* of *sun*, the *onne* of the German *sonne*, the *el* of the Greek *Helios*, and the *ol* of the Latin *sol*, and the *od* of *God* and *Odin*, we have the same root under different forms, and of which the primary sense is *one*. Hence the English word *sole* is the Italian of *sun* and *sol*. As to the *un* of *sun* and the *onne* of the German *sonne*, they are but different forms of the same word; and such too is the Hebrew *on*, which, as shown in our first volume, page

32, the Greeks rendered into their language by *Helios*. *Od*, from its being the same as *odd*, does consequently mean *one*. This *od* is also the root of *God*, which was also, as well as *Gad*, a name of the *sun*, its *g* being here a substitute for the aspirate *h*[9]. And many good Christians believe in those ancient symbols which foretold the truth of the doctrine to be one day revealed, that is, the doctrine of types; for there is according to the belief of the Jew, the Christian, and the Mahometan, only *one* God, as this word clearly shows. Hence the heathens who were first led to the belief that there is only *one* Deity must have been taught this doctrine by the word itself, which was then the root *od*, its *o* not having yet received the aspirate *h*, which was afterwards represented by *g*. But with some people the *o* was never aspirated, as we see by *odd* and the *od* of *Odin*. Now all who have any faith in the divine origin of types, should study these principles of mine, since they can by so doing confirm their belief much more than all who disregard those ancient forebodings of doctrines now received as so many divine truths can possibly do.

Let us now observe that as *od* cannot differ from *odd*, nor *odd* from *add*, and as the English word *add* means to *unite*, and as *unite* and *unit* are radically the same, and do consequently mean *one*, it follows that the *od* of *God* and *ad* have the same meaning, that of *one*. Hence in the first volume (p. 333) the reader will find the following: "When the Buddhists address the Supreme Being, or Buddha, they use the word *Ad*, which means the *First*[1]."

How easily we can now—while taking advantage of the knowledge acquired by the latter etymologies—discover the original meaning of the words some*body*, any *body*,

[9] See the note in this vol., p. 160. [1] Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 199.

every *body*, and no*body*, for here the etymology of *body* has been hitherto utterly unknown; but from knowing that *b* is a common substitute for the aspirate, and that *y* is the ending of a great many words, it follows that these two signs must be left out, which will reduce the four letters composing the word *body* to two, so that *od* alone remains; and as *od* is the same as *odd*, and as *odd* means *one*, it follows that every *body*, some*body*, any *body*, and no*body* are for every *one*, some *one*, any *one*, and no *one*. But how is *body* to be explained when it means a number of persons? Its meaning will not be different; it stands still for *one*, but not for *one* out of several, but as a *whole* composed of several; that is, as all the individuals of the *whole* combined in *one*. This we can see more easily when we observe that the root of *whole* is *ol*, and that *ol* is, with the aspirate *h*, equal to *hol*, and that when this aspirate is replaced by its substitute *s*, we shall have *sol*, and as *sun* means *un* or *one* when its *s* is dropped, so must *ol*. And as *o* is here equal to *oi*, and *oi* to *a*, it follows that *ol* is the same as *al*, and *al* the same as *all*, by which we see that the radical meaning of *whole* is *all*; and this is confirmed by the Greek ὅλος, which means both *all* and *whole*, and as the *o* of its root *ol* has the aspirate sign over it, this root is as just shown equal to *sol*, *s* being a common substitute for the aspirate *h*, as we have often seen.

What difference is there now in meaning between the word *body* and the word *man*? There is none whatever, for *man*, as we have shown under *homo* and the *vir* of *virgo*, has also the meaning of *one*; hence every *body*, no*body*, &c. does not differ in meaning from every *man*, no *man*, &c. The intelligent student may now discover the etymology of many other words of similar import, and

perhaps more easily than I could, for I have no pretensions to acuteness, all the important etymologies I have hitherto made being due to the principles of my discovery of the origin of language. But who can fail to analyse such a word as the Latin *nemo, nobody?* For its root must be *em,* and this word cannot differ from *om,* nor *om* from *on,* in which we see so many names of the *sun,* and consequently the meaning *one.* And is it not then easy to see that the *n* preceding *emo* must be for *in,* its *i* having been dropped; and *in* is here a negative, such as it is in *inimicus,* that is, *inamicus* or *no friend;* this serves also to confirm our etymology of *homo,* of which the root *om* is the same as the *em* of *nemo,* and, as we have seen, it means also *one.* When we now give to *nemo* the form to which it is precisely equal, namely, *in-omo,* we see that it is exactly equal to *in-homo,* literally, *no man,* or, if you will, *no one,* or *nobody,* the *o* of *omo* having here, in common with all initial vowels, a right to the aspirate *h.*

But as all persons have not aspirated initial vowels, we may by omitting the aspirate or its substitute, often discover the real etymology of a word. Thus when we observe that *b* is a common substitute for the aspirate, and that *m* replaces *b,* we see in the Latin *bonus* and the Greek μόνος radically the same word; and that they do also in one respect correspond in meaning, becomes very plain when we observe that *bonus* means *good,* and that this idea was named after *God,* then one of the names of the *sun,* and the supposed author of *goodness;* and, because appearing *alone,* the idea expressed by *solus* was called after it, and *solus* is the Latin of the Greek *monos.* Hence it was not after the divine nature once attributed to the *sun,* but after its singleness that the idea *monos*

was named. When we now leave out the *b* and the *m* of *bonus* and *monos*, and remark that the *o* occurs three times in the two words—once in *bonus* and twice in *monos*—we shall find each word equal to *unus, una, unum*, which makes it evident that the *os, e*, and *on* of the Greek *monos, mone, monon* are exactly equal to the *us, a*, and *um* of *bonus, bona, bonum*. It is thus shown how the two very different ideas—goodness and singleness—are each traceable to the name of the sun. Let us now find one or two other ideas of a similar origin.

Ens, the old participle present of the Latin *esse*, is also equal to *unus*, its *e* being but a different form of *o*, as we have often seen; and *o* being, as usual, for *oi*, and *oi* being equal to *u*, as shown by *croix* and *crux*, *noix* and *nux*, it follows that *ens* cannot differ from *uns*, nor *uns* from *unus*, a vowel being understood between two consonants, and consequently between the *n* and *s* of *uns*. This serves to show that the idea existence must have been named after its supposed author the sun.

If we now put *b*, as a substitute for the aspirate *h*, *ens* will become *bens*, and consequently *bonus*, by which we see that a word meaning *existence* does not differ from one meaning *goodness*, which arises not from either idea having been called after the other, but from both ideas being traceable to the same source—to the idea signified by the name of the object once revered as the author of goodness and existence. And the participle present of all verbs in all languages must, whatever their forms may be, have the same meaning, that of *one*. Hence the Greek of the Latin *ens* is *ōn* (*ων*).

But if instead of *b* before *ens* we put *m*, which often represents *b*, we shall instead of a word meaning *good* or *single*, obtain one meaning the *mind*, that is, *mens*, and

which is but a different form of the Greek *menos,* or it is rather the same word, a vowel being understood between the *n* and *s* of *mens.* Now *mens* does not differ from *bens* (shown to be the same as *bonus* and *monos*) but by a different form of *b,* that is, by its initial consonant being *m* instead of *b,* both these signs *m* and *b* being traceable to the aspirate *h.* Now what is the primary signification of *mens* or *mind? Wind, air, breath,* or *spirit.* In short, it has the same meaning as the English word *soul,* or its German form *seele.* And as in *soul* and *sol* it is easy to perceive the same word, and consequently from their radical identity with *solus,* and the English word *sole,* it is equally easy to see that *mind* must, though not different from *wind,* have still the meaning of *one* or *solus,* and to be, for this reason, traceable to the sun. But why should this be? Because all ideas expressed by such words as *air, wind, breath,* or *spirit,* have been called after existence or life, and existence or life after its supposed author the sun. Without this explanation who could ever suppose that a word meaning radically *one* might also serve to signify *mind, wind, air, breath,* or *spirit?* Now, as the learned tell us that the M in Latin is the W in Sanskrit, we see that Mind cannot differ from Wind. Hence we need only turn up M in order to see that it is the W in a different position. If we now give to *od, one,* a form to which it is entitled, we shall also bring it equal to both Mind and Wind. Thus its *o* having *i* understood, *od* is the same as *oid,* which, as every vowel or combination of vowels may take the nasal sound, *oid* cannot differ from *oind,* and as both *M* and *W* do often precede initial vowels as substitutes for the aspirate *h,* it follows that *oind* is equal to both *moind* and *woind,* that is, when the *o* is dropped and

represented only by the dot over the *i*, *Mind* and *Wind*.

An idea very different from both *mind* and *wind* is *hand;* yet the three words expressing these very different ideas are one and the same. This we can easily perceive when we observe that the *m* and *w* of *moind* and *woind* (the elder forms of *mind* and *wind*) are each a substitute for the aspirate *h*, so that *moind* and *woind* are equal to *hoind*, that is, when the *o* and *i* coalesce, making *a*, *hand*. And *hand*, as we have seen, means a *maker*, and this idea was called after the *sun*, because the sun was worshipped as the *maker* of all nature. And as *b* often replaces both *m* and *w*, this arising from its being also a substitute for the aspirate *h*, it follows that hand cannot differ from *band*, nor *band* when we open its *a*, from *boind*, that is, when the *o* is dropped, from *bind*, and a band is that which *binds*. But how is *band* to be accounted for when it means a number of persons, as a band of soldiers? Just as we have accounted for *body*, which means, as shown only awhile ago, not only *one* person but several united. Hence in *boind*, the elder form of *band* and *bind*, we see, when its nasal sound is dropped, *boid*, and what is *boid* when its *i* is dropped but the *bod* of *body?* This is confirmed by *manus*, which has not only the meaning of *hand*, but, as every one knows, a number or body of persons also. Such too is the *man* of the English word *many*.

Though I have now perhaps shown sufficiently how all the roots of language are, like the letters of an alphabet, but one and the same root, and that they may, for this reason, replace one another, their difference in meaning being only conventional, and that I might leave off here giving any more such proofs,—I cannot, however,

help giving one more instance serving still further to confirm the several statements just made. For this purpose I will take the root *ar*, when made to signify *air*. We see it in the Greek *ἀὴρ*, in the Latin *aēr*, and the Hebrew *ruh*, of which the *r* is the only part of the root now remaining; but as this *r* must have once had a vowel before it, we see that it does not differ from *aēr* in Greek and Latin, nor from its English equivalent *air*. But that this root might end with any other consonant, and have still the same meaning, I am now going to show. The English word *soul*, and its German form *seele*, of which the primary signification is *air*, *wind*, or *breath*, shows that its ending is equal to both *al* and *el*, well-known names in Hebrew of the true God and the sun, after which both *soul* and *life* have been called. When I say that *soul* and *seele* are radically the same as *al* and *el*, it is because every single vowel is equal to a combination of vowels, so that the *oul* of *soul* and the *eel* of *seele* cannot differ from either *al* or *el*. And by the analysis given of *od*, root of *God*, and whence *mind*, as we have seen, it must be admitted that the idea *air* may be signified also by a root ending with *d* as well as with *r* or *l*. In *mens*, Latin of *mind*, we see that *air* might also end with *n*, and which is further confirmed by the Greek *μένος*, which has also the meaning of *mind*, and becomes the word *mens* itself when its *o* is dropped. And as the *ens* is the old participle present of *esse*, and as it means to *be*, that is, to *exist*, we thus see how a word meaning *air*, the *soul*, and the *mind* may have also the meaning of *existence*. And all this can be easily conceived. But the French of *soul*, that is, *âme?* It is the same as the Greek *ἄημι*, which means to *breathe*, so that its original meaning (that of *breath*) does not differ from that of *soul*.

THE TRINITY.

Let us now notice *spiritus*, of which the primary signification is also *wind* or *air*, and consequently the *soul* and the *mind*. We are to account for the initial *s* of *spiritus* as no radical part of this word, but as being occasioned by the euphonical tendency there is to sound it before *p* and several other consonants. The *spirit* of *spiritus* is therefore reducible to *pirit*, of which the radical part is *pir*, *p* representing the aspirate *h*. And as the *i* of *pir* has, as usual, O understood, we see that *pir* is equal to *poir*, and *poir* is but another form of ποιρ and πωρ, both of which represent παῖς, a son, and are regarded as the originals of *puer* in Latin. By this we see that the *pir* of *spiritus* means a *son;* but when the *o* and *i* of the original form of *pir*, that is, *poir*, coalesce, both *pir* and *poir* are brought equal to *par*, and *par* is the radical part of *pario*, which means to *beget;* and it is also the radical part of *parens*, that is, a *begetter*, a *parent* or *father*. Thus *spiritus* means not only *spirit* or *wind*, but also, as we now see, both *father* and *son*. That is to say, this single word *spiritus* serves to name under its radical part *par*, the three persons that constitute the Trinity—the *Father*, the *Son*, and the *Spirit* or *Ghost*.

What is now the primary signification of each of the three names *Father*, *Son*, and *Spirit?* Father means the *maker*, which happened to be one of the names of the sun. But how did the sun obtain this name? It grew out of the O, the sun's first name. And in what way? It happened in this way: from the O appearing always alone it was, besides naming the sun, made to signify *one*, and in order to show when it had this particular meaning,

the figure 1, then represented by the shape of a finger or straight line, just as it is still, was put with the *o*. Now when this combination *oi* was pronounced its sound was always closed with that of a consonant; that is, it became *oib, oic, oid,* and so on with all the consonants. But when the initial vowels of such combinations were aspirated, these combinations became *hoib, hoic, hoid,* &c., &c. And as the aspirate had many substitutes, and of which the chief one happened to be *B*, then *v, b, m,* &c., the combinations *hoib, hoic, hoid,* &c., became *foib, voib, boib, moic,* &c., &c. And as all these forms grew out of the *o* they were consequently the roots of language, and so many different names of their parent the *sun*.

Now when the sun was thought to have been the *maker* of the world, what was the particular word adopted for signifying this idea of *maker?* Every word made after the manner above given can have served for this purpose. Thus some people chose *foib,* as is shown by *foib* being the same as the *fab* of *faber,* which means a *maker* or *worker*, and does not differ from the word *father.* Others chose *foid, poid* or *void,* whence the *fat* of *father,* the *pad* of *padre,* and the *vat* of the German *vater.* In the roots of these several words we have forms equal to *oid* and *oit;* that is, when the substitutes of the aspirate *h* are left out, and *oid* and *oit* are each made equal to οιητ, root of the ποιητ of ποιητὴς; and this word, which has grown out of the *o*, means not only a *poet,* but also a *maker, worker, mechanic, artificer,* &c.

We now see how the radical part of any word might (but conventionally) signify *maker,* and from the *sun* having been once regarded as our Maker, every such word would, of course, be equal to a name of the sun.

Hence a word signifying the *hand* may be always easily traced to this source. Now after which idea, *sun* or *hand*, was that of father called? I have sometimes, I think—even in the first volume—supposed the idea *father* to have been called after *hand*; but though the *hand* may be regarded as the author of what it makes, it cannot, like a father, be the author of an existence, of a living being. It appears, therefore, more reasonable to derive the word *father* from one of the many names of the sun than from one for the *hand*. The result will, however, be always the same, for the reason that the *hand* cannot have a name different from that of the sun after which it was called.

But words signifying the *sun* and the *hand* are sometimes so very dissimilar in form as not to seem any way related. Witness the Greek words for the *sun* and for *hand*, *Helios* and *cheir*. But when we observe that the root of *Helios* is *el*, and that *el* is equal to *ol*, and from *i* being understood with *o*, and from the *oi* thus obtained being, as usual, equal to *a*, it follows that the *el* of *Helios* cannot differ from *al*, and which is confirmed by *Helios* being *halios* in the Doric dialect. What is now the root of *cheir?* It is *eir*, which from its being equal to *oir* so is it to *ar*, and as *l* and *r* do constantly interchange, *ar* and *al* are as one and the same root. But *Helios* and *cheir* would be less unlike each other, if they had both the same aspirate. They might, however, have been alike in this respect, for the old Latin word *hir*, which means the *palm* of the *hand*, and after which it was called, is allowed to be the same as *cheir*. And as the aspirate is never to be counted as belonging to the radical part of a word, *hir* is reducible to *ir*, and this is confirmed by the fact itself, since *ir* is used also in

Latin for *hir*, and it has the same meaning. And how very evident this etymology becomes when we observe that *ir*—this reduced form of *cheir*—appears often in both Latin and English under the form of *un*, root of *sun*. Witness only *ir*reverentia and *ir*reverence, where *ir* is for *un*, root of *unus*, so that such a word as *ir*regular is equal to *un*regular. But *un*, I shall be told, has now a negative meaning, whereas *ir* when representing *cheir*, is affirmative. But the answer to this objection must be that *un* is both affirmative and negative, so that it can be taken in either sense. Its earliest form must have been *o*, then *oi*, then *a*, then with the nasal sound *an*, and both these forms (*a* and *an*) have each the meaning of *one*. But when *oi* receives the nasal sound—to which every vowel and combination of vowels are entitled—it becomes *oin*, which when *o* takes its form of *e* is *ein*, as it is in German. But as *oi* is, as usual, as equal to *u* as it is to *a*, we must allow that *oin* cannot differ from *un*, French of *one* and root of *unus*. And to all these, *on* and *one* are exactly equal, as it were easy to show on applying our principles, if the reader could not perceive that it is so at a glance.

But why, I may now be asked, should this doctrine of the Trinity—and which is in the Christian religion regarded as perhaps the most important of all doctrines—be composed of exactly three persons, and neither more nor less? If I be told it is because three and Trinity are radically the same word, this will be no just reason, for why should such a doctrine be composed of three persons more than of four, five, six, or any other number? Let us apply our principles, and see if we can through their means find out the cause. We have shown that when the *s* of *spiritus* is left out, because here no radical part

of this word, *piritus* alone remains, of which the root *pir* is equal to *par*, and in this we have the *par* of *pario*, to *beget*, of *parens*, a *parent*, or *begetter*, and of πoιρ, the original of the Latin *puer*, which means a *boy* or *son*. We therefore see that *spiritus* has not only its usual meaning of *air*, *breath*, or *wind*, but also of *father* and *son*; that is, when its radical part *pir* is brought equal to *par*. But though these three words are as one and the same word, and though this circumstance might have very well led to the belief that the three persons of the Trinity were, *while being three*, only one person; yet this does not sufficiently account for a doctrine of so much importance having been confined to this particular number of *three*. Let us then look once more at the radical part of *spiritus*, that is, at *pir*, which we have shown to be equal to *par*. But it cannot be equal to *par* without its being also equal to *per*; for *par* is, when we open its *a* thus, *oi*, not different from *poir*, nor *poir*, when its *i* is dropped, from *por*, nor *por* when its *o* appears under its form of *e*, from *per*. And this is confirmed by the *par* of the French word *par*fait being in *per*fectus and *per*fect written *per*. Now as *p* and *v* do often interchange it follows that *per* is equal to the *ver* of *verus*, and *verus* means *true*, and its adverb *verè*, in which we see the English word *very* means *in truth* or *truly*. If now, while omitting the *s* of *spiritus*, this sign being here only euphonical, we put the *ver* of *verus* instead of the *pir* of *pir*itus, we shall have *veritus*, that is, since *u* and *a* are equal to each other, *veritas*. There is not, therefore, the slightest difference in meaning between *spiritus* and *veritas*.

We can now tell why there are only three persons composing the Trinity, for what could any one in

ancient times, when all persons seem to have believed in the WORD as in a God, require to know more of a doctrine than that it was TRUE? Hence in *three* and *true* we have the same word under slightly different forms. And of *three* and *true* the French word *vrai* is still but another form; and when we allow the *ai* of *vrai* to return to its first place, that is, to precede the *r*, *vrai* will become *vair*, which, as a combination of vowels is equal to a single vowel, cannot differ from the *ver* of *verus*, Latin of *true*. And when we now make the *e* of the *ver* of *verus* fall behind the *r*, we shall have *vre*, and *vre* is equal to *thre*, and consequently to *three*. But why so? Because *v* is often used as a substitute for the aspirate *h*, witness *h*esperus and *v*esperus, and all such substitutes are equal to one another just as all letters are. Hence ἁλς the sea is equal to the θαλς of θάλασσα, which has the same meaning, the aspirate *h* of the one word being the *th* of the other. *F* which is often used for *v*, is also a common substitute for *h*, and is consequently equal to *th*, as we may see by comparing the Latin *fera*, a *wild beast*, with its Greek equivalent θήρ, *thēr*. Another substitute of the aspirate *h* is *s*, as we see by comparing the Greek *hepta* with its Latin equivalent *septem*; and that it may be replaced by the aspirate *th* just noticed, is shown by comparing *truth* and *trus*, for the *u* of tr*u*s being the same as *oi* (witness cr*u*x and cr*oi*x) this word cannot differ from *trois*, nor *trois* (French of *three*) from its Greek equivalent τρεῖς, and τρεῖς by the dropping of its *ι* becomes *tres* in Latin, which, while meaning in this language *three*, stands for *very* in French, *très bon* being for *very good*; that is, *thrice good*. From this it would appear that when anciently the meaning of an adjective was intensified, the adjective itself must have been repeated

three times, *bon, bon, bon,* being then for *très* bon, or *three* times good.

That *truth,* as above stated, is equal to *trus,* is further shown by comparing ha*th* and ha*s,* do*th* and doe*s,* love*th* and love*s,* &c. And though *truth* and *verity* or *veritas* are so very different in appearance, they are, however, radically the same. In order to discover how this can possibly be, let us only observe that as *u* and *v* are, as every one knows, the same sign, it follows that the *tru* of *truth* is equal to *trv*—the *u* having now its consonant sound—and as a vowel is due between two consonants, we find that *trv* cannot, when we read after the Hebrew manner from right to left, differ from the *verit* of *verity* or *veritas,* the vowel inserted between *v* and *r* being *e,* and the one between *r* and *t* being *i.*

We have now seen that the *pir* of *spiritus* is equal to *per,* and *per* to the *ver* of *veritas;* but this does not give us the primary signification of either *per* or *ver,* though by having taken advantage of this knowledge we have proved *spiritus* and *veritas* to be, notwithstanding their difference in meaning, the same word under two different forms.

We have now seen that *pir* (root *spiritus*) is equal to *par,* and that *par* is reducible to *ar,* its *p* being here left out, because only a substitute for the aspirate *h;* and as *ar* is the same as *air,* and as this is the meaning of *spiritus,* no objection can be raised to such an etymology; but as we have also shown this *pir* of *spiritus* to be equal to *per,* and *per* to the *ver* of *very, verus* and *veritas,* the question we have now to answer is this: can either of these ideas—air and truth—have been called after the other? It is evident that *air* was, like the *soul* and *mind,* called after *life,* and *life* after its supposed author, the

sun; but we cannot suppose that *truth* was called after *air*, though its name may, like that of *air*, be traceable to the name of the sun. Then after what was it called? After the supposed author of existence, and consequently after existence itself, that is, typically, the sun. Hence the true God styles himself AM[1], and so does Jesus[2]. And according to Parkhurst[3] אמת *amt* means *truth*, and its root is *am*. Nor can this *am* differ from *om*, and of which *on* is another form, and both words (*om* and *on*) are well-known names of the *sun*. In Sanskrit Buddha is called *Om*, as I learn from Dr. Adam Clarke, and this, too, in a passage given as an instance of the Hindoo Trinity, and which I may have to quote presently. But as *om* and *on* have each, because signifying the sun, the meaning of *one*, why should a word for *three* have also served for expressing the idea *truth?* It must have arisen from the habit once prevailing of repeating the same word *three* times in order to intensify its meaning. Then how, I shall be asked, was any word meaning *three* first formed? My conviction is that man must have progressed very considerably from his first low state—which was scarcely above that of the brute creation—when he could count as far as three, since there are even still, as the late Mr. Crawford, F.R.S., observes, whole nations that cannot count beyond duality, though every one of them has been able to make a complete language of its own, and which apparently great wonder must have been achieved —and that, too, very easily—after the manner I have already shown in this first volume[4].

Let us now show in what way a word for *three* can have been made, and let us bear in mind that every root

[1] Exod. iii. 14.
[2] John viii. 58.
[3] P. 24. ed. 1823.
[4] Ch. vi. p. 12.

in a language is traceable to the first name given to the sun—to the O. Thus when O became *od*, and *od* became *oid*, the latter form having been obtained from *i* having been joined to the O as its explanatory sign, with many people this *oid* must, by the dropping of the O, have become *id*, and *id* have become *it*. Then when man had so far progressed as to be able to count as far as *two*, he must have added to this *it* another word for *one*, that is, some other root, supposing he did not repeat the word *it* itself, which he may have often done. But let us suppose that he chose some other root then well known to mean *one*, such as *er*, in which case his word for two would be *it-er*; and this is the *iter* of *iterate*, and it consequently means *two*, but literally *one-one*. When man's intellectual powers had at length so far progressed as to enable him to count as far as *three*, must he not have added to his word for two, that is, to *iter*, another well-known word for *one*, such for instance as the word *as*, or rather *ois*, which is its elder form? *Three* would then be expressed by *iterois*, or *itereis*, *eis* being the same as *ois*; and from these forms would come, on being abridged, such words for *three* as *trois*, *treis*, and *tres*. But when the word for *one* joined to *iter* was simply *oi*, then *three* would be expressed by *troi*, *tru*, or *tre*; whence *true* and *truth*. Here *truth* is for *true the*, the article *the*, which must have first preceded *true*, having afterwards fallen behind it. And that *truth* is equal to *trus*, as already stated, becomes now very evident when we observe that *the* is expressed in Saxon by *se* also; so that *true the* cannot differ from *true se*, which arises from *th* and *s* being each a substitute for the aspirate *h*; so that the root of either *the* or *se* is *e*, and as this vowel is not only equal to *o* but to any other vowel or combination of vowels, it follows that *the* might

be *tho*, *thoi*, *tha*, not to mention several other forms, and so might the Saxon *se* have been *so*, *soi*, or *sa*.

We now see that the idea *truth* may have been often expressed not only by any single root signifying the *sun* but also by any word for *three*. The reason why any other number might not have served for this purpose as well as *three* no doubt arose from the ancient practice that appears to have prevailed over the world of repeating the same word *three* times, as sufficient proof that the statement so made should be regarded as *true*. There is another observation deserving of being made respecting *words* for *three*; it is that from each of them being composed of one of the many names of the sun three times repeated, they must all, for this reason, be highly expressive of existence, and have consequently a meaning not different from that of the verb to *be*. Hence such a word for *three* as the Greek *treis* may have once appeared thus, *eister*, which would happen from the final word for *one*, that is, *eis*, having at first gone before the word for *two*, *iter*, and have afterwards fallen behind it, in which case *treis* would be equal to *eister*, whence *estre*, now written *être*. As to the Greek infinitive *einai*, it may have once been *ei-en-ai*, each of these syllables having the meaning of *one*; but since existence is signified by every infinitive, this idea may have been as often expressed by a single syllable—a name of the sun—as by three. Hence in Sanskrit the verb to *be* is signified by *as* (*one*), and which in Hebrew means *fire*, an idea called after the sun, from the belief which has ever prevailed that the sun is *fire*. Nor should we here fail to observe that from one of the syllables meaning *three* having been dropped the two remaining may have been taken in the sense of *three* though having at first meant only *two*. Hence the Latin adverb *ter*,

thrice, has really the meaning of *three,* but as it is equal to the *iter* of *iterate* it must at first have meant only *two.* It stands, however, for the Greek *treis* or the Latin *tres,* of which the ending *eis* or *es* has been dropped. How now are we to account for the Hebrew שלש, *sls,* being in this language the word *three?* We are to consider each of its three consonants as having a vowel understood, and *sls* to be therefore equal to some such combination as *as-al-as,* and to mean literally *one-one-one.* To this it may be objected that the word for *two* in Hebrew is not *as-al* or *al-as,* but *sni* (שנ) ; but we should observe that after the Hebrews had a word for *two,* ages may have intervened previously to their having become so enlightened as to know how to count beyond duality. Their first words for *one* may, in so long an interval, have been therefore changed for others widely different in form though not so in meaning, and which can be the more easily conceived when we call to mind that all the roots of a language have grown out of the O and its explanatory sign the *i,* and that they are consequently but so many names of the sun, and that they do each for this reason mean *one,* which we must admit on merely comparing *sol* and *solus,* in which we see also the meaning of the name of the sun.

Our derivation of *truth* seems to be still further confirmed by the inseparable Greek particle *eri,* ἔρι, which must have been often aspirated though it is not so now. But as it serves to heighten the signification of the word to which it is attached we may regard it as having the same primary signification as *hero, herus,* or the German *herr.* Hence if Greek scholars had remarked that every initial vowel may be aspirated, they would not assert as they do that ἔρι has no meaning by itself; for on finding



it with the aspirate *h* to be *heri*, they would admit that radically considered, it was the same as *hēros* in Greek and Latin, and as *hero* in English [5]. When we now replace the aspirate of *heri* by its common substitute *v*, this word will become *veri*, and *veri* cannot differ from the Latin adverb *verè*, nor from its English equivalent *very*, and such words do also heighten the sense of those they precede; hence *very* good, *truly* good, and *highly* good have the same meaning. In the adverb *valdè* we see another proof that truth is traceable to height, for when the *v* of *valdè*, which here represents the aspirate, is removed, this word will be *aldè*, which cannot differ from *altè*, *highly*. But I shall be told that *valdè* comes from *validè*, and *validè* from *validus*, and *validus* from *valeo*, to *be strong*; and this is very true: but *strength* is traceable to *height*, and so evidently, that *fortis* is, as we shall see, if we have not seen it already, but a different form of *altus*.

We have now seen perhaps sufficient to be convinced that *spiritus* or *air*, and *veritas* or *truth* have been signified by the same word under different forms, though neither idea can have been named after the other; it is, however, easy to conceive that they can both be traced for their birth to the same source—to the name of the sun—and this accounts for the identity in form of the words by which they are expressed. But a proof which only now occurs to me has been omitted. It is that *air* is the root of *αἴρω*, and it means to *raise*, *lift up*, *extol*, &c.; yet it is the English of *ἀὴρ* in Greek and aër in Latin. And this is a plain proof that the same word may signify both *air* and *height*; or, if you will, *spiritus* and *veritas*.

[5] "EPI nihil per se significat, sed est particula augens significationem in compositione."—*Schrevelius*.

The German *herr* affords still another proof that a word signifying dignity and consequently height, may signify *truth;* for when the aspirate *h* of this word *herr* is represented, as it often is, by *s* (witness *hepta* and *septem*) it will become *serr*, now written *sehr*, and which means *very*. And that the *e* of this word is another form of *o*, and that *o* has, as often shown, *i* understood, and that the two signs *o i* make *a*, is proved by the inseparable Greek particle *eri* taking also, without any change in meaning, the form *ari*[6].

But as the German *herr* means also *lord*, and as in our etymology of *lord* we have, in opposition to Bosworth and Max Müller, proved it to mean the *high one*, &c.[7], we may conclude that such too must be the meaning of truth, and that it was called after the sun, then —because worshipped as God—revered as the essence of truth itself. But as the most usual representative in English of *herr* is *sir*, this affords additional proof of the truth of the present etymology; for *sir* cannot differ from the Greek σειρ, which, as well as *helios*, means the *sun*. Nor can I here help noticing a philological blunder as gross as that which derives the name of the sun from its own light and heat, and of which both Messrs. Max Müller and Adolph Regnier have been guilty, but not more so, I believe, than all other philologists. The blunder to which I now allude is that of deriving σειρ, the sun, from σείρω, which means to *dry;* for here it is self-evident that there is no more difference in meaning between *seir* and *seirō* than there is between a noun and its verb. Hence when *seir* was first used as a verb, its literal meaning was to *sun;* that is, to put any thing

[6] "Vocula præfixa vocabulis apud poëtas significationem auget." —*Schrevelius.*

[7] Vol. i. p. 429.

damp or wet before the sun, to the end that it might be dried by the heat thence derived. It therefore follows that to derive *seir*, the *sun*, from *σείρα*, to *dry by the sun*, is to assert that the *heat* of the sun must have been so well felt as to have the power of drying, before the sun itself had been yet in existence.

But with respect to *σείρ*, we need only drop one of its letters (the *e*) to bring it equal to the word *sir*, the English of the German *herr*. And here too we see the original of the inseparable Greek particle *ari*; for the *s* of *seir* being left out because only for the aspirate *h*, *eir* which remains is equal to *oir*; that is, by the joining of the *o* and *i*, making *a*, to *ar*, which is the root of *ari*; and this proves that whatever heightens or intensifies must have been first expressed by a word serving to name the sun. And if I be told that the *oi* of *oir* (this other form of *eir*) is as equal to *u* as it is to *a*, and that *eir* is consequently the same as *ur*, what will this prove but that *ur* must have once named the sun or an idea traceable to this source? Hence the inhabitants of the city of *Ur*, mentioned in Genesis, were *fire*-worshippers, and *pur*, Greek of *fire*, is the same word, for its *p* being here for the aspirate must not be counted; and hence the *u* of *uro* to *burn*, and the *ur* of the word *burn* itself; not to mention the German *feuer* and its English equivalent, *fire*. Now the radical parts of these words are equal to *ar*, which must have been often written *al*, and so have named the sun as well as it must have named other ideas traceable to this source, different substitutes of the aspirate serving to distinguish from one another the different acceptations of the same word.

As *uro* to *burn* has been also written *buro*, this serves

to show that its initial vowel must have been aspirated, and that the aspirate was afterwards represented by its substitute *b*. Latin scholars suppose that *buro* is the elder form of *uro;* but it is much more likely that *uro* was the earliest form, and that from *b* having been dropped, *buro* became what it was at first. But as we have just seen how the *u* of *ur* is the same as *a*, it follows that *bur* cannot differ from *bar*, and *bar*, as we have also seen, has several important meanings[8]. Thus in Hebrew it means *son, word, corn*, and also, when its *a* falls behind its *r* (giving *bra*) it signifies *create;* in this language it means under its form *bur* also a *well*, or *spring*. In Gaelic we have shown how it means the *sea*, and consequently *water*, whilst in Latin it is equal to *far, corn*. Such too is the *par* of *pario* to *beget*, nor less so the *par* of *parens*, and πόϊρ in Greek, and *puer* in Latin, with probably others which now escape my memory. And all these can, as we have seen, be easily traced to the name of the once supposed author of life, the sun, even as easily as πῦρ, Greek of *fire;* for this element and the sun bear too close a resemblance to each other for allowing us to suppose that man could in the beginning have failed to perceive their affinity. How now are we to account for πυρὸς (genitive of πῦρ) meaning not only *of fire*, but wheat or corn also? A child not more than twelve years old, who has read thus far my work, can, in the short space of one minute, account for two ideas so different in meaning as *fire* and *corn* having been signified alike. Thus from knowing that every word

[8] The author can seldom call to mind in what part of his work the words to which he thus so often refers are to be found, but a copious index not yet made will, he hopes, afford the reader every information he may on such occasions require.

can be traced, either directly or indirectly, to a name of the sun, he will see at a glance that *fire* must, because of its nature, have been first signified by a name of the sun. And as *corn* serves like *bread, meat, water,* and all such ideas to support life, it must have thence taken its name, as in the foregoing pages has been already often shown; and as the sun has been worshipped as the author of existence, it follows that the term *corn* must —but indirectly, that is, through a word meaning life— be the same as one of the names of the sun. So often all this has already been submitted to the reader, that any one, I say, even a child not more than twelve years old, can, by means of the knowledge thus far acquired, tell how it has happened that ideas so different as *fire* and *corn* have been named alike. But how long might it take a body of the most learned men in the world to find out without the knowledge here referred to, why *fire* and *corn* have been so expressed? In truth I cannot say; perhaps they might—if they could live so long—make the discovery in a hundred years, and perhaps not in a thousand, and perhaps never. But their great learning would afford them little or no assistance; what they would need most—and it happens to be that with which linguists and philologists in general do not appear to be too largely provided—namely, the power of thinking long and seriously upon any of the more important points suggested during such an inquiry. I have already observed how wrong it was in M. Littré to have neglected inquiring strictly into the cause of the verb to *be* (*esse*) replacing the word for *water* (*eau*) in a certain part of France. He should have also asked himself many times—even a thousand times before he gave it up—why the name *Eve* was, as well as *esse,* one of his

words for *water*, for as *Eve* means, according to Moses, the *living*, it affords further confirmation of the identity in meaning of *water* and *life*. Here was matter for astonishment, and to which M. Littré should have drawn public attention. He should have spoken to all the members of the Academy and the Institute about it, and have suggested the necessity for a prize being offered to any one who could account for water having, besides its usual well-known meaning, that of life also. But philologists see nothing of importance in such an inquiry, it lies far beyond their reach, for the reason that they are perhaps of all learned men the least prone to think. There is, however, nothing more deserving of notice and close investigation than language, nor is there any thing in the world so full of wonders; almost every word is in itself a perfect wonder. Hence it is that men of the deepest understandings are ever filled with astonishment when they happen to meditate upon the nature of language, and hence too they must often ask themselves how can any thing so exceedingly abstruse and complicated, and yet, for all that, so logical, have been first formed, and be now found all over the world, even among nations the most unenlightened of the human race, and of whom thousands have, however, as the late Mr. Crawford, F.R.S., informs us, each made its own language, and that too very well. That is the astounding circumstance, but which has been clearly and fully accounted for in the sixth chapter of this work.

Another curious instance now occurs to me that the root *ur* may mean something very different from *fire* and *corn*, which we have just shown it to mean. There is a tendency to add a nasal sound to the letter *r*, as we see by comparing the French words *tour* and *séjour* with

turn and *sojourn*. If we now give this nasal sound to *ur* it will become *urn;* but there is, I shall be told, no relationship between an *urn, corn,* and *fire*. We can, however, account for their similarity in form. An *urn* is a vessel, and the first use made of it was that of holding liquids, and it was from this use it took its name, and was consequently, like all such vessels, called after water. It might seem from the resemblance it bears to a word for animal water, that it was named with reference to such an idea, but it cannot have been so; the word in question must have first been a general name for water, the particular term by which it is now distinguished being conventional. Hence it is that *urna* in Latin means not only an *urn* but a *pot* or a *pitcher* also; and *urnarium,* which is radically the same word, served not only as a board upon which pots and kitchen utensils were placed, but also as a sideboard in a dining-room for holding such articles as cups and drinking glasses; and all such things, though seeming to have been called after animal water, must have been named after the most usual word for water.

If we now aspirate the *u* of *urn,* and replace the aspirate by its common substitute *b,* we shall get *burn,* and thus see how a word traceable to one for water is not less so to one for *fire*. But even in old English *burn* means both *fire* and *water,* since it was once used in the sense of a *well* or *spring*. In *barn,* which was called after *corn,* we have still the same word.

THE TRINITY.

"It is not," says Calmet in his Dictionary of the Holy Bible," the least remarkable thing belonging to this subject, that it appears to have made part of the belief of

the most ancient nations, and in the earliest ages. Modern discoveries have found a Trinity among the Brahmins of Hindostan; that may have been the origin of the Platonic notions, and very possibly is the remains of a principle generally, if not universally, received in the theology of the original Oriental nations."

And Dr. Adam Clarke submits to his readers in his comments on the Bible the subjoined very ancient specimen of the Trinity: "How astonishing," he exclaims, "is the following invocation of the Supreme Being (translated from the original Sanscrit by Dr. C. Wilkins), still existing on a stone in a cave near the ancient city of Gya, in the East Indies!

"The Deity who is the Lord, the possessor of all, appeared in this ocean of natural beings at the beginning of the Kalee Yoog (the age of contention and baseness). He who is omnipresent, and everlastingly to be contemplated, the Supreme Being, the Eternal One, the divinity worthy to be adored, appeared with a portion of his divine nature. Reverence be unto thee in the form of Bood-dha! Reverence be unto the Lord of the earth! Reverence be unto thee, an INCARNATION of the Deity and the Eternal One! Reverence be unto thee, O God, in the form of the God of Mercy; the dispeller of pain and trouble, the Lord of all things, the Deity who overcometh the sins of the Kalee Yoog, the Guardian of the Universe, the emblem of mercy toward those who serve thee—One! the possessor of all things in VITAL FORM!

"Thou art Brahma, Veeshnoo, and Mahesa. Thou art the Lord of the Universe! Thou art under the form of all things, movable and immovable, the possessor of the whole! And thus I adore thee. Reverence be unto the BESTOWER OF SALVATION, and the Ruler of the faculties!

Reverence be unto thee, the DESTROYER of the EVIL SPIRIT! O Damordara, show me favour! I adore thee who art celebrated by a thousand names, and under various forms, in the shape Bood-dha, the God of Mercy! Be propitious, O Most High God!"

According to Dr. Adam Clarke, the following explanation of the names mentioned in this Trinity is thus given: "O'm, a mystic emblem of the Deity, forbidden to be pronounced but in silence. It is a syllable formed of the Sanscrit letters *a*, *oo*, which in composition coalesce and make O, and the nasal consonant *m*. The first letter stands for the *Creator*, the second for the *Preserver*, and the third for the *Destroyer*. It is the same among the Hindoos as Yehovah [Jehovah] is among the Hebrews. Brahma is the Deity in his creative quality. Veeshnoo, he *who filleth all space*, the Deity in his preserving quality. Mahesa, the Deity in his destroying quality. This is properly the Hindoo Trinity; for these three names belong to the same Being."

This explanation of the Hindoo Trinity is far from being correct. It is only a learned Hindoo could imagine that the word *Om* has the extravagant meaning here assigned it; it is simply the O with the nasal sound, and which sound may be expressed with equal propriety by either *m* or *n*. *Om* is therefore a name of the *sun*, and we have already seen it under its form *On*, and which the Greeks have rendered into their language by *Helios*. When it was first forbidden to be pronounced but in silence, then silence or concealment must have been one of its meanings; and this can be easily conceived when we remark that it seems to forbid the utterance of another word, for when it is heard the mouth is shut, there being a firm compression of the lips. Hence ac-

cording to Parkhurst[9] *om* signifies in Chaldee "to hide, *conceal, obscure;* to be *hidden, to lie hid* or *concealed.*" It was, therefore, their reverence for the doctrine of the WORD that induced the Hindoos to believe they should not pronounce this name of the Deity but in silence. The English interjection *hum!* which is, we may say, the same word with the aspirate, is also expressive of concealment, for it implies silence.

In the *Brah* or *Bra* of the name *Brahma* we see the Hebrew word for *create,* and which we have already explained; and hence it is that Brahma is said to be the Deity in his creative quality. But this *bra* is, when the *a* returns to its first place, *bar,* and as *r* and *s* are often used indifferently for each other, this *bar* is the same as *bas,* just as *arbor* is the same as *arbos;* and *bas* cannot differ from *bash* any more than *finis* can from *finish.* And as *bash* must, from the constant interchange of *b* and *v*, have, by many persons, been pronounced *vash* or *vesh,* we thus come to the Veesh of Veeshnoo, the Deity in his preserving quality, that is, as a Saviour; so that, in the Hindoo theology, the Creator and the Saviour have radically the same name. It is also easy to perceive in either *Bas* or *Bash* another form of *Mas* or *Mes,* which arises from the confounding of *b* and *m* in perhaps all languages; and what have we in *Mas* or *Mes* but the *Mes* of *Messiah,* that is, the *Anointed,* the Saviour, for the Hebrew משח *msh, oil,* is still the same word, and which we have already fully explained and have traced to a word for *water.* As to the *noo* of *Veeshnoo,* it is only its ending, and it should not for this reason be regarded as a radical part of this name. When this ending was, however, perceived to have a particular meaning,

[9] Lex., p. 481.

an additional belief must have been the consequence. In Taylor's Calmet there is, says Higgins[1] a print given of the Indian *Avatar*, Vishnuh, coming forth from the fish's belly. This idea was, of course, suggested by the name *Vishnu* being perceived to mean *fish-born*. As to *vish*, it is clearly enough equal to *fish*, and to the *pisc* of *piscis* in Latin; and as a *fish* was named after the element in which it lives, we have thus an additional proof that the name *Messiah* and a word for *water* are radically the same.

Now as to *Mahesa*, the name of the Hindoo deity in his destroying quality, it is the same as the *Mes* of *Messiah*, and, as we have just seen, another of its forms is *bas* or *bash*, which may mean either *high* or *low*. When taken in the latter sense it meant *destruction*, this idea, as well as that of death, having been named after *lowness*. But when *bas* or *bash* signified *high*, it was equal to a name of the Deity, not because the Deity was named after *height*, but because *height* was traceable to the same source. In the *bas* of the Greek *basileus*, a *king*, we have an instance of *bas* meaning *high*, and so have we in the *Bash* of *Bashaw*, for in Turkish or Arabic, *bas*, then written *bash*, means *head*. A very plain proof that the idea expressed by *destruction* was called after *lowness* can be shown by the word *destruction* itself; for as its part *struction* is but another form of *structure*, and as we see by the *struc*, that a *structure* is something *raised*, *elevated*, or *built up*, it follows that *de-structure*, that is, *destruction*, has the opposite meaning; that is, what has been *brought down* or *made low*. Hence a *structor* is one who *elevates*, who *builds up*, but a *destructor* is one who *destroys*, who makes *low*,

[1] Vol. i. p. 638.

a *destroyer*. We thus see how from the same word having, like *altus* in Latin, the opposite meanings of *high* and *low*, a name not different from that of the Deity may have a very *bad* meaning. Even this English word *bad* cannot differ from the *Bud* of *Buddha*, a name of the *sun*. And as its *b* does here but represent the aspirate *h*, and as it may for this reason be dropped, the *ad* which remains is also one of Buddha's names, as we have already seen. Or, as any one of the substitutes of the aspirate *h* may, when the sense corresponds, be changed for another of its substitutes, and as *g* serves as well as *b* for this purpose, we see that *bad* may be replaced by *gad*, and *gad* was a name of the *sun*, and it cannot differ, save conventionally, from God.

What difference is there now between *bad* and the English word *bed*? There is none except conventionally. The use of a *bed* is for lying *down*, and it was for this reason called after *lowness*. But if a person well acquainted with Hebrew and Greek, but knowing nothing whatever of English, were to be shown such a word as *abed*, and be requested to tell its meaning, he might, with a very slight knowledge of our principles, say that it was exactly equal to the אבד *abd* of אבדון *abdun* in Hebrew, and to the Αβαδ of the Greek Αβαδδων, neither of which differs from *destructor* in Latin, and this would be very correct, which arises from a *bed* having been called after lowness, and from the idea expressed by *destroyer* being traceable to the same source. As there must have been a Trinity with most people some time after the primary signification of words was lost, it is reasonable to suppose that one of three persons may have served to mean the *destroyer*, which would be occasioned from the same word signifying both *high* and *low*.

Thus such a name of the Deity as *Om* might as well signify *low* as *high*, and so might its other form *On*. Thus *om* cannot differ from the *um* of *humble*, which is expressive of lowness; nor can *on* differ from the negative *un*, nor *un* from the root of *under*, which is also expressive of *lowness*, and consequently of *destruction*: hence to be *undone* is to be *destroyed*.

If we therefore find a Trinity of which the first person is signified by *Don, Lord*, its third person may be signified by the same word with some slight difference in form for the sake of distinction, such as Down for instance, which is really the same word; so that it might as well mean *high* as *low*, and which is proved by certain *hills* in England being called the *downs*. But where is the second person, that is, the *maker* of such a Trinity? We have it in *do*, to *make*, to the *o* of which many persons must have given the nasal sound, and so have brought it equal to both *Don* and *down*, that is, to *high* and *low*. And what have we in this second person *Don* but a form precisely equal to *dun*, and *dun* cannot differ from *thun*, which is the German of the verb to *do*.

The learned have often remarked that there has been a divinity whose name meant the Destroyer as well as the Creator, but for which they have never been able to account. We now see that it arose from the name of the Deity not being different from a word meaning both *high* and *low*, and from *destruction* having been called after *lowness*. Then are we to suppose that the Deity was called after *height?* No; but we are to suppose that such ideas as *high, height* and *highness*, were called after the name first given to the Deity, and that was the name first given to the *sun*.

And such was in very remote times the origin of a

Trinity. It arose from three objects of worship having been designated alike, at least in one respect, apart from the other meanings which their names might have. Hence Dr. Adam Clarke, referring to the Hindoo Trinity, observes, "This is properly the Hindoo Trinity, for these three names belong to the same Being." Precisely so; and such is the origin of not only the Hindoo Trinity, but of all the other Trinities that ever have been or that ever may be; that is to say, they were all suggested by three beings—their objects of worship—having the same name, and of which one of the meanings must have belonged equally to each of the three persons. And though every such ancient Trinity was only a myth, yet, according to the doctrine of types, it served to foretell, long in advance of divine revelation, the only real Trinity that ever has been, namely, that of the Christian religion. Nor can it have been necessary to lead to the origin of such a doctrine that the three names were the same or nearly the same, in form; an identity in one of these meanings must have been thought sufficient; but their having the same meaning may have often, though not always, caused them to be alike in form or nearly so.

A REVIEW OF THE THREE DIVISIONS INTO WHICH LANGUAGE HAS BEEN DIVIDED.

These divisions are so very natural as to have required no ingenuity, no effort whatever on the part of those who first expressed their ideas by words instead of signs. The discovery and explanation already given of them in the first volume[2] are sufficiently clear to need no

[2] Page 12.

further observation. And to what important discoveries in the origin of ideas are not these three divisions likely to lead! and of which many instances have been already submitted to the reader. How inexplicable it has hitherto been to account for two opposite ideas being expressed by the same word! Witness the Hebrew word אור *aur*[3], which, though the usual meaning is *light*, is sometimes used in the sense of *night*; for this word *night* means *no sun, no light*, and consequently *darkness*. In the *ar* of *dark* we see the same root, for it cannot differ from *aur*; so that its *d* is to be regarded as the prefix *de* when used negatively, as in the French word *defaire*, where the *de* corresponds with the negative *un* of *undo*. Two other words which differ very much in meaning are *give* and *have*; yet they make but one and the same word, and this cannot be accounted for, but by discovering that they belong to the same division of words, namely, to those traceable to the hand. Thus when we replace the *g* of *give* by the sign of which it is only the substitute, we shall bring it equal to *hive*; and as the *i* is here for *oi*, and *oi* for *a*, we find that *hive*—this other form of *give*—does not differ from *have*. Now as to *give* a thing is to *hand* it, we can easily account for the idea expressed by *give* having been called after the *hand*. And as a thing *had* is literally a thing *haved*, that is, a thing in *hand*, we thus see how the two ideas come from the same source, and that their difference in meaning is but conventional. If we now observe that the *hav* of *have* is the same as *hab*—witness the *hab* of *habeo*—and that the aspirate *h* is frequently represented by *f*, we shall instead of *hab* get the *fab* of *faber*, which, from its meaning a *workman* and consequently a *maker*, belongs to the same division of

[3] Page 16.

words as *giving* and *having*, though in meaning it is very different from either of these ideas. But as the *f* of *faber* is for the aspirate *h*, and as it must not therefore be counted, we see that the root of *faber* is *ab*, but which cannot differ in meaning from *ac*, *ad*, *ag*, or any other root, except conventionally. This root *ab* is, however, the Hebrew of *father*; and as I have already discovered the original meaning of *father*, and have shown it to be that of *maker*, it follows that this idea also belongs to those called after the hand. Now as the hand did not obtain the name of *maker* but because its principal use is that *of making*, and as *maker* was also one of the names of the sun because the sun was believed to have been the *maker* of the world, we are by this knowledge enabled to account not only for the *hand* but for all ideas traceable to this source, being also traceable to the division of ideas named after the sun, but indirectly.

But as the *fab* of *faber* cannot differ from the *fab* of *faba*, Latin of *bean*, is this idea also, I may be asked, to be traced to the *hand*? No; but it is to be traced to an idea after which the hand has been called, that of the *sun*, the once supposed author of life; and a *bean* has thence taken its name because, like *corn*, *bread*, *meat*, and *water*, it serves to support *life*: hence *bean* is but another form of *been*, *being*, and the Saxon *beon*, which are also words implying *existence* or *life*. It is thus made evident that the name of so simple a thing as a *bean* is equal to one of the many names of the sun though not called after it, but after one of its meanings—that of life. By this, too, we see that *ab*, Hebrew of *father*, is equal to the English verb *be*, not because this idea was called after *father*, but after *life*; and from the word *father* having the meaning of *maker*, a name of the *sun*, we thus see

why *ab, father* or *maker,* and the verb *be* were expressed by the same word, though *be* was not called after either *father* or *maker.*

Faba, the Latin of *bean,* has so clearly *food* for its original meaning, that Ainsworth, though knowing nothing of the origin of language, traces it, but with a doubt, to this source. There can, however, be no doubt about it, for *bean* cannot differ from either *been* or the Saxon *beon,* and these are inflections of the verb to *be;* and this verb implies existence, and *food* has been called after this idea, and the *bean* is a well-known kind of food.

From *bean* being thus traceable to *food,* and *food* to *existence,* it follows that it might just as well mean *life* as a kind of food. This will account for its being equal to the *bain* of *βαίνω,* which means to *go,* and to *be* has also this meaning in Greek. It has it even in English, for "I have *been* to see you," means, "I have gone to see you." If we therefore aspirate the initial vowel of the *ein* of *einai,* εἶναι, to *be,* and then replace this aspirate by its common substitute *b,* we shall obtain *bein,* which cannot differ from the *bain* of the *βαιν* of *βαίνω,* any more than it can from the French word *bain,* a *bath;* and this was called after water, and water, as we have seen, after life. In this way a great many ideas can be shown to have names not different in form from the one meaning a *bean,* though not called after it. Witness the *ben* of *benè,* which is equal to *bean,* because one vowel is equal to a combination of vowels; and the adverb *benè* means *well,* and *well* when a noun means a *spring,* and this idea was called after *water. Ben* is also the same in meaning as *bonus,* which has been also written *benus,* and *bonus* means *good;* and this idea was called after *God,* an ancient name of the sun, the supposed author

of *life*, which is another plain instance of the word *bean* being traceable to the sun, and consequently to life. In *bon* we have a well-known name of the *sun*, for its *b*, being here for the aspirate, it may be dropped, and the *on* which remains means *one*, a name of the sun, and hence, as we have already shown[4], the Greeks have rendered it into their language by *Helios*. Another very clear proof that a word for *bean* may mean both *life* and *water* is shown by its French form *fève*, for when here the *f* is left out because representing the aspirate *h*, *eve* remains, and according to the Bible[5] *Eve* means *life*, and it is also one of the many forms of the French word *eau*, according to M. Littré. Hence the same word may mean *bean*, *life*, and *water*.

What is now the etymology of *pea?* We need not go beyond its present form to discover it. When we drop its *p*—here a substitute for the aspirate—we obtain *ea*, which is the Saxon of *water*, and, like food, water was called after life. *Pea* is therefore, as well as *bean*, another word for *food*, though it does not differ from one for *water*. This becomes more apparent when we observe that the Greek πίσον and the Latin *pisum* have each the meaning of *pea*, for the radical part of each word is *pis;* and this happens to be the radical part of *piscis*, a fish, and also of πίσαι, which means to *give to drink*, and both these ideas were called after water. But in the Irish of *pea*, which is *pis*, there is no suffix, and we need only supply the *o* understood with its *i* in order to obtain *pois*, which happens to be the French of *pea;* and when we now observe that *pois* is by the joining of its *o* and *i* equal to *pas*, and that *pas* cannot, from the interchange of *p* and *v*, differ from *vas* nor *vas* from *was*, we obtain

[4] Page 32. [5] Gen. iii. 20.

the radical part of the German *wasser*. But as the *p*, *v*, and *w* of these words do but replace the aspirate *h*, and as they may for this reason be left out, we shall in the *as* which remains have the Sanskrit of the verb to *be*, and of which *is* in both Hebrew and English shows another form, not to mention the *es* of the Latin *esse*. And that this *es* might as well mean food as it does *water* is shown by *esca*, of which *vescus* is but another form; for when we aspirate the initial vowel of the former, and replace this aspirate by *v*, its radical part *esc* will be equal to the *vesc* of *vescus*, and each of these words (*esca* and *vescus*) relates to food. Latin philologists suppose that the *v* of *vescus* has here the power of intensifying the *esc* of *esca*; but this is a mistake. There is no more difference between the *esc* of *esca* and the *vesc* of *vescus* than there is between the *hesper* of *hesperus*, and the *vesper* of *vesperus*. *Esca* must have therefore been pronounced *hesca* by some people, and then by the aspirate *h* having been represented by *v*, others must instead of *hesca* have pronounced *vesca*, whence came its adjective form *vescus*.

Even such a form as *vesca* might mean water as well as food, for it is radically the same as *vesica*, which means a *bladder*; and as a *bladder* is for holding water, it has been called after its use. Hence its radical part *blad* cannot differ from *blud*, which is the Saxon of *blood*, and *blood* was, because a liquor, called after *water*. But as *blad* or *blud* cannot differ from the French *bled*, which means *wheat* or *corn*, we thus see that *food* or *drink* can be signified by the same word, because these two ideas are each necessary for the sustaining of *life*, after which they have been called. In *vessie*, French of *bladder*, it is easy to see the *wass* of the German *wasser*,

and that it is also radically the same as *vessel,* an idea called also after *water.*

But I have been overlooking the best proof that can possibly be given that the primary signification of the word *pea* is *food,* and this proof is afforded by its German equivalent *ert,* of which the *e* being the same as *o,* and *o* being equal to *oi* or *a,* the entire word cannot differ from *art,* and *art* is the radical part of ἄρτος, Greek of *food.* And if we aspirate the *a* of *art* and replace the aspirate by its common substitute *b,* we shall get *bart,* that is, *brat, brut, bread* and *brute,* which forms we have already seen, and have shown to be but other words for *life,* because named after it. We need say no more of *bean* and *pea;* they are but different forms of the same word, and that word means food. When we now look at these two words *pea* and *sea,* and compare their meanings, the insignificance of the one to the vastness of the other, have we not reason to wonder how two ideas between which the difference is so great can be signified by the same word, *ea* being the root of both? And as this root serves to signify *food* and *water,* and as these ideas have been called after life, we see that *ea* implies existence, and means a *one,* a *being,* in short, the verb *be* itself, from the root of which, that is *e,* it does not differ. And as *e* cannot differ from *o,* and as *o* was the name of the sun, we thus see how so very trifling a thing as a *pea* can, because signifying *food,* be traced to life, and from life to the supposed author of life. But when the primary signification of the word *pea*—that of food—was forgotten, and when men began to perceive it did not differ from one of the many names of the object they were then worshipping as God—they must have begun to regard it as something divine, even as much so

as they did leeks and onions, which became also objects of worship with the Egyptians some time after the real meanings of their names were lost sight of, and which must have been that of food.

We should now bear in mind that words expressive of food or drink may also signify *water, life, saviour,* and finally the *sun.* Hence in the Anacalypsis[6] it is said that in the Arabic language of the Koran Jesus Christ is called Ischa; and according to the same authority[7] Ischa means also Saviour, whilst in Irish it stands for fish; that is, it is *Ischa* with the digamma prefixed, *fischa.* In the *Isch* of *Ischa,* we have also a form equal to *esca, food,* and of which the root *es* is also the root of *esse,* to *be.* And as *es* is for *os,* just as shew is for show, and as the *o* of *os* has *i* understood, it follows that the *ois* thus obtained is the same as both *as* and *eis,* in the former of which we have the Sanskrit of the verb to *be,* and in the latter the monogram of *Ἰησοῦς,* Jesus; and according to St. Matthew this name means Saviour. Having already shown how the ideas *life, be, save,* and *water* are signified alike, we can easily perceive in *as,* Sanskrit of *be,* the root of the German *wasser,* of which the *w* is for the aspirate *h,* and all that follows its *as* is equal to *er;* for as the *s* should not be doubled any more than the *t* in *water,* the whole word is for *waser,* of which the radical part is *was,* and of this the root is *as.* In *was* we see also a form equal to the *wes* of *wesan,* which means to *be* in Saxon. In the *wes* of *wesan* we see also the *ves* of *vesica* and *vessie,* the Latin and French of *bladder,* and a bladder was called after water, which it serves to hold. Now as the W in Sanskrit is the M in Latin and other languages, does it not follow that the *wes* just noticed is the same as

[6] Vol. i. p. 583. [7] Vol. ii. p. 347.

mes? And as V and W do constantly interchange, and W and M also, what difference can there be in meaning between *vessie* and *messie?* They differ very much in meaning, though in the value of their forms they are exactly alike. And why should this be? Because they both emanate from the same source. Thus a bladder was called after that which it contains, namely, water; so that it does not in this respect differ from a tub or a pitcher, though in the form of its name it bears no resemblance to either. There was, therefore, a time when such a thing as a *bladder* might have received divine honours, that is, after the cause of its being so named was forgotten, and that it was then perceived to mean *water*, and consequently *save* and *life*, whence the belief with the heathen that water was something divine; he was not aware that it was called after life because serving to support it, and that life was called after the sun, its supposed author, and that from the sun being then worshipped as God, it was believed to be a saviour. Hence the several ideas *sun, saviour, life,* and *water* must have been often signified by the same word, and such was, in very remote times, the origin of baptism, the original meanings of language having been already forgotten and nothing more being known of its terms—then only one syllable each—than that they seemed to be—apart from their other meanings—so many different names of the name of the sun; and as this luminary was then revered as God, even so was the WORD, nor less so the ideas it served to name.

But the *Messiah* was not, I shall be told, called after water, and this is very true; but having taken its name from that which was called after water, its meaning is the same. And what was that? It was *oil*, and from

oil being a liquid substance, it was like other liquids called after water. Hence the *Anointed*—which is the real meaning of the word *Messiah*—signifies literally the *oiled*, and so might it signify the *watered*, though not called after water. This is made evident by the fact that the Hebrew word signifying the *Messiah* is according to Parkhurst composed of these three letters משח *msh*, and these three letters do also, and still according to Parkhurst, mean the *anointed*. And what else do these three letters משח *msh* mean according to Parkhurst? *Oil*, and nothing more; so that it is as I say, the *Messiah* means the *Anointed*, and the *anointed* means literally the *oiled*, from which it would appear that the first ointment in use was simply *oil*. It is now easy to conceive why *oil* was believed to be possessed of divine power. From its having, because a liquid, been called after *water*, and *water* after *life*, and *life* after the *sun*, it obtained a name not different from that of the then great object of worship; so that to anoint a person was thought to make him, as it were, a God. Hence when the *o* and *i* of *oil* coalesce, this word becomes *al*, once a well-known name in Hebrew of the sun and the true God. The ελ of ἔλαιον, and the *ol* of *oleum*, which are the roots of the Greek and Latin words of *oil*, are but other forms of *al*, and were consequently in Hebrew names of the sun. But if these roots were aspirated they would become equal to the *hol* of *holy*, and also to the *hal* of ἅλιος, and the *hel* of ἥλιος. As to the French of *oil*, *huile*, it is still but another form of *al* and *el*, for when we drop its aspirate, its remaining part *uile* will be equal to *voile* (its *u* being for *v*, and its *i* having, as usual, *o* understood); and what is *voile* when its *i* and *o* meet but the Latin *vale*, *farewell*, and in which we have still the root

al, so that it may, when literally considered, be said to mean *to God,* that is, as in French, *adieu.*

We now see how any word meaning *oil* might signify *holy, divine,* or *God-like,* and this accounts for the anointing of kings, prophets, and priests with *oil*—it was done out of reverence to the doctrine of the WORD, in which all were at the time bound to believe. No name for *oil* can, however, come as near to the name of the sun as *water;* and why so? Because water has only one idea between its name and the name of the sun, and that one idea is *life,* after which it was called; but *oil* has two ideas between it and the sun, namely, *water* and *life.* Might not any other liquid substance as well as *oil* have been found not to differ from the name of the sun, and so have been revered—even as much so as *oil*—on account of its name? Certainly this might be, and not only as to liquid substances but as to solid *food.* And why so? Because food was called after life as well as water, and it is so for the *same* reason, namely, that it supports life, and consequently serves to save it. Hence referring to *bread* and *wine* Christ is made to say, "This is my body and this is my blood." And are not these substances still taken in memory of HIM, even as He recommended[8]? And this solemn ceremony, every good Christian will exclaim, does not come through a type, but direct from the SON Himself. But this affords no proof, some other good Christian may exclaim, that this divine sacrament had not been typified long previous to the coming of Christ; and he may strengthen his belief in the doctrine of types by a passage from Cicero, who is reported to have asked about forty years before the birth of Christ in some such words as these: "What do you think of a

[8] 1 Cor. xi. 24, 25.

people who imagine they eat their God in a bit of bread." I have read a passage taken from Cicero to this effect, but where I have met with it, or by whom it was quoted, I cannot now call to mind.

Now from food and water having been each called after life, may it not have often happened, that the word for bread with one people may have been the word for water with another people? This may have often been. "Υδωρ, the Greek of water, will serve to show how even the same word may have meanings as different from one another as dry and wet or bread and water. The root in ὕδωρ is ὑδ, in which, when its aspirate sign is replaced by B, as it frequently is, we see *Bud*, which is the same as *Buddha*, the *sun*. But when the aspirate is represented by *s*, instead of *Bud* we get the *sud* of the Latin *sudor*, which means *sweat*. Here we see in the *sud* of *sudor* and the English *sweat* but different forms of the ὑδ of ὕδωρ, and the primary sense is *water*, and this is traceable to *Budh* or *Buddha*, which is equal to the ὑδ of ὕδωρ, because water was called after life, and life after the sun. Let us now notice the English equivalent of *sudor*, that is, *sweat*. Its *s* being here euphonical, as it often is before *w*, *m*, and some other signs, and as it must not for this reason be counted, *weat* alone remains to be noticed, and in *weat* we see both *wet* and the *wat* of *water*. And as the *w* of *weat* does here but represent the aspirate, and as it is often represented by *wh*, we thus bring *weat* equal to *wheat*, which is corn, and consequently dry food. But as *w* in Sanskrit is M in Latin and other idioms, it follows that the *weat* of *wheat* cannot differ from *meat*, which also means *food*. When we now remark that the *w*, *wh*, and *m*, have grown out of the aspirate *h*, and that they may for this reason be dropped, we reduce these several words

to *eat*, which is the root of *eating*, and our *eating* is our *food*. But the word *food* itself? It cannot differ from *foot*, and the *foot* was called after *motion* because it is by it we move, and motion is life; and this idea took its name from its supposed author, that is, Buddha, Budhe, or Boodh, a well-known name of the sun, and whose present symbol is a gigantic *foot*, as we have seen in the first volume, page 167. As to the *eat* of *wheat* and *meat* it is equal to the *ed* of *edere*, and *edere* is the same as *esse*, to *be*, and to *be* is to *live*, and *living* is *eating*. In *ed* we see also a form equal to *od*, which when aspirated, and its aspirate is replaced by *g*, gives *God*, and this was a name of the sun, as we have shown in our etymology of Buddha, page 164, &c.

Let us now take advantage of something we have just seen; that as *edere* is equal to *esse*, so is *ed*, root of *edere*, equal to *es*, root of *esse*. And as *ed* is for *od*, so must *es* be for *os*. And as neither of these roots can differ from the root of ὕδωρ, that is, from *hud*, it follows since ὕδωρ, *water*, takes in Latin the form of *sudor*, *sweat*, that the latter might be also *sudos*. And why so? Because *hudor*, ὕδωρ, from which *sudor* has come, is written also ὕδος, and even ὕδας. Where now is the advantage of knowing that *sudor*, sweat, and which is but another word for water, is exactly equal to *sudos* or *sudas?* There appears, at first sight, to be none; and yet there is an advantage, as there always is in every kind of knowledge, as I am now going to show: does the reader know any thing of the primary signification of the very well known word *suds?* I could wager a thousand to one, that however clever and learned he may be, he knows no more about the primary signification of *suds* than the most ignorant of English washerwomen. She

knows that it means *soap-water* and so do the very learned, and that it ought to be as it is, and as it always has been and ever will be, written and pronounced *suds* and not *sud*. And in this the poor washerwoman has the advantage of the very learned, who cannot account for the *s* in this word, and who think that it ought, like *lather*, to be in the singular. But so it is in the singular, for it does not differ from *sudos*, which is in the singular number, except by its *o* having been dropped; and as *sudos* is the same as *sudor*, *sweat*, and *sudor* the same as *ὕδωρ*, *water*, it follows that such too must be the original meaning of *suds*, so that it is only conventionally it means *soap-water*, there being nothing in the word itself significant of *soap*, any more than there is in *ὕδωρ*, from which it does not differ in meaning.

Now I have looked into several eminent lexicographers and philologists, in order to see if the primary signification of *suds* might have been known to any of them, but not one of them knew any thing of it. Several of them, however, derive it from the verb *seethe*. But between the ideas seething or boiling and suds there is no relationship whatever. Every one knows that soap-water can be made by soap and cold water as well as by soap and hot water. But such an etymology does not, like mine, account for *suds* being apparently in the plural. If there were any truth in this etymology the word ought to be *sud*. Hence in Professor Latham's late edition of Johnson's dictionary I find suds without its *s*, as the following serves to show: "Sud from the root of *seeth*, sodden, generally plural; there seems no reason, however, against saying *a sud*." But it seems to me that there is a very powerful reason, and which is this, that no one in the world ever says *a sud* instead of *suds*.

Philologists should look round them many times before taking upon themselves the liberty of making such an alteration in a word so much in use, and of which the one now recommended in its stead is so unacceptable to our ears. This reminds me of my etymology of *barracks*, which I have shown in the first vol., p. 73, to be for *war-οἶκος*, that is, *war-house*, *οἶκος* being the Greek of *house*.

But now almost all English dictionaries give *barrack* instead of *barracks*. And why so? For the very same reason they give *sud* for *suds*. Philologists take the *s* of *barracks* for the plural sign, just as they do the *s* in *suds*. The mistake is exactly the same; just as the *o* in sud*o*s, the original of *suds*, has been dropped, so has the second *o* in *οἶκος*.

What is now the etymology of *soap?* By which I mean, after what idea was it first called? No one can tell. It takes in many languages different forms, but they are all radically the same. It does not exist in Hebrew. It is represented by *σάπων* in Greek, and is supposed to be of Celtic or German origin, and to be radically the same as *sapo* in Latin, but what the *sap* of either word means we are not told. But as this *sap* cannot differ from the *sav* of *savon* in French, nor *sav* from *save*, and as *save* is the verbal form of *saviour*, and as this is, as the learned admit, one of the titles of the sun, we see that *soap* is traceable to this source. This does not, however, mean that *soap* was called after the sun, but rather after something else thence derived. Can it have taken its name from *life*, which has been called after the sun? Such an origin for *soap* cannot be conceived; but it may have been called after *water*, since *water* has been called after *life*, as we have already often shown; and as water serves to cleanse and purify, even so does *soap*, which appears to have first been a liquid substance.

Hence in a passage from Arbuthnot on Aliments, quoted by Dr. Johnson, it is said, "Any mixture of any oily substance with salt may be called a *soap*." Even in its condensed state soap is always used with water, and this alone were sufficient to have it called after such a substance.

In its German form *seife*, which is equal to *soife*, just as *soife* is to *safe*, we see the adjective of *save*; nor can either of these forms differ from the *sav* of *savon*, nor from the *sap* of σάπων, nor the *sap* of its Latin equivalent *sapo*. And as *sap* is a juice, and consequently a fluid or liquid, it is also referrible to water, and may, though not called after the idea to *save*, be expressed by such a word. This is made evident by the French of *sap* being *seve*, a form equal to *sove*, and consequently to *soive*, which by the joining of the *o* and *i* gives *save*. But as the *s* in *seve* may be left out for the reason that it does but represent the aspirate, we have in the *eve* that remains the name *Eve*, which means *life*, and as it is, according to M. Littré, one of the forms of *eau*, we see that it means *water* also. These other words *sop*, *sup*, *sip*, *suck* and *soak* may also, because expressive of kindred ideas, be traced to water, either directly or indirectly. *Soap* has therefore, like *suds*, been called after *water*.

Another word for water, apparently very different from all of these just noticed, is the *Mos* of *Moses*. But when we give to its *o* its form *e*, we see that *Mos* does not differ from the *Mes* of *Messiah*, and the Messiah was a Saviour.

Bryant, in his work on the "Plagues of Egypt[9]," referring to the name Moses, says, "*Mo* and *Mos* in the ancient Egyptian tongue, as well as in other languages, signified *water*." But even in English the words *mo* and *mos* mean *water*, as we can easily perceive when we analyze

[9] Page 203.

mist and *moist*, which ideas have been each called after *water*. The root of *mist* is no more than *is*, for its *m* has grown out of the aspirate *h*, just as the *m* of *m*odern has grown out of the *h* of the *h*odiern of *h*odiernus; and as to the *t* of *mist* it must be ascribed to the euphonic tendency that prevails of joining the sound of this letter with that of *s*. But as the *i* of the root *is* has *o* understood, the real root of *mist* is *ois*, and which is also the root of *moist*; so that in *mist* and *moist* we have the same word, their difference in meaning being only conventional. And as the Sanskrit W is M in Latin and other tongues, the *Mos* of *Moses* is equal to *wos*, that is, *i* being understood with *o*, and *o* and *i* making *a*, *was*, the radical part of the German *wasser*, *water*. According to Parkhurst the same word means *Moses* and *draw out* in Hebrew. As to the Egyptian word *mo*, which also means *water*, as it cannot differ from *moi* (*i* being understood with *o*), nor *moi* from *ma*, it cannot, since M is the same as W, differ from the *wa* of *water*. But as the M and W here noticed are each for the aspirate, and must not be counted, it follows that now the letter *a* is the root of the word for water, and it cannot differ from the Saxon *ea* which has the same meaning. Such too is the meaning of the *ois* above noticed, for it is equal to *as*. But why should *water* have this meaning? Because it was called after *life*, and *life* after the *sun*, and every name of the sun means both one and life. Thus *on* is we know for *one*, and Bryant referring to it says, "The term *on* among the Egyptians signifies the *sun*. Hence the city *On* of Egypt was uniformly rendered *Heliopolis*, or the City of the Sun[2]." And that *On* (which is only the *o* with the nasal sound) has the meaning I have always

[1] Page 393, ed. 1823. [2] Plagues of Egypt, p. 215.

shown it to have, Bryant thus testifies in the same work: "All the Grecian authors who speak of the Egyptian term *On*, always refer it to *life* and *being* [3]."

Now as to water it has not, correctly speaking, the meaning of *one;* that is, it was never called after such an idea, though the word by which it is expressed does mean *one*. And why so? Because *water* was called after what it supports, that is, after *life*, and *life* was called after the *sun*, and this luminary, because appearing *alone*, was signified by the word *one;* and this accounts for *water* being a word of equal import, though not called after the idea *one*, or after the sun. Indeed the word *one* itself is when traced to its birth nothing more than the *O* with the nasal sound (On); that is, it has grown out of the name of the sun, and not the name of the *sun* out of the word *one*.

How easy it is now to account for the formation of the German *wasser*! Its radical part *was* must have once been *as*, which means *one*, since it is the French of *ace*, and when it was aspirated, and when its aspirate was replaced by *w*, *as* became *was*. Other forms of *as* are *ois* and *eis*, whence *is* and its Hebrew equivalent *w' is*. The Greek εἷς, *one*, is still the same word, and such, too, is the German *ein*. By this we see that the several ideas *sun*, *one*, *water*, *life*, and the verb to *be*, might be expressed by the same word; and to which we may add the idea *save*, whence *Saviour*. Hence in the *Ιησ* of *Ἰησοῦς* we see a form equal to *eis*, and consequently to a word for water. Such, too, is the *Jos* of *Joshua*, the *Jos* of *Joseph*, and the *Mos* of *Moses*. And this will account for both Joseph and Moses having by some persons been called saviours, but it was to their names they must have been

[3] Page 225.

indebted for such titles, for according to the histories we have of them, saviours they were not, that is, of the human race, such as Buddha and Crishna are represented. Then how do the learned account for such characters as Joseph and Moses having been regarded as saviours? As new incarnations; and that Godfrey Higgins did so believe, the following serves to show:—

"The Abbé de Rocher shows that several kings are copies of Abraham, several of Joseph, several of Moses, &c.; and that Joseph was the Proteus of the Egyptians and Greeks. He observes that Joseph was called a Saviour, and this, from the peculiarity of his story, would be of no consequence; but the Abbé artlessly observes—which is, indeed, of great consequence—that St. Jerome calls Joseph Redemptor Mundi—here evidently letting the secret of the mythos escape him. The Abbé was not aware of the consequence of showing that Moses and Joseph are repeatedly described by different persons, particularly the latter, as a Saviour. He had no knowledge of the new incarnations. Both Moses and Joseph are appellative terms made into proper names[4]."

And not only Moses and Joseph but all other proper names must have once been appellatives; and however barbarous and inhuman any one so called might have anciently been, if his name were perceived to signify *save,* this were enough to convert him into a Saviour. But the name Joseph means, I shall be told, "*increase, addition*;" but it has, I beg to reply, other meanings also. Thus its first syllable *Jos* is the root of *Joses* or *Jose,* which Cruden explains by "raised or who exists; or who pardons, or Saviour." As to its ending *eph,* it is equal to *af, ap,* or *ab,* each of which may, when read after the

[4] Anacalypsis, vol. ii. p. 16.

Hebrew manner, signify *father;* whence it follows that the meaning of the whole word may have been often interpreted the *father* of *Jose* or *Joses;* that is, the father of the Saviour, or of Jesus. All such names can therefore be regarded as types of the true Saviour.

When I began this review of my first volume, I was not aware that such a notice of its principal parts would increase its bulk so considerably as it does. If I were to continue as I have thus begun, my work would not be confined to two volumes only, nor perhaps to three. I must, therefore, discontinue this review. A further notice of the origin and formation of letters, the discovery of the roots, the right use of the aspirate *h*, and then my etymologies,—upon all of which subjects a great deal more, no doubt, might be said,—could not fail, from the many observations they would suggest, to increase not merely the size of my work, but its price also. I cannot, however, help expressing my regret at being obliged to omit the additional proofs I might find of the truth of my etymologies, the discovery of the primary signification of words being of all the other parts of philology by far the most valuable. There was, however, a time when this knowledge must have been well known to all men, even to the most ignorant. But when this knowledge was totally lost, and that no one could tell why things in general had the names by which they were known, then language, instead of being a blessing became an evil; for its words, then of only one syllable each, appeared, apart from their other meanings, to be all so many names of the sole object of worship over the world, whence rose the strange belief that language had a divine origin, and that the WORD should be a sacred doctrine and revered as the supreme divinity, and that so should the

ideas it expressed. But as all men, even those who worshipped the WORD, could not agree with one another on all points, dissension soon sprung up amongst them, and division, and hatred the most intense, and oftentimes very cruel wars. But nothing like this could have ever happened had not the original meanings of words been wholly forgotten. And what might be the result if those original meanings were to be now fully recovered, and through the knowledge thus acquired the discovery of the origin of myths to be also made known? The result would probably be that in less than a century from the present time there would not be two religions in Christendom. And it may therefore be truly asserted that had the science of language been hitherto known, and as well cultivated as that of numbers, never could there have been a religious war any more than there has been a scientific one. Then are we to ascribe, I may be asked, to language the divisions that have so often taken place not only between nations but between different parts of the same nation, and sometimes even between members of the same family? No; we are not to ascribe those unhappy divisions to language, but to our hitherto total ignorance of its origin, as well as to our total loss of the primary signification of its words. When these two great losses are recovered, perfect religious harmony may be expected to prevail throughout all Christendom, but not before.

As an instance of the length to which a continuation of this review might lead, the following proof of the truth of only one of my etymologies will serve to show. The reader cannot have yet forgotten the derivation given by M. Littré and other great philologists of the French word *boucher*, which they suppose was called after

a *buck goat,* but which I have shown to have been called after the verb to *cut,* and of which I have given many proofs from several languages. The instance I gave from Greek was κρεουργός, of which the literal meaning is a *flesh-cutter,* and not, as has been hitherto supposed, a *flesh-worker.* But there is another word in Greek for *butcher,* which has only now occurred to me; this word is ἄρταμος, which is explained *a butcher,* or *one who cuts in pieces.* But when we analyze *artamos,* are we to suppose that it has, like *kreourgos,* the literal meaning of *flesh-cutter?* It can be very easily shown to have this meaning. Thus the radical part of *kreas,* Greek of *flesh,* is *kre,* and this radical part stands for the whole word, as we see by its appearing under this form in *kreourgos,* which is not written *kreas-ourgos.* If we now analyze *kre* we shall find it equal to *ar,* for its k being left out because it represents the aspirate, *re* alone remains, and when we remark that *re* is for *er* (the *e* returning to its first place) and that *er* is for *or,* and *or* for *oir* (*i* being understood with *o*) we obtain by the coalescing of *o* and *i*, *ar,* by which analysis we see that the *kre* of *kreourgos* and *ar* are precisely equal to each other, so that from the *tamos* of *artamos* being a substantive form of τέμνω, to *cut,* the entire word (*artamos*) may be said to have precisely the same meaning as *kreourgos,* that is, a *flesh-cutter.* That *ar* is equal to the *re* of kreas, is shown by its being the root of the Latin *caro, flesh.* Another form of this root is the *air* of the French *chair, flesh,* and which in the same language is written also *ar,* as we see by charnu, *fleshy.* Latin scholars do not therefore mistake when they suppose *caro* and *kreas* to be radically the same word.

APPENDIX B.

DISCOVERIES IN GRAMMAR.

LET me now endeavour to draw from oblivion a few philological discoveries which I made as far back as the year 1844. And though I admit that they are to be found in a work containing no small amount of error—for I was then like a man in the dark, only feeling my way—yet I cannot now—even after twenty-four years—help believing them to be well worth preserving.

The principle by which I was led to those discoveries—for so I must ever consider them—is simply this: that words do not represent ideas as they are made to do, even by persons who imagine that they at least never make so wrong a use of language; but this is a mistake as we shall see presently.

If words were the exact representatives of our ideas, a great many persons would not, as they do, name the same thing alike, but each would have a term expressive of his own peculiar notions of it. Thus a thousand persons may give to an animal the same name, but of the thousand there are not, in all probability, so many as two who have the same idea of it. Even every second time we think of any thing, our impressions of it are never *precisely* the same; at least it appears to be so with myself, and so, I conclude, it must be with others. And granting this, what follows? Why, that if words repre-

sented our ideas, we should never, perhaps, hear the same word twice in our lives.

My attention has been lately drawn to the subjoined from Pascal. I regret at not having met with it when I wrote the above, as it would have greatly tended to strengthen the opinion I then entertained—and which I do still entertain—respecting the wide difference existing between ideas and the names by which they are signified. But it will be seen that, in this respect, I go much farther than Pascal. According to him, though two men on seeing snow and agreeing with each other by saying it is *white*, this conformity in expressing its quality by the same term can be taken as no very certain proof that they agree equally in their idea of it, though there are, he thinks, many more chances that they do so agree than that they do not. But I cannot come to the same conclusion. The chances against any two men having *exactly* the same idea of the same thing, though naming it alike, must be infinite—not less, I should say, than a million to one. But why should this be, if we grant that it is so, asks the intelligent reader? Because language has been made by man, whilst his mind, which is the receptacle of his ideas, is the work of an all-powerful God, who has conferred such countless variety of form upon whatever He has created; whereas man, from his being so vastly inferior, is in his operations, when comparatively considered, confined to almost total sameness. In the whole world there are not, I am sure, two human faces, nor any two human voices exactly alike, any more than there are any two leaves of a tree, however close the resemblance between them may appear, precisely the same.

And even so must it be with our minds and their ideas.

And this infinite variety in all the works of our Creator, I take to be another overwhelming proof of His infinite power and wisdom. Thus if not more than a hundred men in every thousand were to be not only in look and voice, but in all other respects, precisely alike, what confusion would follow!

The following is the passage from Pascal to which my attention has been drawn:—

PENSÉES DE PASCAL. (ARTICLE VI. NO. XXI.)

"Nous supposons que tous les hommes conçoivent et sentent de la même sorte les objets qui se présentent à eux; mais nous le supposons bien gratuitemente, car nous n'en avons aucune preuve. Je vois bien qu'on applique les mêmes mots dans les mêmes occasions, et que toutes les fois que deux hommes voient, par exemple, de la neige, ils expriment tous deux la vue de ce même objet par les mêmes mots, en disant l'un et l'autre qu'elle est blanche; et de cette conformité d'applications on tire une puissante conjecture d'une conformité d'idée; mais cela n'est pas absolument convaincant, quoiqu'il y ait bien à parier pour l'affirmative."

In what way do words serve with respect to our ideas, if they do not represent them? Their office is to name them and nothing more. And as this must have been the first use ever made of language—that of naming things—it follows that in the beginning all words were names and nothing more. And so are they even still; the nine classes into which language has been since divided, having grown out of the several uses, forms, and positions that the name obtains on different occasions. Thus let us notice only two or three English words in proof of this assertion. The word *labour*, for instance, is both a name

and a verb; that is, two parts of speech, as we are taught to believe, but in reality only one—the name, noun, or substantive, as it is called. *Laborious* and *laboriously* are said to be two other parts of speech—the adjective and the adverb,—but they are radically the word *labour*, and they must in the beginning have been expressed by this word, a difference in pronunciation, or, as it is at present in China, a difference in the modulation of the voice being sufficient for indicating the different acceptations of this one word, *labour*.

Let us now take another word; and let it be *unit*, of which *unity*, *union*, *unison*, and to which we may add *joint*, *junction*, and *juncture*, the root of every such word having the meaning of *one*. But *unit*, though a name or noun, becomes, on varying its form, to *unite*, a verb, the radical sense being still *one*. In the adjective *only*, *one* is still the root, its *l* having once been the remains of an article, such as *le*, which, on having fallen behind *one* and coalesced with it, produced *one-le*, now written *only*. And this word *only* is not merely an adjective, like *lone*, but an adverb also, its double power being occasioned by the position it holds with respect to other words. Thus in "John is my *only* friend," it is before a name, and is for this reason said to be an adjective, whilst when attached to a verb, as in "I think *only* of John," it is said to be an adverb. In the *one* of *lone*, or, which is the same thing, of *only*, we have what is called a pronoun; that is, a word representing the name or noun. And as the elder form of *one* is *ane*, and as *ane* is reducible to *an*, and *an* to *a*, we thus obtain the part of speech called an article, and see that it has the same radical meaning we assign to the name *unity*, that of *one*. We have thus far shown how the six classes of

words, known as the article, noun, adjective, pronoun, verb and adverb, are radically the same, and that they must in the beginning have made one word, that is, the name, or, as it is also called, the noun or substantive.

And that the other three classes, the conjunction, preposition and interjection, are all and each of them a name, I am now going to show.

Unit, this word with which we began the latter inquiry, becomes, when its *i* is dropped, *unt*, which is equal to *und*, and this is the German form of the English conjunction *and*, and *and*, as I had occasion to show farther back, means to *unite* or *join*. But when we drop the nasal sound of *and*, and so obtain *ad*, that is, *add*, we get another word meaning to *unite*; from which it would appear that *ad* in Latin and *at* in English have each, as well as *and*, the primary sense of *joining* or *uniting*, although no longer the part of speech called a conjunction, but a preposition. Hence in the sentence "John is *at* home," the meaning is that John and home are *joined* or *united*.

It is no doubt remembered what we have shown by several extracts made from the old book entitled the "Voiage and Travaile of Sir John Maundevile, Kt.," namely, that the *O* anciently meant *one*. Yet this single sign or hieroglyph, as it should be called, is now an interjection, and is the most radical part, nay, the very root of the preceding words belonging to the eight parts of speech we have just passed over. Hence the *O* was in the beginning, like every other articulate sound, a name, and the only one by which the sun was known in very remote times. And when it was first used as an exclamation, man was then impressed with the erroneous belief that he was calling on his God.

Nor should we forget what we have also shown[1] to be admitted, by the learned, namely, that the *on* in the Bible is rendered into Greek by *Helios*, the *sun*; yet this *on* is only the *O* with its nasal sound, which sound may be dropped, and leave only the *O*, just as it happens with the *on* of *Plutōn* in Greek and French, which is reduced to *O* in Latin and English, thus giving *Pluto* for *Plutōn*.

What grammarians in general are likely to think of our thus reducing the nine parts of speech to one, we can easily conceive from the following observation, coming, as it does, from so high an authority: "Mr. Tooke, to be consistent, should not have said there are two sorts of words which are necessary for the communication of our thoughts, viz., nouns and verbs; but there is *one sort;* which would have been saying, in effect, *there is no such science as grammar in the world*[2]."

Nor is the following remark, which defends Horne Tooke's view of language, more favourable to our reduction of the nine parts of speech to one. "That nouns and verbs are the most essential and primitive words of language, and that all others have been formed from them, are universal facts, which after reading the 'Diversions of Purley' (by Horne Tooke), and tracing in other languages the application of the principles there maintained, *no enlightened philologist will now deny*[3]."

But Condillac, who is a higher authority than either Sir John Stoddart or Sharon Turner, favours the view I have taken of the science of grammar. According to him, the best system is that which has the fewest principles; he would, if possible, reduce them even to *one*. His words are: "Le système est d'autant plus parfait, que

[1] Encyclopædia Metropolitana, p. 6. [2] Sir John Stoddart.
[3] History of the Anglo-Saxons, by Charles Turner, vol. ii. p. 420.

les principes sont en plus petit nombre : il est même à souhaiter qu'on les reduise à *un seul*[4]."

We may now give some proof of the advantage to be obtained by considering all words as names. Every schoolboy imagines he can give a very correct definition of the two classes of words known as nouns and adjectives, and show exactly in what they differ from each other. Such a task has, however, proved too much, as we shall see presently, for some of the best philosophical grammarians that have ever entered seriously into this inquiry. But the force of their reasoning and arguments will, perhaps be best understood by our first showing in what, according to our views, these two classes of words differ from each other.

The adjective is by many grammarians called the noun adjective; and so should it be always called, for it is a name. But it differs, I shall be told, in both form and signification from the name, and so it does; but this is no proof that it belongs to a different class of words, since the same word may have several forms and meanings; witness *great, greater*, and *greatest*, which three words differ from one another in both form and meaning, and yet they are allowed by all grammarians to be the same part of speech. Bishop Louth, no mean authority, is, however, of a different opinion. "Adjectives," says he, "are very improperly called nouns, for they are not the names of things." But this is a mistake, for every epithet is a name, and hence to say that the sun is *hot* is to *name* it *hot*, though this adjective is somewhat different from the noun *heat* in both form and meaning.

Now, as we are obliged to admit that there is some difference between the words called adjectives and nouns,

[4] Traité des Systèmes, p. 1.

though this does not prove them to be different parts of speech, it is necessary to discover in what they do exactly differ from each other. An adjective is allowed to have several degrees of comparison, as *great, greater, greatest;* and if the noun *greatness* belongs to the same class, the question is, what place should it occupy with respect to these three degrees, from which it evidently differs in both form and meaning? If I say that A is great, that B is still greater, but that C is the greatest of the three, do I not give a still higher opinion of D if I say that the person so named is greatness itself! I certainly do. Hence the noun or name is an adjective, but in a degree even above the superlative itself. Then the degrees of comparison should run thus: great, greater, greatest, greatness.

Every noun substantive, or name, is therefore an epithet, but such an epithet as comprises in itself *all* the qualities signified by any form of the adjective; but which form—whether the positive, comparative, or superlative—cannever allow us to understand more than *some* of the qualities expressed by the noun, which takes in *all;* and as we cannot have more of any thing than *all* of it, this at once explains what has hitherto greatly puzzled grammarians to account for, namely, why the name or substantive cannot, like the adjective, be compared.

But if all nouns or substantives be, as I maintain that they are, only adjectives in a degree above the superlative, where are, I may be asked, the three other degrees of the English word *house?* I answer that this noun has none of those degrees. But why so? Because it was not needed. When men saw what they considered to be less than a house, that is, in the common acceptation of this word, they called it a *little* house, or a cottage, or a

cabin, and this was found sufficient. But as we now know that the noun or substantive takes in all the qualities of an idea, we have only to lessen it in order to bring it equal to what is called an adjective. Thus, if we saw four places, three of them resembling a house, and one that was a real house, we might compare them thus: A is *like* a house, B is *more like* a house, C is *the most like* a house, but D *is* a house. As the particle *of* has the power of lessening, when it is placed before a noun, it brings it equal to an adjective in the positive degree. Thus there is no difference between *of honour* and *honourable*, as we must perceive on comparing such phrases as "a man *of honour*" and "an *honourable* man"; or, "a woman *of virtue*" and "a *virtuous* woman." It is consequently self-evident that if the nouns *honour* and *virtue* had not such adjectives as *honourable* and *virtuous*, we could obtain words of equal import by putting *of* before *honour* and *virtue*. Thus the French word *eau* has no adjective formed from it, for *aqueux* is the Latin *aquosus*, whilst its English representative, *water*, has two adjectives, *watery* and *waterish*. Then how is *watery* expressed in French? By simply putting the French word meaning *of* before *eau*, thus, *d'eau*. And as this particle *of* before a noun puts the latter in the genitive case, it follows that every such case is equal to an adjective. Hence the crown *of the king* and *the king's crown* have the same meaning.

But it may be said that if every noun can be brought equal to an adjective by putting before it the particle *of*, or any other word capable of lessening its meaning, a language might very well do without those words which are *commonly* called adjectives. And this is very true; so true that there is such a language still in existence,

that of the Mohicans, as I shall have occasion to show presently, though the fact has been denied by learned men, as wholly impossible, simply because they could not point out the exact difference between what they called a noun and an adjective.

That every intelligent reader may the more easily appreciate the discovery we have just submitted to his notice, it will be only necessary for him to read the following confused and contradictory accounts and definitions of the adjective, which are taken from the best philosophical grammarians that ever wrote on language.

"It is necessary," says Sir John Stoddart, "to come to some settled opinion on a question so essential to the science of grammar, as whether there is any, and what distinction between substantives and adjectives; and on this point we trust we have satisfactorily vindicated the principle laid down by Aristotle, and adopted by all grammarians from his time to that of Mr. Tooke. The noun substantive, then, is the name of a conception or thought considered as possessing a substantial, that is, independent existence; the noun adjective is the name of a conception or thought considered as a quality or attribute of the former[a]."

We see that this writer, who was an English judge, and a very learned and enlightened man, had no suspicion that the words he calls substantives and adjectives make only one part of speech, and that they do not differ from each other but in degree, as we have shown. But he appears to have begun his great work on grammar with the firm belief that no important discovery in this science could in our times be possibly made. Thus

[a] Encyclopædia Metropolitana, p. i, which contains his excellent work on universal grammar.

referring to Horne Tooke, he says, "In grammar we have been told that a certain writer of recent date dispelled 'by a single electric flash of genius,' the obscurity which hung over the whole science. It is the duty of the encyclopædist to correct such errors in point of fact, and to expose such absurdity in point of opinion. In physical sciences there may be discoveries which go to alter much of our general reasoning on all subjects connected with those discoveries. Substances altogether unknown, organizations never before suspected to exist, may be rendered obvious by experiment. But in the sciences which depend on a knowledge of the human mind, it is altogether weak and absurd to suppose that any such improvement can exist. By industry and attention we may perhaps be enabled to methodize some portions of every such science better, or even to correct, in some degree, their general arrangement; but we cannot possibly find in them any one topic which has not been admirably handled by some philosopher, ancient or modern; and as to the great leading systematic principles on which they respectively depend, those will generally be found to have been established from the highest antiquity[6]."

The man who is firmly convinced that no new discovery of any importance in the science of grammar can now be made, must find it very difficult to make one. We need not therefore wonder that Sir John Stoddart could not, with all his great knowledge, find out that the substantive and the adjective differ from each other only in degree, the former being in this respect more than the latter.

Let us now hear what Harris, author of the well-known

[6] Encyclopædia Metropolitana, p. 60.

philosophical grammar, entitled "Hermes," has to say of the adjective: "Grammarians have been led into the strange absurdity of ranging adjectives with nouns and separating them from verbs; though they are homogeneous with respect to verbs, as both sorts denote attributes, they are heterogeneous with respect to nouns, as never properly denoting substances[7]."

Though Horne Tooke did not, any more than Sir John Stoddart or any other grammarian, know that the adjective differs only in degree from the substantive, yet his knowledge of it was greatly superior to that of the author of Hermes. His only fault (and it is a serious one) in his account of this word, is that he believes it to be *precisely equal* in signification to the substantive. Yet if he were asked if there be any difference in this respect between the positive *great* and its superlative *the greatest*, he would certainly admit that there is a very wide difference in meaning between two such degrees; yet the difference between *great* and *greatness* is far wider, since *greatness* is a degree above *the greatest*. The following is Horne Tooke's victorious reply to the author of "Hermes" respecting the nature of the adjective: "I maintain that the adjective is *equally and altogether as much* the name of a thing as the noun substantive, and so say I of all words whatever; for that is not a word which is not the name of a thing. Every word, being a sound significant must be a sign; and if a sign, the name of a thing. But a noun substantive is the name of a thing, and nothing more. And, indeed, so says Vossius: 'Nec rectius substantivum definitur—quod aliquid per se significat. Nam omnis vox ex instituto significans, aliquid significat[8].'" And again, he observes as follows: "But if, indeed, ad-

[7] Hermes.

[8] De Analog. lib. i. c. 6.

jectives were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by adjectives; for you cannot attribute nothing. How much more comprehensive would any term be by the attribution to it of nothing? Adjectives, therefore, as well as substantives, must *equally* denote substances; and substance is attributed to substance by the adjective contrivance of language[9]."

Scaliger and Dr. Wallis, two very high authorities, do not seem to differ from Horne Tooke's definition of the adjective. The former contends that adjectives "differ in form, and *not in meaning*, from substantives[1]." And the latter is of opinion that "the adjective is nothing more than the substantive used adjectively[2]."

But both these learned men must have known that there is some difference, nay a very great one, in meaning between *magnus* and *maximus;* and that there is a still far greater difference between *magnus* and *magnitudo.* They never suspected that these four forms of the same word should be thus compared: *magnus, major, maximus, magnitudo.* Yet so it is.

Let us now hear what a whole body of very learned men (Messieurs de Port Royal) say of the adjective, both as grammarians and logicians. The following is from their grammar:—

"Les adjectifs ont deux significations; l'une distincte, qui est celle de la forme; et l'autre confuse, qui est celle du sujet: mais il ne faut pas conclure delà qu'ils signifient plus directement la forme que le sujet, comme si la signification plus distincte était aussi la plus directe. Car au contraire il est certain qu'ils signifient le sujet directement, et comme parlent les grammairiens, *in recto,*

[9] Taylor's Horne Tooke, p. 634, ed. 1840.

[1] Lib. iv. c. 91.

[2] See his Latin-English Grammar.

quoique plus confusement; et qu'ils ne signifient la forme qu'indirectement, et, comme ils parlent encore, *in obliquo,* quoique plus distinctement. Ainsi *blanc, candidus,* signifie directement ce qui a de la blancheur, *habens candorem,* mais d'une manière fort confuse, ne marquant en particulier aucune des choses qui peuvent avoir de la blancheur; et il ne signifie qu'indirectement la blancheur, mais d'une manière aussi distincte que le mot même, de blancheur, *candor*[3]."

And they speak of it thus as logicians: "Les adjectives ont essentiellement deux significations; l'une *distincte,* qui est celle du mode ou manière; l'autre *confuse,* qui est celle du sujet; mais quoique la signification du mode soit plus *distincte,* elle est pourtant *indirecte;* et au contraire celle du sujet, quoique *confuse,* est *directe.* Le mot *blanc, candidus,* signifie *directement,* mais *confusement,* le sujet, et *indirectement,* quoique *distinctement* la blancheur[4]."

This is rather obscure, nor is the following less so: "*candidus,* blanc, signifie le substantif, tiré de l'adjectif, savoir, *candor,* la blancheur, et de plus, la connotation d'un sujet dans lequel est cet abstrait[5]."

But substantives are, on certain occasions, considered by this learned body as adjectives: "Il y a des noms qui passent pour substantifs en grammaire, qui sont des veritables adjectifs, comme roi, philosophe, médecin, puisque ils marquent une manière d'être ou mode dans un sujet: mais la raison pourquoi ils passent pour substantifs c'est, comme ils ne conviennent qu'à un seul sujet, on sous-entend toujours cet unique sujet sans qu'il soit besoin de l'exprimer[6]."

The substantives which this learned body regard as

[3] Page 276.
[4] Logique de Port Royal, p. 131.
[5] Gram. de Port Royal, p. 358.
[6] Logique de Port Royal, p. 131.

adjectives are such as stand in apposition to other substantives, and alluding to which Du Marsais says: "Qualifient-ils? ils sont adjectifs. Louis XV. est roi: donc roi est là adjectif."

But this is a serious mistake, and it arises from its not having been known that all those words called substantives are only adjectives in the highest degree of comparison. Hence Horne Tooke, though not aware of this important truth, is very correct when he says: "The same word is not sometimes an adjective and sometimes a substantive." Condillac also is of Horne Tooke's opinion, as is shown by the following: "Parcequ'on peut regarder ces noms (roi, philosophe, poëte) comme modifiant des substantifs sous-entendus, il y a des grammairiens qui les mettent parmi les adjectifs; cela est libre: je remarquerai seulement que, si tout nom qui modifie est un adjectif, on ne trouvera plus de substantifs que parmi les noms propres[7]."

And if proper names do not now modify, it is because they are no longer used as they were in ancient times. When a man was then called Mr. Smith or Mr. Carpenter, he was by trade a smith or a carpenter, and then every such name modified as plainly as that of poet or philosopher does at present; or even as *smith* or *carpenter* does still when used as a common name.

Though Horne Tooke knew nothing of the real difference between the words called substantives and adjectives, yet it must be admitted that in his account of them he is greatly to be preferred to Messieurs de Port Royal. But the generality of grammarians will, probably, be of a very different opinion. Thus Sir John Stoddart says, "Mr. Tooke says he has confuted the account given of the adjective by Messieurs de Port Royal, who

[7] Gram. de Condillac, chap. 12, 1re partie.

"make substance and accident the foundation of the difference between the substantive and the adjective; but if so, he has confuted an account given not only by Messieurs de Port Royal, but by every grammarian who preceded them, from the time of Aristotle; and whatever respect we may entertain for the abilities of Mr. Tooke (which in etymology were doubtless great), we must a little hesitate to think that he alone was right, and so many men of extensive reading, deep reflection, and sound judgment, were all wrong.[8]"

Nor does Du Marsais, though allowed by D'Alembert to have won as a grammarian immortal fame, show us more clearly the nature of the adjective than Messieurs de Port Royal or Horne Tooke. "L'adjectif," he says, "ne fait qu'énoncer ou declarer ce que l'on dit qu'est le substantif; en sorte que l'adjectif c'est le substantif analysé, c'est à dire, considéré comme de telle ou telle façon, comme ayant telle ou telle qualité. Ainsi l'adjectif ne doit pas marquer, par rapport au genre, au nombre et au cas, des vues qui soient différentes de celles sous lesquelles l'esprit considère le substantif[9]."

Let us now notice Condillac's account of the adjective, which, though very clear, is far from being correct: "Homme, vertu, sont deux substantifs dont les idées existent dans notre esprit, chacune séparément. Celui-là est le soutien d'un certain nombre de qualités, celui-ci est le soutient d'un autre nombre, et ils ne se modifient point. Mais si je dis *homme vertueux*, cette forme du discours fait aussitot évanouir l'un des deux soutiens, et elle réunit dans le substantif *homme* toutes les qualités comprises dans le substantif *vertu*.

[8] Encyclopædia, Met., p. 23.

[9] Du Discours et ses Parties, p. 127. Œuvres de Du Marrais, t. 1re.

"En comparant ces mots, *vertueux* et *vertu*, vous concevez donc en quoi ces adjectifs diffèrent des substantifs. C'est que les substantifs expriment tout à-la-fois certaines qualités et le soutien sur lequel nous les réunissons: les adjectifs, au contraire, n'expriment que certaines qualités, et nous avons besoin de les joindre à des substantifs, pour trouver le soutien que ces qualités doivent modifier[1]."

This account of the adjective comes nearer to that of Horne Tooke's than at first sight appears. But I have an objection to make to both definitions. If the adjective be as Horne Tooke contends as much as the substantive, and if it transmits, as Condillac asserts, *all* the qualities inherent in the substantive, how does it happen that we can say *more virtuous* and *most virtuous?* Thus, in A is virtuous, B is *more virtuous*, C is the *most virtuous;* how does it happen if A takes *all* the qualities belonging to the substantive *virtue*, that B and C have still more than A? This is about as easy to conceive as that A should have to himself the whole of a house, and that B and C should have still more of the said house than A.

Another rather strong objection to every definition tending to bring the adjective equal to the substantive is this, that if it were correct, substance might, in point of degree, be thought susceptible of comparison. But this, it would seem, cannot be allowed either by Aristotle, Scantius, Harris, or Sir John Stoddart, as is shown by the following: "Substantives cannot be compared, as such, in point of degree; for that would be to suppose that the nature of substantial existence was variable, and that one existing thing was more truly existing than another, which is absurd. 'A mountain,' says Harris, 'cannot be said more to be or to exist than a mole-hill;

[1] Gram., 2nde partie.

but the more and less must be sought for in their quantities.' In like manner when we refer many individuals to one species, the lion A cannot be more called a lion than the lion B. But if more any thing, he is more fierce, more speedy, or exceeding in some such attribute. So again, in referring many species to one genus, a crocodile is not more an animal than a lizard is, nor a tiger more than a cat; but, if any thing, he is more bulky, more strong, &c.; the excess, as before, being derived from their attributes. So true is that saying of the acute Stagirite, 'Substance is not susceptible of more or less.' Scantius, referring to this passage of Aristotle, observes that we may hence infer that comparatives cannot be drawn from nouns substantive. Hence," adds he, "they are deceived who reckon the words senex, juvenis, adolescens, infans, &c., substantives: for they are altogether adjectives. Nor is it to be objected that Plautus has made from Pœnus Pœnior, for he does not there mean to express the substantial existence of the Carthaginian, but his cunning, as if he had said *Callidior;* for the Carthaginians were reputed to be a cunning people. So the writer who used the word Neronior, from Nero, meant only to signify an excess of cruelty[2]."

Here are several other very different and contradictory accounts of the adjective:—

"Le nom adjectif est celui qui ne signifie pas une chose, mais qui marque seulement qu'elle est."—*L'Abbé Regnier.*

"Les adjectifs sont des mots qui présentent à l'esprit des êtres indéterminés, designés seulement par une *idée précise* que peut s'adapter à plusieurs."—*Beauzée.*

"C'est un nom qui exprime un *objet vague,* considéré comme revêtu de quelque qualité."—*Restaut.*

[2] Encyclopædia, Met., p. 36.

According to the first of these three respectable authorities, the adjective does not signify a thing, but only indicates that it is. According to the second, it presents to the mind objects *undetermined* but attended by a *precise* idea; and according to the third, it expresses a *vague* object invested with a quality.

Does the intelligent reader understand these definitions? As for myself, I must confess that I do not; and I doubt very much if the authors of them ever did. But according to Buonmattei, the adjective does not mean all that the substantive does mean, nor has it a confused meaning, nor a vague meaning, nor a precise meaning, but it means *nothing at all.* This definition, if not very satisfactory, has, at least, the rare merit of being pretty clear. The following are the words of Buonmattei:—"Nel modo che l'accidente s'appoggia alla sustanza, l'aggiuntivo s'appoggia al sustantivo—E come l'accidente non può star nel orazione senza un sustantivo: e standovi, non vi starebbon a proposito; *perchè non significherebbon niente*[3]."

The author of the valuable article on grammar in the *Edinburgh Encyclopædia*[4], opposes thus such an account of the adjective as the one given by the last-mentioned authority: "Some have asserted that the adjective by itself expresses no idea. This opinion has arisen from the circumstance that it supposes some other idea expressed by a different word. But this is in reality an addition to its meaning." If this be true, the adjective must mean all that the substantive does mean, and something more besides, which coincides with Condillac's opinion. But from what the same writer continues to observe, it would appear that the adjective and substan-

[3] Quoted by Horne Tooke.

[4] Henry Dewar, M.D., F.B.S.E.

tive express exactly the same idea. "Every idea," he says, "expressed by a substantive may be also expressed by an adjective, and *vice versâ*. The idea expressed by '*man*' is also expressed by '*manly*;' and the idea expressed by the adjective '*good*' is also expressed by the substantive '*goodness*.'" And a little farther on he still says, "A *Roman senator* and a *senator of Rome* mean exactly the same thing; therefore the ideas contained in the one word *Rome* are also contained in the word *Roman*[5]."

This account of the adjective cannot, any more than all the others we have already seen, bear investigation. If, as the writer contends, every idea expressed by a substantive may be also expressed by an adjective, and *vice versâ*, it must follow that the adjective and substantive may be used indifferently; yet we cannot say "*manly is mortal*," instead of "*man is mortal*;" nor can we say "*a man action*" instead of "*a manly action*." Hence between *man* and *manly* there is a wide difference; nor is there less between *goodness* and *good*, since we may not say "*John is a goodness boy*," instead of "*John is a good boy*." But when this writer says that "a *Roman* senator and a senator *of Rome* mean exactly the same thing," he is very correct. And he is so, for the reason I have already given, namely, that the particle *of* when put before a substantive lessens its power so far as to bring it equal to an adjective in the positive degree, *of honour* and *of virtue* being precisely equal to the adjectives *honourable* and *virtuous*. Indeed this mode of making adjectives by placing before substantives some word or other capable of diminishing their power, appears so very simple and so very natural, that it is really

[5] Edinburgh Enc., p. 415.

astonishing that all the languages in the world have not formed their adjectives in this way. But that there must be many of those which are still in a primitive state, that have such adjectives and no others, there cannot be the least doubt. Hence the writer just quoted should not allow us to understand that *Rome* and *Roman* have the same meaning, but that the *two* words *of Rome* are in this respect precisely equal to the *single* word *Roman;* and this he would himself admit on perceiving that *Rome* and *Roman* cannot replace each other, as no one can say a *Rome senator* for a *Roman senator.*

No intelligent reader will now say, on having read those numerous contradictory and faulty accounts of the adjective, that the inquiry we have made on this subject is not one of great necessity and importance. Indeed it was, as Sir John Stoddart expresses it, "necessary to come to some settled opinion on a question so essential to the science of grammar, as whether there is any, and what distinction between substantives and adjectives." And this we have done so fully and so clearly as not to admit of a doubt. Indeed, if any one were, on seeing all we have just shown respecting the adjective, to declare to us, even on oath, that he still entertained some doubts as to the reality of our discovery, it would not be in our power to think he spoke sincerely; unless, however, we knew him to be, in literary pursuits, some very narrow-minded sceptic, in which case we should not find the least difficulty in accepting as sincere every word he said to our prejudice. No one of this ill-favoured class can, without taxing his powers of mind to the utmost—even to an extent more than his nature allows—conceive the possibility of any discovery that may happen to lie too far beyond the reach

of his own limited views; except, however, all such discoveries as every one else admits, when he ever joins his voice to that of the crowd, affecting, in order to be thought more intelligent than he really is, his firm belief in what he neither does nor can believe.

Farther back I had occasion to observe, that in the language of the Mohicans there are none of those words called adjectives; and though the intelligent reader can now, from all he has just seen, very easily account for what the grammarian less informed may consider as utterly impossible, yet he will probably have no objection to read the declaration made on this subject by a learned doctor of divinity, a man who was brought up from his childhood among the Mohicans, and who seems to have been as well acquainted with their language and its dialects as one of themselves. I abridge his statement from the "Diversions of Purley," in which the reader will find it set down more fully. Horne Tooke thus introduces it to his readers: "Doctor Jonathan Edwards, D.D., pastor of a church in New Haven in 'Observations on the Language of the Muhhekancew Indians, communicated to the Connecticut Society of Arts and Sciences, published at the request of the Society, and printed by Josiah Meigs, 1788,' gives us the following account:—'When I was but six years of age, my father removed with his family to Stockbridge, which at that time was inhabited by Indians almost solely. The Indians being the nearest neighbours, I constantly associated with them; their boys were my daily schoolmates and playfellows. Out of my father's house I seldom heard any language spoken beside the Indian. By these means I acquired the knowledge of that language, and a great facility in speaking it; it became

more familiar to me than my mother tongue. I knew the names of some things in Indian which I did not know in English: even all my thoughts ran in Indian; and though the true pronunciation of that language is extremely difficult to all but themselves, they acknowledged that I had acquired it perfectly, which, as they said, had never been acquired by any Anglo-American.'" Here follows a long list of the dialects of this language, which though given by Horne Tooke, it is not necessary to transcribe; after which the latter continues thus: "Having thus given an account of himself, and of his knowledge of the language, he proceeds (in page 10) to inform us that 'The Mohicans have no adjectives in all their language. Although it may at first seem not only singular and curious but *impossible* that a language should exist without adjectives, yet it is an indubitable fact.'"

Even this doctor of divinity appears greatly astonished that this language with which he was so well acquainted has none of the words called adjectives; but how much more astonished he might be if assured that this language has, as well as all the languages ever yet spoken, this single part of speech *and no other!* Hence, when the Mohicans had occasion to say that their pastor was a *good* and an *honest* man, they must have expressed themselves by saying he was a man *of goodness* and *of honesty*, in which they would seem not to use adjectives but substantives only; whereas, from the particle *of* lessening the power of the substantive, *of goodness* and *of honesty* are equal to adjectives in the positive degree; that is, to *good* and *honest*, just as *of honour* and *of virtue* are equal to *honourable* and to *virtuous*. By this it is clearly shown that substantives express the qualities of

ideas as well as those words we call adjectives; and the following, from Sir Charles Stoddart, will serve to prove how much even very learned grammarians have hitherto stood in need of this knowledge:—"From what has been already said, we may perceive the absurdity of asserting that adjectives, 'though convenient abbreviations, are not necessary to language;' and still more, 'that the Mohicans have no adjectives in their language;' for though this latter fact is vouched by Dr. Jonathan Edwards, D.D., pastor of a church in New Haven, and communicated (by their request) to the Connecticut Society of Arts and Sciences, and published by Josiah Meigs, yet it amounts to nothing else but that the Mohicans cannot distinguish subject from predicate, or substance from quality; and if so, they must be utterly destitute of the faculty of reason, which we suppose neither Dr. Edwards, nor Mr. Meigs, nor Mr. Took intends to assert[6]."

According to this statement, it is evident that Sir John Stoddart has come to one of two conclusions; namely, either that the Rev. Dr. Edwards must have told a wilful falsehood in declaring that the Mohicans, who were according to report, a very shrewd people, had no adjectives in their language, or that they were, as to intelligence, no better than downright idiots. But there was still a third conclusion to which Sir John might have come, if he could conceive any thing apparently so inconceivable; namely, that he himself, though allowed to be a learned judge and an elegant writer on universal grammar, did not happen to know the real difference between the two well-known classes of words called substantives and adjectives, or rather the difference between

[6] Encyclopædia Met., p. 36.

the degrees of this single class. But if any one had dared to throw out such a hint to the eminent grammarian, or to any of his many admirers, he would most assuredly have either been laughed out of it, or have been told that his insinuation was not only preposterous, but grossly impertinent. Yet this were not only a true but a just solution of the problem in question, as it would acquit the Rev. Dr. Edwards of having published a falsehood prejudicial to the interests of science, and clear also the poor Mohicans of being thought so very stupid as to be "utterly destitute of the faculty of reason."

THE PLURAL NUMBER.

How the idea of plurality was first expressed is another of my old discoveries which I consider worth preserving. In the beginning this must have been by a repetition of the object named at the time, as, for instance, *ox, ox;* and then in order to prevent the repetition of the same name, such a word was chosen as could serve as a substitute for the name of any thing whatever, and this could be no other than the pronoun *one*. Hence instead of the plural *ox, ox,* man must, after a time, have said *oxone;* that is, *oxen,* the *en* of the latter being but a different form of the Saxon *æn,* and which in the Swedish tongue is written *en*. When the pronoun that should be used for thus serving to form a plural, happened, like *eis* in Greek, to end with an *s,* then such a word as *oxen* would become *oxes;* so that if this form of the plural was not used for *ox,* it arose from such a form as the Saxon *æn* or the Swedish *en* having prevailed at the time more than such a word as *es, eis,* or *as*. Such forms as the latter may be therefore considered as the originals of the present plurals in *s,* to whatever languages they belong.

But probably in all languages some nouns cannot be said to be plurals except conventionally: that is to say, they have nothing more significant of plurality in them than their singulars. Thus the *i* in *domini* has no more right to signify plurality than the *us* of its singular *dominus;* so that it is only conventionally that it serves for a plural number. This observation will apply to many nouns in Greek and Latin. It will apply also to the plurals of *foot* and *tooth* in English, of which the plurals *feet* and *teeth* are not plurals except conventionally, double *e* (*ee*) not being more significant of the idea of plurality than double *o* (*oo*).

There are also many nouns of which the plurals do not differ in form from their singulars: witness only the nominatives plural of the fourth and fifth declensions in Latin; which do not differ any more from each other than in English the words *deer* and *sheep* in the singular differ from *deer* and *sheep* in the plural.

I learn from M. Max Müller that in Chinese the plural is signified by adding to the singular a word of quantity. But this cannot have been man's first manner of signifying a plural number. But it must, as I have shown, have been done by the repetition of the object named, and then in order to prevent this repetition, a word meaning *one* must have replaced the second name. Now as to this discovery, which was published in 1844, I find it confirmed in a work of very great learning and merit, which appeared in the year 1868. I have every reason to suppose that the writer never met with my book, and this confirms still more the reality of my discovery. As what he says of the singular number is well worth notice, it were best to begin with it before quoting what he says of the plural,

"Singulier.—Le langage n'a pas de signe particulier pour rendre le singulier. En effet, le nombre singulier,

—si toutefois c'est un nombre, ce qui pourrait être révoqué en doute, puisque l'idée de nombre semble indiquer l'idée de pluralité, qu'exclut le singulier,—ce nombre singulier représente seulement une unité, et cette unité se retrouve toujours dans le pronom qui forme comme nous le verrons tout à l'heure la désinence nominal.

"PLURIEL.—Il n'en est pas de même pour le *pluriel.* C'est bien là un nombre, aussi est-il rendu par une unité ajoutée à l'unité du singulier. Le signe commun du pluriel indo-européen est un S, reste du pronom SA, que l'on ajoute au thême singulier. SA exprimant un objet, une individualité, une personalité, une unité; en un mot, on l'ajoute au thème singulier qui contient une personne, une unité, et l'on a ainsi: SA + SA = un + un = *deux*, c'est à dire, le pluriel. En effet, il n'est evidemment pas nécessaire pour former un pluriel qu'il y ait plus de deux unités, puisque le duel n'est qu'un pluriel imparfait; et c'est ce qui nous reste maintenant à demontrer[7]."

THE VERBAL ENDING "ED."

There is another of what I cannot help considering one of my old discoveries in etymology, which I now beg to notice. I allude to the ending *ed* of English preterits and past participles. M. Max Müller's explanation of the origin of this *ed* is—though I believe it to be a mistake—very good, and I am sure, from the many times he alludes to it, that he himself thinks so too. Indeed, it seems to be his pet etymology, and not without reason, for it is, I say, very, very good, although what I must after all regard as a mistake. But there are different

[7] "La Langue Latine etudiée dans l'unité Indo-Européenne, page 152. Par Amédée de Cain de Saint-Aymour." Librairie de L. Hachette et Cie.

kinds of mistakes; there are stupid mistakes, absurd mistakes—I have made a good many of both in my time —and very reasonable ones, that is, mistakes that indicate great ingenuity and acuteness on the part of him who makes them; and it is to this class of mistakes I assign M. Max Müller's etymology of *ed.* He alludes to this ending of the preterit and past participle of every regular English verb in five different places of his first volume, namely, pages 124, 195, 241, 260, and 281; and he traces it, I am sure, very correctly from the Gothic to the Saxon. "In the former tongue the preterit of *nasjan*, to *nourish*, is," we are told, "in the first person singular, *nas-i-da*; in the dual number, *nas-i-dedu*; in the plural, *nas-i-dédum*. The subjunctive of the preterit, *nas-i-dedjau*; dual number, *nas-i-dedeïva*; plural, *nas-i-dédeima*; reduced in Anglo-Saxon in the singular, *ner-ë-de*; plural, *ner-ë-don*. Subjunctive: *ner-ë-de*; plural, *ner-ë-don*."

I have here given but the first person of the preterit; M. Max Müller gives also the second and third; but for which there was no necessity. After this he says, "Let us now look to the auxiliary verb to *do* in Anglo-Saxon. Singular, *dide, didest, dide*; plural, *didon, didon, didon*."

M. Max Müller continues thus: "If we had only the Anglo-Saxon preterit *nerëde* and the Anglo-Saxon *dide*, the identity of the *de* in *nerëde* with *dide* would not be very apparent. But here you will perceive the advantage which Gothic has over all other Teutonic dialects for the purposes of grammatical comparison and analysis. It is in Gothic, and in Gothic in the plural only, that the full auxiliary, *dédum, dédu, dédun*, has been preserved. In the Gothic singular *nasida, nasidés, nasida*, stand for *nasideda, nasidedés, nasideda*. The same contraction has taken

place in Anglo-Saxon, not only in the singular, but in the plural also. Yet such is the similarity between Gothic and Anglo-Saxon, that we cannot doubt their preterits having been formed on the same last. If there be any truth in inductive reasoning, there must have been an original Anglo-Saxon preterit[8].

SINGULAR.	PLURAL.
ner-ë-dide	ner-ë-didon
ner-ë-didest	ner-ë-didon
ner-ë-dide	ner-ë-didon.

"And as *ner-ë-dide* dwindled down to *nerëde*, so *nerëde* would, in modern English, become *nered*. The *d* of the preterit, therefore, which changes *I love* into *I loved*, is originally the auxiliary verb to *do*, and *I loved* is the same as *I love did*, or *I did love*. In English dialects, as, for instance, in the Dorset dialect, every preterite, if it expresses a lasting or repeated action, is formed by *I did*, and a distinction is thus established between 'e died eesterdae,' and 'the vo'ke did die by scores;' though originally *died* is the same as *die did*[9].

"It might be asked, however, very properly, how *did* itself, or the Anglo-Saxon *dide*, was formed, and how it received the meaning of a preterit. In *dide* the final *de* is not a termination, but it is the root, and the first syllable *di* is a reduplication of the root. The fact being that all preterits of old, or as they are called, strong verbs, were formed, as in Greek and Sanskrit, by means of reduplication, reduplication being one of the principal means by which roots were invested with a verbal character[1]. The root *do* in Anglo-Saxon is the same as the

[8] Bopp, Comparative, § 620. Grimm, German Grammar, ii. 845.

[9] Barnes' "Dorsetshire Dialect," page 39.

[1] See M. M.'s "Letter on the Turanian languages," pp. 44—46.

root *thē* in *tithēmi* in Greek, and the Sanskrit root *dha* in *dadhami*. Anglo-Saxon *dide* would therefore correspond to Sanskrit *dadhau, I placed.*

"Now, in this manner, the whole, or nearly the whole, grammatical framework of the Aryan or Indo-European languages has been traced back to original, independent words, and even the slightest changes which at first sight seem so mysterious, such as *foot* into *feet*, or *I find* into *I found*, have been fully accounted for. This is what is called comparative grammar, or a scientific analysis of all the formal elements of a language preceded by a comparison of all the varieties which one and the same form has assumed in the numerous dialects of the Aryan family. The most important dialects for this purpose are Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and Gothic; but in many cases Zend, or Celtic, or Slavonic dialects come in to throw an unexpected light on forms unintelligible in any of the four principal dialects[2]."

All this is very fine; but previous to my own humble explanation of the verbal termination *ed*, I must observe that my faith is not without some slight share of misgiving with respect to what M. Max Müller here states so positively; namely, that in the manner he has traced *ed* to its source, "even the slightest changes which at first sight seem so mysterious, such as *foot* into *feet*, or *I find* into *I found*, have been fully accounted for[3]."

I regret that M. Max Müller has not told us the wonderful process by which *foot* was changed into *feet*. I have ever thought, and until further informed, I must think so still, that this change was effected solely for the purpose of giving to *foot* a form that might serve as its plural, and that for the same reason the singulars *goose*

[2] Vol. i. pp. 261, 262, 263.

[3] Page 263.

and *tooth* became *geese* and *teeth*. But it is only conventionally that such words as *feet*, *geese*, and *teeth* are plurals. They differ greatly from such plurals as ox*en*, ass*es*, to the singulars of which *en* and *es* (each meaning *one*) have been added, by which addition they have been made what may be justly called genuine plurals, since by this wise contrivance *oxen* and *asses* are made equal to *ox*, *ox*, and *ass*, *ass*, as I have already shown in my account of the origin of the plural number. But this double *ee* for double *oo*, used for the purpose of making conventionally a plural for a singular, might just as well have served to distinguish a noun from a verb. Thus when it was found necessary to make such words as, *blood*, *brood*, and *food* serve as verbs, they were written *bleed*, *breed*, and *feed*. Yet as *breed* and *feed* are also used as nouns, we see that it is only conventionally that they are verbs, just as feet, geese, and teeth are not plurals except conventionally.

Now what leads me to suspect that the very learned authors of comparative philology—I mean the Germans, with whom no Englishman, and much less any poor devil of an Irishman, can, in so abstruse a science, think of competing—may have shot somewhat wide of the mark in their accounting for the change of *foot* into *feet*; for if they have in this instance made no mistake, how does it happen that they have not known that their own word *seele* is precisely equal to *soole*, just as *feet* is to *foot*; for the principle by which this simple change is accounted for shows also that the *sool* of *soole* cannot differ from *soul*, nor *soul* from *souffl*, as we have shown, and of which etymology the German authors of comparative philology knew no more than the new-born infant, for if they had this knowledge, M. Max Müller, who stands at the head of the

whole tribe, and is as well acquainted with every one of their etymologies as they are themselves, would have it also.

The other change of *find* into *found*, alluded to above by M. Max Müller, may have, for aught I know, been accounted for very learnedly, but my method for so mysterious a change is very simple. If we listen to the language of very young children, we shall hear them say *finded* (just as we say *blinded* and not *blound*) nine times out of ten for the once they make use of *found;* and as very young children express themselves—which is in general very logically—so must men also have done while language was yet, as it were, in its infancy. But as *finded* may have been by many persons shortened to *find*, this, from its being a present time, must, for the sake of distinction, have been changed into *found*, and have been under this form conventionally made to represent a past time. Hence there is no difference in meaning, except conventionally, between *find* and *found*, any more than there is between *bind* and *bound*, or *grind* and *ground*.

Now for my own etymology of the verbal termination *ed*.

It is shown by every regular verb in English that there is no difference whatever between the termination (*ed*) of an imperfect tense and a past participle. Hence when we do not in an irregular verb find the endings of the imperfect tense and the past participle alike, this is no proof that they are not in meaning precisely the same. Hence when an author writes, as many have done, I have *wrote* or I have *spoke*, instead of I have *written* and I have *spoken*, there is not the least difference in meaning between *wrote* and *written*, and *spoke* and *spoken;* and which is confirmed by the fact that there is none what-

ever in English between the *loved* of *I loved* and the *loved* of *I have loved.*

Now the question is this: what is the literal meaning of the *loved* in *I loved,* and the *loved* in *I have loved?* The answer must be that in each case the literal meaning is *loved* in the *past* time; in other words love *gone.* The next question is this: does the *ed* of *loved,* or another acknowledged form of this *ed,* ever mean *gone?* Before answering this question I beg to show from a learned authority, some of the many forms to which this *ed* is equal. Martin, in his philological grammar, says: "*Ed,* as was shown before, is purely Hebrew, and signifies *witness,* or *testimony;* and in this sense it is used when added to a verb, to imply something already done, and of which it still bears witness. The Saxons variably wrote, *ed, ede, od, ode, ad, id, ud, yd,* and *de,* which are immaterial with regard to variation, and tend to confirm the idea that the sense of a word exists in its consonants[4]."

Here we find it admitted that the Saxons used all these several verbal endings indifferently, so that what any one of them can be shown to mean, such must be the meaning of all the others. Now this being undeniable, it follows that each of them taken separately must mean *gone,* for that is the meaning of ODE in Saxon, which, according to Bosworth, is the perfect tense of *gan* ("to *go,* to *walk,* to *happen*"), *Ic eode,* which cannot differ from *Ic ode,* signifying *I have gone.* Hence *loved* is literally *love gone,* and consequently *love past.* I find, however, in Parkhurst (edition 1823, p. 490) that עדה *ode* means "*to pass to pass, pass away,*" and this confirms all I have just said.

Now as to the word *did,* which is, according to M. Max Müller, the original of the ending *ed,* it is the

[4] Page 393.

imperfect tense, as every child knows, of *do;* so that it is but a different form of *do-ode,* literally, *do gone.* And as the *oo* of *do-ode* cannot differ from *ee,* any more than *blood* can from *bleed,* it follows that *do-ode* is equal to *deede,* that is, *deed;* and that from *do-ode* being for *did,* it is equally evident that in *did* and *deed* we have the same word differently written. Hence *I did love* is for *I deed love;* that is, I the *deed* (namely) love.

The reader will now please to recollect what was stated further back, namely, that the *loved* in *I loved* and in *I have loved* are equally significant of the past. Hence a verb in the imperfect and perfect tense, however widely it may differ from itself in form, does not differ in meaning. *I wrote* and *I have wrote* were therefore equally correct if sanctioned by general use. The same observation applies to did and done; it is only conventionally that the one differs from the other; in meaning they are alike; as much so as the *loved* in *I loved,* and the *loved* in *I have loved.*

These observations have induced me to look into a German grammar, in order to see if this English termination *ed* may not be in M. Max Müller's own language as well as in Latin, in which its existence has never been suspected. And in German it evidently is. But in the preterit or imperfect it is written *te,* which in past participles becomes (no doubt for the sake of distinction) *t.* Thus my authority says that *loben,* to *praise,* is in the imperfect or preterit, *lobte,* but that its past participle is generally *gelobt,* and only sometimes *gelobet.* But the latter, which is equal to *gelobed,* must be its more original form, though not so much so as *gelobod* or *gelobode.* Hence in the German *te, t,* or *et* we have the English *ed,* and the meaning of this ending in both

languages must consequently be the same, namely, *gone.*

When I now look out for the preterit of *thun*, which is the German of to *do*, I find *that*, which, from *th* and *t* being each constantly used for *d*, cannot differ from *dad*, nor *dad* from *did*, by which we see that in the German *that* and the English *did* we have one and the same word. And how evident all this becomes when we find the German verb *that* to be in this language a noun also, and that it is there explained by *deed*; so that we do not mistake when we assert that such too is the meaning of *did*. No correct account can therefore be given of the English verbal termination *ed* without its applying also to the corresponding German *te*, *t*, or *et*. M. Max Müller never alludes, however, to this verbal termination in his own language; and yet he must admit that such a word as *geliebt*, for instance, must have had the same origin as its English equivalent *beloved*; which is a proof that the *t* (representing *et*) of the former is the *ed* of the latter; so that to discover the real etymology of this verbal ending in English or in German is to discover it in both, whilst not to be able to discover it in either language is to be ignorant of it in both.

But there are, no doubt, many Germans who will, on comparing two such past participles as *geliebt* and *beloved*, admit without a moment's hesitation, that their endings must have emanated from the same source. But this were not to find out the primary sense of either ending, without which an etymology throws very little light on the science of language.

On reading over what I have here written on the origin of *ed*, there is, I find, room for a few observations more. The Saxon of *deed* is *dæd*, which differs but

slightly from the German *that*. But if the Saxon *dœd* be, as I contend, for *do-ed* (that is, *do-gone*), in which we have the infinitive *do;* why have we not instead of *that* (*deed*), *thunat*, since *thun* is the infinitive in German? Because a vowel may, as I have already often shown, either receive or drop a nasal sound. An early form of *thun* may have therefore been *thu;* or if *thun* were its first form, then the nasal sound was dropped, leaving only *thu*, which is equal to the *tha* of *that*, just as *farther* is to *farther*. And as such a form as *thu* is equal to *du*, just as *burthen* is equal to *burden*, and that this *du* cannot differ from *do*, the present form (in English) of *thun*, is shown by the latter being *don* in Saxon and *doen* in Danish, in both of which we have an *o* instead of *u*.

Another observation necessary to be made is this: In French *fait* is the past participle of *faire*, to *do*, so that its meaning is *done;* but it is a noun also, and then its meaning is *deed*. This is a further confirmation of all we have already said respecting *did* and *deed*, for it is only conventionally that *did* and *done* differ from each other.

Another observation, and one more conclusive than any I have yet had occasion to make relative to *ed*, is the following. This verbal ending is traced by M. Max Müller to a word significant of *doing*, whilst by me it is traced to a word significant of *going*. But in M. Max Müller's own language how are the past participles of irregular verbs signified? Is it by a word of which the primary sense is that of *doing* or of *going?* It is certainly that of *going;* for such past participles have for their sign the word *ge* attached to them, instead of *t* or *et* in regular verbs; and *ge* is the root of *gehen*, to *go*, and it is neither more nor less than our word *go*. Thus

gan in Saxon means to *go*, and one of its past participles is, according to Bosworth, *gegan*, that is, literally, *go, go*. The same authority gives *gangan* also in the sense of to *go*, so that another of the participles of this verb is *gegangen*; which, as it cannot differ from *gegangan*, has still the literal meaning of *go, go*. Now there must have been in German such an infinitive as *ganen* in the sense of to *go*, for the past participle of *gehen* is not, as it ought to be, *gegehen*, but *gegangen*; which, from its being the participle of *gangan* in Saxon, shows that the Germans took it from this language.

I now beg to transcribe the following from Bosworth,—he is referring to *ge*: "In verbs, it seems sometimes to be a mere augment, and to be prefixed to all the imperfects, not, as in German, to the participles only." Bosworth means that *ge* is prefixed, in Saxon, to both imperfects and participles. And so it ought to be, for imperfects and past participles do not differ in meaning but conventionally, as I have already shown, and as it is also shown by every regular verb in English. Bosworth guesses rightly when he says that *ge seems* to be an augment, for so it is; but this augment is signified by a word not meaning to *do* but to *go*. And it might be expressed otherwise. Thus what is the *en* or *es*, (each meaning *one*) of the plural number, but an augment? Thus what is *oxen, oxone*, and *bookes, books*, but *ox, ox*, and *book, book?* The *es* of *bookes* being for *es* or *eis, one*, just as the *en* of *oxen* is for *ein, one*. Hence if verbs be only names, as I maintain they are, it follows that every imperfect tense or past participle is but a reduplication of the idea expressed; so that instead of saying *go, go*, to signify the past, we might, in order to avoid the repetition of *go*, say *go one*, that is, *gone*. Hence Eng-

lish verbs ending in *en* in their past participles, such as *be been, take taken, give given,* and the like, may be very well explained as we have explained the *en* in *oxen,* or the *es* in *bookes, books.*

There is still another manner of signifying the past time of a verb; and that is, by the verb to *be.* But why by the verb to *be?* Because it implies *existence,* and this idea implies *motion.* Hence the ideas to *be* and to *go* are frequently used for each other; I have *been* to see my friend, being synonymous with, I have *gone* to see my friend. And hence also it is that in French *je suis* may mean either *I am* or *I follow.* And every Greek scholar admits the identity in Greek between *to be* and *to go.* Thus εἰμὶ in Greek means not only *I am,* but also *I go.* But though this is generally admitted, the cause does not appear to have been known. Hence grammarians little suspect that when they are entertaining us with what they justly call a *reduplicate perfect;* that is, a repetition of a present to signify a past time; they are all the while only giving us an instance of a noun in the plural number, but used verbally. And this confirms still more the way man must have first expressed the idea of plurality.

The reader has just seen in the *ge* of the past participles of irregular verbs additional proof that the *et* of a regular past participle in German must have been formed from the verb to *go,* since when this *et* is no longer used, *ge* is made to take its place, with this slight difference, that it is then placed before the infinitive instead of being put after it.

When formerly, in 1844, I accounted for the *ed* of English verbs, I made, I now perceive, a great mistake in supposing that the word *had* formed an exception to the

general rule; namely, that *eode*, Saxon of *went*, was the original of this *ed*.

Had is clearly a contraction of *have-ode;* and which becomes more evident when we consider it under its elder form of *hand*. It must therefore have meant *have gone* or *past*, just as *loved* is for love *gone* or *past*. And though grammarians are often justly censured for the names they give to words relating to grammar, they do not however mistake whenever they apply the word *past* to preterits or participles, for it is synonymous with *gone;* as we may perceive on comparing 'the king has *past* by,' with 'the king has *gone* by.' *Past* participles are therefore rightly designated *past*. And to *pass* (which is an idea called after the *foot, pes, pedis*) means to *go;* so that *past* or *passed* is for *pass-ode*, that is, *pass gone*, or, which is the same thing, it is for *pass-pass*, the *ode* or *eode* representing the second *pass*, just as the *en*, *one*, in *oxen* represents the second word *ox* in *ox, ox*.

From all we have now seen it appears safe to conclude that whenever we find a preterit or past participle composed of two syllables, one of them should be considered as meaning *go;* unless, however, it be a repetition of the same word, as *dedi* in Latin; which should be regarded as but a different form of *do-do*, that is, *give-give*, for *given*. But when a preterit or past participle has but one syllable, it should be considered as being conventionally for what is called a reduplication. But such a construction of a verb does not appear congenial to the English idiom, for, if we except the pluperfect of the verb to *have*, *had had*, there is nothing whatever in English like it; and this undoubted fact is by no means favourable to M. Max Müller's etymology of *did*.

The reader who takes an interest in this inquiry, and

who feels desirous of following it up still farther, will please to bear in mind what has been already stated with respect to the similarity in meaning of the verbs to *be* and to *go*, as the one may be probably used instead of the other in different languages.

THE ENGLISH POSSESSIVE CASE.

I may now proceed to notice another of my old discoveries, namely, that the substantive, as it is called, has in English two possessive cases, though it has been hitherto supposed to have only one. Formerly, in my endeavours to render this particular part of my work very evident, I dwelt on it longer than was needed. I can now treat it much more briefly.

As pronouns have two possessive cases, it would appear strange—since they are allowed to be the exact representatives of substantives—if the latter had not also two such cases. And so they have, as I am now going to prove. But it will be first necessary to observe that it is not always a difference in the termination of a substantive that constitutes a difference in case, as we must admit on looking over the declensions of substantives in several languages, in which we shall often find two or more different cases with the same endings. In English the possessive pronoun *her*, as in "*her* book," differs, however, in form from *hers*, as in "this book is *hers*;" and the one can never be used for the other; thus we cannot say, "*hers* book" for "*her* book," nor "this book is *her*" instead of "this book is *hers*." But the masculine of both *her* and *hers* has only one form, that of *his*, as we see from "*his* book" and "this book is *his*;" which is a further proof that different cases have often no difference in form. Hence the *his* in "*his* book," and the *his*

in "this book is *his*" are two very different cases, as different as the cases *her* and *hers*.

Let us now put a substantive in the possessive case corresponding with *her* and *hers*; as for instance, "*Mary's* book" for "*her* book," and "this book is *Mary's*" for "this book is *hers*." We see here the difference between *her* and *hers*, and there is precisely the same difference between the word *Mary's* in "*Mary's* book," and the *Mary's* in "this book is *Mary's*." And as the *his* in "*his* book" is not the same case as the *his* in "this book is *his*," the *his* in the former being as different from the *his* in the latter as *her* is from *hers*; neither is the word *John's* in "*John's* book" in the same case as the *John's* in "this book is *John's*," though they do not differ from each other in either sound or form.

It has been hitherto usual for grammarians to suppose when the possessive case of a substantive has no other substantive expressed after it, that there must be one understood, which is a great mistake. And why so? Because the thing supposed to be understood is already expressed. Thus when we say "this *book* is *Mary's*," why should *book* be still understood since it is expressed? And, moreover, when on such an occasion we replace the substantive in the possessive case by its pronoun, as in "this *book* is *hers*," the mistake is doubly apparent, for not only is it shown from the substantive supposed to be understood being expressed, but also from the impossibility of repeating this substantive after the possessive *hers*, as no one can say, "this book is *hers* book."

Having thus shown that the substantive in English has, like its representative, the pronoun, two possessive cases, let us now endeavour to find out what has been

hitherto utterly unknown, namely, the primary sense of the possessive sign in English, made thus, *'s*.

The comma, or mark of elision, which is here put before the *s*, indicates the omission of the *e* we see in the Saxon and German possessive *es*. But what does this *es* mean? the curious reader will ask. Its primary sense must have been that of *one*, but it has conventionally several other meanings; such as, *of*, *to*, *at*, *on*, *in*, *the*, *this*, *he*, *she*, *it*, &c., no matter to what language it may belong. And when we remark that the possessive in Saxon is also represented by *a*, *an*, and *e*, this affords additional proof that such a word as *es* must in the beginning have meant *one*. And such, I am inclined to believe, must have first been the meaning of all particles of one syllable, the meanings they obtained afterwards being only conventional. Thus though there is a difference in meaning between the English particles *at* and *to*, yet they are represented in French by the same word (*à*), and so they ought to be: for as *to* is equal to the form *ta*, this allows us to perceive, when we read after the Hebrew manner, that in *to* and *at* we have the same word, though we do not use them alike, there being some difference in meaning between the phrases "to throw a thing *to* a person," and "to throw a thing *at* him." Nor is the difference less between the phrases "to go *to* Paris" and "to be *at* Paris." And as we also say, "he lives *in* Paris," this is an instance of *at* and *in* being used for each other. And as "I believe *in* God," was anciently, "I believe *on* God," this is an instance of *in* and *on* being used alike. Yet *on* has still its primary sense of *one*, "*on* dit" being equal to "*one* says."

Now as to the sense in which the sign of the possessive should be taken not only in Saxon, German, and

English, but in all languages; it is that of *of* or *to*. Thus Mary's book is equal to the book *of* Mary, or the book *to* Mary; that is, belonging to Mary. By this it is shown that a possessive sign is equal to one of the class of words called prepositions, though from its radically meaning *one*, it must have anciently been a pronoun. When the possessive sign in Greek is *ēs*, as in *kephalēs* (*of* the *head*), it may be said not to differ from its Saxon, German, and English form. And when it is represented by *ou*, as in *poiētou* (*of* the poet), its sign is equal to *ov*, that is, *of*. But when any other case takes the possessive form, as *poetæ* in Latin, which may mean either *of* or *to* the poet,—that is, be a dative as well as a possessive,—this arises from the possessive sign (*ae*) meaning, when primarily considered, *to* or *at* as well as *of*, as already shown. But as this possessive and dative may be the nominative plural also, we should not now consider it otherwise than as being *conventionally* so; for it is not (in *itself*) now more expressive of a plural number than the possessive and dative in the singular. And as all the several endings of a substantive do not appear to differ otherwise in meaning than conventionally, this would go to prove that a substantive may be considered as having only one case; and which can be easily admitted when we observe that the particles serving to form its cases—such as, *of*, *to*, *at*, *in*, *on*, &c.—do not differ from one another in meaning except conventionally, as we have seen.

But the possessive case in English requires further notice. Thus when referring to books, if I say, "*Mary's* is very interesting," the possessive case seems here to serve as a nominative. But it is not so; for the meaning is, "this *book* of *Mary's* is very interesting;" so

that *book* and not *Mary's* is the nominative. But has not *Mary's*, I may be asked, in the sentence, "*Mary's* is very interesting," the word *book* understood after it? Impossible; for no English possessive, whether substantive or pronoun, can, I find, have a substantive understood after it when there is not one expressed. Thus, if we use the pronoun possessive that represents the word *Mary's*, and say, "*hers* is very interesting," no one will now think of asserting that *hers* has the word *book* understood. Yet *hers* is here what *Mary's* is in "*Mary's* is very interesting." But what is now the meaning of the possessive sign? It has still the same meaning, that of *to* or *of*. But how are we to account for the *of* which is expressed before Mary's in "this book of Mary's"? It seems now to govern Mary's, as if this word were here both an objective and a possessive case. It does not, however, do so; but it governs the word *things* or *property* understood, and the apostrophic *'s* governs Mary, this sign having here, because a preposition, the meaning which it has every where else, that of *to* or *of*. "This book *of* Mary's" is therefore equal to "this book of the *things* or *property to* Mary;" that is, belonging *to* Mary.

When *of* thus precedes a possessive case, it constitutes what grammarians call a double possessive, and which they have never yet been able to explain. But I have discovered a very simple rule by the use of which this hitherto inexplicable difficulty can be very easily accounted for. This is my rule: when it is not certified that more than one particular thing or set of things, such as "*this* book," or its plural "*these* books," can be meant, then the word *things* or *property* should be *ever* understood after the preposition *of*. Thus in the phrase, "this book of Mary's," it is not certified that Mary

owns more books than the one here referred to, and for this reason, the word *things* or *property* should be understood after the *of* which precedes the possessive *Mary's*. Hence "this book of *Mary's*" is equal to "this book of the *things* or *property* belonging to Mary." And as in "these books of Mary's," it is not certified that Mary owns more books than those here referred to, we must, as in the singular, "this book," still understand things or property after *of*, and explain thus: "these books of the things or property belonging to Mary."

But when we say, "this is a book of Mary's," we are allowed to understand that she has more books than one, and from the property (her other *books*) being thus made known, we should consider the word which names this property, that is, *books*, as being now the objective case of the preposition *of*. Hence as *a book* is for *one book*, the sentence "this is a book of Mary's," should be explained; "this is one of the books belonging to Mary."

And as in the sentence "these are books of Mary's," we are allowed to understand that she has other books than the books here referred to, the explanation should be, "these are some of the books belonging to Mary."

The possessive case of a pronoun, whether single or double, is to be accounted for in precisely the same way.

We have now to answer a very important question, and which is this: if the preposition *of* is, as well as the apostrophic *'s*, a sign of the possessive case, as all grammarians do admit, why have we more than one of these two signs? Because the regular and general use of one of these signs, namely, *of*, is for inanimate things, whereas the other (*'s*) is for persons. There are a few exceptions to this rule, but they are, in truth, only exceptions, and nothing more. Hence it is very bad

English to say "show me the book *of* John," or "that book *of* John;" which should be, "show me *John's* book," or "that book *of* John's."

It were equally bad to say "the hill's top," or "the hill's foot" instead of "the top *of* the hill," or "the foot *of* the hill;" and so it were to say, "the chair's back" or "the house's back" for "the back *of* the chair, the back *of* the house." But to this part of the rule there are some exceptions, such as "a day's journey," "an hour's time," "a pin's point," &c. But they are very few, and their number should not be increased.

But why do grammarians say that the possessive case may, when relating to persons, be signified by *of* as well as by the apostrophic *'s?* It is because their knowledge of the latter is very imperfect, so much so that from their inability to explain it, they would, if that were possible, banish it out of the language altogether.

That a writer such as Cobbett, whose language is so purely Saxon, should say that *of*, as a sign of the possessive, may be used instead of the apostrophic *'s*, is astonishing. And yet he does say so, for these are his words: "But observe, this change (he is alluding to the possessive case as indicated by the apostrophic *'s*) is not absolutely necessary. We may ALWAYS do without it if we please; for the hat *of* Richard is the same as Richard's hat[5]." No: it is not so. Nor did ever Cobbett or any other Englishman say, even once in the whole course of his life, "show me the hat of Richard," instead of "show me Richard's hat." Or if he did say so, he spoke very bad English, such only as a foreigner would use.

But Cobbett is not here more in fault than any other English grammarian. Thus Dr. Priestley—and a very

[5] French Grammar, let. vi. p. 74.

clever man and a very close thinker was Dr. Priestley—remarks as follows: "We say it is a discovery of Sir Isaac Newton, though it would not have been more improper, only *more familiar*, to say, a discovery of Sir Isaac Newton's[6]."

This also happens to be a great mistake. A discovery of Sir Isaac Newton does not mean that Sir Isaac Newton made a discovery, but that he himself was discovered, as if he had been lost and was found again. But *a discovery of Sir Isaac Newton's* is genuine English. The words *more familiar*, here used by Dr. Priestley, should therefore be effaced, and replaced by the words *"far better English;"* and I do strongly recommend this alteration to the editor of the next edition of this great man's works.

But no form of expression in the English language has hitherto been more imperfectly accounted for, or more severely censured by grammarians in general than this double possessive. Such scholars, however, as Bishop Lowth and Dr. Crombie, seem to admit that it is very good English, though they are as unable as any one else to give any thing like a satisfactory explanation of it. And it is this inability of theirs that has induced grammarians of less note—and who are themselves equally incapable of accounting for the difficulty—to condemn this double possessive as altogether a very corrupt form of expression. On looking over some of those English grammars intended for the use of the French nation, I open one, which from its very respectable title, cannot but be considered a great authority, as the following must oblige the reader to admit:—

"Grammaire complète de la Langue Anglaise, par F. Churchill, Professeur d'Anglais au Collége Royale Henri

[6] Grammar, p. 72.

IV. à Paris. Ouvrage autorisé par le Conseil Royal de l'Instruction Publique, 1842."

In this respectable grammar, from which the author gives lectures on the English language and literature to, probably, some hundreds of pupils every year, I find a passage of the harshest invectives against the use of the double possessive. Notwithstanding his admission that there is perhaps in the English language no form of expression more frequently heard, it is in his opinion an illogical, vicious, and false construction, and that consequently Sutcliffe, a modern grammarian, rejects it altogether. These are his words: "Peut-être n'y a-t-il aucune façon de parler qui soit plus employée en Anglais que celle qu'on appelle le double possessif, et cependant rien ne saurait être plus contraire à la logique. Ainsi un grammarien moderne (Sutcliffe) rejette-t-il tout à fait cette construction. Néanmoins, en raison de son fréquente usage, il nous a paru nécessaire d'en parler, tout en avertissant l'élève de ce qu'elle a de *vicieux*."

After censuring Lowth and Priestley for their explanation and use of this double possessive, he continues thus: "Pour montrer combien cette façon de parler est vicieuse, supposons que l'on veuille dire, *one of the king's servants:* en employant l'idiotisme que nous critiquons, on dira, *a servant of the king's;* et la phrase si l'on supplée l'ellipse, deviendra, *a servant of the king's servants,* c'est à dire, non le serviteur du roi, mais le serviteur des serviteurs du roi."

Here we see the great advantage of the rule laid down farther back; namely, that when a possessive noun or pronoun has no object expressed after it, as in "this book is John's," there is not then one understood. To this simple rule I have never yet met with an exception, and

I am sure I never shall. Hence in the phrase, "a servant of the king's," it is very wrong to suppose that the possessive *king's* has *servants* understood after it; for then, as Mr. Churchill justly observes, the meaning would be a servant not of the king's, but a servant of the king's servants. But here is how the phrase should be explained: As the words "a servant of the king's" allow us to understand that the king has more than one servant, the property possessed is therefore made known, it being easy to perceive that it is *servants*. And as the word *a servant* means *one servant*, and as the possessive *king's* means *to the king*, that is, belonging to the king, and as it has nothing understood after it, it follows that the whole phrase is literally equal to "one of the servants belonging to the king."

The double possessive is therefore as correct and as pure a form of expression as can possibly be, and our language would suffer a great loss if deprived of it. But the possessive case when formed by the particle *of* and used for persons, as in "a servant *of* the king," is very bad, and the English language could not but gain on being rid of so corrupt a form. This particle as a sign of the possessive does very well in its own place, and that is when used for objects, as in "the back *of* the house," or "the foot *of* the table."

But the great fault with all grammarians is always to allow something to be understood after a word when it does not offend the ear to hear the thing referred to expressed. Thus if pointing to three books we say, "put up those two and give me the *other*;" every English grammarian in the world will assure you that the word *other* has here the word *book* understood after it. But why so? Because it does not offend his ear to say

"give me the *other* book." But if we say, while still pointing to the three books, "give me that *one*, and put up the *others*;" you will be assured with equal positiveness that now the word *others* has not the word *book* understood after it. And why so? Because every English grammarian now finds, on consulting his ear, that he cannot say "give me the *others* books." And thus it is with every one of them, whether he be learned or unlearned. It is his ear that reasons and not his understanding. It is just as wrong to assert that *book* is understood after the word *other* in "give me the *other*," as it were to assert that it is understood after *others* in "give me the *others*."

But such a mistake as this cannot be detected as easily in French as in English; because it does not offend the ear to say in this language, "donnez-moi les *autres* livres." Hence, if in such an instance as this we do not express the word *livres* after *les autres*, but say, "donnez-moi *les autres*," every French grammarian will assure you that *livres* is now understood after *les autres*. And yet it is not so. The word *autres* is not here an adjective pronoun, but as genuine a substantive pronoun as the word *les* in "donnez-*les*-moi," which *les* no Frenchman will say has any thing understood after it, any more than its representative in English has any thing understood after it in "give me *them*." The cause for not understanding any thing after such a pronoun as *autres* in "donnez-moi les *autres*," is this: that the things referred to are, as it were, expressed because they are clearly indicated or pointed at, and a thing expressed is not understood.

With respect to the double possessive, we see how seriously the old and genuine English idiom is likely to suffer from its having been hitherto so imperfectly un-

derstood and explained. Besides the censure bestowed on it by the grammarian Sutcliffe in England, and the learned English professor of a French College in Paris, do we not find in the well-known English grammar adopted by all the respectable scholastic institutions throughout Great Britain and America, the following concluding observation on his same difficulty?—"But after all that can be said for this double genitive, some grammarians think that it would be better to avoid the USE OF IT ALTOGETHER, and to give the sentiment another form of expression [7]."

Now, if we are to avoid the use of it altogether, how are we to express ourselves? Why, instead of saying "a soldier of *the king's*," we are to say "a soldier of *the king*;" for this is such a form as grammarians can account for. But if it be correct to say "a soldier of *the king*," it must be equally correct to say "a soldier *of him*," and consequently "a soldier *of them*," or *of me, of us*, or *of you*. These are forms which grammarians can very easily account for, and so they must find them very logical; yet our ears assure us that they are detestable; and though our ears may sometimes deceive us, we cannot accuse them of doing so on the present occasion, as what they now tell us is sanctioned by good taste and common sense.

Let us now show further the advantage to be derived from a perfect knowledge of the double possessive.

Webster was a very clever man. He is the author of a first-rate philosophical grammar; and he has done for England what M. Littré is doing at the present moment for France, that is, he has compiled the best English dictionary now extant.

Yet this very learned grammarian and lexicographer

[7] Murray's Grammar, p. 174.

makes very serious mistakes in grammar because of his imperfect knowledge of a possessive case. In proof of this I need quote only a few of his statements and the passages by which he endeavours to prove the correctness of his views. Thus referring to the word *theirs*, he says, "Theirs is used as a substitute for the noun and the adjective to which it refers, and in this case it may be the *nominative* to a verb." It is no slight error in grammar to say that an English possessive case can ever be a nominative; yet in proof of this bold assertion he quotes the following: "Our land is the most extensive; but *theirs* is the best cultivated. Here *theirs* stands as the representative of *their land*, and is the *nominative* to *is*." He never suspected that the word *theirs* has here the meaning it has every where else, namely, *to them*, that is, belonging to them, and that it cannot, for this reason, serve as a nominative. Hence, "*theirs* is the best cultivated," should be explained thus: "this land or that land of theirs," that is, "this or that land of the things or property belonging to them, is the best cultivated," by which we make *this or that land* be the nominative case, and not *theirs*, which is a genuine possessive and *never* can be a nominative. He continues thus:—

> "Nothing but the name of zeal appears,
> 'Twixt our best actions and the worst of *theirs*."

"In this use *theirs* is not the possessive, for then there would be a double possessive." This would be very true if *of* had not here the substantive "actions" understood. Hence—

> "'Twixt our best actions and the worst of *theirs*"

should be thus explained: "'Twixt our best actions and

the worst of *the actions belonging to them,*" that is, *their actions.*

Webster gives several other instances of this kind, endeavouring to show that a possessive may serve as a nominative. But of these instances we need quote but one more, which is the following: "Your house is on a plain, *ours is* on a hill." This is good English, but certainly *ours* must be the nominative case to *is*, or it has none.

The same explanation as those just given will still apply here: "Ours is on a hill," being equal to "this house of ours is on a hill;" so that *house* and not *ours* is the nominative to *is*, *ours* having the meaning of *to us*, belonging to us; and the *of* having, as already shown, its objective *things* understood. This particle *of*, when preceding a possessive, and hence appearing to make a double possessive, as in "'Twixt our best actions and the worst *of theirs*," is what has hitherto puzzled grammarians the most in their fruitless endeavours to give a correct explanation of an English possessive case. Another great difficulty which they could never explain was the literal meaning of the possessive sign (*'s*) in English. They never supposed that it could be a preposition having the meaning of *to* or *of*.

Since the above account of my discovery of a second possessive case was written, I have received from London Parts I. and XVIII. of a very important work now in course of publication, entitled—

"A Dictionary of the English Language, by Robert Gordon Latham, M.A., M.D., F.R.S., &c., late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and late Professor of English, University College, London; author of 'English Language,'

&c. Founded on that of Dr. Samuel Johnson as edited by the Rev. H. J. Todd, M.A., with numerous emendations and additions. To be completed in 36 parts."

This is, I say, a vast, a most important undertaking. But as Professor Latham is allowed by all England to stand at the top of his profession, it will, no doubt, be universally admitted that so great a work could not have fallen into better hands.

His "18th part" contains a large amount of learned and just observations well calculated to serve every student desirous of obtaining a true history of the rise and growth of the English language. Here, too, may be found not a few very shrewd and original remarks relating to grammar. This distinguished professor is not, however, more fortunate than any of his predecessors in his endeavours to explain an English possessive case; nor does his notion of the nature of an adjective appear more correct. In support of this statement I beg to call Professor Latham's attention to the subjoined extract from his "Parts of Speech" (p. ci), with my remarks upon it. He will, I have no doubt, admit, like a true lover of science, not only the justness of these remarks, but also the reality and value of the discovery without which I could have never made them.

"Though we can say 'man is mortal,' we cannot say 'man's is mortal.' We must add *nature, body,* or some word of the same kind, before we get sense. This applies equally to single words like *man's,* or to combinations like *of* man. The *'s,* the sign of the case, in the former instance, is an inseparable element; the preposition *of,* in the latter, a separable word. Neither, however, can form a term by itself; nor can the combination of which they form a part.

"That sentences like 'this is John's' form no objections need only be suggested. There is always a second word implied or understood; i. e. the word which belonged to the subject, whether explicitly named, as 'this hat is John's *hat*,' or understood.

"More than this, strictly speaking it is doubtful whether even adjectives and pronouns are truly categorematic (i. e., forming terms by themselves), inasmuch as it may be argued that, when we say, 'wine is good,' we always understand a substantive, the full expression being 'wine is good *wine*,' or 'wine is *a* good *thing*.' And the same reasoning may be extended to the pronoun. When we say, '*this* or *that*,' we always mean *this something, that something*; this *N* or *M*; as the case may be. Individually I think that the pronoun *is* truly categorematic, though this is no place for an exposition of my reasons for doing so. Be, however, the case in this respect as it may, it is a matter of fact that, for most purposes of ordinary grammar, the pronoun and adjective are not only commonly treated as categorematic, but may be so treated without much inconvenience. It may also be added that under any view whatever, the difference between the pronoun and adjective in respect to their power of forming terms is real. The former can be either subject or predicate, the latter predicate only. The closer connexion, arising from this, between the pronoun and the substantive, than that between the substantive and the adjective is also real."

This passage contains several very serious mistakes, none of which a man of Professor Latham's superior intelligence could have ever committed had he known that English substantives have, as well as the pronouns by

which they are represented, two possessive cases. This knowledge would have even prevented him from transmitting to other grammarians and other times his very imperfect views of the nature of adjectives and pronouns. But in respect to these hitherto inexplicable points in grammar, Professor Latham does not appear to have been more in the dark than any of his predecessors.

When he says in the sentence, "this is John's," there is always a second word implied or understood, and gives, as an illustration and proof of the truth of this opinion, such an instance as "this hat is John's *hat;*" the mistake is not single but double. Thus every one will admit that when a substantive is expressed it cannot be understood; as for instance in such a sentence as "this is John's hat," no one would repeat the word *hat,* and say, "this is John's *hat hat.*" But why so? Because the word *hat* is already expressed in "this is John's *hat.*" But is it not also expressed in "this *hat* is John's"? Undoubtedly it is, and it cannot for this simple reason be understood. Now what has led so distinguished a grammarian as Professor Latham to make so serious a mistake? It arose from his not being aware that English substantives have two possessive cases; and he has, as well as every one else, been kept from this knowledge because these two cases do not differ in form from each other. But it is not, as I have already shown, a difference in form that always constitutes different cases.

Now for the second proof telling against Professor Latham's account of the possessive case of substantives in English:—

If in his instance "this is John's," or "this hat is

John's," he used the feminine *Mary's* instead of *John's*, and then instead of the noun Mary's, he used the pronoun possessive which represents it, as, "this hat is hers," he would have seen that there was nothing understood after *John's* any more than there is after *hers* in "this hat is *hers*;" as no one can say, "this hat is *hers* hat." Hence when *Mary's* has the word *hat* after it, it is equal to the possessive pronoun *her*, as in "give me *Mary's* hat;" that is, "give me *her* hat;" and when Mary's has not a noun after it, as in "this hat is *Mary's*," it is always equal to *hers*, as in "this hat is *hers*." If it even became usual to use *hers* instead of *her*, and that we might say "give me *hers* hat," yet this would not justify us in asserting that in "this hat is *hers*," the word *hat* is still understood. And why so? Because the word *hat* being expressed, it *cannot* be understood.

The two possessive cases of a substantive, though not differing from each other in sound or form, are, however, as different, the one from the other, as *my* is from *mine*; or as *our* is from *ours*; or as *thy* is from *thine*; or as *your* is from *yours*; or as *her* is from *hers*; or as *their* is from *theirs*. As to *his*, it wants a double form; but when it has an object after it, it is the masculine of *her*, as in "*his* book;" whilst in "this book is *his*," it is the masculine of *hers*, and has consequently nothing understood after it.

Professor Latham does not attempt to account for what is called a *double* possessive; as, for instance, "this hat *of John's* is very dear;" but if he had done so, he would have found it far more difficult to explain than a single possessive, in which he has so signally failed; and yet not more so, as I have already stated, than any

of his predecessors. And that is a consolation, as Sheridan would say. I have already had occasion to show how far another very learned lexicographer and distinguished grammarian (Webster) has been from divining the meaning of this double possessive; and, in all probability, Professor Latham, had he tried to explain it, would not have been more successful.

Let us now notice the following, given in the passage already quoted: "strictly speaking, it is doubtful whether even adjectives and pronouns are truly categorematic; inasmuch as it may be argued that when we say, 'wine is good,' we always understand a substantive; the full expression being 'wine is good wine,' or 'wine is *a* good *thing*.'" Had Professor Latham a correct knowledge of the possessive case, he could not make such a mistake as he does here when asserting that in "wine is good," the word *wine* is still understood; for this is precisely equal to his mistake when he makes "this *hat* is John's" to be for "this *hat* is John's *hat*." That is to say, he makes that which is fully and clearly expressed to be still understood. This cannot possibly be. But to make the mistake more evident, we need only observe that if *wine* be still understood in "wine is good," so must it be understood in such a sentence as "wine is good for old age;" which sentence would become when the word *wine* is supplied, "*wine* is good *wine* for old age." Hence we may lay it down as a rule in English grammar, that when a noun is expressed it is not *at the same time* understood.

But when Professor Latham explains "wine is good *wine*" by "wine is *a* good *thing*," he changes the sentence altogether; as much so as if he were to say, "wine is a good *stimulant*, a good *drink*, or a good *liquid*;" all of

which are very correct, as correct as "wine is a good *thing*." And why so? Because we are not now told that *wine, stimulant, drink, liquid,* or *thing,* is still understood. But if he had not so changed the sentence as he has done by the insertion of the indefinite article *a,* and had said "wine is good *thing,*" this would have shown him, from its being so incorrect a form, that the word *thing* was not here a fair representative of the second word *wine* in "wine is good *wine*."

As a further justification of his explanation of *wine is good,* Professor Latham continues thus: "And the same reasoning may be extended to the pronoun. When we say '*this* or *that,*' we always mean *this something; that something;* this *N* or *M;* as the case may be."

Now when we say, "give me *this* book or *that* book," Professor Latham will admit that here the words *this* and *that* can have nothing understood after them, for the simple reason that the thing referred to, namely, *book,* is expressed, and that it cannot consequently be understood. His meaning must therefore be that the words *this* and *that* when not followed by the thing referred to have it always understood. But this is a mistake, as great a mistake as when he says that after the word *John's* in "this hat is John's," the word *hat* is still understood; or that after good in "wine is good," the word *wine* is still understood. And the cause of the mistake is the same as that which has kept grammarians from discovering that nouns in English have two possessive cases; that is to say, the word *this* or *that* wants two forms, the one as different from the other as the possessive *her* is different from *hers.* Such a difference exists between the corresponding words in French; and hence no Frenchman can ever suppose a noun to be understood

after the words for *this* and *that* when these words have not, in his language, the things referred to expressed. Thus if referring to books, I say, "donnez-moi *ceci* et prenez *cela*," no one can make such a mistake as to say "donnez-moi *ceci* livre et prenez *cela livre*." But he would say *ce livre-ci* for *ceci livre*, and *ce livre-là* for *cela livre*. Hence when *this* or *that* is not immediately followed by the thing referred to, it is a genuine pronoun, as much so as the pronoun *he, she* or *it*. And as no one can say that the word *book* is understood when he says "give me *it*," neither should he say when referring to any thing, that the word *this* or *that* has the thing referred to understood. But why should this be? Because when we say, "*give* me *this*" or "*give* me *that*," the thing referred to is before our eyes, and this is equal to its being expressed; and, as we have already shown, whatever is expressed cannot, at the same time, be also understood. This will do.

But not so fast, some one will say. Another question remains to be answered. Let us suppose that in French we might use such a pronoun as *ceci* with a noun immediately following it, as *ceci livre* instead of *ce livre-ci*, would it not then be correct to suppose when *ceci* stood alone, that the thing referred to was understood? By no means; because *ceci* would still refer to something present, which would be equal to a thing expressed, and what is expressed cannot at the same time—the reader knows the rest.

And this rule, which I am tired of repeating, though it may be thought uncommonly simple, is in my eyes one of no small value. It was through it I first discovered long ago that substantives have in English, like their pronouns, two possessive cases. It was also

through it I have been enabled to detect the mistakes just noticed of so justly distinguished a grammarian as Professor Latham.

The reader may naturally suppose that this discovery of mine, made so long ago, of a second possessive case in English, was never seen by Professor Latham, it being rather difficult to conceive that if it had ever come under his notice, he could have made those serious mistakes to which I have just taken the liberty of drawing his attention. But we should observe that a person of shallow views—so very shallow as not to be at all capable of believing in the reality of a discovery, however evident it may be, and much less so of making one himself;—has often the power of persuading a man of greatly superior intelligence to reject as ill founded his favourable opinion of some important truth just made known for the first time, and which, previous to his meeting with such an individual, he may have received as a real fact.

But why should this be? I cannot tell you, dear reader, why it should be, but I know from self-experience that it is so. But the cause? Oh! the cause! that is quite a different thing, and a problem not so difficult to solve. It seems to me that I can divine it. May not this be the cause? He who makes a discovery, and entertains no doubt of its reality, is very stubborn in his belief (and this, too, I know from self-experience), so that you might as well try to move a mountain from its place as to shake in the slightest degree his solid convictions. But he who only receives a discovery as real—that is, he who has himself not made it—is not quite so stubborn in his belief. And why so? Because he has not the same interest in the success of the discovery as the discoverer himself; and he may, for this simple reason, be laughed

out of his favourable opinion by one to whom he is vastly superior in point of merit; and this may happen the more easily as few men have so large a share of moral courage as to dare to hold firm to their convictions in opposition to the many. And for the one who is capable of admitting the reality of a discovery there are at least a thousand who are not.

As an instance bearing strongly in favour of those views, I wish here to mention something that has happened to myself. Shortly after the publication of my work I could myself detect, without being shown them by others, the many faults or rather blunders in my second volume, which was composed in great haste, even while it was going through the press. I therefore saw no chance of drawing public notice to my work but through those parts of it which I then believed—and even do so still—to be important discoveries in the science of grammar. And it appeared to me that if these parts were submitted to any of the lovers of truth and science, success would, as a very natural consequence, immediately follow. Big with these hopes, and vain of my discoveries, I had myself introduced without delay to a gentleman lawyer in the Temple, who was then, with many other friends of science, actively employed in founding a kind of grammatical institute. Its exact name I cannot now call to mind, but I have, I think, given its meaning. This was just the thing I wanted.

This gentleman I was informed could never get a case, but being considerably wealthy he lived independent of the law. And though he was supposed not to have sufficient talent to write a book (no wonderful task, however, now-a-days), he was determined to be closely connected with those who could. He aimed at obtaining a promi-

nent place in the new institute, at becoming its president, or at least its secretary. Indeed, at the time I had the honour of making his acquaintance he was, if I remember aright, already named to the latter post, or was on the eve of being so named.

On being introduced to him, I almost recoiled on looking at his countenance. The man had no forehead, unless that might be called one which receded towards the back of his head. I told him I was come to submit to his notice a few grammatical discoveries I had made, to the end that he might, if he found them to be real, lay them before the members of the institute to which I understood he belonged.

He smiled incredulously when he heard me speak of discoveries, put several questions to me which had no relation whatever to either grammar or language, and then asked me if I was intimately acquainted with Grimm and Bopp. I told him that the discoveries I had made were not obtained by consulting others, but by long and serious thinking of my own. That all I learned from others with respect to my discoveries was this; that they knew nothing whatever of the real difference between one part of speech and another. He smiled still more incredulously, and assured me that he was the greatest sceptic then living; and as if he thought great merit was due to him for his extraordinary incredulity, he never ceased boasting of it. The more I looked at the fellow's forehead, the more I felt convinced that he was now speaking the truth; for, though I know nothing of phrenology, never have I met with any one possessed of such a head, whom I did not find distinguished by suspicion, narrow views, selfishness, and low cunning. To this experience of mine, I hope and trust, for the sake of

society, that there may be and that there have been some splendid exceptions, though it has never been my good fortune to meet with one.

As this gentleman lawyer was to be a great man in the new institute, I was determined to do all that lay in my power towards converting him to an admission of the reality of those very evident discoveries with which I have already brought the reader acquainted. But it was all lost labour. Whenever I drove him, as it were, into a corner by requesting an answer to any one of my questions, he would remind me of Goldsmith's Ephraim Jenkinson by his smiles and the affected benevolence of his looks, thus giving me to understand that he could if he would crush me very easily by one of his deep replies, but that he was by nature too gentle, too good, to treat me so unmercifully.

About this time I sent a copy of my work to a very distinguished professor, who was then well known to the public as an elegant scholar and a profound grammarian, requesting him, as a great favour, to let me have his opinion of my discoveries. From this gentleman I received in a day or two a very kind answer, which was to the effect that he had already learned much from my work, and that in about a fortnight, when he would have finished reading it, I should have his sincere opinion of it.

This good news raised my sinking spirits, and I could not get over communicating it to my gentleman lawyer, on whom I expected it would produce an effect. And so it did; but the effect was a very bad one: and it became still worse when he heard me express a hope that the distinguished professor's opinion would probably appear in the journal which was to belong to the new institute, and of which he was also a member.

My friend the lawyer assured me that this could not be, nor should it be; the chief rule of the institution being that nothing was to be made public; that its journal, which was to contain an account of its proceedings, could not be seen by any one or shown to any one except a member. And that if the distinguished professor I named—and who, by the bye, was one of his intimate friends—thought otherwise, he could easily undeceive him. On so expressing himself, he advised me to take back the copy of my work, of which I had some days before made a present to his institute; that it would be a violation of the rules of the establishment to pay any attention to it; and that it might be of some service to me, but that it could be of no service to any one by remaining where it was. On telling him that I could not think of taking back that which I had given as a present, he assured me that such a proceeding was of no consequence whatever, and that he could easily find my book and send it to me; that he thought he knew the particular shelf upon which it lay. And though he was then in the Temple, and his institute was some two or three miles farther off in the West End, he looked far away in the distance, and seemed to have my two volumes exactly under his eye, or at least within its reach. On learning from him that my work was of no service to any one where it then lay, I neither assented nor objected to his offer of finding it and sending it to me. At this he appeared rather pleased, and so we parted on tolerably good terms. But I recollect having allowed him to understand that if my book was not approved of by certain persons, it did not arise so much from a want of good will on their side as from a want of common sense and common intelligence. I



saw from his darkened look that I then struck home. Nor did he forget the blow.

On leaving him I walked straight to the house in which I lodged. It lay in the neighbourhood of the British Museum; yet the hall-door had scarcely closed on me, when it was opened to some one else, who brought me my books. It was evident that he had them in his own apartment in the Temple at the very moment he was affecting to be looking at them in his mind's eye some two or three miles farther off on a shelf in the West End, where it was now certain he did not wish them to remain[8].

I have said that this gentleman never forgot the blow that struck home when I allowed him to understand he was not endowed with a sufficient share of common intelligence to appreciate my discoveries. But he soon endeavoured to convince me that I under-rated his powers, for he not only seized every opportunity of treating my

[8] How long this institute remained in existence I know not. But the rule denying the publication of its proceedings, and ordering that none but its own members should be made acquainted with its progress in science, were enough, in a country renowned for its liberal views, to excite universal disgust; from which I conclude that this institute must have long since ceased to exist. But it has, it would seem, been replaced by one infinitely better; at least it is so in design, since it is not, like its predecessor, desirous of keeping every thing to itself, as the following, which affords me all I know of it, will serve to show: "The Philological Society in London publishes every year a valuable volume of its transactions."—*Max Müller's Lectures on the Science of Language*, vol. i. p. 186.

This society shall, with my best wishes for its success, have a copy of my book as soon as it appears. I am sorry M. Max Müller does not say how long it has been in existence. But its president or secretary, whoever this gentleman may be, will not, I am sure, wish me, like my dear friend the lawyer, to have my "Origin of Language and Myths" returned to me.

pretensions with the utmost contempt, but he wrote a review of my book in a religious journal (of which I forget the name), noting emphatically not only its blunders, of which I admit there were not a few, but taking also great care never to allude to any of the important discoveries which have been here laid before the reader.

But did not his friend, the distinguished professor and profound grammarian, make mention of those discoveries in the letter containing his sincere opinion, and which I must have received from him in about a fortnight? That letter never came to hand, and was, of course, never written. If it had been written and published, not one of the serious mistakes to which I have just drawn attention—especially those of Professor Latham's—could have remained from the year 1844 to the present hour uncorrected. The learned professor was, no doubt, laughed out of his just resolve by one greatly his inferior. And thus it often happens. The merest dolt in literature may sometimes influence not only one very superior in mind, but many; and not towards doing what is right, but what is wrong. When Harvey made his grand discovery, there was more than one eminent physician who at once admitted its reality until sneered or shrugged out of his admission by fellows who, in comparison with himself, were no better than low-bred quacks.

But why, it may be asked, have such worthless and pernicious beings been ever sent on our earth? To be useful in their way. But the misfortune is, that they do not always keep to the places for which Providence had designed them. Thus, if favoured by fortune or family connexions, their vanity leads them to suppose that every such accidental advantage ought to make up for all intellectual deficiencies, and they are consequently often led to aspire

to what lies immensely beyond their reach. When such a character has forced his way into the literary world he is, almost every time he puts pen to paper, guilty of some grievous wrong; for, like every other narrow-minded literary upstart, not possessing a soul capable of conceiving whatever may be truly useful or great, he is constantly opposed to whatever lies beyond the reach of his own confined views. And whenever he does dare to accept any thing of the kind, it is not from his own conviction he will do so—for he possesses no such power—but it is from the convictions of the multitude. He is ever the first to oppose an original truth, but ever the last to be its harbinger. His approval is, therefore, affected. In him there is nothing real but his intense dislike to all who stand any way above him in mind and character.

Though such an individual is a delinquent, because the enemy of every new truth, he differs, however, from every other delinquent, inasmuch that he may all his life escape the punishment and contempt he deserves. The fraudulent tradesman generally receives the reward of his delinquencies; the medical quack though sometimes escaping, is often found guilty of homicide or murder; and the pettifogger may, for some very slight illegal practice, be struck off the rolls, and so, for the want of a profession, be left to starve in the streets, or end his days in the workhouse. But your pettifogger in literature is never, unless he attacks private character, amenable to the law; he by affected ridicule or wilful misrepresentation may, conjointly with a few low confederates, crush in its infancy any important discovery, or perhaps retard its progress for a whole century, yet hold up his head the while, and move where he lists,

fearless alike of blame and detection. But he should, because of his having this power to do grievous wrong with impunity, be regarded by all honest men as a dangerous nuisance; more dangerous by far than he who on the highway orders the lone traveller, at the peril of his life, to stand and deliver; for the latter by his evil ways can, comparatively considered, injure only a few, whilst he who is opposed to the advance of science does all that in him lies to lead us back to the dark days of uncivilized life—to the good old times when men were cruelly persecuted for having dared to expose error or discover an important truth.

As the latter observations have grown out of the account given of my interview with the gentleman lawyer and would-be philologist, who not only made very light of my old discoveries, but even succeeded, it would seem, in persuading a distinguished professor, who had thought favourably of them, out of his convictions; the reader may wish to know who those two gentlemen were. As to the gentleman lawyer I cannot call to mind so much as a single letter of his name, not having had occasion since I last saw him in 1844 to hear him alluded to either in or out of print. But as to the distinguished professor the case is very different. Him I can never forget, as I constantly hear of him in every way, and always with that large amount of praise to which, I have no doubt, he must be justly entitled. He is Professor Latham.

And as this gentleman cannot now feel pleased at having made those serious mistakes in his Introduction to Part XVIII. of his Dictionary, and to which I have drawn his attention, who is to blame for the annoyance so disagreeable a circumstance is likely to cause him? Who

but his dear friend the briefless lawyer and would-be philologist? For if Professor Latham had learned much from my book, as his letter had allowed me to understand, it must have been from those parts of the first volume most deserving of his approval, namely, the discoveries relating to the adjective and the two possessive cases of nouns and pronouns; and if he had held firm to these his first convictions, and had not allowed himself to be influenced by a mind greatly inferior to his own, he would not have left it in any body's power to correct the mistakes I have noticed; and it would be so for this simple reason, that those mistakes would have been then never made.

APPENDIX C.

A VISION.

WHILE dozing the other evening in my old arm-chair, with no other light than that of the full moon then shining brightly into my little room, I began to think of adding to my work a conclusion, in which I might also bring in certain members of the French Institute, with their probable opinions respecting the boldness of my pretensions. But the task was not, I soon found, a very easy one, and, wearied with turning it over in my mind, I fell into a sort of trance, which was not that of one quite awake nor yet asleep, but something between the two conditions; and during this state of both body and mind, I felt myself all at once transported to a large reading-room adjoining the French Academy, where it seemed to me I had often been before. While wondering how I got there, methought I saw three men enter the same apartment by as many separate doors. They seemed to meet according to an appointment previously made. On asking myself who these men might be, an invisible being who appeared to have the power of reading my mind, told me they were named Adolphe Didier, M. Littré, and Max Müller. "They are come," continued the voice, "to talk about your discovery, which is troubling their thoughts much more than they are willing to admit, even to one another. They are not

now in the body, but in the spirit, and so you are yourself." "But cannot these men now see me?" "They cannot," answered the voice, "because controlled by the influence of my presence, and which gives to you not only the power of remaining here invisible, but of overhearing what these men are now about to say of your work."

"And can human beings," I asked, "thus leave the body and hold converse on worldly affairs while in the spirit?" "Human beings of kindred pursuits or feelings do so very often," replied the voice, "but of all they then say they are not allowed to retain the least recollection on their re-entering the body." "How wonderful!" I exclaimed. "Not so wonderful as you imagine," said the voice; "but to man, while his spirit is in the flesh, all his surroundings, even the very least of them, appear as so many inexplicable wonders."

"Why do not these men," I asked, "begin to converse?"

"Because I have not yet given them the permission," answered the voice, "but they may now begin."

And just as the invisible being uttered these words, the three gentlemen above named began, in the order I do here set them down, the following conversation:—

Max Müller (*addressing Littré*): This work on the origin of language seems to me a most unfortunate affair.

Littré: It is so for you especially, my dear Müller.

Max Müller: Not more so than for yourself, surely?

Regnier: How can you think of saying so, my good friend? Littré was obliged to attempt the etymology of a great many words, and without being at liberty to choose from among them, but to take them alphabetically

as they came, whereas you were not bound to any particular class, but only to such as you thought you might easily explain; and though your choice was confined to very few, that is, comparatively speaking—yet your etymologies of these few appear to be now no better than so many blunders. Even in your own language, of which the author of the origin of language and myths tells us he knows nothing, he has clearly proved you to be in error. Only witness what you say of *erste* and *fürst*, between which you find no relationship, whilst Kavanagh clearly shows by the application of one of his confounded rules, that *erste* and *fürst* make only one and the same word. And I cannot help agreeing with him —but this is between ourselves, you know.

Max Müller: But how could you expect me to know that *erste* and *fürst* make only one word, when I knew nothing of the rule by which Kavanagh was guided to this discovery? And have not all Frenchmen, as well as we of the German school, been equally puzzled to know why *je suis* means both *I am* and *I follow?* And why so? Because here, too, as in *erste* and *fürst*, we were not sufficiently acquainted with the aspirate; that is, we did not know that initial consonants may so often represent this sign. Can you suppose that if I had this knowledge I should ever derive *mare*, the *sea*, from a Sanskrit word meaning death? By knowing that the *s* of *sea* does here but replace the aspirate, and that it is not to be counted as a radical part of this word, I could at once perceive that the *ea* which remains is the root, and that from its being the Saxon of *water*, such, too, must be the real meaning of *sea;* and from knowing this I should approve of Bopp's derivation, and not oppose it as I have so foolishly done. Kavanagh has no merit for

his etymologies; with his principles could not any one else discover the original of a word as well as he can? I am sure that I could myself go much farther. Witness only his rule which says that all combinations of vowels are equal to one another; for by knowing this, we see how there can be no difference between *ea*, Saxon of *water*, and its French equivalent *eau*. In *ea* and *eau* we have therefore the same word. And if we now give to *eau* the same substitute for the aspirate we have in *sea*, what shall we get? *Seau*, French of *bucket*. And what is a bucket? A vessel for holding *water;* and, according to Kavanagh, all such articles have been called after *water*. But does the *buck* of *bucket*, you will ask me, ever mean *water?* I answer that it does, for it cannot differ from the German *bach*, which means a *stream*, a *current*, or a *rivulet*, and these and all such ideas have been named after *water*. And as the *b* of *bach* does here but represent the aspirate, what have we when it is removed, because no radical part of this word, but *ach*, and this is only another form of the *aq* of *aqua*. What can be easier than all this? Give me only the fellow's principles, and I engage to do as much as he can—perhaps a great deal more.

Littré: That may be, but you have not had his principles when you lectured on the science of language, and created so great a sensation; for in all your etymologies he has had you on the hip, and has very easily laid you on your back. But this is between ourselves, you know; no one else must hear any thing of it. I am sorry, heartily sorry, that it has so happened, but it cannot now be helped. I tremble for my dictionary.

Regnier: But Kavanagh says nothing against your dictionary; he admires its explanations, and shows that

if you have totally failed in your attempts to trace a word to its original source, it is because you know nothing of the origin of language—that you have not happened to make his discovery, that is all.

Littré: And do you count that as nothing at all? In my opinion it is a great deal; it may injure the sale of my work very considerably. And what then will my publishers think of me? I have certainly overreached myself. I should have made his acquaintance and have courted his friendship when, in 1868, he kindly offered to make me acquainted with his discovery and its principles, but I made light of his offer; for knowing him to be low in pocket, my conviction was then that he could never publish his book; but, as cunning men often do, I have overreached myself.

Max Müller: Not so much so as you imagine, old boy; you must know that to publish a book is one thing, and to make it known is quite another thing. Has Kavanagh any friends in the press? No. Can Kavanagh afford to advertise his work largely? No. How then can Kavanagh's book become known? Answer me that if you can.

Littré: But may not some fool for the sake of science take it under his protection, and so go to the necessary trouble and expense of making it known?

Max Müller: There are many who would certainly do so, if they knew any thing of it; if it were to be brought under their notice; but how is this to be done without either protection or publicity? Though there is not a people in the world more easily gulled by appearances than the English, this cannot, however, be accomplished without a means.

Littré: And what means did you employ for playing so cleverly on their gullibility as to induce them to receive

as genuine those works of yours, though they contain nothing but blunders from beginning to end?

Max Müller: Oh! I had more than one means at my disposal for ensuring immediate success; I came from Oxford, where I ranked high as a professor; at least so it was thought over England. Then note well where my lectures were delivered: at the ROYAL INSTITUTION OF GREAT BRITAIN. Oh, that sounds well, and it must have produced a tremendous effect. Then there was the title-page of my lectures, in which I took care to set down all the philological and other scientific bodies over the world of which I had ever heard the names, as having the advantage of being connected with me. Then there was my own name, a fine German one. And I must tell you that in England no one knows any thing of philology except a German, and *he* is allowed to know every thing about it; so much so, that when on this subject he states an opinion no one dares to contradict him. You can now very easily account for my success. You see I have had more than one means at my disposal. I had also something else in my favour: it was that if I knew nothing of the science of language, there was no one else a whit wiser; and who would dare to oppose me, or what weight could his opposition have whilst I had that powerful organ the *Times* to support me in whatever I thought fit to assert, and——

Regnier: Beg pardon for interrupting you; but tell me, Müller, are you not the chief editor of the *Times?*

Max Müller: Don't ask me that question; pray don't; it distresses me. I have already more than twenty times refused to answer that question; and I must continue to do so as long as I live. There are secrets which must not be divulged. But, as I was saying, you see I have had more than one means for advancing my views,

of which Kavanagh has not so much as one. His very name were enough to damn his book. And why so, you will ask? I answer because it is Irish, not German.

Littré: That was why you entitled your late work "Chips from a *German* Workshop."

Max Müller: Of course it was: do you think I ought to have entitled it "Chips from an *Irish* workshop"? Oh, that would be a blunder, and a very funny one too; and how it would make people laugh, and what a fool they would take me to be!

Littré (*laughing*): Would that blunder be as great as any of your etymological blunders?

Max Müller: Come, come, Littré, you, of all men living, have no reason to rally me upon such blunders. Think only of your own etymologies: of *galetas, espiègle, boucher, charrue, poissarde, animal water, auteur, pater, garçon, Bacchus, ocean, eau, copie, corbeau, grisette, Avatar, Savitar,* with a great many others which Kavanagh has, by the applying of his principles, pointed out and corrected. Do not therefore, I say, banter me upon my etymologies. You have no right to do so.

Regnier: Gentlemen, no quarrelling, if you please. Let us be united, and do all that in us lies to keep Kavanagh's discovery from making a noise. We have for twenty years succeeded in doing so, and who knows but we may be as successful for another twenty years. And if we do not, what can we expect? To be put on one side; to be replaced by men of deep thought; by a Locke, a Condillac, a Thomas Reid, a Dugald Stewart, or a Rousseau; and there are, let me tell you, a few such fellows to be found in both the Institute and the Academy, though the public cannot be brought to think so. And if such men have not hitherto occupied them-

selves about the origin of ideas as signified by words, it was because they had no fixed rules by which they could be guided; and, as according to their philosophical and logical notions, there was nothing in the theories on language but uncertainty and confusion, they thought fit to abandon the solution of all difficult questions on this subject to such men as were, like ourselves, well got up in the common-place rudiments of schools and colleges, and who because not caring to pester their heads with ever thinking for themselves, know nothing more than what may be called a *routine* knowledge of things. But if any of those superior men—I do not mean the *routinists*—happened to hear of such a system of language as that of Kavanagh's, and the results already obtained through its means, they would, to a certainty, call for an inquiry, and have the whole affair sifted to the bottom; and this statement brings now to my mind a rather curious, and what I must call a very significant and intelligent dream which I had only last night.

Littré: Oh, you had a very significant and intelligent dream, eh! I should like to know if you were dreaming when you derived *Helios,* the *sun,* from ἕλη, a word meaning the light and heat of the sun; that looks very like an intelligent dream, eh! to take a derivative for an original. Oh! dear me! what next?

Max Müller: My dear Littré, you are very provoking, indeed you are. You who have yourself made so many blunders, should not——

Littré. Oh, beg pardon, my dear Muller; I forgot myself. You, too, derive the name of the sun from a word meaning the *light* and the *heat* of the sun! eh?

Müller: Of course I do, and so do all who have hitherto tried, but in vain, to discover the etymology of its name.

Regnier is not therefore more in fault than any one else. Of all things, however, the name of the sun should be the last to need an etymology; for the reason, that of all natural objects, it does certainly signify the one most known over the world. But the impossibility of finding such a word no other cause can, it seems to me, be assigned than that already stated by Kavanagh more than once; namely, that from the word serving to designate the sun being itself the source whence all words have drawn their existence, it cannot for this simple reason have an original; and if it were not the source of all words, its origin would, beyond all doubt, be now well known to every philologist. There can, surely, have never been a word without its etymology, and have not I already expressed myself somewhere to that effect? I mean in print.

Regnier: You have to be sure; I recollect it well; and Kavanagh, who takes advantage of every thing, quotes the passage in his first volume. You will find that it is where, alluding to *aham*, Sanskrit of the pronoun *I*, you say: "Though the etymology of *aham* is doubtful, it has never been doubtful to any scholar, that, *like all other words*, it must have an etymology [1]."

Max Müller: Ay, they are my words, and I cannot deny them, for they are true. But we must not forget that as every admission of this kind goes to prove the truth of Kavanagh's theory, it must not, for this reason, go beyond ourselves.

Messrs. Littré and Regnier: Oh never! never!

Max Müller: Ought we to take an oath, gentlemen, to bind us more strictly to secrecy?

Messrs. Littré and Regnier: Why should we? Where

[1] Origin of Language and Myths, vol. i. p. 118.

is the necessity? Is not our interest more binding than fifty oaths?

Max Müller: True, gentlemen, very true; I forgot that. But if it be observed that we stand by one another as we do, may it not be asserted that we constitute a *clique?*

Littré: But what of that? What wrong can there be in our constituting a *clique?* Are not all societies in the world composed of *cliques?* What is in England your House of Commons, or your House of Lords, but two fine bodies of *cliques?* So many parties in every such assembly, so many *cliques.* And what are all your holy and sanctified Bishops, pray, but a very well organized *clique?* How firmly they stood by one another when opposed to Colenso! Though this poor fellow had forty very enlightened clergymen on his side, there was not so much as one Bishop amongst them. And what were they who stood by Colenso? They were also a *clique,* and no way different from the one composed of Bishops but by their being a very noble and disinterested *clique;* they were men who, because opposed to the dignitaries of their Church, had nothing to gain, but who ran the risk of losing, perhaps, a great deal. There is, therefore, I say, nothing wrong in a *clique;* and as all societies have their *cliques,* why should our Academy or Institute be without one?

Max Müller: What are you thinking of, Regnier? You look very thoughtful.

Regnier: I am thinking of what Kavanagh once said to a friend of mine, when assured that unless he had some protectors in our *clique,* the Volney prize would never be awarded him, for the reason that with us all went by favour.

Messrs. Max Müller and Littré: And what did Kavanagh say to that?

Regnier: He declared that he had nothing to fear from the *clique*, that every member of the committee named for awarding the Volney prize is as strictly bound, as if on oath, to deliver his opinion conscientiously,—that is, as a man of honour and honesty.

Littré: What an egregious simpleton! Is there nothing the matter with the fellow's head? Has he never been in a lunatic asylum?

Regnier: I put that question to my friend, who assured me that he had also put it, but as delicately as he could, to Kavanagh himself. But he swore that he was not then mad, nor ever had been so.

Littré: Of course, of course, who ever heard of a madman admitting that he is or ever was mad? I have had, as a medical man of some experience, many of those unfortunate creatures under my especial care, and they were all in their own opinion as wise as Solomon himself——

Müller: But you must admit, my dear Littré, that Kavanagh has had like Hamlet, "method in his madness;" for how could he else detect——

Littré (*interrupting him*): So many of my mistakes you are going to say; but to which you may justly add, a few of your own gross blunders.

Regnier: No quarrelling, gentlemen, no quarrelling, I beseech you.

Littré: Ay, and his daring to take up any of our mistakes or blunders, affords proof the most evident that the fellow must have been mad. If he were not out of his mind how could he expect the Volney prize while Regnier and I, with others of our friends were on the

committee? We indeed should then be mad if we spoke of his work otherwise than as a compilation of blunders. I wonder some intelligent friend of his did not put him on his guard.

Müller: But several of his friends assured him that he would never get the prize if he noticed any of our mistakes.

Littré: In that his friends were right. But what did he say to that?

Müller: He declared that he apprehended no foul play, for the reason that the members of such a committee were each bound, as if on his oath, to deliver his opinion as his conscience dictated, and that if he did otherwise he would be no better than a perjurer and a robber; a perjurer because speaking contrary to what he sincerely believed, and a robber because depriving another of that to which he had a lawful right; and that if the law did not reach such offences they were not the less very grave crimes in the sight of heaven.

Littré: Oh, does the fellow believe in heaven? Another proof of his insanity.

Regnier: But, my dear Littré, Kavanagh is not, you must allow, entirely out of his mind when he lauds your dictionary to the heavens, as he frequently does.

Littré: No; he has, like all madmen, his moments of lucidity, and when he praises my dictionary he is certainly for the moment in his right mind, and both his judgment and taste may be then safely relied upon. But when he dares to take up any of our faults, he is then certainly mad, stark mad.—What are you taking a note of, Müller?

Müller: Only of that word *stark*. I mean to examine it when I have time, according to Kavanagh's principles.

He often alludes to its radical part *ark* in his etymology of *König*.

Littré: Then you sometimes try, I suppose, to make discoveries in language by the use of this fellow's principles?

Müller: I do so every day. Even this morning I have made two grand discoveries, etymologies of which Kavanagh himself would be proud.

Littré: And by his system?

Müller: Even so.

Regnier: And you could have never made them without his principles, eh?

Müller: Never; nor could any one else.

Messrs. Littré and Regnier: Let us hear them.

Müller: Not yet; some other time. Regnier, let us have your dream.

Regnier: No; give us your etymologies first, and you shall have my dream afterwards.

Müller: Well, be it so. On entering a coffee-house this morning to read the papers, the first I happened to cast my eyes on was the one styled the SPORT, and not knowing the etymology of this word, I applied Kavanagh's well-known rule, which says that the *i* is always understood with the *o* when it is not expressed. I therefore supplied the *i*, which brought sport equal to *spoirt*, and this, from a vowel being mostly always due between two consonants, gave *spoirit*. And what is *spoirit* but *spirit*, the *o* having been dropped? In Latin *spoiritus* must have therefore preceded *spiritus*. What is now, let me ask, a man of *sport?* He is a man of *spirit*. But what is the meaning of *spirit*? It means *wind*, *breath*, and hence *life*. And when in French you say of a man *qu'il a vécu*, what do you understand? A man who has

enjoyed *life*, a man who has had much *sport* in his time. *Sport* is therefore *liveliness*, and *liveliness* is *life*. Hence to be *lively* is to be full of *life*, and consequently full of *spirits* or *sport*. There is an etymology for you!

Littré: Yes, it is not bad; but it is no way difficult; any one could make it out as well as you, no more for that being required than to know that *o* has *i* understood when the latter is not expressed, just as *i* has *o* when *o* is not expressed. And when by this means you obtain *spoirt*, could not every one perceive in this form the word *spirit;* for that no more being needed than to drop the *o* and to insert an *i* between the *r* and *t*, according to the rule that two consonants may take a vowel between them. And does not every one know that to be in *spirits* is to be *all alive*—in short, to be *animated*.

Müller: You are right; than these few rules no more is needed to enable every one to discover the original of *sport*. But how were these few insignificant rules acquired? By having first known how man acquired the use of speech. And how very easy it must have been to obtain this knowledge! It was first of all only necessary to know that men in the beginning spoke to one another by signs, and that it was a sign made by the mouth gave birth to the first word ever spoken; for man having then uttered a sound for the sole purpose of drawing attention, while referring to the sun, to the rounding of his lips, heard invariably the same sound, that of O, which then became a word, and was soon understood by all to mean the sun. What can be more easily conceived than this? Yet thousands of years passed away without its having been hitherto discovered.

Regnier: And a few years more are likely to pass away before either the Institute or the Academy can be brought

to admit it. And why so? Because it is not their interest to do so; that is the chief reason. Their reputation as enlightened men would suffer from it; that is to say, they would be loaded with ridicule for not having admitted years ago what they would now admit.

Littré: It seems to me, Müller, that you are beginning to study and practise Kavanagh's principles more than your own and our interest should justify you in doing.

Müller: Be not alarmed. Our interest shall not suffer from what I know of his principles. I saw the reality of his discovery long ago; but I took care not to divulge it. If I had been such a fool, my lectures on the science of language, which have brought me in so large an amount of both money and fame, would have never been heard of. No man is, you know, obliged to cut his own throat.

Regnier: Very true; and it is very just. Self-preservation is the first law of nature.

Littré: Let us now have the other etymology, and Regnier will then give us his dream.

Müller: Well, I had no sooner discovered the primary signification of *sport*, than the French adverb *comme* attracted my notice. I saw at a glance that it did not differ from *homme* in form, for its *c* is here for the aspirate *h*, just as it is in *corne*, which is for *horn*. Don't interrupt me, gentlemen, pray don't. I perceive by your looks of astonishment that you are going to ask me what relationship can there possibly be between two ideas so different from each other as those expressed by *comme* and *homme*.

Regnier: Exactly so; that is what we want to know, and we feel already convinced that there can be no relationship whatever between these ideas, and that you cannot induce us to believe that there is any.

Müller: Don't be so very hasty, gentlemen, pray don't. Let me first ask you if you have any notion of the primary signification of *comme*.

Littré: I have given all its different forms in my dictionary, and that is all that I or any one else can know of it.

Regnier: I am of Littré's opinion, and what confirms my belief that we must be right is the fact that when we replace the word *comme* by *homme* in such a sentence as, "Je pense *comme* vous," we shall have, "Je pense *homme* vous," which has no sense. If we even take the original meaning of *homme*, that is, as Kavanagh has discovered, *one*, we shall have still no meaning; for what can we or any body else understand by such a sentence as, "Je pense *on* vous," or "Je pense *un* vous"? In English, "I think *man* you," or, "I think *one* you," is fully as void of meaning.

Müller: Very true, gentlemen, very true. But you forget what Kavanagh has clearly shown, namely, that the Latin of *homme*, that is, *homo*, means also *same*, as in *homo doxia, same opinion;* and *one* has also this meaning of *same*, since when we say, it is all *one*, our meaning is, it is all the *same*. Kavanagh has made all this very evident in his article under *Homo*. Hence, "Je pense *comme* vous" means literally, I think *same* you; that is, my thought and yours are the *same;* or, if you will, my thought and yours are *one*. How still more evident this etymology will become when we translate, "Je pense *comme* vous" into English, which is, I think *as* you; for what is this *as* but εἷς, which, when the sign of the aspirate is dropped, becomes *eis*, that is, *ois;* and, consequently, since *o* and *i* make *a*, *as*, which is a plain proof that *as* means *one*, and consequently *same*.

Littré: But you are missing a plainer proof, my dear Müller. Do you not see that our word *as* means *one*, since it is the French of the English word *ace?*

Müller: True, my dear friend, very true; I was overlooking that very plain proof.

Regnier: And you are still overlooking another very plain proof.

Müller: And what is it, pray? I like to be informed.

Littré: Do you not recollect how Kavanagh has several times shown, while quoting Parkhurst for his authority, that אישׁ *ais* means both *one* and *man?* And as a combination of vowels may be reduced to a single vowel, there can be no difference between *ais* and *as*.

Müller: Very correct; nothing can be more so.

Littré: And it would appear that this word *as* was once used in French instead of *homme;* for what is the *ois* of Fran*çois* and Angl*ois*, but *as*, the *o* and the *i* having coalesced and made *a?* And what is Fran*çois* and Angl*ois* but French*man*, English*man;* or, if you will, Franks-*man*, Angles-*man?*

Müller: How delighted Kavanagh would be to have all these additional and incontrovertible proofs of his etymology of *homo!*

Littré: Of course he would; but shall not we do all that in us lies to keep them for ever out of his reach?

Müller and Regnier: We shall, we shall; of that, my dear Littré, you may rest assured.

Littré: I thank you, my worthy friends, for this strong assurance of your attachment. I may, therefore, I suppose, give, in the forthcoming edition of my dictionary, the same etymology of *homme* and *homo*.

Regnier and Müller: Undoubtedly you may; not forgetting to repeat your observation that all who have

hitherto tried to discover the etymology of *homo* have tried in vain, and that there are only conjectures respecting its original meaning. Is not that what you say?

Littré: It is to that effect, if not my exact words.

Regnier: Well, let it be so still. Change nothing; let not the self-evident additional proofs we have just seen of the truth of Kavanagh's views have the least effect on you.

Littré: And are you and Müller of opinion that I ought to leave unnoticed and uncorrected all my other etymologies to which he has drawn attention?

Müller and Regnier: Certainly you ought, for you have now gone too far to draw back. Though, by the bye, some of your blun——beg pardon, your mistakes, I mean, are *un peu trop fortes*. Don't you think so, Müller?

Müller: Certainly I do. Especially his etymology of *galetas* is rather shocking, because put in the Preface as a specimen of his cleverness as an etymologist.

Regnier: That is a just observation. Why, in the name of goodness, have you put that word in the Preface as a specimen of your great discernment? In the body of your Dictionary it is bad enough, but in the Preface it is really astounding. Oh, there Kavanagh has you on the hip.

Littré: But as no one has hitherto been able to discover the etymology of *galetas*, is not that in my favour, and may it not induce many persons to suppose that Kavanagh has not perhaps discovered it any more than myself?

Regnier: Many of the persons who have not seen either his or your etymology of *galetas* may think so, seeing that you have a great name as a philologist, and

that he has none; but all persons who read the two etymologies of *galetas* must condemn yours and approve of his. About that there can be no doubt; for he gives rule and reason for whatever he advances, whereas you have nothing to support what you advance, if we except your taking the name of the tower *Galata* at Constantinople as the original of so common a word as *galetas*. And while Kavanagh is refuting so extraordinary a derivation, how many other curious and valuable etymologies start up, without being sought for, under his pen! My advice is, therefore, that you should keep quiet, for if you say any thing in defence of your views you will be crushed—crushed even to atoms.

Müller: The contest would not, moreover, be equal. Kavanagh has his rules—oh, confound those rules of his!—to support him, whereas our poor friend has, like all the philologists by whom he has been preceded, only conjectures and guesses to offer to help out his arguments. I am sorry, heartily sorry, that it is so, but it cannot now be helped. Let us, therefore, I say, keep quiet, and if questioned about Kavanagh's work, we are to affect the most complete ignorance respecting it, and declare that we know nothing at all about it; ay, and if necessary, even call upon heaven and earth as witnesses that we had not so much as heard of it before.

Regnier: Well, gentlemen, I think I may now tell you my dream.

Littré: No, no; this is no time for dreaming. We have something more serious to think of.

Müller: But allow me to tell you, my good friends, that all dreams are not to be slighted. I have had myself some very extraordinary dreams in my time: I once composed some beautiful verses while dreaming.

And that which astonished the most in those verses, and filled all who heard them with the greatest admiration, was their being so very logical and lucid.

Littré: And when you composed your lectures on the science of language, and made so many discoveries in etymology, were you dreaming?

Müller: No, I was wide awake.

Littré: What a pity it is you were not then dreaming! When you next write on the science of language, I would advise you to go to bed.

Müller: Come, Littré, leave off your jeering; *shut up!*

Littré: And what do you mean by *shut up?*

Müller: You are, to be sure, a pretty lexicographer, not to know the meaning of *shut up.* Why, it means "be silent," "cease talking."

Littré: Oh, I always thought that among friends the usual expression for that was, *hold your tongue.*

Müller: Yes, that locution did once exist, but it is now obsolete.

Littré: And how long since, pray?

Müller: Ever since *slang* has become the fashionable language of high life, I mean the language of our drawing-rooms and clubs, and that is now some twenty or thirty years. It may be a trifle more or less, I cannot say exactly.

Littré (*addressing Müller*): What two books are those which I see sticking out of your pockets behind?

Müller: They are only my "Chips from a German Workshop."

Regnier: But why do you carry such a work about with you? Its faults are even more glaring than those of your lectures on the science of language.

Müller: Yes, I think they are; but what of that?

Could not you and Littré very easily convince the Institute that this is by far my best work, and that since the prix Volney was awarded me for my lectures on the science of language, so ought it also to be awarded me for my "Chips from a German Workshop," because of its superior merit.

Regnier: Yes, I think we can very easily do that; Littré, what is your opinion?

Littré: My opinion is that we should wait a little longer, for as Kavanagh, in noticing the blunders of both the works, has had Müller so often on the hip, what would people say on now reading Kavanagh's work?

Müller: But if we succeed in having it damned as soon as it appears?

Regnier: Oh, in that case we can easily get the prize for your book. It will be presented rather late, as it has been in print some two or three years, and it will be contrary to rule to receive it. But we can easily overcome that little difficulty, on the ground that your "Chips from a German Workshop" is a work of merit so very extraordinary as to be greatly superior even to your lectures on the science of language.

Müller: Regnier, let us have your dream.

Regnier: But I can perceive that it annoys Littré.

Littré: No matter, go on; it won't last long, I hope.

Regnier: You must know, gentlemen, that I dined out yesterday——

Littré: You need not tell us that—we know it already, and all Paris knows it; there is a full account of it in several of the morning papers. The heading is "*Night Adventures of a Venerable Member of the Institute.*" They tell us how you spent the evening, or rather the whole

night, in an English house of Bacchanalian celebrity; and how, when trying to stand up and keep on your legs, you lost your balance, and, tumbling under the table, you nearly killed a poor Englishman who had been already lying there for some time.

Regnier: Oh, that is not true. It was the master of the house that fell on top of him while reaching me his hand to help me up. And I admit that the poor fellow may have been hurt, for I heard him groan most piteously: the master of the house, let me tell you, is a very heavy man. He is, without exaggeration, twice as big as I am.

Müller: I cannot account for a man of your mature age and high position as a member of the French Institute, being found associating with a set of drunken fellows.

Regnier: You must know, my dear Müller, that of all men I am one of the most abstemious; but I am just now composing a book which is to bear the title of "*English Life exactly and faithfully portrayed.*"

Littré: Why tell me, Regnier, what can you know about English life, you who have never been out of France?

Regnier: But what of that? Must authors be well acquainted with the subjects they have to write upon? If they never wrote but on that hard condition, there would be now very few books in the world. What do you know, for instance, about etymology? you cannot tell the primary signification of the most common-place words, and of which Kavanagh has given us numerous proofs; and yet you write upon it, and while doing so you speak very big, as if you knew all about it. In this respect you are only outdone by our worthy friend

Müller—but beg pardon, gentlemen; I can see by your looks that I have offended both of you. I did not, however, mean to do so. I wanted only to show how very unjust it would be to require of an author to make himself well acquainted with his subject before he set pen to paper—that was all, I can assure you. Now to return to my book upon English life: I wish you to know that I am having myself introduced to a great many English families, especially to such of them as are accustomed to live here just as they do when at home in merry old England. Yesterday I had the good fortune to be invited to dine and spend the evening with an excellent family of this class, and wishing to do like every one else, in order to become the better acquainted with English life, I partook, it must be admitted, much more of certain strong wines than I had ever partaken of before. The result was that I did fall under the table as already stated, but not on him who had fallen there before me. Let me now tell you how I so far forgot myself as——

Littré: To fall under the table.

Regnier: Here is how it happened: The master of the house, though rather fond of his glass, is a very learned, and, what is better, a very clever man. We discoursed on many curious subjects, and finally on the nature of human speech and its origin, when Kavanagh's system came up. How heartily he joined with me in laughing at the idea of deriving all words from the name of the sun! "But the sun itself," he asked, "after what was it called according to this madman? He cannot tell, nor can any one else; and this he assigns as a proof that his discovery must be real. It is very easy to trace the name of the sun from one language to another,

but to find out after what it was man first named it appears rather difficult. We have not yet made this discovery, but we have not given it up. By dint of hard thinking we may at length light upon it, and when we do, then Kavanagh's system will be blown up, and all his etymologies along with it. But how extraordinary!" he exclaimed, "that up to the present day no one has been able to tell after what idea the sun was first called! Has no great philologist even dared to guess what may have been the origin of its name?" "There have not been merely guesses," I answered, "but positive statements as to the origin of its name, and according to which it is traced, not only to its own light and heat, but even to a word signifying *sunburnt*." On hearing me make this statement, he looked rather displeased, and gave me to understand that he was not joking, and that he thought I should not, any more than himself, mix up pleasantry with our discussion, which he suggested ought to be treated very seriously, the subject being in his opinion one of great interest. I assured him that I was not joking, but in earnest, and of which I could convince him at the instant if he would only show me his Greek dictionary, there being scarcely a work of this kind which did not give such an etymology of the name of the sun as the one I just mentioned. On being thus persuaded he stood up, and placing his hands on his sides as if to keep them from splitting, he gave so loud a laugh as to make several sportsmen at the other end of the table start, and ask, with a look of wonder, what could be the cause of so terrific an explosion of merriment on the part of their host; but on being informed that our conversation was about words, their look of wonder was suddenly changed for one of pity, as if they found it difficult to

conceive how two men who had passed the meridian of life could discourse on a subject so very silly as that of language, at a time when all minds were wholly engrossed respecting the probable winner of the Derby, and the great boat-race then about to take place between Oxford and Cambridge.

Now during this very exciting discussion, which lasted at least a full hour, I was constantly obliged to moisten my lips and my palate, just as if I were giving a public lecture; and as the master of the house never allows water on his table after dinner, having, he said, through his knowledge of chemistry discovered that it weakens both brandy and wine, I was necessarily obliged—but greatly against my will, I assure you—to put up with wine. It was a hard case, you will say, but there was no help for it. The wine, however, seemed very good; and I kept sipping it, and sipping it so often—but it was only for moistening my lips and my palate, you know—that when I tried to stand I could not, for the life of me, keep on my legs, and so, losing my balance, I tumbled headlong under the table. It was then that the master of the house while helping me to rise fell rather heavily on the poor fellow who had been sleeping there very quietly for some time. I suggested that we should rouse him up, but the master of the house objected, remarking that it would be much better to let him have his sleep out, for he had been drinking hard for the last three nights, and that he now needed rest, as he was to be in London in two days' time to assist at a Temperance Society of which he hoped to be elected the president. "And no man," said the master of the house, "can be more deserving of so high a place, for the reason that no one has hitherto either written or spoken

so forcibly against our tolerating the lower orders of our countrymen to be allowed the free use of intoxicating drinks, nothing being more degrading," he observed, "than drunkenness. As to our friend passing his night under a table, that is nothing at all, he is used to it, and so is every one of us. I have, for my own part, slept many a long night under a table. But this friend of mine is a very poor toper; he is generally floored after no more than five or six bottles of port or sherry; but that wild bluff-looking fellow whom you see yonder at the end of the table could take a dozen bottles before he fell; he is a famous fox-hunter, perhaps the best horseman in the kingdom, but he has had so many falls, and has met with so many accidents, that there is scarcely a limb in his body that has not been broken and set several times. He has now only his neck to dispose of. The gentleman you see next him is an officer in Her Majesty's Service. He is allowed to be a firstrate shot, and to be as clever with the sword as he is with the pistol. He has about five or six duels on his hands every year, and he always comes off victorious. But the law in England is so severe against duelling that he is always obliged to settle such affairs abroad." "Then you have him over here, I suppose, every time he has an affair of honour on his hands." "Oh no," said mine host; "he generally waits until he has some four or five such affairs to settle, and then he and his antagonists come here by mutual agreement, and so he finishes them all off at the same time. By this method he is spared the trouble and the expense of travelling to the Continent so often in the year." "And who is this tall gentleman," I asked, "whose look is so very grand and imposing?" "He is a fine orator, sir, a member of the House of Commons, and bids

fair to become, some two or three years hence, the Prime Minister of England."

Just as mine host finished this account of his guests the Member of Parliament stood up, and looking at his watch, said: "Gentlemen, it is, I perceive, past two o'clock; I beg to retire, for I must leave Paris early to-morrow in order to be at my place in the House to-morrow evening." "Then," said the fox-hunter, "let us all retire and have a little sport before going to bed." To this proposal no objection being raised we all went out together, and the master of the house saying he would like a mouthful of air before lying down came out also, being so kind, on perceiving that I was not yet very steady on my legs, as to lend me his arm. As the apartment in which we had been carousing happened to be on the ground-floor, we all reached the street without accident. But now my English friends seemed to be no longer the same individuals; the open air gave them a new existence. They ran about in all directions, and kept shouting, singing, and dancing as they ran, but no two appeared to have the same taste: the fox-hunter putting himself on all fours, and running while in this position almost as fast as a horse, imitated so well the cry of a whole pack of hounds in full chase, that if you did not see the performer you might suppose yourself at a hunt. The great duellist owned a very different sort of taste. His frolic consisted in pulling hard at the bells of doctors, chemists, and midwives, all of whom were thus aroused from their beds, and on their appearing they were sent off in different directions to houses, where he very gravely assured them their services were then loudly called for. "But where is our friend the Member of Parliament?" I asked mine host, who was still very kindly lending me the support

of his arm. "Do you not see him over the way," he said, "tugging with all his might at the knocker of that great door?" "But for what purpose?" I asked. "Why to wrench it off, to be sure, and take it home with him to London, as a trophy and a souvenir of his visit to Paris." On expressing my astonishment that a Member of Parliament should so amuse himself, he begged me to observe that when an orator has been for a couple of hours on his legs, or has for that long space been taking notes, and preparing his reply to some other orator, his mind must be all the while most painfully on the stretch, and hence it needs relaxation on his leaving the House. "Our friend has already wrenched some twenty or thirty knockers off doors in London when returning home late at night from his parliamentary duties. This habit has now grown upon us to such an extent as to seem quite natural, so that we cannot even in foreign countries leave it off. Do you hear how our friend over the way puffs and blows at that French knocker? The job does not appear to be a very easy one; let us go over and lend him a hand." "Oh not for the world; I beg to be excused. With us such a prank, would, in the eye of the law, be regarded as house-breaking, and if I were found assisting or looking on, I should, to a certainty, be arrested as an accomplice, and so be ruined for life." "Nonsense," said my English friend, "come along;" and so saying, he began to drag me along with him; but as he did not happen to be much more steady on his legs than I was myself, he fell heavily on the hard ground, drawing me on top of him; but as I succeeded in getting up first, I ran away from him towards home as fast as I could, not waiting even to look for my hat, which flew off my head as I fell, and

was blown by the wind I knew not whither. I had not, however, gone far before I fell again. But by grasping a lamp-post, to which I had crept on all fours, I succeeded, without any other assistance, in getting once more on my feet. My first care on rising was to look back and see that I was not pursued by any of my English friends. It afforded me no small relief on perceiving that not one of them was in sight, and so I went merrily on, singing and whistling by turns, as if feeling delighted at having escaped, with only the loss of an old hat, from the dangerous company I had been in. But I could not now tell where I was; I had evidently gone astray, and as all Paris was still in bed, there was yet nobody to guide me towards my own neighbourhood. In this bewildered state I kept wandering about the silent streets, falling occasionally, and rising each time to my legs with no other assistance than that of a lamp-post. At length as the dawn began to appear I met with some individuals, who, on looking at me, would laugh in my face, chuck me under the chin, tap me on my bald head, and ask me where and with whom I had passed the night. These familiar tricks and jests so annoyed me that, as well as I can now recollect, I forgot myself so far as to knock one of the fellows down, who, on rising, had dared to return the blow. Of course he would not have presumed to do so had he known I was a member of the Institute. It seems that I then became insensible, and so remained for some time. When I recovered my senses I found myself in bed, and heard the doctor of the neighbourhood—who had been called in—say, that I had been only stunned by a fall or a blow, and that then there was nothing at all the matter with me. The late ridiculous follies of which I had been an unwilling

witness, now rushed to my mind, and as I feared that they might remain with me all night, and so become a disagreeable dream, I began, in order to banish every recollection of them, to think of something else, and for this purpose I tried once more—and now perhaps for the twentieth time—to discover, if possible, the idea after which the sun was first called. But wearied out with thinking, and still with thinking in vain, I at length fell fast asleep, when I had the following very singular dream: —Methought that we three, with all our friends of the Academy and the Institute had met in a great hall, to hear a discourse just then about to be delivered, on Kavanagh's pretended discovery of the origin of language and myths. The lecturer, a tall man, whose look if expressive of strict justice was not less so of severity, began in the following manner—and, as if he were angry, in no very gentle tone of voice—his discourse.

"GENTLEMEN,—The subject of the Lecture I am now about to deliver happens to be one of much more than usual importance, and of this you will yourselves be at once convinced by a careful study of the work I have here before me, and which is entitled '*The Origin of Language and Myths.*' Nor should this title, though apparently a rather bold one, be any way different from what it is, the author's presumption in adopting it in preference to any other title being fully justified by almost every page of his two volumes. All the nations of the earth have the use of speech, but, strange to say, we have only now been told in what way this great faculty, which shows how wide the difference between man and the brute creation, was first acquired. And can any thing be more easily conceived than that men must have first, as the

author proves, expressed their ideas by signs? And, this being granted, does it not as easily follow, since words are sounds, and since sounds can be produced by the voice, that man's first word must have come to him through a sign made by the mouth? And when it is observed that the mouth, however we may twist it or turn it about, can represent no other significant figure than that of a circle, how easily we are led to suppose that it must have been while man was signifying the sun by the rounding of his lips he obtained the name of this object, and consequently his first word, the least sound he uttered at the time for drawing attention by the noise so produced to the object his sign was representing, being always sufficient to allow him to hear O. The author has had no more than this sign to work upon, and he has worked upon it, has shown how the whole of human speech has grown out of it, just as the geologist has shown from a single bone the form of an animal which must have once existed, though every vestige of that animal's name and its race has for a great many ages been forgotten.

"The author of this work has turned the knowledge he has obtained of man's first word to some account. It has enabled him to show how nations 'so low in the scale of humanity as to be incapable of reckoning beyond duality,' could each of them make a language of its own, and that too very easily, no mental effort, no ingenuity whatever being required for so great an achievement. This is made so very evident that no one who reads with any share of attention the first sixteen pages of his work can entertain a doubt of its reality. If there were even a nation of born idiots, we could conceive them capable of making a complete language of their own, the task would be so uncommonly easy for a people entirely dumb and, as it were,

still in their infancy; though we can safely assume that such a task could not now be performed by the most learned body of men in the world. And what can show more forcibly the infinite wisdom of an almighty Being than His thus giving to His creatures, while yet in a state so very low as to be scarcely in point of intelligence above the brute creation, the means of achieving without effort, and even unknown to themselves, the greatest of all wonders, namely, the formation of language?

"It is true, as our author admits, that three very eminent men preceded him in stating that the language of signs must have been known before that of sounds; but those eminent men never suspected that it was through a sign made by the mouth while pointing to the sun that language came into existence. And that such is the real origin of human speech is shown very clearly by this simple fact, that language has been always supposed to have emanated from a divine source; for the sun being the earliest object worshipped as God over all the world, and words being at first, as they are still in China, of only one syllable each, they must, in addition to whatever else they were made to signify, have appeared to have all, when radically considered, only one meaning—that of the name of the sun. Hence the belief that God was the WORD; and as men in the beginning called the sun their maker, just as we do now call the Deity our MAKER, that accounts in very ancient times for the belief that all things were made by the WORD, that is, by the sun, this object and the WORD being then regarded as one and the same.

"This much serves to prove that language must have grown out of the name of the sun, which leads necessarily to the conclusion that if the name of the sun be really

the origin of language, this name can itself have no original; but if an original can be found for it, this will go to prove that it cannot possibly be the origin of human speech, nor any thing more than a derivative. The question now to be solved is this, Can there be found in any language in the world an idea from which any word designating the sun can have been derived? Does any gentleman present feel disposed to answer that question?" Here the lecturer paused as waiting for a reply; and as he looked towards where I sat, he drew the eyes of the whole assembly upon me, so that I could not but answer: "Sir," said I, "I can perceive that you, and probably all who are here present, expect from me a solution of the difficulty in question. All I can say, sir, on this subject is, that I have my doubts if the sun was really ever called after either its own light or heat, which is, I believe, the only etymology hitherto given of its name. I have myself given this etymology of the name of the sun, as the author whose work forms the subject of your lecture does not fail to observe, but I have taken care to express a doubt as to its soundness. I am now looking out for a better etymology of the name of the sun, nor do I despair of finding one, for every word must, as M. Max Müller justly admits, have an etymology, and of all words those signifying the sun in the many known languages over the world should certainly be the last to want their etymology, the object they designate being so well known to every one, and so constantly admired. If I should, however, fail after some months of incessant thinking and research to make this discovery, I intend to suggest to both the Institute and the Academy, that they should offer a prize of a few thousand francs to any one who might be the first to discover the idea after which the

sun was called. And such a prize could not fail to do much good, for with regard to language it would lead to no small share of inquiry, and such inquiry as would, in all probability, throw a great deal of light on the science of philology."

"Then you do, M. Regnier, verily believe that the primary signification of the name of the sun may be one day discovered?"

"Certainly I do; for if the sun was not called after either light or heat, it must surely have been called after something else."

"I agree with you there, M. Regnier, unless its name be the source whence all language has emanated, in which case the name of the idea after which it was first called cannot possibly be discovered."

Now, methought the lecturer wished to know from M. Littré his opinion respecting the name of the sun. "I know," said Littré, "that our word *soleil* is, not to mention its dialectical variations, radically the same as *sol* in Latin, as *helios* in Greek, and that it has in Hebrew and its dialects forms which are still radically the same, such as *el, al, hel, hol, bel, bal,* &c.; and no more than this needs be known. Conjectures on such a subject lead to nothing worth acquiring. Give to me what is positive, material, in short; for I am, sir, as every one knows, perhaps the most obstinate of all living materialists."

"So I have heard, M. Littré, and I am sorry for it; not in a religious point of view, for the man who is, unfortunately, so deficient in mind as not to have by reasoning the power of convincing himself that there must be an existence beyond the grave cannot have the power of admitting the reality of an important discovery, which always requires an intelligence of more than ordi-

nary depth. But I can prove to you, though I may not convince you of it, that there must be a state beyond the grave, even a state of rewards and punishments; and this is how I can prove it. This world, though it must have been made by an almighty Power, is far from being a perfect state. And why so? Because the Power that brought it into existence never meant it to be perfect; for if it were in all respects perfect it would be then a heaven, in which case its creatures could not—because having never been unhappy—well know what happiness is. Why, now, are the innocent so often made to suffer through life and the guilty to prosper? Because it belongs to our present imperfect state. But, notwithstanding this imperfection, we see enough to feel thoroughly convinced that the mighty Power which made all and governs all must be one of infinite wisdom; and as this cannot be denied, what follows? That He must be infinitely just. But why so? Because infinitely wise; for where there is infinite wisdom, there must be infinite justice. Hence, he who suffers unjustly while in this life will be amply rewarded in the next, whilst he who has passed through life in doing wrong will hereafter be punished, but with mercy, which implies that a chance will be given him of living over again until he has fully atoned for the past, and so have wrought his own salvation. There must be, therefore, I say, a state beyond the grave—a state of rewards and punishments—otherwise God would be unjust, and this is not in His power, because of His infinite wisdom. And such, sir, is my philosophy."

Littré listened, I thought, with some attention to this discourse, at the close of which he said, "Well, sir, your philosophy is not so very bad, I have heard a great deal worse in my time; I mean to think a little on it."

"I hope you will," said the lecturer, "and that by doing so you may enlarge your mind to such a degree as to enable you to admit the reality of the important twofold discovery to which the author who is the subject of my lecture lays claim."

"That is hoping for a little too much," said Littré. "For the last thirty years, sir, I have been rather seriously inclined. There was a time when I used to read more for amusement than information, but that happy time has long since gone by; if it should, however, return, and that in my second childhood I shall call for a work that will make me laugh, I shall very likely look into the book you refer to—but not until then. There are few things that amuse me more than *presumption*."

Here methought our friend Müller stood up, and referring to the last word uttered by Littré, he said, "Sir, *presumption* has upon me an effect very different from that which it has upon my worthy and learned friend M. Littré. Presumption can never make me laugh; it fills me with pity, it distresses me beyond the power of words to express. I never visit a lunatic asylum—never—never. And why so? Because the sight of its unfortunate inmates would distress me too much; it would break my heart, it would kill me outright, I am sure it would, for such is my nature. I wish I had sterner feelings, for then I should not suffer as I do for the misfortunes of my fellow-creatures. Now, what difference is there between the man of very great presumption and the inmate of a lunatic asylum? There is, you will say, a considerable difference; and so there is. But on whose side does the advantage lie? They are both madmen, but the unfortunate maniac appears to be very happy in his madness; he believes himself, perhaps, the Saviour of

the world, or the pope, or some great king, emperor, or sultan, and he generally lives and dies while entertaining these agreeable delusions. But this cannot be said of him who is over-presumptuous. After a time, when he is, for his disgusting self-esteem, overwhelmed with ridicule and severe reproach, or, what is worse than all, silent contempt, he sees how foolish he has been, for then common sense returns, and his state of mind is to be pitied; oh, it grieves me to think of what he then must feel! I cannot bear to picture to myself his sufferings, the idea of them is much more than I can bear."

At this part of his discourse, methought that Müller appeared unable to proceed; and drawing his left hand across his eyes as if to wipe away a tear, he let the other fall dejectedly by his side, and so he remained for a minute or two silent. In several parts of the assembly there was a murmur of applause; but one gentleman, whose look wore, I thought, a very arch smile, whispered to those who sat near him, that Müller was certainly a clever man, and that his conduct on the present occasion reminded him of that of Ulysses when contending with Ajax for the armour of Achilles. But our friend having, as if with a strong effort, mastered at length his emotion, he thus resumed: "But however I may feel, sir, for the unfortunate author whom your too generous nature has this day tempted you to take under your humane protection, I am not less bound to feel for myself and the public, for there is great truth in that old saying, '*que la charité bien ordonnée commence chez soi,*' a maxim to which, alas! I seldom adhere, being always through the weakness of my nature much more inclined to feel for others than I am for myself. It is wrong, very wrong, I know it is; but what can I do? It is not now in my

power to change my nature. On the present occasion I am not, however, going to plead solely for myself, but rather for others. Please to observe that there are thousands upon thousands who are fully impressed with the truthfulness of my lectures on the Science of Language. And this being undeniable, ask yourself if it be at all conceivable that a philologist closely connected with all the scientific bodies over every part of the civilized world can have possibly made the mistakes, nay, the blunders, the gross blunders, he is so foolishly represented by your most extraordinary *protégé* to have made. Then please to remark, sir, how wide the difference between this man and myself. I do not deny him the right of being regarded as a human being, any more than I deny a cobbler or a scavenger that right. But can I go any farther? I am afraid, greatly afraid, that I cannot. But who is this man? Whence did he emanate? Is he a German? Was he born and bred in the noble fatherland of science and philology? No, no; but judging from his reckless, wild, and mad presumption, it were much more reasonable to suppose him an escaped Bedlamite; yet he has not even this merit, for Bedlam is in England. Then, is he not an Englishman? No, no; he is not even so much as an Englishman; nor even so much as a Frenchman. Then, whence does he come? You, sir, who have, because made blind by your extreme kindness of heart, taken this would-be philologist under your protection, I beg you to know, and so do I beg all the enlightened persons here assembled to know, that he is only an Irishman! no more, I assure you. I see you gentlemen all around me start; and your looks so expressive of wonder seem to exclaim, Is it possible? seem to ask me if I can be very certain of what I state? and

may I not have been imposed upon by some idle report? But what I assert is the naked truth; I have received the information from so trustworthy an authority that it cannot be contradicted. Now, sir, are you not convinced that the work you are lecturing upon can be no better than a compilation of sheer nonsense? Who, let me ask you, has ever before heard of an Irish philologist? And only think of his mad pretensions. He dares to call in question not only the truth of my etymologies, but also those of Grimm, Bopp, Popp, with all the glorious philological fraternity of fatherland. Talk of presumption! compared to such audaciousness as this, all other kinds of presumption may very well pass for modesty itself. Then, apart from his being only an Irishman, who is this individual of such daring pretensions? He is nothing, sir, nothing whatever. He has no friend, no protector, either in or out of the press; he stands absolutely alone. The subject of your lecture, sir, is therefore a shadow, and nothing more. But a shadow can, it appears, grow mad as well as a solid substance; and what a painful proof of this fact is afforded us by this man's egregious folly in risking his hard earnings, as I have been assured, of many years in publishing this wild production of his? He saw long ago, and he saw truly, for he was not then, it seems, in so complete a state of dementation as he has been since, that no publisher in all Christendom would risk, in so fruitless a speculation, the large sum that would be required for the printing of his work. Hence, he began to hoard up, unknown to every one, even to his own family, every shilling he could possibly spare until he had at length amassed the necessary quantum. And so he leaves Paris, where he had been earning just enough to keep the wolf from the door, and makes his way to

London for the sole purpose, I may say, of scattering it all to the winds. Now, if this wild goose chase after glory be not a freak of madness, even of stark madness, I feel myself bound to confess that if I had to give my idea of madness, the definition would be found very imperfect.

"Now, sir, though you must be, I am sure, from what I have stated, convinced that the individual upon whose work you are delivering this lecture is no way deserving of your generous protection; yet I cannot help giving you a still more convincing proof of this fact than you have yet heard. But what I am going to say will cause me very great pain; and why so, you will ask? Because it will oblige me to say something to my own advantage, and this will distress me exceedingly, for I feel more inclined to shun praise than to seek it; but such has been always my natural disposition, and I cannot now change it; I wish I were like others, then being under the disagreeable necessity of saying any thing in my own praise would not distress me as it does.

"First of all, sir, I beseech you to cast a mere glance over the title-page of my lectures on the 'Science of Language,' and then over that of the work you have taken, out of pity, I suppose, under your protection; the one title-page, I am ashamed to tell you which it is, looks for all the world like a mighty forest rich in noble trees and plants odoriferous; and the other, pray what does it resemble? a sorry desert, rich only in its miserable sterility. And do not suppose, dear sir, that I could not increase the title-page of my work to double its present length; but my natural disposition would not allow me to proceed any farther, so greatly am I disposed to shun praise rather than to seek it.

"Then mark the unprecedented sale of my lectures, 3000 copies every edition! And how many editions of it have there been already thrown off? I am sure I cannot say. The edition noticed by your would-be philologist was the fifth, and that was some two or three years ago; I cannot say how many there may have been since. And if you ask me how many translations there have been made of it, I am equally at a loss to tell you. Never before did a work of the kind obtain so wide a circulation. As to the many learned reviews given of it, they must, I should say, be countless. Then please to note well my position before the world: I am a leading professor at Oxford, and from my being very learned in Sanskrit my friends forced me, but greatly against my will, to put myself forward as a candidate for the professorship of that language, and also for its literature, with which I am equally well acquainted. On that occasion that mighty and truthful organ of public opinion which has never been known to bestow its praise on the undeserving, wrote a leading article so much in my favour as to assert—and every assertion made by the *Times* may be relied upon as safely as if made upon oath—that I was the very best Sanskrit scholar then living or then in all England; I cannot call to mind the exact words, for praise, of which I have had already, on account of my great success as a philologist, so large a surfeit, is no longer agreeable to me, my nature being, as I said awhile ago, to shun praise rather than to seek it.

"Nor should I here, sir, however repugnant it may be to my feelings, omit to call your attention to the eulogium adjudged by the *Times* in its issue of November 20, 1856, to my discovery of the real origin of myths. This eulogium you will find in its notice of the Oxford and

Cambridge Essays, and it is in the following words: 'After showing that the real difficulty does not consist so much in the fact of the propagation of myths by tradition as in explaining how they arose at all, Professor Max Müller proceeds to find the solution in comparative philology.' Referring again, sir, to this important discovery, the *Times* has also in the same article the following: 'In our opinion, though not the most popular, this is the most masterly of these Essays. It is original in its turn of thought and application; a new ship launched on a new ocean, which has sailed over and come back bringing new treasures from unknown shores.' You will admit, sir, I know you will, that if I were fond of praise, as most men are, I ought to be one of the happiest men living, but with me it has not that effect. Such is my nature.

"Please now to observe that as far back as the year 1850, your would-be philologist has been sending to the French Institute (as a candidate for the prix Volney) works on the origin of language and myths, and that they have been always regarded as so much waste paper; whilst my lectures on the science of language have, as soon as presented, received this glorious prize. Yet in the very face of this acknowledgment, and which has been made by the most learned, just, and impartial body of men in the world, he has the presumption to treat all my etymologies as so many gross blunders! His presumption leads him even so far as to make a wager of ten to one (1000 francs to 100) that he has really made the discovery of the origin of language; and he has the front thus to defy not only me but any member of the Academy or the Institute. If this be not the very acme of presumption, I should like some one to let me know what

presumption is. His conduct in thus presuming to suppose that gentlemen so much his superiors in all respects, should notice the challenge of any one so greatly below them, affords another extraordinary instance of the fellow's presumption. It reminds me of a fable called *The Eagle and the Sparrow*. The sparrow is, you must know, a very sensitive and pugnacious little fellow, and having once, as he thought, received a slight insult from the eagle, he commissioned one of his friends to wait upon the royal bird with a challenge, written out in due form, and in which he defied him to mortal combat. The eagle, on receiving the epistle, and having learned from the messenger before opening it that it did really contain a challenge, at once imagined that it must have come from some noble bird deserving of his notice, but on reading the name of his would-be antagonist, he burst out laughing, and that was all the satisfaction poor Pierreau's offended dignity ever received from the king of birds. Now not until your *protégé* becomes as distinguished among philologists as the eagle is among birds, can he expect from me or any of my friends of the Academy or the Institute a more satisfactory answer to his paltry challenge than a hearty laugh."

Here, methought, our friend Müller paused for a moment; and, as if strongly impressed with the belief that his discourse was received by the lecturer and every one present as very satisfactory and conclusive on all points, he observed as follows: "Sir, I have, I perceive, convinced you, perfectly convinced you, that the author—if author he may be called—of '*The Origin of Language and Myths*' has made a most grievous mistake—indeed, I might say, if I were not so inclined to be merciful, an unpardonable mistake—in having presumed to call in

question the truth of the scientific opinions of not only myself but of several other very eminent men. Now, sir, I must in concluding take the liberty of beseeching you to grant me one great favour,—only one, sir, and it is simply this, that in the severe chastisement with which I know you are about to visit this man who has so grossly imposed by his pretensions on your generous nature, and so shocked public opinion by having dared to think and judge of my works differently from the learned of all Europe and America, you will be merciful, at least so much so as not to drive him to an act of desperation; for however low he stands as a philologist he is not the less a human being, and is not, probably, as utterly devoid of feeling as he is of common sense. Do, therefore, I beseech you, dear sir, have mercy on him."

As he uttered the latter words, both his look and his voice bespoke great tenderness of heart; and I could hear many say, as he sat down, "How compassionate!" But the man whom Müller reminded of Ulysses, as I have already said, did not use the expression "how very compassionate!" but instead of it he said—and with the same arch smile as before—"How very clever!" Even the lecturer, methought, had just such another smile on his countenance as he thus addressed our friend:—

"Your merciful indulgence, sir, towards the author of '*The Origin of Language and Myths*' is highly commendable; and the more so as he has shown little or no pity for you, but has dared to criticize your beautiful etymologies with as much freedom as if you were not a German, or any thing better than an Englishman or a Frenchman. Even the grand title-page of your lectures, in which your connexion with all the scientific bodies

over the wide world is so beautifully set forth, and of which the sight ought to have filled him with awe, appears to have had no effect on him whatever. Was there ever any thing like it? Even your being a professor at Oxford, your being accustomed to hold forth at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, your being on the *Times*, your being recommended by that mighty organ of public opinion to Oxford for the professorship of Sanscrit, your having taken the trouble to recommend yourself on the occasion in a leading article of the same mighty organ; all these circumstances ought to have made some impression on the impenetrable soul of the author of '*The Origin of Language and Myths;*' but no, they have been unheeded by him, and this may account for his having dealt with your etymologies so unmercifully. But ought not, every one will say, your having gained the Volney prize to have deterred him from finding the least fault with those etymologies, since it was through their having been found so very perfect and original that the golden medal was awarded you by the enlightened and conscientious members of the committee. They were of course filled with admiration on beholding your grand discoveries in philology; never could they have known, but for you, that the English word '*soul* was named after the tossed-about waters of the sea,' and that the sea itself, under its Latin form *mare*, was called after *death*, such being the meaning of a Sanscrit word which is very much like it. How natural these etymologies must have appeared to the members of the committee when compared with those given by the author who is the subject of my lecture! Thus, instead of showing, as he ought of course to have done, that the English word *soul* means the tossed-about waters of the sea, he proves

by the principles of his pretended discovery that it is radically the same as *sufflatus* in Latin and *souffle* in French, and that it consequently means *breath*, just as its equivalent forms in Hebrew, Greek and Latin do, as every one knows. It seems that the etymology of this English word *soul* has been more difficult for all classes of philologists than the corresponding form in any other language, with the exception perhaps of its German representative *seele*, which is evidently the same word. How very thankful all Germany ought therefore to be to you, M. Max Müller, for giving them the real origin of *seele*, since, from its being equal to *soul*, it must have also the meaning of the 'tossed-about waters of the sea,' and not *breath*, as the author of '*The Origin of Language and Myths*' has the temerity to assert in opposition to so high an authority as yourself. But your recommending him to mercy obliges me to look over his wild blundering on this occasion as well as on the many other occasions in which he is equally severe upon your etymologies, and of which every one is, according to the principles of his strange discovery, shown to be a very gross mistake. But who will believe him? For who can suppose that a person who is only an Irishman can compete with the learned philologists not only of England and France but, what is a vast deal more, all Germany, not even omitting yourself, you who are now allowed to be the greatest philologist in the whole world. The man must surely be mad; presumption so very extraordinary cannot be otherwise accounted for.

"Then please to notice his pretending to have discovered not only the origin of language but even of myths. But it is clearly shown by the *Times* in its notice of the Oxford and Cambridge Essays, in its number dated 20th of No-

vember, 1856, that you, sir, and not this wild Irishman, have been the real discoverer; for is it not there stated, in this great organ of public opinion, that your 'Essay is *original* in its turn of thought and application; a *new* ship launched on a *new* ocean, which has sailed over and come back bringing *new* treasures from *unknown* shores.' And why does the *Times* speak thus so highly of your Essay? Because you have found 'the solution of myths in philology.' It is true that the very same solution was found some short time before you, but so very short a time as to be undeserving of attention; it did not make more than some ten or twelve years, and so short a space could give no right to an Irishman when so great a man as a German puts in his claim as the original discoverer. In 1850 the author upon whom I am delivering this lecture sent to the French Institute a memoir entitled '*Origin of Language and Myths*,' which is also the title of his present work. In 1856 he changed this title to '*Myths traced to their Primary Source through Language*,' of which the *Times* received a copy as soon as it appeared, and that happened to have been many months anterior to the Oxford and Cambridge Essays. This copy was, no doubt, sent by the *Times* to you, sir, to know if it were at all worthy of notice, for it is you who review all such works for the great organ of public opinion; but you would not condescend to look at it, it was not at all deserving of your attention, so that I may safely conclude that you had never heard how the origin of myths was discovered until by your profound knowledge of the origin of language and its principles you had made that discovery yourself. All this can be easily conceived, for it is implied by the passage from the *Times* when it likens, as we have just seen, your Essay to a '*new* ship

launched on a *new* sea,' and bringing back after its voyage '*new* treasures from *unknown* shores.'

"Now, who dares, after this positive statement, to doubt your discovery of the origin of myths? But in this Oxford and Cambridge Essay of yours, you praise the wonderful wisdom of the *Times*, just as the *Times* praises the wonderful originality of your Essay. Your words are: 'Have we not been told that there is *more wisdom* in the *Times* than in Thucydides[2]?' Who doubts it? Do you not yourself write for the *Times;* and does not this simple fact afford sufficient proof of its great wisdom? Whenever your learned articles appear in the mighty organ of public opinion, must not every one on reading them exclaim, 'How wonderful the wisdom of the *Times!*'"

Here, methought, our friend Müller did not seem pleased at its being thus made known to the assembly that he had spoken of the *Times* so very favourably in his Oxford and Cambridge Essay, as this might induce the evil-minded to think that if he praised the *Times* it was that the *Times* might praise his Essay. But the lecturer, in order to remove every such suspicion of collusion, begged the assembly to observe that "it would be as unjust to suppose that the honourable Oxford professor and the *Times* acted collusively as to suppose that M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire and M. Max Müller did also act collusively because M. Max Müller praises M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire's work on "Buddha and his Religion," and M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, who is a distinguished member of the Institute, writes very fine reviews in the *Journal des Savants* on M. Max Müller's lectures on the "Science of Language." And that these

[2] Essay, p. 3.

lectures must be perfect," said the lecturer, with a smile, "is proved by the fact that M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire never writes so much as one word in his reviews against them, any more than M. Max Müller writes, in his 'Chips from a German Workshop,' so much as one word against M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire's work on 'Buddha and his Religion.' We are therefore bound to admit," continued the lecturer, with a smile, "that these two works are faultless, each of the disinterested reviewers having, of course, delivered his opinion with the utmost impartiality, and as his conscience dictated.

"And now, M. Max Müller, if you wanted to prove to all the learned bodies over the wide world who happen to have the precious advantage of your connexion, that your manner of explaining a myth is greatly superior to that of the author of the '*Origin of Language and Myths*,' you might only refer to your etymology of *savitar*, which, according to the presumptuous author I am now noticing, is very faulty. He even shows—I mean he endeavours to show—that your immortal Grimm, and even the Hindoos themselves, to whose language and mythology the name *savitar* belongs, had a very imperfect notion of its origin. This affords additional proof of the man's presumption, since he admits himself that he knows nothing whatever of Sanskrit or any of its dialects. But it appears to me very evident, and so must it, I presume, appear to every one else, that he pays no regard or attention whatever to what you so emphatically state, that 'the principles that must guide the student of the science of language are *now firmly established*.' These words of yours are quoted by him in his Introduction; and do they not tell us, as clearly as words can, that we need now only read your invaluable works in

order to know all we need know to obtain a perfect knowledge of the principles of the science of language. But this unfortunate man is so very blind to his own interest, and he has so much confidence in what he is pleased to call the discovery of the origin of language and myths made by himself, that he shows as much indifference for this statement of yours as if he did not believe it to contain a particle of truth."

Here methought Müller sat down. And as several persons of the assembly began now to turn over the pages of one of Kavanagh's two volumes in search of Müller's etymology of *savitar*, the lecturer, who guessed what they were in quest of, said: "You will find it, gentlemen, in the first volume, chapter xlviii., page 396; and under the same heading is also to be found several other etymologies, and of these M. Littré's etymology of the important name *Avatar* happens to be the first, and which no doubt M. Littré and his friends of the Academy and the Institute may think very correct, but which, according to the author of '*The Origin of Language and Myths*,' is one of the worst he has ever met with. While you are casting a glance, gentlemen, over the etymology of *savitar*, and commenting upon it among yourselves, our lecture may, I suppose, be suspended for a few minutes." To this proposition all present seeming to nod assent, they rose from their seats, and dividing themselves into groups of some three or four persons each, they moved silently about the great room whispering to one another in so low a tone of voice that I could not overhear their observations. Methought that we three went together. "You, Littré, appeared very thoughtful, much more so than I ever saw you before. Upon requesting you to acquaint me with the cause,

you said: What that lecturer has observed respecting a future state of existence has impressed me more with the belief that there may be really such a place than any other argument I have yet heard on the same subject."

Regnier: His argument has had no such effect upon me.

Max Müller: Nor upon me.

Littré: Very likely; but you may not have listened to it as attentively as I have done, nor have since reflected on it as seriously. Only listen to his reasoning while I now submit it to you in perhaps a fuller and clearer light than he has himself represented it. He says this world is not a perfect state. His meaning is that it is full of anomalies. That we have earthquakes, inundations, volcanoes, pestilential diseases; that the strong are allowed to oppress the weak, and the guilty to prosper and the innocent to suffer. But why should this be? Because this world is imperfect, and because it was never intended by the mighty Power who made it that it should be perfect; as if He chose this mode for enabling His creatures to appreciate and enjoy more fully the happiness awaiting them in a perfect state beyond the grave. But why was not this world and its creatures made perfect from the beginning? For the reason just assigned, that we might see more clearly the difference between perfection and imperfection. But how can we with safety believe that it was at first in the Creator's power to make this world and its creatures all perfect? By merely looking around us and investigating the formation of whatever our eyes may chance to fall upon; for whatever that thing may be, the more we examine it the more we shall be filled with astonishment on contemplating the infinite wisdom it displays. Think only of what a very wise man, one of the ancients, did on being asked what

reason he had to believe in the existence of a God; he stooped down, and picking up a straw, said, "That alone convinces me that there must be a God;" thus allowing the Atheists who had questioned him to understand that it lay not within the power of either nature or man to produce any thing revealing so much wisdom as a mere straw. We must, therefore, admit that if this world be full of anomalies it is not the less full of infinite wisdom; and where there is infinite wisdom there must be infinite justice, and consequently a state beyond the grave. And why so? Because in this life the deserving do not always obtain justice; from which it follows that there must be a state where they cannot but have the justice denied them while they were on earth. If it were not so, God would not be just, and we know that He cannot be unjust. And why so? Because we know from His works that He must be a Being of infinite wisdom; and where there is infinite wisdom there must be infinite justice. Hence, it is not in the power of an all-wise Being to be unjust.

Max Müller: But has not God the power of doing every thing?

Littré: No, for He cannot do what is wrong; of that power He is wholly deprived by His infinite wisdom. God is therefore compelled—and still because of His wisdom—to deal justly towards all His creatures, so that they who do not obtain justice here must receive it elsewhere, and not as a favour, but as a right of which not even a God, however great He may be, has the power of depriving them. And why so? Because it would be unjust.

Regnier: Then how, according to the reasoning with which the lecturer appears to have endowed you, are the wicked to be dealt with?

Littré: They will be obliged to suffer and atone, but with mercy, for the wrong they have done; and if their punishment does not take place in this life it will certainly take place elsewhere, and this affords an additional proof that there must be another world. Why, you will ask me, did I not know all this before? Because I was at first taught to believe that there was a time when our earth was a paradise; and that because two human beings had then transgressed, its Creator thought fit to exchange its bliss for misery, and to doom all mankind to death, and only because the first man and woman had sinned. This, I felt convinced, could not possibly be; for however imperfect the very worst of human laws may be, there is not one of them so outrageously bad as to authorize the punishment of children for the crimes of their parents, that is, the innocent for the guilty. But it is said in the Bible, I shall be told, that the Lord visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation, Exod. xx. 5. But it is also said in the same book: "The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers," Deut. xxiv. 16. Now, which of these two laws are we to believe? for, the one being acontradiction of the other, we cannot possibly believe both. In order to know which we should choose, we ought to consult that revelation in which there can be no mistake, and which was in existence a great many ages before the Bible had been heard of, and it is a law implanted in every human breast—I mean our sense of right and wrong. This revelation is by far the grandest and truest of all. In it there can be no contradiction, no lying interpolation, no religious fraud. And it requires no great scholarship, no learnedly profound commentary,

to be understood by every one, by the most ignorant as well as by the most erudite; for every one is told by that "sweet little cherub" within—his conscience—when he does that which is right and also when he does that which is wrong.

Now, what has the lecturer told me this evening that I did not know before fully as well as himself? He told me only this—that our earth was never meant to be perfect. That is all, I assure you. I saw long ago that it is very imperfect, that it is full to overflowing of anomalies. But it did not then occur to me that it was not intended by its Creator to be any better than it is. I stood in need of this knowledge; and having now obtained it, I can very easily explain and reconcile what I could not make out before. Why are there still so many Atheists in the world—even among the learned? Because they stand in need of this very little, but very important, bit of knowledge. Let it therefore be known to all persons that the world was never a paradise, was never perfect, and there will not be any more Atheists; for men of common sense will then say, We see how it is, every natural object we examine, whether it be animate or inanimate, reveals the hand of a God, and proves to us that all might be made equally perfect if it so pleased the Creator. Man cannot have been, therefore, perfect from the beginning, but imperfect; endowed, however, with sufficient reason to improve his state, which cannot be done by remaining idle, but by hard working. And this is the crowning beauty of the divine system, for it allows us to perceive that all who by their own just efforts raise themselves from a lower to a higher condition will be indebted to themselves alone for their improvement and not to others, which would deprive

them of all merit. According to this system every one is, therefore, obliged to work out his own salvation, and not to look up to any kind of foreign intervention, either earthly or divine, for the obtaining of so great a favour. And I am now further led to believe that when we shall in the other world have reached, through our labours, a state of bliss, we shall be still obliged to work, and so continue through an eternity of ages, for ever improving, for ever acquiring knowledge, for ever learning something that we knew not before, our admiration and delight still increasing for ever and for ever.

Regnier: Do you mean to tell me, my dear Littré, that this new philosophy with which you are now favouring us has been suggested by that single observation of the lecturer's,—namely, that our earth was never perfect, nor was ever intended to be perfect?

Littré: My present arguments have been all deduced from that simple source. And was it not wisely arranged that our earth and its inhabitants should have been both made imperfect, but that we should be endowed with the means of reaching, through our own efforts, a less imperfect state? If all had been made perfect from the beginning, we could never know what perfection is; and if we were allowed to live for ever in such a state of blessed idleness, we should be entitled to no more merit for whatever we might do than is due to the sons of kings for having been born princes. I do, therefore, withdraw from what I have hitherto advanced in opposition to Kavanagh's theory of language. What I have just learned respecting a future state has somewhat enlarged my views, even so much so that I can now see and judge more clearly than I ever did before. You, too, Regnier, should withdraw your opposition. But you,

Müller, should more readily do so than either of us, since it was through his meeting with your blundering "Lectures on the Science of Language" he was first led to this attack upon us three.

Regnier: I don't mean to draw back.

Müller: Nor do I. To-morrow, Littré, you will forget all these arguments.

Littre: This cannot possibly happen unless some occult power of which I know nothing should deprive me, within so short a space, of all recollection of what I now feel, understand, and am determined upon.

Regnier: It seems to me, my dear Littré, that Kavanagh's odd whim of turning trifles to account has so far taken possession of you as to drive you mad. By to-morrow your reason will, I hope, return.

Littre: It will, I assure you, continue. There was a time—but it is now gone by and it will, I hope, never come back—when I believed as Solomon did, when he is made to say: "That which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast," Eccles. iii. 19. Yes, this was how I have believed up to the present; but a change has come over me, a change for the better.

On the different groups of the assembly returning, at this particular moment to their places, the lecturer rose and asked if any other gentleman wished to enter into a discussion either for or against "*The Origin of Language and Myths.*" Several of the assembly at once stood up; upon seeing which, the lecturer suggested that the precedence should be given to the eldest, whereupon they all sat down with the exception of M. Patin.

"Sir," said this venerable gentleman, addressing the lecturer, "I wish to make a few observations respecting the subject of your lecture. I have gone carefully through the memoir, entitled '*The Origin of Language and Myths*,' sent to the Institute in 1869 by its author, who thought it justified him to offer himself as a competitor for the prix Volney of that year. Yes, sir, I have gone carefully, very carefully, through that memoir, and I can safely assert that it is in substance precisely the same as its present greatly enlarged form in two volumes. But this question, sir, of the origin of language is a very difficult one to solve; and if the discovery to which this author lays claim could have ever been made, it would not surely have been delayed until we are far advanced in the nineteenth century. My conviction therefore is, that the origin of language has not been discovered by Mr. Kavanagh, and that it never will be discovered by any one. Then please to observe, sir, the source whence he derives his discovery. The sun! the sun! only observe that. But what on earth has language to do with the sun, or the sun to do with language? Has this grand luminary vocal organs; can it utter words? Oh, your author must have surely been dreaming when this strange origin of human speech first took possession of his mind! Why not make his discovery without bringing in the sun? He takes advantage of my admission, which is to the effect that it is not in my power to contradict him, that is, to assert he has not made the discovery to which he lays claim; but do I not also say that I cannot allow that he has made the discovery in question? But if I cannot admit his having made so great a discovery, are there not others who deny that he has made it? There is M. Littré, and there is M. Regnier, two very honour-

able and disinterested judges, and men of very great learning. And there is our no less honourable and learned correspondent Professor Max Müller, of Oxford. This great man, who is bound to report to our Academy every discovery made in England in the science of philology, declares openly in his fine lectures on this subject, in 1861, that 'we cannot yet tell what language is;' by which he means that we know nothing of its origin. These words are, however, to be found in a work published several years after that of Mr. Kavanagh's, entitled '*Myths traced to their Primary Source through Language*,' and which appeared in 1856; and in which work the leading principle of his pretended discovery is just what it is in the work you are now taking under your protection. You now see, sir, that if I cannot deny to Mr. Kavanagh that he has made the discovery of the origin of language and myths, there are other high authorities who can. And whether I should or should not refuse my assent to Mr. Kavanagh's real or pretended discovery, ought I not, out of pity and regard for my colleagues, with whose works he deals so unmercifully, to incline to their side rather than to his? Why should he, I want to know, take up any of the faults in the works of my friends? Might he not discover blunders enough in the works of other philologists, without referring to those of the very men who were to state their opinions of his work? And only note how daringly this is done, as I am going to let you see by an instance or two. He shows how a child could, with his principles, discover the etymology of our word *garçon* in the very short space of some five or six minutes; and that he would allow six months to all our enlightened members to make the same discovery, and that probably they

would at the end of that time be as far from having accomplished the task as they were on the first day. And what time, do you suppose, he allows to all of us in the Institute and the Academy for discovering the primary signification of the Latin of *beaver*, that is, *fiber?* Not less than a whole century; whilst a child acquainted with his principles could not fail to perform the task at a glance—that is, at sight, as soon as seen. Now, sir, you must admit that Mr. Kavanagh's having thus dared to address so learned and illustrious a body of persons as those of which our Academy and Institute are composed, is not to be endured by men who entertain so just a sense of their own dignity and importance. A king, sir, would think himself honoured if received as an Academician. Indeed, the late emperor felt most desirous to become a member of our glorious fraternity, and his 'Life of Cæsar' was written in the hopes that it would give him the right to offer himself as a candidate; but his friends assured him that he did not stand sufficiently high as a literary character to entitle him to so great an honour, and he did not for this reason dare to present himself, knowing that he would, in all probability, suffer a defeat. It is therefore very wrong in Mr. Kavanagh to presume so far as to allude as freely as he does to so illustrious a body of great men as our Academy, not to mention those of the Institute. But the unbounded freedom with which he criticises Professor Max Müller's two great works—namely, his 'Lectures on the Science of Language,' and his 'Chips from a German Workshop'—is inconceivably bold. Such conduct does not merely apply to M. Max Müller, but to all Oxford, where this eminent professor is so highly esteemed, and justly so, since this esteem is confirmed by our Academy

and Institute, of which the enlightened members have unanimously awarded the prix Volney to M. Max Müller. I am not prepared to show that M. Max Müller's faults are not real, any more than those of my colleague M. Littré; but that does not justify Mr. Kavanagh's unbounded liberty. He ought to have shrunk from daring to lay the mistakes of such men before a public by whom they are so admired, and who must consider it very great presumption in any one to allow them to perceive that they have in their admiration been imposed upon. Men even in low life do not like to have it known that they have been made fools of, and men in high life like it yet a great deal less. Hence, when Mr. Kavanagh points out the errors in philology of such writers as M. Littré and his colleagues, he shocks the exalted feelings of not only those distinguished literary characters, but of all their admirers. Mr. Kavanagh should be put in his right place, should be shown the wide difference between himself and certain great men; in other words, he should be taught to know himself. I don't mean to say that he should be horsewhipped into such knowledge, but that some means or other should be practised for teaching him the principles of common politeness.

"I have another very serious objection to Mr. Kavanagh's book being made popular by its being lectured upon; I allude to his discovery of the origin of myths. A charming English poet says,—

'Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise.'

Now there are many myths which bear a rather startling resemblance to certain doctrines of the Christian faith, and Mr. Kavanagh does very improperly allude to such resemblances, regarding them, I admit, as

no more than types of truths revealed long after. I admit also, as he does, that many learned and good Christians entertain the same opinion respecting such resemblances; but I consider it very rash and wrong to notice circumstances of this sort in any way whatever, since the doing so is well calculated to disturb certain quiet minds of the Christian community. Thus we are very happy in our present belief that there is only one God; but when told by your author that all our names of the Deity were anciently names of the sun, and that with all people the sun's name means *one*, may not such teaching lead some persons to suspect that our believing in only *one* God may have first been suggested by the name of the Deity having been discovered to signify *one?* Then his explanation of the blessed Trinity, as shown under his etymology of *Spiritus*, is also very startling, nor less so is his showing how it happened that in very remote times the heathen believed in the sacredness of water, and consequently in baptism. Then there is his explanation of the *Sabbath*, which divine institution was known to all men even long previous to the giving of the law. And though your author shows how this knowledge was first communicated to the heathen by the word itself, and that it was then only a type of the true *sabbath*, to be long afterwards revealed, he should not, however, have noticed this word, but have rather shut his eyes upon it; for may it not lead some people to suppose that our *sabbath* did not originate as we are taught to believe by that passage in Exodus (xxxi. 17), which so clearly states that 'in six days the LORD made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he rested, and was refreshed,' but that the belief was first suggested by the several meanings of the word *sabbath* itself? These are,

sir, you will admit, very serious objections to Mr. Kavanagh's work; there are truths which should not be told, old errors should, from their having so long made us happy, be handled very tenderly, they should be even respected, and in most cases be allowed to abide.

"But there is one particular question respecting Mr. Kavanagh's explanation of myths, to which I should like to have a very clear and distinct answer. He seems to regard those myths resembling certain doctrines of our holy religion as being only types and not as having been the originals of our Christian doctrines; but is he sincere, I should like to know, in this belief? I think he ought to be put on his oath. I can easily believe that Dr. Parkhurst, the author of the Cambridge Key, and all such good Christians, are very sincere in whatever they state respecting types, but I have my doubts if on such occasions Mr. Kavanagh be sincere. And why so, you will ask? Because in his work entitled 'Myths traced to their Primary Source through Language,' published in 1856, he regards very often, if not always, such myths as the originals of the Christian doctrines to which they bear, it must be admitted, a very close resemblance. Who knows but he still entertains the same belief, though he does not confess it, and that he now affects to believe like so many good Christians, to the end that his work may be the more kindly received? The man should, I say, be put on his oath.

"For these several reasons, sir, my opinion is that no one should lecture on Mr. Kavanagh's work, or in any other way try to make it known. All discoveries even of truths are generally very dangerous things; the young and thoughtless do not think so because they have not the experience of the aged.

"But if Mr. Kavanagh has done what is both rash and foolish in those etymologies which relate to the resemblances I have just spoken of, are not some learned Christians fully as much to blame for regarding those resemblances as types of certain Christian doctrines? They should not have noticed them at all. Thus why should Dr. Parkhurst tell us as he does more than once that Hercules was a true type of our Saviour; and why should the learned author of the Cambridge Key say that such too was Buddha when he is represented weltering in his blood to wash away the sins of a wicked world? Attention should never be paid to such startling resemblances. And if Mr. Kavanagh does very wrong when he shows that Bacchus was not only a true type of our Saviour, but that he had the same monogram (IHΣ), is not Dr. Stukely, the antiquary, who was a very learned and orthodox Christian, much more to blame when he tells his readers that 'panthers were the nurses and bringers-up of Bacchus,' and then adds that the name of Jesus was also Ben Panther, Panther being his foster father's family name. Stukely should have kept this knowledge to himself. He never supposed that such a statement could, because true, do any harm, but it is on the contrary well calculated to do a great deal of harm, for all readers are not likely to take Dr. Stukely's explanation of so startling a circumstance as satisfactory, namely, that it had 'pleased God to reveal to the heathen part of what was to happen in future.' Mr. Kavanagh does not fail to notice all this in his second volume, page 187. But he would have done better if he had disregarded it altogether. It is one of those startling truths of which no mention should be made. But is not Sir William Jones, who was a very learned and sincere

Christian, as much to blame as Dr. Stukely, when he says, 'In the Sanskrit dictionary, compiled more than two thousand years ago, we have the whole history of the incarnate Deity born of a virgin, and miraculously escaping, in his infancy, from the reigning tyrant of his country.'? Here again Mr. Kavanagh is much to blame for taking the notice he does of this admission in Volume II., page 99, of his present work. The fact of such an admission having been made by one of the most learned and orthodox Christians that ever wrote, can be no excuse when we observe that every such statement must startle and disturb the quiet mind of many a true believer, while it does but strengthen the unfortunate infidel in his incredulity.

"But what good do we derive from many of our scientific discoveries? They cause in general much more trouble than they do good. When Galileo found out that the earth moves, must he not have shaken the faith of all persons—and they may have been thousands—who received his discovery as real? And what were people the better then, or what have they been the better since for this new scrap of knowledge? It has not prolonged man's existence so much as one hour, but it may, from its having disturbed the peace of so many, have rather served to shorten it on more occasions than one. Fenelon, who was a very great man, and who flourished many years after Galileo, when he alludes to the earth in his article on the Omniscience of the Deity, speaks of it only as an immovable body suspended in space. And why did he do so? Because he did not like to trouble his own mind or the minds of his followers about its moving or not moving. Now if I had lived at the same time with Galileo, and was as old as I am at present, I should perhaps

have joined with the learned and orthodox members of the Holy Inquisition in obliging him to abjure his errors; but I should not, I think, have made him go on his knees while doing so, nor have kept him in prison for nearly twenty years; for if I was then a young man, my conduct would, in all probability, be very different from what it is now. At my time of life few men like to encourage new discoveries. If thirty or forty years ago Mr. Kavanagh's work happened to fall in my way, I might have gone into it heart and soul, but I am no longer now what I was then. Some men remain young all their lives, whilst others, inasmuch as soul or spirit is concerned, may be regarded as dead at forty, even though they drag on their existence to eighty or ninety.

"Mr. Kavanagh having had occasion to write to me about his memoir, which was mislaid and could not for several days be found, took advantage of that opportunity to beg of me as a very great favour to let him know—either verbally or in writing—what I thought of his discovery, assuring me that he could travel fifty leagues on foot to have the benefit of my opinion, he being then preparing his work for the press. And in the event of my not acceding to this request, he begged to know if I could not, through my influence in the Academy, obtain from any number of its members an investigation of his philological pretensions.

"To these requests I was obliged to answer negatively. It may be said that I ought to have at least obtained from some of my colleagues the inquiry Mr. Kavanagh so earnestly called for, and that I was the more bound to obtain it since, according to my own admission, I was not prepared to assert that he had not discovered the origin of language; but as discoveries

are seldom or ever found to be real, we look upon them with great indifference and suspicion, and do all we can to discourage them. And of this, has not the present discoverer received from us a very striking instance? Thus to whom was the prix Volney adjudged? To the author of a glossary! And why so? Not that such a work can be compared to one far more original, and of which I could not myself deny the reality, notwithstanding the critical acumen which my profession as a public examiner of the most learned students of France has enabled me to acquire. I admit that Mr. Kavanagh has given, even in our own language, the primary signification of many of our household words which we could not ourselves discover, such as, *boucher, garçon, galetas, homme,* and many others. But he will not stop here; he must trace every word up to the name of the sun, which I take to be his great mistake, and which has obliged me to regard his discovery—at least in this respect—as a failure; though when I think of the many curious results he has obtained through the applying of his principles, I am not prepared—as admitted in the passage he has quoted from my letter[3]—*to contradict him.* I am greatly afraid that my colleagues—such as are the most opposed to Mr. Kavanagh's views—will blame me for having made this admission, but I cannot now recall it, since it is already in print, and my answer to every such reproach must be that the admission is true.

"The principal opposition to Mr. Kavanagh's claims will be founded on the belief that if they were acknowledged real they might lead to very serious changes in more things than one. Thus, passing over the effect they might have on the opinions long since entertained re-

[3] Introduction, page xxiv.

specting the fabulous parts of ancient history and religion, and regarding only the words of every-day life, have we not reason to suppose that they might disturb some of our old opinions not a little? Thus Mr. Kavanagh alludes somewhere in his present work to Locke's opinion respecting the formation of language, and which is, as well as I can recollect, to this effect, that if we knew how words were first formed we should need no other logic or philosophy. Now granting for the sake of argument the truth of such an assertion, and granting also that Mr. Kavanagh's discovery be real, what would be the result? If it were to be adopted it would be this, that all logicians and philosophers would be obliged to unlearn a great deal, if not the whole, of what they have hitherto learned. This would be somewhat disagreeable for all persons who have finished their studies, especially for persons as far advanced in years as I am, who would probably think it rather late in life to go a second time to school. And what an alteration it would necessitate in dictionaries, especially in those that have in any way attempted the etymology of words! To a certainty it would oblige my dear colleague Littré to burn of his great dictionary all he has written up to the present, and to begin this vast labour over again. What trouble! What confusion! And what a large amount of additional printing would be then required! Indeed printing would, in this case, become a very profitable business. And who knows but it may have been some rogue of a printer that first suggested the idea of Mr. Kavanagh's strange discovery, and that on having communicated it to others of his own trade, may not a great many of them have joined in taking it up as likely to prove a very lucrative speculation, and that they are now

employing Mr. Kavanagh to work it, promising him, in the event of its succeeding, a large portion of the spoil. When viewed in this light—and so it might very well be viewed—what would become of the grand discovery you are now protecting? After a very short time it would be exploded, and justly condemned as a literary fraud. I do therefore advise you, sir, if you set any value on your character as an honourable and an honest man, to wash your hands out of this affair altogether.

"You see how we of the Academy and the Institute are doing all that in us lies to put this discovery down. But its author is so fool-hardy as to show no regard whatever, either for ourselves or the salutary instruction we are endeavouring to impress upon his mind. Our having preferred a glossary to his mighty discovery appears to have had not the least effect upon him, or if any effect, it appears to have been rather that of a strong stimulant, for he has sent us in another bundle of his '*Origin of Language and Myths*,' as an additional proof that his pretensions are real, and with this second big bundle he has even dared to send us a challenge, a wager, sir; and to make this challenge more insulting the odds are all in our favour, being no less than ten to one, one thousand franks on his side against our hundred. He even names the broker where his thousand franks are lodged; and in this he has acted wisely, for without this assurance we could have never supposed that he had so much money. But I think he should be made to tell how he came by it. I do not mean to insinuate that he has stood on the highway for it, though between ourselves be it said, I do verily believe that if he could not help himself otherwise he might have recourse to this dreadful means sooner than allow what he regards as a

most valuable discovery to be lost to the whole world for ever. But we shall soon sap the foundation of his discovery, and this will prove a death-blow to his system, and consequently to all he has obtained through its means. His etymologies, which have so startled myself as to oblige me to make that admission in his favour, for which I may expect some cutting reproaches from my colleagues, will then be regarded as wholly accidental; and it is well known that many wonderful things may be ascribed to accident, though some persons are simple enough to assert, and Mr. Kavanagh is I believe of the number, that there is a cause for every thing. But how are we to sap the foundation of his discovery you will ask? By simply finding out the idea after which the sun was named; no more is needed to prove the fallacy of his system; and it is then that all his etymologies may be safely regarded as accidental. It is true that we have not yet been able to discover this idea, though it is now the principal subject of our thoughts both night and day; but it must be found. We intend to collect for this purpose a large sum from among ourselves and others, and offer it as a prize for the etymology of the name of the sun. The Academy will give at least some five or six thousand franks, or it ought to do so; the Institute perhaps a little less. But Oxford will send us a large sum in order to save their favourite professor from a signal defeat. And what may we not expect from the *Times*, of which the shareholders are so wealthy, and for which great journal Professor Max Müller has done so much? Then the Royal Institution of Great Britain, where he has delivered his famous lectures, will of course be very liberal on this occasion, to the end that all the world may see that these lectures were

not what Mr. Kavanagh has endeavoured to show, made up entirely of blunders from beginning to end, and that the members of this noble Institution have not therefore any reason to be ashamed of their lecturer.

"You may be inclined to suppose that Mr. Kavanagh's present work will, because in two volumes, show more difficulties to be overcome than either of his manuscript memoirs, of which we have so easily disposed; but however the number of his proofs may be enlarged, this will not prove the infallibility of his system if we can only find out the idea after which the sun was first called. And as a large prize is to be the reward to any one who makes this discovery, is it not reasonable to expect, since there are few things that may not be accomplished by means of money, that we shall one day know the name of that idea we are now so anxiously in quest of? But you will ask if this idea can never be known, and that all persons will be obliged to admit that it was from the sign *O*—first name of the sun—that language emanated, what shall I say? I must say that such an admission would be for Mr. Kavanagh a great triumph, but for every one else a great misfortune. And why so, you will ask? Because it might lead to serious changes—changes even in religion; and that, you must admit, would be dreadful. I do therefore hope that if Mr. Kavanagh's origin of language be ever received by all men as real, I shall not be then on earth. Like most persons of my age, and knowledge of mankind, I have a natural antipathy for discoveries and innovations of all kinds. And why should we ever wish to have such things when we can live without them? But there are human beings of conduct so strange as to force them upon us notwithstanding the cold indifference, and sometimes suspicion,

with which they are for the most part received. The author of the work which is the subject of your lecture appears to be a human being of this class; for notwithstanding our several rebuffs he still perseveres, still shocks us with his presumptuous attempts to convert us to his own preposterous belief that he has really discovered the origin of human speech, even though we are now far advanced in the nineteenth century. In the year 1850 he sent us a specimen of this discovery. It was, of course, at once rejected as so much waste paper. In 1856, imagining he had made it more evident, he sent it to us again, but it was of course again rejected. After this last rebuff he became crest-fallen, and so remained for many years, until most unfortunately for himself he happened to meet with M. Max Müller's celebrated lectures on the Science of Language, and, about the same time, with some numbers of M. Littré's excellent dictionary. On applying the principles of his discovery to these great works, he thought he could detect many very gross mistakes; and now feeling sure that we could not fail to perceive the reality of his discovery, and admit the advantage to be derived from it, he came boldly forward with an astounding batch of those mistakes, as a candidate for the prize Volney. It was again rejected. If he had happened at this time to be in his right mind he would have gone no farther, and so have never made another attempt; but he appears to have been still completely beside himself, for he sends us the year following another batch of his etymologies, and along with them his challenge of ten to one that his discovery is real. Who would not suppose that he must by this time be entirely worn out? But it would be a great mistake to think so. To use a pugilistic locution, he comes even

now, in the year of our Lord 1871, up to the scratch as fresh as ever, just as if he had never received a single knock down. And he still comes forward with his insulting challenge of ten to one that his discovery must be real, which implies that we of the Academy and the Institute must, when compared to him, be neither more nor less than two great bodies of simpletons. Now if this be not wild bull-dog courage I should like to know how it should be designated. The fellow is incorrigible, is certainly deranged; and apparently so much so, that his case is, I am afraid, a hopeless one. Now certain unfortunate individuals, needing guardians over them, are debarred the use of pistols, razors, and knives; but there are in my humble opinion three other rather dangerous instruments which are allowed—but very incautiously—to be in the way of another class of individuals needing also to have guardians over them, but who, unfortunately for themselves and the public, happen to have none, and these three dangerous instruments are *pen*, *ink*, and *paper*. This is, I say, a very painful case, but as we of the Academy and the Institute owe a duty to the public, we cannot well get over dealing with your author's present work as we have already dealt with all the others, and this, though it be strictly just, does not imply a very favourable issue. But as there are in all learned bodies a few enthusiasts, men who have not yet reached my many years of experience, if Mr. Kavanagh does, through the folly of such madcaps—supposing any of them be allowed on the Committee—obtain the prize, my advice will be, not, on any account, to hand it over to himself, but rather to the person who may be at the time his principal guardian. When any one is so far gone as to have the firm conviction that he has discovered

the origin of language, even the first word ever spoken by man, we cannot suppose such a person may in a few months—that is, between the present time and the first of August, when the prize is to be awarded—have sufficiently recovered his reason to be entrusted either with the gold medal or its value in money. Oh, this is certainly a very painful case; so much so that I cannot bear to dwell on it any longer. I have, sir, in a few plain observations given you, as you see, my candid opinion respecting the subject of your lecture; and in this I have done no more than my duty, and it is to be hoped, sir, that you will now do yours."

"You may be sure, sir, that I shall," said the lecturer, as M. Patin sat down. "And to begin, I agree with you, sir, that we might live very well without certain discoveries and innovations, and that they are not when adopted always free from serious consequences. Thus there was a time when men herded with the beasts of the field; but they have since altered their condition so far as to build themselves houses, a rather bold innovation, and not at all free from peril, since we now run the risk of being sometimes crushed to death by the falling in of a roof, a danger to which we were not exposed before. There are persons, however, who prefer this innovation to the stretching of their limbs on the cold ground. But this being after all only a matter of taste, it cannot, I must admit, weaken the force of your powerful argument against discoveries and innovations.

"As to my author's mad obstinacy in persisting as he does despite the superior opinion of your Academy and your Institute, to assert that he has really discovered the origin of language and myths, I know not how to excuse it; it is fully as bad as Galileo's having presumed to say

that the *earth moves* even after he was told by the enlightened members of the Holy Inquisition that *it does not move.* But Mr. Kavanagh's obstinacy will no doubt soon receive a severe check, for he is to send copies of his present work to some of the leading philological societies of Europe and America, humbly requesting that he may, in the interest of science, be favoured with their opinions as to whether he has or has not made the two-fold discovery to which he lays claim. And he intends to make and publish a collection of these and all other notices, whether favourable or adverse, with the names of the authors or sources whence they emanate, to the end that his readers may perceive how far their own views of his work are strengthened or weakened by those of others. To himself he reserves the right of replying, as well as he can, to all opinions opposed to either his system or its principles. But more than this the author cannot do towards procuring for his discovery the least share of notoriety. Thus he has no friend among the reviewers of the day; and having exhausted all his pecuniary means in the printing of his work, he has now no funds to expend on advertisements, and advertisements cost money, and without them publishers declare that no work, however remarkable its intrinsic value may be, can have any chance of success; unless, however, it be the production of some popular writer, or be entirely made up of amusing frivolities, all such effusions having in our enlightened times many more chances of success than such as have only original and important truths to recommend them. This work may be therefore compared to a friendless child, when thrown upon the wide, wide world, all alone, and so doomed to make its way through the crosses and troubles of this life as well as it can."

At this part of my dream methought M. Patin stood up and put the following question to the lecturer: "Sir, I should like to know in what light you are to view the silence of those philological societies who are likely to take no notice of the present Mr. Kavanagh intends to make them of his work?"

Lecturer: I am happy to inform you, sir, that silence upon all such occasions will be regarded by Mr. Kavanagh as highly favourable, not only to the French Institute but to all who happen to be of the same opinion. It will, indeed, fully show that if such parties had the honour to be of your Academy, they would have taken exactly the same view of Mr. Kavanagh's pretensions as you and yours have done.

M. Patin: Sir, I rejoice to hear you say so. I was afraid that so important a fact—a fact which is so likely to be greatly in our favour—might be overlooked by Mr. Kavanagh or his friends.

Our colleague now sat down, apparently very much pleased, and the lecturer resumed his discourse as follows: "But apart from Mr. Kavanagh's helplessness towards advancing his work by the means I have just mentioned, there are other obstacles in his way. His discovery, though clearly and fully made, is still in its infancy, and so are the principles without which it cannot be turned to account and appear self-evident to all understandings. These principles must be learned; and though they are uncommonly simple, and very few in number, and though he repeats them almost every time he applies them lest the reader should forget them, yet the fact that they must be learned is sufficient to show that the pages of his work, in two volumes, cannot, without an occasional pause, be run through as easily as those of a novel,

or as the columns of a newspaper. This is certainly a great obstacle towards Mr. Kavanagh's immediate success. But to the thoughtful mind it will prove to be no obstacle at all.

"You ask, sir (addressing M. Patin), why has not Mr. Kavanagh made his discovery without bringing in the sun? It is as if you were to ask any one who had built a fine house why he did not erect it without a foundation. The basis of Mr. Kavanagh's discovery is the name of the sun: take this basis from him and you cut the ground from under his feet, and he and his house—that is, he and his discovery—will then both fall to the ground, and be doomed never more to rise. But how are you to prove that all words have not grown out of the first name ever given to the sun? By finding that object, and the name of that object, after which the sun itself was called? And is not this very easy? Of course it is; the quadrature of the circle is not more so. The author of 'The Origin of Language' cannot, however, find it. But perhaps he never tries to find it, you will say; and it is even so. He did once try, but he never bestows a thought on it now. And why should he? If he were now to spend even five minutes in quest of the idea from which the sun took its name, what would that go to prove? Nothing more, nothing less, than that during those five minutes the author of 'The Origin of Language' must have been out of his mind. And why so? Because he must know that if there be an idea after which the sun was called, that idea must have been expressed by a word, and as this would prove that there was a word in use before the sun had yet been signified by an articulate sound, it would follow that all other articulate sounds could not have had the name of the

sun for their original source, and this would be a complete contradiction of what he has so often and so clearly proved—that the name of the sun was man's first word.

"'But where is,' M. Patin will ask, 'the advantage of this knowledge?' The advantage is immense. Men of thought have hitherto paid little or no attention to philological inquiries. And why so? Because such men could see nothing in what is called the science of philology but confusion; they saw nothing like a beginning, they had no data, nothing fixed to guide them to the primary source of language, and they have been consequently led into the grievous error of supposing that the more a man knows of languages the more capable he must be to form an opinion as to how the use of words was first acquired. Hence linguists and grammarians have been always looked up to as the best judges of the philosophy of language; whilst on such an occasion very profound and close thinkers have, whenever a comparison was drawn between the two classes, been always regarded with indifference. Thus, if M. Dufaure, who is an academician and an eminent lawyer, had dared to say any thing in favour of Mr. Kavanagh's views when, in 1869, he happened to be a member of that committee which, deciding against the author of '*The Origin of Language and Myths*,' awarded the prize to the compiler of a glossary; how may we suppose his opinion to have been received by all the linguists and grammarians then present? They would, of course, have all surrounded so justly a distinguished character as M. Dufaure, and have told him that he was certainly, inasmuch as jurisprudence was concerned, perhaps the greatest man of the age, but that he could not, for the want of time, have ever bestowed so much as one hour's serious thinking on

either language or grammar since he left college; and M. Dufaure would necessarily be obliged to admit that there was some truth in such a statement; and knowing that those men had all their lives no other occupation than the declining of nouns and the conjugating of verbs, he would be necessarily led to endorse their opinion of Mr. Kavanagh's discovery, whatever that opinion might be. But if M. Dufaure happened after this endorsing to meet with Mr. Kavanagh's 'Origin of Language,' and if, after having studied it seriously, he was again on a committee of the Institute to which Mr. Kavanagh had sent in what he believed to be an additional proof of the truth of his discovery, what might be the result if he were again entreated to accede to the opinions of the linguists and grammarians? He would very likely ask the most learned of them, such a man as M. Regnier, for instance, in what consisted his superiority over Mr. Kavanagh. The gentleman might say that he knew as well the roots of many languages as M. Dufaure himself knew the order of the letters in the alphabet of his own language, and that probably Mr. Kavanagh could not lay claim to so extensive an acquaintance with languages. To this M. Dufaure would at once answer that Mr. Kavanagh's work was not on *languages* but on *language*. And then M. Dufaure might say to this learned linguist: 'Sir, since you know the roots of so many languages, can you tell me the origin of a single root in no matter what language?' 'Oh no, sir, I cannot; for no one knows any thing of the origin of the roots of a language.' Thus, though a great linguist may be well acquainted with as many as twenty languages, and know all the roots of each of these languages, he could not, though it were to save him from being hanged or shot, tell the origin

of so much as one root in any language whatever; and this is admitted by all philologists. And what might M. Dufaure think on hearing such a statement? His impression would necessarily be that all the linguists and grammarians in the world know far less of the science of philology than a schoolboy some nine or ten years old knows of the science of numbers. And while, being so convinced, it would not be difficult for him to show, by the use of Mr. Kavanagh's principles, that however he might have forgotten much of what he had learned when at college, he knew something more of *language*, if not of *languages*, than any of his colleagues, whether they belonged to the Institute or to the Academy itself.

"But the author of '*The Origin of Language and Myths*' can meet with no obstacle so likely to keep his discovery from being known as wilful and gross misrepresentation. It may be thought that the individuals who have recourse to means so low for retarding the progress of science and truth cannot possibly prevail, in our enlightened days, when there are so many great men as far above them for the superiority of their intellectual powers as giants are in stature allowed to be above dwarfs. But the mere dwarf in literature will take care to give so false a representation of Mr. Kavanagh's discovery that a master spirit suspecting no deception will say, on reading such a representation, 'this pretended discovery must, I perceive, be destitute of all proof, and I do not, for this simple reason, intend ever to read or in any way notice the work in which it is developed.' No one can find fault with a man of superior intelligence for judging thus unfavourably of a work he never saw, when he allows himself to be imposed upon by a very false report of some pettifogger in literature;

he is only to blame for not judging for himself on so important a question, and especially if the author's own argument and words be not submitted to him, but only the argument and words of his critic. But why, you will ask, do I assume that Mr. Kavanagh's present work may be so unfairly dealt with? I do not mean to say that any enlightened member of the press will give such a review of his work; indeed, I am so far from supposing any thing of the kind, that I feel thoroughly convinced every enlightened reviewer will do him ample justice. But the pettifogger in soul and mind will not do so. And why? Because it is not in his power; he is too subservient to vulgar opinion, he dares not to think for himself, his sentiments are too grovelling, the man has no moral courage, he must think as others think, he has no respect for his own mind. But when evident truths come in his way, truths too evident to be overcome by any force of drivelling sophistry, how does he manage? If he should find these truths to have been admitted by others, he will take to himself the merit of admitting them also. But if these are evident truths which he has reason to suppose his readers may not have seen, he will shut his eyes upon them, or allow you to see them through a very gross and wilful misrepresentation. Allow me to confirm the truth of this assertion. It would, I presume, be difficult to state more positively and clearly than Mr. Kavanagh does how he has been led to discover that man's first word was the name of the sun. Thus, on having convinced himself that in the beginning men must have expressed themselves by signs, he was naturally led to suppose that the language of sounds might have come from a sign; but it thence followed that the sign giving vocal sounds would be made by the mouth,

which he thought could not possibly be, but he was soon very agreeably undeceived by his own reasoning, as the following (written in 1856) serves to show: 'The mouth cannot, like the hand, give the images of things. Thus, in whatever position we put it, however we may twist it or make it gesticulate, we cannot give to it the form of a man, an animal, a bird, a tree, or any thing of the kind; all of which the hand can trace very easily. But stay, there is, however, *one* well known figure, yet only *one*, which it is allowed the mouth has the power of representing. Thus orthoepists say that, in order to obtain the sound peculiar to the O in the alphabet—for it has several other sounds—we must form the mouth similar to the letter itself, that is, make it take a round or circular form. Yet this is the figure of the sun, the most attractive of all objects, as well as the most revered in ancient times; it being then, as already shown, universally adored as God. Now I have found it after years of almost incessant thinking,' &c[4].

"Now have we not in those few lines Mr. Kavanagh's reason for believing that the name of the sun was man's first word, and this reason for his so believing is repeated in different ways throughout his work. But every narrow-minded critic will not see it, but take great care to conceal it. Thus a very learned Jew, in a notice he gives of Mr. Kavanagh's work, makes the following statement:—'Why should the first word uttered by man have signified the sun? [Mr. Kavanagh has often told why.] In our opinion a body at regular hours appearing and disappearing, and that, too, without being attended by any violent commotion, was less likely to attract the attention of man in his primitive state than that of an

[4] Myths, vol. i., p. 15.

uncommon phenomenon, astonishing and terrifying him. The forked lightning as it rent the clouds succeeded by the deafening thunder clap shaking the earth, or the hollowing hurricane as it swept past, uprooting the stately oak and demolishing his frail hut, were much more likely to attract his attention and form the subject of communication with his fellows. Our author's statement, therefore, is 'that the first object named by man must have been the sun, appears to us quite gratuitous, destitute of every foundation, and therefore the whole reasoning built upon this assumption must fall to the ground."—*Jewish Chronicle, April 10th*, 1857.

"Now such are the reviews Mr. Kavanagh's present work is likely to obtain on its first appearance; the petti-foggers in criticism will not dare to give the author's reason for believing that man's first word must have been the name of the sun. And as no one can, without thinking long and seriously on it, imagine that human speech did so originate, every wilful misrepresentation, every lying notice of our author's discovery cannot but tell greatly to his disadvantage. It is true that the reviewer's own opinion 'that the forked lightning and the hollowing hurricane' were much more likely than the sun to attract man's attention, and form the subject of communication with his fellows, is greatly in Mr. Kavanagh's favour; an idea more egregiously absurd it would be difficult to conceive. I am sorry the reviewer does not tell us in what way the use of speech could be suggested by the forked lightning rending the clouds, the deafening thunder clap, or the hollowing hurricane! The sun is, it appears, too natural, and it needs 'violent commotion:' its appearing so regularly is not at all in its favour; nor is the very fulsome bombast used on this

occasion by the learned doctor in any way in his favour. But its author, no doubt, thinks it very fine, and does Mr. Kavanagh, gentlemen, think it very fine? He does, and almost as fine as that sublime morceau in his countryman's 'Lectures on the Science of Language,' where our poor soul is made to dance 'up and down and reflect heaven and earth on the mirror of the deep.' But there are persons of taste so unrefined that every such beautiful passage has no other effect on them than that of producing a sort of nausea, as if they stood in need of an emetic; whilst others—especially such young ladies and gentlemen as are under sixteen years of age, and who look upon such a work as 'Hervey's Meditations' and 'Tupper's Poetry' as the finest books in the whole world — will regard the two German passages here referred to as exquisitely sublime; but

'Such and so varied are the tastes of men.'

"Now this German doctor, and who is both editor and proprietor of the *Jewish Chronicle*, is allowed to be a very great linguist, and his great repute in this respect led our author to make his acquaintance at a time when the doctor was giving from the Hebrew text a translation of the Bible. As I have never met with so many very stupid and wilful misrepresentations as are to be found in the few columns of his journal in which he reviews 'Myths traced to their primary Source through Language,' his translation of the Bible, will not, I am afraid, rank very high either for its truthfulness or its literary merits.

"My impression now is respecting Doctor B.'s strange review of our author's work, that he must have often read it without cutting the leaves, so very inapplicable

and unconnected are his statements. Only witness the following:—'All words are by *this classification* reduced to three divisions;' but as the *classification* here mentioned is not explained or quoted, the reader cannot conceive what kind of a classification it must be—nothing can be more nonsensical. Nor is what comes next to this passage a shade better, there being no connexion whatever between it and the passage by which it is preceded: it begins with the words, 'Thus if I want to find the primary signification of the word *child*.'

"Now as Mr. Kavanagh happened to have conversed several times with Dr. B. about the printing of his work, this gentleman appeared to be on those occasions as much in his right mind as any other man; but if Mr. Kavanagh had never seen him, and if he had to form an opinion of him from this very singular review, he would say that, judging from some portions of it, he never met with a more disgraceful and wilful misrepresentation; whilst judging from other parts, he would say that the review must have been written by some one still in his infancy, but that if it happened to be the production of an adult, he could not help regarding the reviewer otherwise than as a born idiot.

"Dr. B. still continues his review of Mr. Kavanagh's work; but as gross blundering and gross misrepresentation combined are in all his statements, and as this can be easily conceived from what we have just seen, it seems scarcely necessary to notice any further a reviewer who appears to have no regard for truth, and who is moreover very shallow-minded. As to his presumption, it appears to be unbounded. Only witness the following statement:—'It would be no difficult matter to show by imitating the processes adopted by Mr. Kavanagh that

any thing and every thing might be proved in this manner, and that a philology based upon his principles would be nothing else but a card-house, a plaything of an idle hour, which a touch of the finger will as easily demolish as it was erected thereby.'

"Now if this were true, dear doctor, what would it prove? Nothing more or less than this, that you must yourself on performing such a feat, have a hundred times more genuine wit in any one of your little fingers than you happen to have in your whole head. I would therefore advise you, dear doctor, to take great care of your fingers, for as I firmly believe what you say, every one of them must be worth a great deal more than its weight in gold. What would not I give to own such fingers? To a certainty, if they belonged to me I should not be now here to lecture in favour of Mr. Kavanagh, but to give him such a cutting up as no poor devil of an author had ever yet received. But to give an instance of the doctor's exquisite presumption, might not Mr. Kavanagh beg him to explain how it happens that the Hebrew root אל *al* means, according to Parkhurst, not only God, but also *the* and *no*, not to mention several of its other very different meanings? Now can the doctor tell Mr. Kavanagh how this happens; if he can, he will, it seems, render no small service to the science of philology, for Parkhurst referring to this root אל *al*, says: 'This is one of the most difficult roots in the Hebrew language, and various methods have been taken by learned men to account for its several applications[5].'—

"אל *al*, as Mr. Kavanagh shows, was also a name of the sun, and did consequently mean *one*, which is the meaning of both the definite and indefinite article, as he has

[5] Lex. *sub voce.*

also shown several times[6]. By thus knowing that the primary signification of the definite or indefinite article is *one*, and that this idea was named after the sun, it is easy to tell why the sun and the article אל *al* have been named alike. But why should this *al*, which is also an article in other languages as well as in Hebrew, signify *no* or *not*, as it is also, according to Parkhurst, allowed to do? For this simple reason, that the Hebrew אל *al* means *low* as well as *high*, just as *altus* does in Latin, and ideas having a *negative* as well as a *bad* meaning belong to the division of words traceable to lowness. Hence it is that אל *al* though meaning *high* means also *low*, and consequently *no* or *not*, as Parkhurst admits. In page fifteen of Mr. Kavanagh's first volume of his present work, a very learned French theologian endeavours to show why the same word can thus in different languages mean both *high* and *low*; but, as our author shows, his attempt is a failure. Now we have even in English this word *al* in the sense of a negative; for according to Mr. Kavanagh's principles it must have been once written *oil*—that is, before the *o* and the *i* coalesced, making *a*—and when under this form of *oil* it became *il* by the dropping of the *o*. Hence *il* in such words as *il*legal, *il*liberal, *il*licit, has a negative meaning. But might it not, every one will ask, have the opposite meaning like its original אל *al*? And so it has this opposite meaning, as we see by such words as *il*lumine and *il*lustrious. But if *il* could not be shown to serve as the emphatic article as well as *al*, what would that prove? Nothing contrary to the etymology just given, for the same idea might be expressed by a very different root, that is, different in form but not in meaning. Mr. Kavanagh may be also asked to explain how it happens

[6] See vol. i. pp. 32, 33.

that this *al* is equal to *oil*, which differs widely in meaning from the name of the sun, and from a word meaning *high* and *low*, as well as from one having a negative meaning. Mr. Kavanagh cannot tell why the liquid so named is signified as it is. And why can he not tell? Because all the roots of a language are, like all its letters, equal to one another. Nor can he tell why the root of the word for *water* is *at* in English and *aq* in Latin, and *ud* in Greek, and ים *im* in Hebrew; for all these roots are equal to one another in meaning though different in form, and so might their meanings be also very different, for it is only conventionally they mean water. Hence *as*, which is the root of the German *wasser*, might as well mean *fire* as it does *water*, and this is confirmed by the Hebrew אש *as*, which does mean fire. But can *oil* be traced to the name of the sun? Of course it can, like all other roots. Thus, because a liquid substance, *oil* is traceable to *water*, and *water*, because serving to support *life* has been called after *life*, and *life* has been called after the supposed author of life, that is, the *sun*. And as *water* has been always regarded as something sacred, even so has *oil*, as every one knows. The following from Parkhurst will confirm what Mr. Kavanagh has often said of water: 'Water having always been, as it still is, the principal drink, as bread is the principal food of the Eastern nations, hence *bread* and *water* denote in general *the necessaries of life*[7].' And that is why *water* has, as well as *bread*, been called after *life*. If we needed further proof that an article may have a negative meaning, we have such a proof in the negative *un*, as *un*happy, *un*kind, *un*fortunate, &c.; for this *un* is an article in French, and

[7] Page 266, ed. 1823.

it cannot differ from *an* any more than the German conjunction *und* can differ from its English equivalent *and;* and *an* had once the meaning of *the,* as our author shows in his first volume of his present work, page 33, just as it has still in Gaelic. And why should this be? Because the definite and the indefinite articles have each the meaning of *one,* and *one* may signify, as just shown by אל *al,* either *high* or *low,* and words which have a negative meaning are traceable to lowness. Hence *un* is the root of *under,* and that a word of this meaning might serve to signify *over* is shown by the ὑπ of ὑπο, which means *under,* whilst in ὑπὲρ, which means *over,* we have the same root. And as ὑπὲρ is the Latin *super, over,* might not the latter have as well meant *under?* for as *p* and *b* do constantly interchange, this *sup* of *super* cannot differ, except conventionally, from the Latin *sub.* Hence in the French *dessus* and *dessous* we have really the same word, though their meanings are as opposite as *white* and *black,* or as *light* and *darkness.* And how every comparison thus made confirms still more and more the etymologies by which they have been suggested! Thus in Saxon the same word means both *white* and *black;* and אור, *aur,* which in Hebrew means *light,* has sometimes in the Talmud the meaning of *night,* which is for *darkness.*

"We have now seen how it happens that the Hebrew אל *al* means not only *God,* the *sun, the,* and the negation *no* or *not.* And could our learned Jew do all this by a touch of the finger? Never, nor by any other means in his power, though it were even to save him from being crucified. Let us now give an instance of his great cleverness as a philologist. Referring to what he could do with a 'touch of the finger,' he continues thus:—

"'Suppose we were to argue that God, read backwards,

is dog, that this is the Hebrew *dag* (according to our author it should often be read backwards, and vowels may be changed), and dag or dagon (a nasal sound by the same authority may be added) means fish, and that therefore the Philistines worshipped the idol Dagon as their God, where would there be a flaw in our reasoning? and yet it can etymologically and historically be proved that our English God has no more to do with the Hebrew dag than the name of London with that of Jerusalem.' This, no doubt, Dr. B. considers very profound and very learned; yet it is neither the one nor the other; but it is, on the contrary, uncommonly shallow, and still more erroneous than it is shallow. Thus if we were to grant what is here so positively stated, namely, that our English word God is nowise related to the Hebrew word *dag*, what would this prove? The fallacy of our author's system? By no means; for it is constantly shown in his work, how the same word may, under its different forms, express ideas that are nowise related. Thus, from the B of Barracks being as equal to M as it is to W, the building so called may mean a sea-house as well as a war-house; but as soldiers do not usually live on the sea or by the sea-side, Mr. Kavanagh does not say that the primary sense of Barracks is sea-house, though he may safely assert that such is the real meaning of the Spanish word *baracca*, which is the name of 'little cabins made by the Spanish fishermen on the sea-shore.' Our author is therefore always guided by reason in the application of his principles, as he might else commit the most grievous mistakes, and this he has more than once impressed upon his readers. But to return to what the Doctor appears so very certain of; namely, that our word God and the Hebrew word *dag* are nowise related, we beg to inform him that this

is a philological blunder of the first magnitude; but it is increased ten-fold when he so dogmatically asserts that this bold statement of his can be both *etymologically* and *historically* proved. The Doctor overlooks the fact to which our author often refers in his two volumes, namely, that Hebrew and Saxon are, though it does not appear to the short-sighted, fundamentally the same language. This is, however, so very evident, that one learned authority, alluding to the Saxon under its present form in England, declares as follows: 'If I had an English and Hebrew dictionary as full as Parkhurst's Hebrew and English Lexicon, I think I could make, out of the two languages, a language in which conversation might very well be carried on by a Hebrew and an Englishman, respecting all the common concerns of life[8].'

"Englishmen are therefore speaking, at the present hour, but unknown to themselves, the most ancient languages in the world. This too is admitted by the highest living philologist in this country, or perhaps in any other; namely, Professor Max Müller, who, in the opening of his Treatise on Comparative Mythology, expresses himself thus: 'The earliest work of art wrought by the human mind—more ancient than any literary document, and prior even to the first whisperings of tradition—the human language, forms an uninterrupted chain from the first dawn of history down to our own times. We still speak the language of the first ancestors of the human race[9].' Now these admissions coming from learned men, who knew nothing of our author's theory of language, con-

[8] See Anacalypsis, vol. i. p. 796, and Myths, vol. i. p. 73.

[9] Years after Professor Max Müller expressed this true opinion he published his work entitled "Lectures on the Science of Language," in which Mr. Kavanagh has shown so many serious mistakes.

firm the truth of what our author's principles do so constantly show; namely, that all languages are, from their having been made after the same system, radically alike. But here Dr. B. may request Mr. Kavanagh to let him see the Hebrew *dag* in English in the sense of God, and this he can very easily do. Dag is precisely equal to day, and hence in Saxon the latter is *dæg*, in Danish *dag*, and in German *tag;* and the idea *day* was called after the *sun*, and this great object was anciently revered as God over all the earth. Hence Deus and Dies are really the same word under different forms, nor is the root of either of them (*de* or *di*) different from that of day. Hence Dag (root of Dagon) and the English word Day are one and the same, and as the latter means God so does the former, since the divinity so called was, as Parkhurst testifies, the Aleim of the Philistines. When we now read the Dag of Dagon from right to left, we get Gad, and this cannot differ from God any more than the ancient words *ane, bane, stane*, can from their present forms *one, bone, stone*. And that Gad means the sun, even in the Bible, we see from the following: "'Ye are they that prepare a table for *Gad*, and that furnish the offering unto Meni[1].' As Gad is understood of the sun, we learn from Diodorus Siculus that Meni is to be viewed as a designation of the moon[2].'

"By this it is clearly shown that the name Dagon means (when primarily considered), like that of every other divinity, the sun, and that such too is the radical sense of both God and Gad. Nor was the circumstance of the name Dagon having also the meaning of *fish*, overlooked by the superstitious of ancient times, as is shown

[1] Isaiah lx. 11.

[2] See Dr. Jamieson's Dictionary, art. Moon, and Myths, v. i. p. 9.

by the following: 'And the head of Dagon, and both the palms of his hands were cut off upon the threshold; only the *stump* [literally the *fishy part*, according to the marginal note in the Bible,] of Dagon was left to him[3].'

"And is not this single circumstance another overwhelming proof of the truth of our author's theory of myths? Thus, primarily considered, the name Dagon means the sun, as we have just seen; and because the sun was once, by all people, worshipped as God, this led to the belief that Dagon was God. But the name Dagon has still other meanings, but principally that of fish, and hence this divinity was—at least in part—represented under such a figure; that is to say, it was this other meaning of his name first suggested this representation of him. And such, we say, is the way our author accounts for all that is fabulous in ancient history and religion; and though his work abounds with proofs the most undoubted of the truth of his system, yet Dr. B., though well aware of the fact, never once alludes to so startling a circumstance, but does all in his power to conceal it by grossly misrepresenting the principle—as we have shown—upon which so important a discovery is based.

"But we have not yet done with Dagon. The root of this name exists in Hebrew under another form, as we are now going to show. From *dag* being, as we have just seen, but a different form of the Saxon word God, it follows that it is also equal to our word good, these two ideas—God and good—being, in Saxon, expressed alike, which arises from the latter having been called after the former. But as *g* appears often under the form of *w* (witness gages in French and wages in English), and as W is as often represented by B, it follows that

[3] 1 Sam. v. 4.

good is equal to both Wood and Bood, and consequently to Wod and Bod, which are two of the various forms of the name Buddha; and he too was the sun, and is said to have been worshipped all over the world. From this it appears, I shall be told, that Buddha and Dagon make only one and the same divinity; and this is so true that in a list of Buddha's names given by Faber, the fourteenth is 'Dagon, or Dagun, or Dak-po[4].' And another variation of it (given in this list by the same authority) is Godam; that is, when we read the root God from right to left, Dogam, and this is evidently but another form of Dagon. Thus we obtain proof upon proof of all we assert, and this too from men who had no idea of either our author's theory of languages or of myths.

"Another very learned and orthodox authority[5], after giving a long list of Buddha's names—or rather so many variations of the same name—says: 'Our words *foot* and *boot* are his name, and the latter is the very way in which he is called at his ancient, but ruined, temple of Bactra or Boot-Bumian.' From the same authority we learn that Buddha is worshipped at the present hour 'in the form of a gigantic *foot*, of which the sole is covered with hieroglyphics, and the lamas and emperors of the Buddhic creed delight in being called excellent Feet and Golden Feet.' And is not this another very plain proof of the truth of the theory of myths? Thus, when the divinity in question is called Dagon, its figure is partly that of a fish, such being now the meaning of its name; whilst when it is called Buddha, its figure is that of a *foot*, because Buddha and foot are, though they have not a letter in common, radically the same word.

"We need not, in the long list of Buddha's names

[4] Pag. Idol., b. iv. c. v. p. 351.

[5] Nimrod, v. iv. p. 217.

given by Faber, go beyond the three first, that is Boudh, Bod, and Bot, in order to discover the Hebrew form of the *dag* of Dagon alluded to above; for what is the last of these three forms (Bot), when we read from right to left, but *tob*, which is the Hebrew of *good;* and good is the same as God, and God the same as Gad, and Gad, when we read as in Hebrew, is the same as the Dag of Dagon, as we have already proved even beyond the possibility of a doubt. But we have even at the present hour in English both Bot (this elder form of Buddha's name) and its Hebrew equivalent *tob, good;* for they who first used *better* for *gooder* must have often used *bot* or *bet* for the positive, that is, for good; and have compared thus, *bot, botter, bottest:* or *boot, booter, bootest.* Indeed *boot* (also one of Buddha's names) is in use even still, as we may perceive by the locution, 'what boots it?' which is equivalent to, 'what good is it?' that is, *cui bono?* and for the reason that the *bet* of *better* is for *bot*, just as *shew* is for *show*, or as *elder* is for *older;* and that this *bot* is for *good*, and *good* for *God*, it follows since *bot* is the Hebrew *tob, good*, that these words *God* and *good* are just as much Hebrew as they are English. And it is in this way we still speak, as Professor Max Müller says, 'the language of the first ancestors of our race,' no matter by what name we now call it, for there is still, as there ever has been, only one language over all the earth.

"We need not now endeavour to show the extreme weakness and folly of Dr. B.'s statement when he so loftily asserts: 'And yet it can *etymologically* and *historically* be proved that our English God has no more to do with the Hebrew *dag* than the name of London with that of Jerusalem;' for with respect to the first part of this statement, that of *etymologically* proving how widely

the names of God and Dagon differ from each other, we have already, by what we have just passed over, sufficiently exposed its fallacy; and as to the second part of this statement, that of proving the same thing *historically*, it is the very climax of absurdity, seeing that these names, God and Dagon, must have long preceded —perhaps for thousands of years—the most ancient historical record in existence.

"The Doctor is, it appears, familiar with several languages of the East, but it is evident that he knows nothing of the philosophy of any language, nor even of so much as a single word. Any one with only a smattering knowledge of his own tongue, but gifted with the powers of observing, thinking, and inquiring, would be far more qualified than Dr. B., with all his learning, for conceiving and composing such a work as the Myths. And if such a person owned a mind free from the mean vice of disingenuousness, he would be also more capable than this gentleman of reviewing our author's book. For this it would be only necessary to give, in the first place, a fair exposition of the nature of its twofold discovery; then a brief sketch of its leading principles, and finally some account of the extraordinary results obtained through their application. Nor would the conscientious reviewer find it difficult to convince every unprejudiced mind of the reality of these results, since for this it would be only necessary to show, by a few plain instances, in what way they are almost all confirmed by such collateral evidence as no impartial judge can think of impugning. Thus, to adduce only one instance of how others confirm the proof of God and Dagon being radically the same word, it would be only necessary to observe that Dagon and Godam are allowed by the learned to be two of Buddha's

names; for no two things can be thus equal to any third thing without being also equal to each other. And the moment we admit the equality of Dagon and Godam, so do we admit that of Dagon and God, since the latter is the root of Godam. And should the pious Christian observe that he finds it hard to believe that God is, like Gad, but another word for the sun, he may be told that he ought not to find such a belief more difficult than that by which he is led to take Sunday in the sense of the Lord's Day, though well aware that it literally means the day of the sun.

"But how, it may be asked, could any one with only an indifferent knowledge of his own language, give a proper review of a work that refers so often to languages in general? We may answer that such a reviewer is not, we allow, as capable of detecting any mistakes committed in relation to certain foreign languages with which no one can be said to be familiar, and of which even many of the learned themselves know little more than what they can collect from lexicons; yet if such a reviewer be an original and close thinker, he will, we maintain, be far more capable of writing a true and able notice of a work on the origin of ideas and the philosophy of language than a very learned linguist, should the latter only be, as he too often is, a very shallow observer. But what is there to hinder any one acquainted with English only from perceiving the truth of almost any etymology that can be made by the application of our author's principles? Thus supposing that in his endeavours to discover the radical sense of the word *grot*, he read it from right to left, as many words may be read, and so obtained torg, would he not be soon led, on finding in none of his dictionaries of foreign languages a

word like this with such a meaning as could be applied to a grot, to make it take the form trog, nothing being more common than to meet with instances of vowels having fallen behind *r*? And as it is very usual to meet with *g* appearing under the form *v* (witness sage and savant, or léger in French, and levis in Latin), and as *v* is the same as *u*, trog is thus brought equal to *trou*, and every French dictionary will tell the English student that *trou* means a *hole*, and than this no better radical sense can be assigned to the word grot, as every one, unless he be as dull or as disingenuous as Dr. B., must admit. If now the English student looks out for *trog* in Greek, he will find *trogle*, and this, he knows, is equal to *trou le* (that is, *le trou*), just as *soleil* is equal to *sole il;* that is, *il sole* in Italian; and by this his etymology is doubly confirmed, for his lexicon tells him that *trogle* means 'a hole, a cavern;' and a grot is a cavern. Now the bold assertion that every such etymology is no better than 'a card-house, a play-thing of an idle hour, which the touch of a finger will as easily demolish as it was erected thereby,' can have never been made except by a very shallow or a very disingenuous mind.

"We find also in Dr. B.'s review the following: 'The whole system of Christianity, according to our author, rests upon no other foundation than that of a mythical character.' No honest reviewer would make such a statement as this without at the same time observing that every thing advanced upon this delicate subject is supported by the highest orthodox divines, whose admissions are, as shown by our author, to the effect, that types of the Christian dispensation, even to its very Founder, did long precede the coming of Christ. But why does the Doctor omit all Mr. Kavanagh says of the

Jewish persuasion? It is simply because he is a Jew, and because he is well aware that our author has advanced nothing concerning this faith in which he is not borne out by the highest authorities. But all this is concealed, which is very unfair.

"But though Dr. B. has so utterly failed in his puny endeavours to show the fallacy of our author's principles and their results, he has, it would seem, a very just idea of their value and importance, since, had so vast a discovery been really made, Mr. Kavanagh would, according to the Doctor, 'have solved a problem which has hitherto baffled the most gigantic minds, and [so have] conferred an inestimable service upon the learned world.'"

Here, methought, the lecturer made a pause; and for several minutes the assembly appeared to be commenting on the review they had just heard. I could not catch much of what they said; but I could easily overhear them make use of some very bold epithets—such as, *false, deceitful, mendacious,* &c.—every time the review was referred to. At the end of about five minutes the lecturer resumed thus his discourse:—

"Gentlemen,—If there be any of you who are about to start in life as authors, allow me to put you on your guard against the petty members of the press. You must never do or say any thing that will hurt their vanity; if you do, you make yourself an enemy for life, you inflict a wound that never heals. And if you imagine that these pettifoggers in literature can do you little or no harm because of their insignificance, you make a great mistake. It is their very insignificance that makes them so powerful. But there is one thing, thank Heaven, of which they are in a great measure ignorant. And what is that? you will ask. It is, that they know not the full

extent of their own power. Archimedes is reported to have said, that if he had another earth whereon to plant his machines, he could turn our earth upside down; but the petty members of the press can do as much without leaving their own world. Their broad lies will serve them for a standing-point, their waspish instincts for powerful machines, and their natural imbecility for that profound knowledge of which the great geometrician of Syracuse possessed so large a share. But, fortunately, they know not their own strength; they know, however, sufficient to be well aware that they do a great deal more harm than the superior members of the press do good. But how can this be? It can be for this reason, that the highly enlightened mind is above being capable of a mean act; and from his detestation and abhorrence of what is low he cannot easily suppose it to belong to others, especially if the latter be not regarded as disreputable characters. Hence it follows that such individuals as are a disgrace to the press do frequently impose, by their barefaced presumption, upon men to whom they are, inasmuch as literary merit is concerned, vastly inferior. Of this apparent impossibility I mean to submit to you presently, gentlemen, a very plain and convincing instance; but, previously, I wish to let you see how very easy it is to make yourself a mortal enemy of a would-be great literary character. Some thirty years ago Mr. Kavanagh made a few important discoveries in the science of grammar—they are the same which now appear at the end of his present work under the heading of '*Discoveries in Grammar.*' He should have stopped there, and not have meddled with what he then knew nothing about, namely, the origin of human speech, and the primary signification of words. But while his gram-

matical discoveries were being published, he unfortunately discovered the origin of the plural number, the etymology of *barracks, tranquil,* and the verbal ending of verbs in their past participles, namely *ed;* and being very vain of these discoveries, he foolishly fancied he could analyze all the words in the world. He therefore attacked the names of the Greek alphabet, though he was then even ignorant of its letters. Very gross mistakes were consequently inevitable. And why so? Not because he knew nothing of Greek, but because he knew not yet how man had first acquired the use of speech, without which knowledge no philologist, however learned he may be, can escape making very serious mistakes.

"While Mr. Kavanagh was submitting one Sunday evening, to a worthy friend then residing in Kensington, his discoveries in grammar, the latter, without consulting our author, called in a literary acquaintance living close by, in order to see how far this gentleman's opinion coincided with his own, which was very favourable. But Mr. Kavanagh begged to be excused for not wishing to make his discoveries known to this stranger, assigning for reason that the Messrs. Longmans, who had given him an appointment for the next morning, might not approve of his doing so.

"The gentleman withdrew in about half an hour, not over pleased, it would seem, at his having been thought so little of. His self-love was evidently very sorely wounded.

"When Mr. Kavanagh saw Messrs. John and William Longman at ten o'clock the next morning, he felt not a little surprised on being told by those gentlemen where he had spent the previous evening. And while he was yet wondering how they could have obtained that infor-

mation so very early, they requested him to let them know the name of the strange gentleman who was called in to be made acquainted with his discoveries in grammar, but who was obliged to withdraw without their having been communicated to him. Mr. Kavanagh could not tell his name; perhaps he had not heard it, and that the stranger was not introduced but as a friend or next-door neighbour. The Messrs. Longmans wished very much to know his name; it seemed then to Mr. Kavanagh that they did not view his conduct in a very favourable light. But Mr. Kavanagh could give no other information respecting this gentleman than that his hair was dark, and that his parents had neglected to have him vaccinated. Our author could now tell through whom the Messrs. Longmans had received their information respecting him; but he could not yet understand how they happened not to know the name of their informant. But he was soon allowed to perceive that the informant had not shown himself, but had employed an agent—some one who had access to the Messrs. Longmans—to represent him, but who was bound not to tell from whom he came. Our author on learning, some time afterwards, this honourable gentleman's name, learned also that he was no better than a mere pettifogger among reviewers, and that his interfering, after the manner just described, between himself and the Messrs. Longmans, proved him to be no better than a literary scamp of the very lowest order, and a wretch to be both despised and feared. Nor has this very susceptible literary gentleman yet forgotten what some thirty years ago he regarded as an insult; and which is shown by his never allowing an opportunity to escape without thwarting, whenever he

can, not only Mr. Kavanagh's views, but also those of a very near relation. Nor does he want the means of doing mischief, for he is allowed to be very popular as a petty reviewer, so much so, that poor authors cringe to him, and booksellers of all classes dread his power, well knowing how easily he can damn any book when he has no private reason of his own for doing it justice. He is, however, very shallow, but not the worse reviewer for that. And he turns to account so well all the opinions, phrases, and words of his predecessors, that the gentleman who was many years ago the proprietor or the editor of the *Athenæum* said, when speaking of him to a friend of mine, 'The man is possessed of no originality, no depth; others made all his observations long before him; he is *a perfect cento.*' Such was the opinion once given of our reviewer by a very upright and competent judge, who had sometimes occasion to employ him. But by his having made such good use of what belonged to others, he has been enabled to pass for a clever man. He was, I have been assured, the great gun on the journal called the *Leader;* he even made his way into one of the quarterlies; and he is now the soul of another mighty review, whether weekly, monthly, two weekly, or quarterly, I cannot call to mind. But the most conclusive proof he has yet given of his transcendent merit lies in the undoubted fact that he has chosen his residence in one of our London squares.

"Let me now show you, gentlemen, by this great man's review of '*Myths traced to their Primary Source through Language,*' in what way the pettifoggers in literature rise in the world; while men to whom they are not, in point of merit, fit to be the servants, are very often,

through the means of these lying drivellers, allowed to drag on their existence in a slight degree above starvation.

"His review begins thus:—

"'A philologist is a person who must be watched perpetually, believed in slowly, and ridiculed with caution.

* * * * *

"'We are reminded of the diamond trade. The jewel of £10,000 and the stone which is only fit to be cut up for the glaziers are so alike to the vulgar eye, that bringing their noble to ninepence would be a very inadequate description of the conduct of an uninitiated person who should undertake to deal in crystalline carbon on his own account. Now, to which class does Mr. Kavanagh belong? Is he the hero of a system which must beat all other systems into dust; or is he the most absurd schemer that ever tried his hand at an etymology? one or the other of them he must be—there is no middle place for him. Our readers must decide the point; and we must give them the means.

"'Mr. Kavanagh announces two discoveries; the origin of speech, letters, and words, and the origin of myths. 'Men first conversed silently by signs,' says Mr. Kavanagh. They made symbols by drawing; and thus, in a manner, wrote and read before they could speak. The extended finger furnished them with I; the sun and the moon with O. They had a solar religion. While writing O they would make the mouth take the shape of the letter, and then a mere breathing of sound would give the pronunciation of the letter. Thus O is the foundation of the alphabet, with some help from I. Thus one chapter shows 'in what way the different signs composing an alphabet have been obtained from the O.'

Then it is shown 'from the admissions of the learned, how all words must, when radically considered, mean the sun.' Accordingly, when we greet this theory with Oh! oh! oh! Mr. Kavanagh will not consider us disrespectful; for he will see at once that we say all that can possibly be said upon the subject.' Observe that we consider the note of exclamation as merely a form of I.

"'We go on, however, to the more advanced speculations, in which, by reading *any* word backwards as well as forwards, the system converts *any* word into *any* other, with the occasional assistance from the fact that all letters are really the same. In illustration of the last, observe that M is but W inverted: so that *sow* is *som* (*semer*), *row* is *rom* (*ramer*), *sham* is *shem* or *show;* and what is *sham* but to make a *show* of? Thus *mens* or *men* is *wen* or *ventus*. The *glad* in *gladius* read backwards gives *dalg*, and this *darg*, or *dirk* and *dagger*, and *Bride* is *Mride* or *Married*.

"'We are afraid that etymologists will, with one consent, repudiate Mr. Kavanagh's mode of derivation, and will regret that so much ingenuity should not be better guided by discretion and furnished with more accurate notions of the structure of language to work upon. The theory of myths to which all this etymological labour is preliminary, is founded not upon the impossible assumption that the fable or story is derived from the different meanings and aspects of the name of the hero or demigod.' We wish we could give our readers the whole story of Romulus and Remus. We have not courage for the second volume. He stands to the sober etymologist in the same place in which the speculator who connected the quadrature of the circle with the doctrine of the Trinity stands to the followers of Euclid. He has attempted, without width or depth of knowledge, to

handle subjects in which the greatest width and depth have not always preserved the speculator from failure, and he has produced results to which the word failure is inapplicable, because success with his means would have been impossible[8].'

"When the reviewer begins with the very shrewd observation that a philologist must be believed in slowly and ridiculed with caution, his meaning is, that if he, the reviewer of the *Athenæum*, be obliged to ridicule Mr. Kavanagh's work instead of praising it, his opinion will not be delivered hastily, nor without his being very cautious and minding well what he is about; so that whatever he may have to state against Mr. Kavanagh in the review of his work can be safely relied upon, because very *slowly* and very *cautiously* set down.

"The reviewer's second observation is also deserving of some little notice. He alludes to two very different classes of diamonds; a single stone of the one class being worth £10,000, and a single stone of the other class being worth nothing at all; and then he allows his readers to understand that Mr. Kavanagh must belong to one of these two classes, there being no middle class for him, poor devil. Now the worst of books may have some little merit; but if in the opinion of the readers of the *Athenæum* Mr. Kavanagh's work be found to belong to the worthless class of diamonds, it will necessarily follow that his work must be equally worthless. But how are the readers of the *Athenæum* to know to which of the two classes of diamonds—the true or the false—Mr. Kavanagh can be shown to belong? The reviewer will, on this occasion, serve as a very safe guide to all the readers of the *Athenæum*. Hence, when he tells them that they

[8] Athenæum January 10th, 1857, p. 43.

'must decide the point,' he encouragingly adds—lest they might suppose themselves unequal to the task—'and we must give them the means.'

"But how is the reviewer to give them the means? He can do it very easily. To take a cup of tea is not more difficult. He has only to give very gross misrepresentations of his author, and then embellish these gross misrepresentations by a few tangible untruths, so very tangible that the poor wretch who earns his daily bread by false swearing might very well recoil from giving them utterance, the certainty of their leading to his detection being so very evident. To keep back the proofs an author may have for confirming what he advances—and which the reviewer of Mr. Kavanagh's work does *upon every occasion*—is bad enough; gross misrepresentation is still worse, and this, too, is what our reviewer never misses an opportunity of having recourse to; but when he makes Mr. Kavanagh say that which Mr. Kavanagh never did say, nor could think of saying any more than he could think of shooting himself, by what name should we designate such an act? By that of *a palpable falsehood.* But how can this grave accusation be confirmed? By stating Mr. Kavanagh's words, and then those of the reviewer. By this means it can be easily seen on which side the truth lies, as easily as that which is as white as snow can be distinguished from that which is as black as ink. Nor is such conduct as this more difficult to conceive than the same gentleman's conduct with the Messrs. Longman already mentioned; the man capable of the one act is fully as capable of the other.

"'Men first conversed silently by signs,' says Mr. Kavanagh.

"Yes, and so say Condillac, Thomas Reid, and Dugald

Stewart; men to whom this narrow-minded driveller is what a farthing rushlight must appear when compared to the sun. But this proof he takes care not to mention because favourable to the author.

"'They made symbols by drawing; and thus, in a manner, wrote and read before they could speak.'

"Nothing can be more evident, since it is what every two persons do at the present hour when neither understands the language of the other; that is, they make signs and they read those signs, so that it may be well said that they write, draw, and read, without speaking. This the reviewer takes care not to observe, though it is stated by the author.

"'The extended finger furnished them with I; the sun and the moon with O.'

"This is very gross misrepresentation. The reviewer should begin with the O. He should first show how this sign was obtained, and then how the I happened to be joined with it. He should observe, as the author does, that while man was representing the sun by a sign—that is, by giving to his mouth a circular form—and then by uttering a sound, for the sole purpose of drawing attention by the noise so produced to the sign, he always heard O; and that he must have soon begun to use this sound, because more expeditious, instead of the sign out of which it grew; and that such must have been his first word, the mouth not having the power, however we may twist it or turn it about, to represent any other object in nature than that which is circular in form; and that if the sun was preferred on this occasion to other circular objects, this arose from its having been regarded as the noblest of them all. Every honest reviewer would then show, as the author does, how the I happened to be con-

nected with the O. He would not fail to observe that it was merely used as an explanatory sign; for the O meant not only the sun but the idea *one* also, because it appears always *alone* in the heavens, which led to the error of supposing that *sol* comes from *solus* instead of *solus* from *sol*[9]; and that, in order to avoid confusion, an I was put by the side of the O to show that the latter did not then mean the sun, but *one*. And what can be more reasonable than to suppose that the sign I is, because a straight line, the representation of a finger? men being even still accustomed to count on their fingers. In this way the O and the I came often together (OI), so that when they coalesced they made *a*, whence a, in which we see also an O and an I. And though every such sign means only *one*, yet it is composed of two signs (O and I) of which each, when considered separately, means *one;* and, from knowing this some nations have represented such signs as *a* and a by two ones connected by a hyphen; and such is the sign A. How clearly this origin of the sign *a* is confirmed by the author when he remarks that it was from the O and the I having so often stood side by side the belief arose that when only one of them appeared the other was understood, and that its absence was then signified by a dot, such as we have now over the i, and such as was anciently also in the centre of the ⊙; but this was not general with all people; the Greeks, for instance, have no such dot over the ι.

"We have now seen the gross misrepresentation of the reviewer when he says, 'the extended finger furnished them with I, the sun and the moon with O.' He takes care not to show in what way, and why, the extended

[9] "Quòd solus appareat, cœteris sideribus suo fulgore obscuratis."—Cicero.

finger was joined with the O. And when he allows his readers to understand that the *moon* as well as the sun furnished the author with the O, he is guilty of another gross misrepresentation. The moon because another luminary, and circular in form, is to be traced to the sun; but the author does not say that the moon had any thing to do towards furnishing him with O; had there never been a moon, he would have still shown the O (first name of the sun) to have been the origin of human speech. And when the reviewer says, 'this O is the foundation of the alphabet with some help from I,' what can the readers of the *Athenæum* understand from such a statement when they are not told how the O and the I made *a?* And that the O is the foundation of the alphabet, and that all letters might have been represented by this single sign and segments of it, becomes evident by the fact itself, since the author shows both in 'Myths traced to their Primary Source through Language [1],' and in his present work [2] that there is such a language still extant, and that the best judges of the languages of the East find a close resemblance between it and Sanskrit. The honest reviewer in the *Athenæum* forgot to mention this very strange coincidence which is so very favourable to our author's theory.

"The reviewer continues thus:—'Thus one chapter shows in what way the different signs composing an alphabet have been obtained from the O. Then it is shown from the admissions of the learned how all words must, when radically considered, mean the sun.'

"Yes; but the reviewer takes care not to show how our author gives very plain proof of this fact. Every one knows that all proper names must have first been

[1] Vol. i. p. 25. [2] Ibid.

appellatives or common names. Hence if we find it admitted by very learned men that the names of the heathen gods and goddesses are traceable to the name of the sun, does not this go to prove, since these names were once appellatives, that is, common names, that so many words could not possibly have, when radically considered, this single meaning, without such having been the meaning of all words? Two very high authorities, however, state the fact that so many names are radically not different from the name of the sun. A statement to this effect is made both by Bryant and Sir William Jones; the reader will find it in the 'Myths[3],' and in the author's present work[4].

"But the reviewer's most powerful argument must, at least, in his own opinion, be the following:—'Accordingly when we greet this theory with Oh! oh! oh! Mr. Kavanagh will not consider us disrespectful, for he will see at once that we say all that can possibly be said upon the subject. Observe that we consider the note of exclamation as merely a form of I.'

"Mr. Kavanagh is, he has assured mé, so far from regarding this straightforward statement from his Royal Highness the prince of literary scamps, and who is also the prince of literary pettifoggers, as every one who is not afraid of his Highness admits, that he is mightily pleased at having been so honoured by so competent a judge in matters philological. But Mr. Kavanagh thinks it is a great pity that so much exquisite facetiousness should be wasted on this occasion, there being, in his humble opinion, a much shorter method of proving the evident fallacy of his theory of language; so that the facetious application of Oh! oh! oh! might be

[3] Vol. i. p. 42.

[4] Vol. i. p. 18, 20.

turned to account on some other occasion, and perhaps serve to do away with the vulgar belief that the prince of literary scamps and pettifoggers in literature is not quite so much the very essence of sterility as some persons are led to suppose. He has therefore only to find—and so scatter poor Morgan Kavanagh's theory to the four winds of heaven—the idea either in or out of nature, after which the sun was first called; for as this idea, which any one of our reviewer's great width and depth can easily find, must have been signified by a word, every one will at once see that the name of the sun—that is the *O*—cannot have been the origin of language, since an idea after which the sun was named has just been discovered. And by whom? By the very prince of pettifoggers himself.

Now when Mr. Kavanagh dares to assert, as he not unfrequently does, that men who may be far above him in other respects, such as Messrs. Max Müller, Littré, and Regnier, do greatly mistake in many of their etymologies, this arising from their knowing nothing of the origin of human speech; he does not confine his objections to mere assertions, and stop there, but, he gives ample proof of the truth of his bold statements, by replacing the false etymologies by true ones. But does the present reviewer, or any of Mr. Kavanagh's reviewers, prove the unsoundness of his etymologies by giving correct ones of their own? They never do; yet this would be the sure way to convince their readers that Mr. Kavanagh's etymologies are so many evident blunders. Thus, instead of their ridiculing the idea that the O—first name of the sun—was the origin of human speech, they should show after what idea, in no matter what language, the sun was called; and if this idea could be

found, it would be proof, the most conclusive, that the foundation of Mr. Kavanagh's theory must be false. But they cannot find it any more than they can find the quadrature of the circle; for this, however, they are not to blame; and why so? Because it *cannot* be found. And why can it not be found? Because it is the origin of language, and whatever is the origin of a science, cannot possibly have an origin unless we admit what no one will admit, namely, that an origin may have an origin.

"Mr. Kavanagh may therefore safely defy the reviewer of the *Athenæum* to find the idea after which the sun was called, in no matter what language, for he knows well that it cannot be found, for the simple reason that this name (of the sun) is itself the source whence all words have emanated. But however obtuse this reviewer may be, Mr. Kavanagh fancies that he can at least bring him to admit that the O, if not the origin of language, must, however, have once served as a name of the sun. And this is how it can be shown and proved. Let us only observe that the English word *no* is *non* in Latin and French. But why is the English *no* not written *non?* For the reason that its O did not receive the nasal sound? And why does *non* end with *n?* Because its O received the nasal sound; that is, because some persons spoke through the nose when they pronounced *no*, and so made this word become *non*. There is not therefore the least difference between two such words as *no* and *non*, any more than there is between *Cato* and *Caton*, or than there is between *Plato* and *Platon*. By this we clearly see that there can be no difference between *o* and *on*. What is now the meaning of the Hebrew noun *on?* It is a well-known name of the sun, the Greeks having always, as Higgins testifies, rendered it into their language by Helios. This

is clearly shown in the first volume of the 'Myths[5].' And so is it shown many times in Mr. Kavanagh's present work.

"Let me now, gentlemen, give you a plain instance of the reviewer's brazen front when it suits his interest to tell a shameful lie: 'We go on, however (that is, after his having disposed of the O), to the more advanced speculations, in which, by reading *any* word backwards as well as forwards, the system converts *any* word into any other.'

"Now, what can the readers of the *Athenæum* have thought of Mr. Kavanagh's system on reading such a lying statement? Here is the heading in Mr. Kavanagh's work[6]—*Words are to be* OFTEN *read as in Hebrew, from right to left;* now every philologist knows that this is true; but Mr. Kavanagh does not say that *all* words may be so read; but according to this notorious liar our author is made to say *any* word may be so read, which must afford a strange opinion of Mr. Kavanagh's work. Here are a few instances out of a great many, as serving to prove the truth of our author's rule: *ab* and *am* (Hebrew of father and mother) become, when read from right to left, *ba* and *ma;* that is, since *b* is the same as *p*, *pa* and *ma*, in which we have the roots of *papa* and *mamma*. In Irish *sab* means *death*, but when read from right to left this *sab* gives *bas*, which means *low*, and to be dead is to be *low*. This etymology is confirmed by the fact that *bas* is, as well as *sab*, the Irish of *death*.

"This *bas* is also the radical part of *base* and *basis*, which are each significant of *lowness*. *Bas* is also the French of *stocking*, and so it may very well be, for a

[5] Pages 54 and 55. [6] Vol. i. p. 84.

stocking relates to the *foot*, and there is an affinity in meaning between lowness and the foot; witness the *foot* of a hill, or the *foot* of a column, that is, the low part. Hence *stocks* is the name of an instrument of punishment in which the *feet* are placed. The *stocks* mean also the public *funds*. This, too, can be easily conceived, for *fund*, *fund*ament and *found*ation do each imply *lowness*. *Sable*, *black*, is also traceable to lowness, its radical part *sab* meaning not only death, as above shown, but, since its *a* is equal to *u* (witness farther and further), to *sub* also, which means *under*.

"These etymologies will lead to others. Thus a *stock* of any thing is a *store*, and as the *o* of each word is equal to *oi*, and *oi* to *a*, it follows that *stock* and *store* might as well have been written *stack* and *stare*. Now as a *store* of any thing is a *fund*, and as a *stock* is that which remains, and is kept standing, this will account for *store* being the same as *stare*, to *stand*. Hence a *stack* of corn is also both a *store* and a *staud* of corn.

If we now read *spot*, a *place*, from right to left, what shall we obtain if not *tops*, and what is *tops*, when the vowel due between the *p* and *s* is supplied, but *topos*, and this is the Greek of *place*. When in like manner we read *skin* from right to left what have we? *Niks*: and as here the *i* has *o* understood, and as *o* and *i* make *a*, we obtain *naks*, of which the *nak* is the radical part of *naked*, and to be in one's *skin* is to be *naked*. This etymology is happily confirmed by the fact that when we supply the vowel due between the *k* and *s* of *naks* we get *nakos*, which happens to be the Greek of *skin*.

"How now does it happen that the French preposition *à* is rendered into English by two words, that is, by *at* and *to*? But have we two words in *at* and *to*? Let us

see. The *o* of *to* having *i* understood, and *o* and *i* making *a*, brings *to* equal to *ta*, which when read from right to left gives *at*; and this shows that in *at* and *to* we have but one word read differently. And these two ways of reading the same word have been turned to good account, for they give two very different meanings. Thus to throw a book *at* a person is not the same as to throw a book *to* a person, yet these different meanings belong to the same word read differently.

"Now, gentlemen, please to observe well what I have yet to say in confirmation of Mr. Kavanagh's rule that words are to be *often* read, as in Hebrew, from right to left. Our author states in his present work several times that the primary signification of an article, whether definite or indefinite, is *one*, and that such too is the meaning of the sun, and consequently of the Deity. Now what difference is there between the French articles *le* and *la?* There is none whatever, for the *e* of *le* is equal to *o*, just as *shew* is to *show;* and as this *o* has, as usual, *i* understood, and as *o* and *i* make *a*, it follows that *le* is equal to *la*, and that it is only conventionally that the one word is masculine and the other feminine. If we now read *la* from right to left we shall get *al*, and the Hebrew of this word (אל) is thus explained by Parkhurst: 'It is used as a name or title of the true God[7].' If we now aspirate *el* and *al* (that is, *le* and *la*), we shall get *Hel* and *Hal*, in which it is easy to perceive the *Hel* of *Helios* and the *Hal* of its Doric form *Halios*. Now referring to these two words (*Hel* and *Hal*), Parkhurst has the following: 'All in those parts (about Phenicia) worship the sun, who in their language is called *Hel*. God is called *Hal* in the Punic or Carthaginian tongue.'

[7] Lex., p. 14, ed. 1823.

And on the same page Parkhurst gives to אל *al* the meaning of *the* or *that.*

"It may even happen that there are languages in which two words going often together may be sometimes read backwards, for the purpose of obtaining different meanings. This I have been led to suppose from observing that it happens so in French. Thus *grand homme* now means a *great* or *celebrated man;* whilst when we read the same two words backwards, that is, *homme grand,* they mean only a *tall man. Honnête homme* gives also a very different meaning when the two words are made to change places: thus *honnête homme* means an *honest man,* whilst *homme honnête* means a *polite man. Sage femme* and *femme sage* have also very different meanings, since the one means a *midwife* and the other a *virtuous woman.*

"We have now seen enough to feel convinced that words are to be *often* read from right to left as in Hebrew; but not *always,* as the lying reviewer of the *Athenæum* makes our author say when he allows his readers to understand that Mr. Kavanagh's rule is to the effect that *any* word may be read from right to left as well as from left to right. And he improves upon this palpable falsehood by saying that Mr. Kavanagh 'converts *any* word into *any* other, with the occasional assistance from the fact that all letters are the same.' In illustration of this last (*sic*), observe that M is but W inverted.

"Now why did Mr. Kavanagh make this bold statement? Because he found that the signs of an alphabet do constantly interchange, and that this could not possibly be unless they all emanated from the same source. Thus he saw that *oi* made not only *a* but *u* also, as is shown by *croix* and *noix* in French being *crux* and *nux* in Latin; that this *u* is also equal to *a,* as we see by

comparing *further* and *farther;* that this *u,* though a vowel, is the same as V, as we see by observing that *lieutenant* is pronounced *liev*tenant, and that the *clou* of *girofle* is *clove* in English, and that until a comparatively late period *u* and *v* were regarded as the same sign. V, this other form of U, Mr. Kavanagh saw wanted only the hyphen and to be inverted to be the same in form as A; yet as V is constantly used for B, and consequently for U, since in V and U we have the same sign, it would follow, from U being the same as *a,* that the latter sign (*a*) must be the same as B. And that U, though a vowel, is sometimes used for B, Mr. Kavanagh saw, by observing that *au*fugio and *au*fero are for *ab*fugio and *ab*fero, as every one knows. Now as to B, which from its being so often used for V (witness the *hab* of *habere*, being the same as have), it follows since V and W interchange (witness *v*ent and *w*ind, *v*in and *w*ine), and since V is the same as B, that the latter must be the same as W; hence the familiar of William, that is *Will,* does not differ in use from *Bill,* nor Na*b*ob from Na*w*ab. Hence the locution *by the by* is also used for *by the way,* and *good by* is evidently *good wy;* that is, when the vowel due between *w* and *y* is supplied, *good way.* Hence to bid a person *good by* is to wish him a good *way,* which is exactly according to the equivalent locution in French, namely, bon *voy*age; the *voy* of *voyage* being equal to *vay,* and *vay* to *way,* so that *voyage* is literally *way*age.

Now what was it led Mr. Kavanagh to know that M is but W inverted? It arose from his having first discovered that *a* and *u* are as one and the same letter, *farther* not being different from *further.* By thus taking advantage of what every one knew, but which no one had ever turned to account, he soon discovered that all letters are

one and the same differently formed and pronounced, a difference in form and sound not constituting different letters, since almost every letter has different forms and sounds though it is still the same letter. Now by the applying of this important discovery, first suggested by the words *farther* and *further*, he soon found himself able to explain words which neither he nor any one else could account for before. Thus he saw from the interchange of *o* and *a* (witness *o*lder and the *a* of the *a*lder of *a*lderman) that *Mars* does not differ from *Mors*; so that the original meaning of the God *Mars* is the god of death. And as W is as equal to B as it is to M, our author shows that the *Mar* of *Mars* is equal to the *bar* of *barracks*, by which he saw that this word is for *War-acks*; that is, since *a* is composed of *oi*, *war-oikos*, which means *war-house*, *acks* being for *oikos*, Greek of *house*. This etymology is the more valuable as it corrects the gross mistake now to be found in the dictionaries of all English philologists, that of writing *barrack* for *barracks*; because not being aware that *acks* is for *oikos*, they could not account for the *s*, and so they have left it out, writing *barrack* for *barracks*. Johnson, Webster, and all who follow in their wake make this great mistake, and our lying reviewer of the *Athenæum* takes care not to point it out. He takes care also when he says '*bride* is *mride*, or *married*,' not to observe that this etymology is confirmed by the French of *bride* being la *mariée*, that is, the *married*, which makes this etymology self-evident. He has also taken care not to allude to the important etymologies given by Mr. Kavanagh of the words *brine* and *wicked*, of which the former is for *barine*, that is, from the identity of B and M, *Marine*; and as *marine* is to be traced to *mare*, Latin of *sea*, it follows that *brine*

first meant *sea-water,* and this is further confirmed by the French word *mariner,* which means to *pickle,* but literally to *brine.* A very clear instance of M being W inverted is afforded by the word *wicked* and its French form *méchant, wick* being the radical part of *wicked,* and *mèche* (which has the meaning of *wick*) being the radical part of *méchant.* Why two ideas so dissimilar as *wicked* and the *wick* of a candle should be expressed both in English and French by two words radically alike, is fully accounted for in Mr. Kavanagh's present work[8], and much better than in the 'Myths.'

"The reviewer gives none of these latter proofs that M is W inverted, well aware that he could not do so without allowing it to be seen that Mr. Kavanagh's system must be founded on truth. But the honest and enlightened reviewer would draw particular attention to such etymologies. He would observe that it was only now the real meaning of the word *barracks* was discovered, and that the discovery was made by knowing that M and W are but different forms of the same sign, and that of these B was another form by which the primary signification of such words as *bride* and *brine* was made self-evident, though hitherto no one could make out why a newly-married woman was called a *bride,* or why a sort of pickle was called *brine,* but the lying reviewer in the *Athenæum,* the wilful enemy of truth and science, has done all he could to keep the world still in ignorance not only of these important etymologies, but of a great many others of equal value, and not a few—judging from the light they throw on ancient records—are even of a great deal more value. But when Mr. Kavanagh first stated—some thirty years ago—that M is W inverted, he was

[8] Vol. i. p. 226.

not aware that this could be proved by Sanskrit, of which language he happens to know nothing. He is told, however, in a work published by a learned Sanskrit scholar only two or three years ago, that the W in Sanskrit is in Latin *often* replaced by M, the author showing as one proof among others that the W of *Wari*, Sanskrit of *sea*, is the M of its Latin equivalent *Mare*. Mr. Kavanagh has occasion to refer several times throughout his present work to this interchange of W and M, and of which the first instance occurs in vol. i. p. 48.

"Mr. Kavanagh does not accuse the lying reviewer of the *Athenæum* with having wilfully concealed this proof of the truth of his system, for probably he knew no more of Sanskrit when he wrote his review than Mr. Kavanagh himself did then. But our author is now becoming very learned in Sanskrit, since he knows already as many as some five or six words of this language, all of which he has picked up while running through M. Max Müller's works, and this respectable stock of pilfered knowledge has greatly served Mr. Kavanagh in confirming some of his own etymologies and detecting the errors in those of his learned master, Professor Max Müller. What might he not do if he knew some five or six thousand Sanskrit words!

"But why does not our reviewer correct Mr. Kavanagh's unsound etymologies by giving the true ones? Take only this word, *Mind*, of which our author, by inverting its M, makes *Wind*, which happens to be the meaning of both *spiritus* and *mind*, as every one knows, though no one has ever, before Mr. Kavanagh, shown that *Mind* is, by the inverting of its M, the word *Wind* itself. Why does not our lying etymologist show that the word *Mind* is very different from *Wind*, and so prove

this etymology to be a blunder, and that it must be also a blunder to assert that the W in Sanskrit is often, as above stated, represented in Latin by M?

"Why, now let us ask, is the English verb to *sow* made to have the same meaning as *seminare* in Latin and as *semer* in French? No one can tell but by applying the principles of our author's discovery. It is very easy to account for *seminare* in Latin and *semer* in French, the radical part of each of these two words being *sem;* and *sem* being the radical part of *semen,* the Latin of *seed,* just as it is of *semence* in French, by which we see that to *sow* a field is literally to *seed* it, that is, to put seed in it. Nothing can be plainer than this; every one can tell why *seminare* and *semer* have the meanings which are now assigned them. But *sow* differs widely in appearance from the *sem* of *sem*inare and *sem*er until we turn to account what Mr. Kavanagh discovered many years ago, namely, that W is often represented by M; for, by knowing this, we can say that the verb to *sow* is equal to *som,* and that *som* is as equal to *sem* as show is to shew, or as older is to elder, the *o* appearing often under its form *e.* There is not, therefore, a letter in difference between *sow* and *sem,* the sole difference between them is in the form of its two letters *o* and *w;* and every letter may take different forms, and be all the while the same letter. Witness A, a and *a,* in which we see the same letter under three different forms.

"Now when the reviewer shows that *sow* is the same as *som,* why does he not show, as Mr. Kavanagh does, that *som* is the same as the *sem* of *semer,* just as show is the same as shew? Because this might lead many intelligent readers to perceive the truth of the etymology; but by stopping at *som* no one could perceive any thing in it

but nonsense. The next etymology he tries to cover with ridicule is the verb to *row*, and now, as before, he stops at *rom*, taking care not to show that, according to Mr. Kavanagh's principles, *o* is as equal to *a* as it is to *e*, which is confirmed by *older* being the same as *elder*, of which neither can differ from the *a*lder of *a*lderman, so that *rom* is equal to *ram*, which is the radical part of *ramus*, an *oar;* and by this we see that to *row* a *boat* is literally to *oar* it. But what is the etymology of *oar*, or *ramus?* We should remark that *ram*, radical part of *ramus*, cannot differ from *arm*, the original place of its *a* being before and not after the *r;* and the two *oars* propelling a boat are its two arms. This is confirmed by *ramus* meaning not only an *oar* but a *branch;* and when the nasal sound of the *a* of *branch* is dropped, this word becomes *brach*, which is the radical part of *brachium*, an *arm;* and the branches of a tree are its arms. And after what was *arm* called? We discover its origin by observing that its root is *ar*, that *ar* is equal to *oir*, and *oir* to *eir*, root of *cheir*, Greek of *hand*, after which the *arm* was called. And as the hand was called after the sun, that is, a *maker*, we thus see how an *oar* or the *branch* of a tree can, because traceable to the hand, be also traceable to the sun, which was called our Maker.

"By thus discovering that *ar* is the root of *arm*, we see that the *m* is no radical part of this word; there is a tendency to sound this sign after *r*, as there is also to sound an *n;* thus *patrem* and *matrem* must have first been pater*m* and mater*m;* and so must *farina* have first been *farn*, whence the French *farine*. Hence *barn* or *bern*, which, according to Parkhurst, meant a *son* in old English, is the Hebrew word *bar* itself, which also means a *son*. And this addition of *m* and *n*, though merely

euphonic, often served to distinguish a derivative from an original. Thus when *pater* and *mater* became *paterm* and *materm*, this served to distinguish one case from another; and when *far, corn,* became *farn,* this served to distinguish meal from corn. In the same way *barn* was distinguished from *bar,* Hebrew of *corn,* and which is but a different form of its Latin equivalent *far.* Then what difference is there in meaning between *farn* and *barn?* There is no difference except conventionally. Thus *farreum,* a kind of food made from corn, happens to mean also a *barn.* Nor does *bran* differ in meaning from either corn or *bern,* except conventionally. Parkhurst does not fail to draw from בר *br* (that is, *bar, son*) a genuine type. Thus from its being the radical part of ברית *brit,* and from this word having also the meaning of 'a purification sacrifice,' and as, according to the same authority, 'it is used as a *personal title* of Christ, the real *purifier* and antitype to all the sacrificial ones,' the certainty of its being a real type appears very clear to all who have any faith in the doctrine of types. We now see that in *oar* we have the root *ar,* which, from the euphonic tendency above shown, cannot differ from *arm,* nor *arm* from the *ram* of *ramus,* which means both a *branch* and an *oar;* and a *branch,* as we have shown, is an *arm.*

"You may wonder, gentlemen, said the lecturer, that I should take so much notice of a reviewer so unworthy of all notice; but, in my humble opinion, it is a great mistake to make light of such characters, however contemptible they be. From the clever reviewer there is nothing to fear; he has a just sense of his own dignity as a true man, and will do nothing to sink himself in his own opinion. But the low, lying driveller has also a just sense of his own vile character, and he cannot do any

thing above meanness; so that whenever he finds his way into a popular review he becomes from that day out a dangerous nuisance, so much so, that to countenance his bad doings by silence may be well called a crime, and so may all persons deriving any benefit from such doings be safely regarded as accomplices.

"Let me give you, gentlemen, only one instance more of this man's gross misrepresentation and palpable falsehood combined. Near the close of his article he says: 'We have read only one of Mr. Kavanagh's volumes; we have not courage for the second volume.' Now what can be more prejudicial to an author of two volumes than to be told by a reviewer in a popular journal that he stood in need of courage to read his second volume? But this happens to be a very stupid and wilful lie; for where does he get the following misrepresentation of a valuable etymology, now discovered for the first time: 'The *glad* of *gladius* read backwards gives *dalg*, and this is *darg*, or *dirk*, and *dagger*.' Now this shameful representation of Mr. Kavanagh's own words and showing is taken from volume the *second*, page 217; so that the lie is self-evident. He therefore took care not to mention the part of Mr. Kavanagh's work from which he quoted this etymology, and which, as above set down, must give a strange idea of our author's powers as an etymologist. Mr. Kavanagh says: 'When we read the *glad* of *gladius* from right to left and so obtain *dalg*, what is this, since *l* is the same as *u* (witness g*l*ad and the ga*u*d of ga*u*deo), but *daug;* that is, since *u* is the same as *g* (witness *u*uerre in the Teutonic tongue and *g*uerre in French), *dagg*, which is the radical part of *dagger?* But as *l* takes the form of *r* as often as it does of *u*, many persons—even whole nations—would pronounce da*l*g as

if written dar*g*, and dar*g* as if written dar*k*; and what is this but d*u*rk, or, as we now have it, d*i*rk, which is also a dagger[9].'

"When Mr. Kavanagh shows, on the following page, that edged tools, from a needle to a hatchet, have been named after the idea to *cut*, it can be easily conceived that the same word may have been often read not only from right to left, but that its letters must have been also made to interchange and change places, without which great confusion would be the consequence. Schrevelius gives all these meanings to κοπίς: 'sword, knife, cleaver, scimitar, axe, sting;' and that each of these must have first meant to *cut* is shown by κόπτω, which means to 'beat, strike, cut, wound, cut off, slay, cleave, pound.' But take only the word dagger, of which the *a* is for *oi*, so that when the *o* is dropped dagger becomes *digger*. And what is a *digger?* He is one that cuts the ground. And with what? With a spade. And that the word meaning a spade may also mean a sword is shown by *spada*, which is both the Saxon and Italian of *sword*, and also by the Swedish and Danish languages, in which *spade* is the word sword itself; and Donnegan explains κοπίς both by *sword* and *dagger*. In order to find in the *glad* of *gladius* a word meaning to *cut* we have only to make its *a* return to its first place before *l*, by which *glad* will become *gald*, and *gald* can no more differ from *geld*, to *cut*, than the *alder* of alderman can differ from *elder;* or than *Halios* (Doric name of the sun) can differ from *Helios*.

"Now could this mendacious reviewer tell us how it happens that *glad*ius and *glad*ness are radically the same word, or how it happens that the *gald* and *geld* (these

[9] Myths, vol. ii. p. 217.

other forms of the *glad* of *gladius*) do not differ from the word *gold?* No; it would be much easier for him to swallow a sword, hilt and all, than to tell how this happens. The reader will find it, however, fully and clearly accounted for under our author's etymology of SAVITAR[1].

"Now take away all the wilful misrepresentations and gross lies of this review, and what remains? Nothing. The reviewer has not dared to correct a single etymology of all those to which he has drawn attention. Why not give us the primary signification of *gladius* or *dagger*, or of any other word, and so confound Mr. Kavanagh by proving his etymologies to be all false? Or let him take the sun and tell us, if he can, after what it was first called. If its name be not the origin of human speech, it follows that language must have been in existence before the sun had yet obtained a name; and, granting this, it will follow that the name of the sun cannot have been the origin of human speech, and that it must have been called after some idea, some object having itself a name and to which name that of our grand luminary can be traced. Now can our reviewer, or any reviewer of so popular a review as the *Athenæum*, discover the idea or object after which the sun was first called? If so, he should tell it at once, not even wait until the next day hoarding within himself so important a secret; for, to a certainty, such a discovery would throw so broad a light on the origin of language as not to be surpassed by any other discovery ever yet made by man. As to Mr. Kavanagh, he has remained whole nights awake in endeavouring to make this discovery, but he has been obliged to give it up. It has however occurred to him, that as the eminent reviewer of

[1] Vol. i. p. 396.

the *Athenæum* is a first-rate hand at inventing—not lies oh, no, no!—he might, perhaps, if he only set about it, make this wonderful discovery. But a discovery is after all considerably less difficult than an invention, which, it would seem, if we may judge from the review of Mr. Kavanagh's work in the *Athenæum*, is uncommonly easy, to 'keep probability in view' not being even requisite. Thus, is it at all likely that an author would ever make a statement to the effect that by reading *any* word backwards as well as forwards, *any* word may be converted into any other word? Now such an invention as this has not so much as the shadow of probability; it is, however, an invention, a genuine invention; and to deny to its author the merit and the glory of it would certainly be an act of very gross injustice. But when he presented to the readers of the *Athenæum* this fine specimen of his inventive powers, what a high opinion he must have entertained of their reason and common sense, and how largely he must have relied on their very goodnatured innocence and simplicity.

And how long did this invention occupy his thoughts? Perhaps not five minutes. What a difference between him and our author, who assured me that he has often remained whole nights awake in endeavouring to make a very simple discovery. But it may be that an invention is somewhat more easy than a discovery. Witness our novel writers, how very easily they invent; little children even invent; one of them has scarcely left its mother's lap before it begins to invent by telling fibs. But I have heard that such as are very truthful in their childhood are often when they grow up much addicted to misrepresentation and lying, and this may very well be, and it leads me to the charitable supposition that our

reviewer must, when a child, have been really very truthful. I read only the other day in a remarkably well-conducted newspaper, which, as it will apply to Mr. Kavanagh's work, I beg to quote: 'May not the very highest form of invention be discovery? And what should be the sublimest order of discovery but the finding out of the truth[2]?'

"But there is, in my humble opinion, a discovery fully as sublime as the one here referred to, and perhaps a little more difficult; and which is this:—To discover in a clear and perfect discovery that it is a discovery, and no mistake. By a master-spirit only can so great a wonder be achieved. However evident an important discovery may appear to others, it will be always found, when presented to the judgment of the petty critic, to lie oceans of miles beyond the stretch of his narrow-minded views.

"According to the reviewer in the *Athenæum*, Mr. Kavanagh is made to hold a very poor place when compared to the *sober* etymologist.

"But who is, pray, the *sober* etymologist? It is he who, like M. Max Müller, derives *homo* from *humus;* the sun from a word meaning heat and light; it is he who derives the word *soul* from a word meaning the ocean; it is he who derives *mare*, the *sea*, from a Sanskrit word meaning death, because the Sanskrit of *death* is *mar;* it is he who derives *galetas* (French of *garret*) from *Galata*, the superb tower at Constantinople; it is he who derives *sea* from a Greek word meaning to *shake;* it is he who derives the French noun *boucher* from a buck-goat; it is he who derives *garçon* from a thistle, the heart of a cabbage, or a bud; it is he who derives *grisette* from the sort of cloth the young woman so named wore

[2] Daily Telegraph, May 3, 1871, p. 5, col. 5.

in her dress; it is he who tells us that *tranquil* means the smoothness of the sea; it is he, or rather they who have in their dictionaries converted *barracks* into *barrack* and *suds* into *sud;* it is he, or rather they who tell us it is impossible to find the etymology of either God or good; it is he, or rather they who derive *Lord* from a Saxon word meaning a loaf of bread; it is he who has given more than twenty different forms of the French word *eau,* but who could as soon drink the Seine dry as discover the idea after which water was, in no matter what language, first called; it is he, or rather all France, who could never tell how it happens that *je suis* means both *I am* and *I follow;* it is a certain learned German and Frenchman who admit that of all the mysterious things in the world there can be nothing so wonderfully mysterious as the roots of language; it is all the philologists now living, as well as all who have lived, that cannot discover the idea after which the sun was, in no matter what language, first called; it is he who assures us that *poissard* (originally a *fishmonger*) was never called after *poisson* or *fish,* but after *pitch, poix,* because every thing stuck to his fingers; so that the real meaning of *poissard* is a *rogue,* or *robber,* and so forth; it is he and they who assert that the origin of animal water is unknown, though Mr. Kavanagh gives an instance of a baby having known it; it is they who cannot account for the radical identity of the French words *rose* and *rosée.* These etymologies, which make only a few of those made by our author, might be increased to any amount; and they can be traced to very *sober* etymologists: Mr. Kavanagh has had, however, all of them on his hip, and has laid every one of them full length on his back, though they were all at the time very steady on their legs; for that is implied by the

words of our great reviewer, when he so clearly makes it appear by the dint of lying and gross misrepresentation that Mr. Kavanagh is something a great deal less than nothing at all when compared to the *sober* etymologist, and that 'he has attempted, without width or depth of knowledge, to handle subjects in which the greatest width and depth have not *always* preserved the speculator from failure.'

"According to the latter statement, philologists of the greatest width and depth have not been *always* preserved from failure when handling subjects which Mr. Kavanagh, who though entirely destitute of both width and depth, has dared to handle. Now is there a particle of truth in this bold assertion? The readers of the *Athenæum* are here allowed to understand, that at least *sometimes*, though not *always*, men of the greatest width and depth have succeeded when writing on the origin of language and myths. How Mr. Kavanagh would like to see the works of those great men who have succeeded when handling the grave subjects in question! He would, I have no doubt, sell the coat off his back, ay, and his shirt along with it, if he could not otherwise raise the wind, to purchase one of their books. But this cruel reviewer will not give us the names either of these authors or their books. How selfish he must be! The books are of course to be found; of that there can be no doubt; but where are they to be found? Ay, 'that's the question.' This rogue of a reviewer must know very well where they are to be found; but the sly fox will not name the place, lest we should become as wise as himself. Oh! he is a deep one, but as selfish as he is deep; M. Max Müller himself is not more so, for he allows us to understand that he is thoroughly acquainted with

certain firmly-established principles of language; but the secret is his own, and he will not let it out, not even to himself, lest he should correct his own blunders. What an extraordinary instance of selfishness and secrecy! But why has the reviewer of Mr. Kavanagh's work written more than two or three lines on '*Myths traced to their Primary Source through Language?*' It was only necessary to name the authors of the greatest width and depth, who have, according to his statement, succeeded in handling the same subjects, though all have not been so fortunate. And by acting in this straightforward way, what trouble, time, and expense he would have spared our author, who would never think of publishing his present work if he had been previously informed that the origin of language and myths had been already written upon by certain authors who were far more competent than he was himself to grapple with subjects so difficult. By this straightforwardness on the reviewer's part, he would have also taken it out of an author's power to accuse him of either gross misrepresentation or lying.

"Our author on finding himself so unjustly treated by the reviewer of the *Athenæum* and others replied to such attacks in a *brochure* entitled, '*An Author his own Reviewer*,' but this was regarded by the prince of petti-foggers in literature as the height of impertinence. This gentleman has the right of gross misrepresentation and lying as much as he pleases, but no author must be so bold as to oppose this gross misrepresentation and these palpable falsehoods. When knocked down, and trampled upon while down, the poor devil must, on rising, take off his hat to the gentleman, and say, 'Thank you, sir, you have done me a great honour.' He must not presume to

utter a word in his defence; if he should so far forget himself he is a spiteful wretch, and his defence is so stupid as not to be understood. Lest you should suppose, gentlemen, that this representation of the reviewer's conduct is rather too strong, allow me to submit to you his own words, and which you will find in a journal entitled the *Leader*, April, 1857, page 476. 'We know not to what class of readers Mr. Kavanagh has addressed "*An Author his own Reviewer*,"—a spiteful, unintelligible, and imbecile tirade against certain critics,' and principally (he might have added) against myself, who am here proved to have been guilty of gross misrepresentation and palpable falsehoods. And when he says, 'We know not to what class of readers Mr. Kavanagh addresses "*An Author his own Reviewer*,"' it is only fair that he should be told, Mr. Kavanagh's *brochure* is addressed not to such literary individuals as are a disgrace to the honourable members of the English press, but to all those who are an honour to it, and they are those who abhor from their souls gross misrepresentation and palpable falsehoods, and especially when means so vile are put in practice for retarding the progress of truth and science, and also for crushing, if possible, one who, as the reviewer knows very well, has been struggling for years against dire adversity, while endeavouring, all the while, to render his work less faulty, and above all to make the discovery it developes more evident.

"He says that Mr. Kavanagh's *brochure* is *unintelligible;* and why does he say so? Because he cannot leave off fibbing. He understands it very well, and which is proved by his styling it a *spiteful and imbecile tirade.*

How does he know that this *brochure* deserves to have such epithets applied to it? Because he finds it very intelligible.

"That our honest reviewer should style Mr. Kavanagh's *brochure spiteful* is what might be reasonably expected, such being nearly always the very epithet applied by criminals to their judges whenever their base or heartless conduct is, as it ought to be, forcibly but justly stigmatized. But Mr. Kavanagh's tirade is not only *spiteful* but *imbecile*, says our noble-minded reviewer; and when we observe that imbecility means feebleness of mind, it must be admitted that our author's attack is rather feeble when exposing the mean heartlessness of the man who could have recourse not merely to common-place misrepresentation, but even to wilfully-palpable falsehoods, for the sole purpose of crushing one who, he had every reason to suppose, was on his last legs, and who, if then knocked down, could rise no more, whilst he, from writing in a popular journal, was sure to have a host of dunghill acolytes ever following in his wake, and echoing, under different forms of expression, whatever their leader might think proper to assert.

"No more needs now be said of our very susceptible critic. He will of course regard it as very great presumption in any one so humble as a lecturer daring to find fault with what he has condescended to state relative to our author's work on the origin of myths; but our defence is not addressed to the severe and honest reviewer, whose opinions, however widely they may differ from our own, we shall always treat with respect; but let not him whom we find guilty of gross misrepresentation or wilful falsehood in his notice of Mr. Kavanagh's '*Myths traced to their Primary Source through Language,*

or of his present work entitled '*Origin of Language and Myths*,' expect any mercy from us, for he shall have none. Indeed, it would be a criminal act to show any to so dangerous a nuisance, as the doing so might, by encouraging such an evil, serve to retard the progress of truth and science.

"That it is only a man of great intellectual powers can perceive in the first rude sketch of an important discovery that it may, notwithstanding its then ill-favoured appearance, be founded on truth, I beg now, gentlemen," said the lecturer, "to present to you a very plain instance. A few years previous to his having succeeded—and partly at his own expense—in having his work on the origin of myths published, Mr. Kavanagh feeling anxious to know what an author of style and thought so very original as Mr. Thomas Carlyle might think of his discovery of the origin of myths, submitted to that gentleman a short letter on that subject, with a single specimen serving to show that the history of the fabulous characters in ancient history and religion must have grown out of the different meanings of their names. Mr. Carlyle, in answer to our author's letter, thought if there was no mistake the discovery was an important one, and he accordingly gave an interview for the next day. The result of this interview was so favourable to Mr. Kavanagh that Mr. Carlyle wished to see the discovery made public, and said he would recommend it to the editor of a periodical with whom he was acquainted. Mr. Carlyle did not fail to do as he had promised, for in a day or two he wrote to our author, his letter enclosing one from the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine*. This enclosed letter gave Mr. Kavanagh a rather singular opinion of the writer. It would seem that some one had

previously told him that our author's first work on the science of language, and which should be entitled the science of grammar, was extremely bad, and hence he concluded that the one on myths could be no better. The object of his communication to Mr. Carlyle was therefore to persuade this gentleman to change his evidently favourable views of our author's work on the origin of myths. Mr. Kavanagh could not help thinking rather strangely of that man's mind—and he too an editor—who could speak so decidedly not from what he had seen himself, but from what some one else had happened to tell him; no doubt it was one of the sorry acolytes of the critic in the *Athenæum*, or of the briefless lawyer who had succeeded, as already shown, in persuading so justly distinguished a character as Professor Latham to change the first favourable opinion he had of our author's work on the science of language. But so has it ever been; the merest dolt, though incapable of producing any thing of his own deserving of notice, is not always unsuccessful when he tries, by misrepresentation or falsehood, to make others, who may be far above him in all respects, submit to the views he himself affects to entertain.

"Though Mr. Kavanagh recollects the substance of this gentleman's letter to Mr. Carlyle, there is only one sentence of which he can call to mind the exact words. Thus alluding in a pleasant vein of derision to our author, he says: 'Alas! I have never seen his book!' These words Mr. Kavanagh can never forget; for he thought it most extraordinary that any one pretending to be a critic could not only condemn a work he had never seen, but, in advance, also one of a very different nature, which was already so far approved of by perhaps the highest

authority of the age as to be strongly recommended by him; for that Mr. Carlyle's recommendation was not one of an indifferent kind is proved by a passage in the editor's letter, of which our author does not recollect the exact words, but they were to this effect: 'But you recommend Mr. Kavanagh so forcibly that I find it impossible to resist such pleading. If Mr. Kavanagh will therefore send me a portion of his work, I am willing to publish it in the magazine on condition that I approve of it, and if I should not, I agree to pay him for it.'

"Mr. Kavanagh plainly saw that the writer of a letter so very flimsy and vain would be entirely out of his depth if so original a discovery as that of the origin of language and myths were to be submitted to his opinion, to the end that Mr. Carlyle might learn from his superior judgment how far he was right or wrong in the view he had taken of Mr. Kavanagh's pretensions. It is needless to observe that our author never sent a portion of his work to a man whose letter implied that he thought himself equal, if not superior, to so eminent an authority as Mr. Carlyle. The editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine* must have regarded this slight as an insult from our author; but what must have hurt his vanity still more was to perceive that our author would not so far consent to have him for a patron as to accept payment for an article never to be inserted in his journal. From this insulting offer it was evident that the editor knew as little of our author's independence of character as he would have known of his discovery if its author had condescended to submit it to his judgment.

"Mr. Carlyle, on perceiving that Mr. Kavanagh could not think of sending any part of his work to the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, suggested to have it brought

out by subscription, and that in the list of subscribers Mr. Kavanagh was welcome to put Mr. Carlyle's name either at the top or the bottom.

"This was another striking proof of Mr. Carlyle's great kindness; but our author would not take advantage of it, for the reason that he could never think of applying to any one for the subscription money if it should remain unpaid. But he felt not the less grateful for Mr. Carlyle's offer; which might, however, have been expected, as all men of great intellectual powers cannot do otherwise than act nobly; it is only your would-be great man whose conduct is in general quite the reverse.

"In Mr. Kavanagh's notice of such reviews as he had reason to believe did not do him justice, he neglected to draw attention to the criticism in the *Gentleman's Magazine*. And why so? Because he was not aware of its existence. It was only the other day, and while his present work was going through the press, that on chancing to see a long line of this journal in the reading-room of the British Museum, the idea first occurred to him that probably its enlightened editor had condescended to give some account of his work on the origin of myths, and on looking into a few of the numbers of the year 1857, he soon found that he was not forgotten by its kind-hearted editor, as the following friendly notice will serve to show: 'We speak *very mildly* of this pretentious work when we say that Mr. Kavanagh has attempted to handle a subject altogether beyond his reach. From beginning to end it is *a tissue of absurdities*.' Now this is the sort of review which honourable gentlemen of the press call a *smasher;* for it is so very conclusive, so very crushing, that no logical argument, however powerful, can, with the least chance of victory, oppose it. But

where is, the reader may ask, the reviewer's argument? To which the answer must be that no argument is required. What the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine* was first told, no matter how undeserving of belief his informant may have been, is received by him as orthodox. One of the greatest men of the age cannot even undeceive him. Mr. Carlyle's opinion in favour of Mr. Kavanagh's discovery appears to have been very strong, since our editor declared that it was impossible to resist it; and this opinion is even further confirmed by Mr. Carlyle's kind offer to allow his name to appear either the first or the last in the list of subscribers, in the event of Mr. Kavanagh's consenting to bring out his work by subscription. But Mr. Carlyle did not happen to speak first; and it was not in our editor's power to divest himself of what he had been previously taught to believe. He was, moreover, as one who, for want of originality, never thinks for himself, bound to follow, like a very submissive and true acolyte, the lying journalist in the *Athenæum*. Thus the latter says that Mr. Kavanagh 'has attempted, without width or depth of knowledge, to handle subjects in which the greatest width and depth have not always preserved the speculator from failure.' And some six or seven months later his humble follower repeats the same idea under a different form, his words being: 'Mr. Kavanagh has attempted to handle a subject altogether beyond his reach.'

"How fortunate it was for Mr. Carlyle that Mr. Kavanagh did not publish his work by subscription, for his world-wide fame would have been crushed by the lying journalist in the *Athenæum*, and also by his dear acolyte of the *Gentleman's Magazine*. There is, however, some difference between these two gentlemen. The one is too

contemptible to deserve notice in any way whatever, the other may be both honest and honourable; his apparently great defect seems to be extreme silliness, with no mind of his own, and ever liable to be made the dupe of the first lying literary communication that happens to reach him. He has not even sufficient talent to invent nonsense of his own, but must take that of some one else; and to change the nonsense he has once imbibed for that of common sense is equally beyond his power. Only witness his preferring the lying review in the *Athenæum* to the judgment of so great a man as Carlyle. And like all silly minds he also appears to have no very trifling share of vanity; so that he must have taken as a very gross insult Mr. Kavanagh's rejecting him as a patron, for his offering to pay our author for an article he was predetermined never to insert was equal to his presenting himself as Mr. Kavanagh's pecuniary assistant. But as there is no reason for supposing him a dishonourable man, silliness being his chief characteristic, our author may, without degradation, put himself so far on a level with the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine* as to make a wager with him, not so much for the purpose of taking his money as for obliging him to regret his having spoken of our author as he has done, and to impress upon him the necessity of trying for the future to think for himself and not to follow blindly in the wake of so disreputable a literary character as he who is not only guilty of very gross misrepresentation but of wilful falsehood also, as Mr. Kavanagh has clearly demonstrated, and as any one else might as easily demonstrate if he were only to think and judge for himself.

"Now the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine* asserts that Mr. Kavanagh's work is 'a tissue of absurdities from

beginning to end;' which implies that Mr. Kavanagh has not by any means made the discovery to which he lays claim; but our author feels so thoroughly convinced of his discovery being real that he is willing to lay a wager of two to one—say forty pounds to twenty—with the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, that the review of his work in this periodical is a very gross misrepresentation, not wilful, perhaps, but probably through the reviewer having allowed himself to be guided by the despicable critic of the *Athenæum*, or by one of his wretched acolytes.

"And how very easy it will be for him to confirm the truth of all he has stated to the prejudice of our author—that is, if there be any truth in his statement. He has for this only to show that man did not in the beginning express his ideas by signs, and that it was not through a sign made by the mouth while representing the sun he obtained his first word—that is, the O—and consequently the origin of language. But how can he prove, it may be asked, that the O was not the first name given to the sun? Very easily. He has only to find out after what it was the sun was first called, that is, if the O was not its first name; and this being found, in no matter what language, it will, of course, show that the origin of human speech cannot be traced to the O, there having been a language in existence at the time the sun was first named. But can this first name of the sun—in no matter what language—be ever discovered? Of course it can; and so can the quadrature of the circle. The one is only a little bit more difficult than the other, and that is not the quadrature of the circle, this being, comparatively speaking, uncommonly easy; but it is to find out the idea after which the sun was first called, a discovery that

will, I have no doubt, be found rather more difficult than it may at first sight appear.

"We now see what the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine* has to do in order to prove that the discovery to which Mr. Kavanagh lays claim is 'a tissue of absurdities from beginning to end.' As to the beginning, that alone is our author's discovery, and, compared to which, what follows is infinitely less than secondary; in short, it is, correctly speaking, no part of his discovery of the origin of language, but only what has thence emanated, and it is presented as so many proofs of its reality, but among which there might be many mistakes without the least deterioration of the discovery itself.

"'Now Mr. Kavanagh could never think of censuring a critic for the severity of his strictures, provided he had not recourse to gross misrepresentation or wilful falsehoods. Our author has met with several very stupid notices of his work; but as no man should be called to account for being stupid any more than he should for his having been born blind, Mr. Kavanagh has taken no notice of such reviews, as they may have been written by very honest and honourable men. But there is some fault to be found with the proprietors or editors of respectable journals for not making themselves better acquainted with the capability of the persons they employ. Only witness how very clearly Mr. Kavanagh expresses his opinion respecting the origin of speech in a passage quoted from the 'Myths' in his introduction to the present work[3], and which begins with these words: 'We cannot for an instant suppose that speech was ever invented,' &c. In opposition to this plain statement, Mr. Kavanagh is made to say that 'men *invented*

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language.' Here is another statement from the same authority just as correct as the preceding one: 'Our author professes to found his work on the work of the 'Anacalypsis' of Godfrey Higgins.' Here it is evident that the reviewer takes the word Anacalypsis for the name of an author, and not for the name of a work; and that it was about this author Higgins wrote. Hence his meaning is, that Mr. Kavanagh professes to found his work on the 'Anacalypsis.' But there is not a word in either of Mr. Kavanagh's volumes to suggest such an opinion. But because Mr. Kavanagh quotes from the 'Anacalypsis,' the reviewer imagines that that must mean that he founds his work on the 'Anacalypsis.' Godfrey Higgins supposes, in the opening of his work, that language came naturally to man; and, farther on, he calls it 'a beautiful invention.' But it did not come naturally to man, nor was it an invention, since, according to our author, it was obtained unawares while man was representing the sun by giving to his mouth a circular form, and then by his uttering a sound to draw attention to that form, when he always heard O, which, on receiving the nasal sound, became *On*, a well-known name of the sun, and not different from O, man's first word. And as to the origin of myths, though Higgins shows that there was a time when all men had the same religious belief, he never suspects that this universal agreement arose from all people having radically the same language and consequently the same superstitions.

"'Now, every one who knows any thing of letters must be well aware that Hebrew is read *backwards;* and that such a word as *mar* makes *ram* when read after the Hebrew manner. Yet our critic gravely informs his readers that the root of Mars—that is, *mar*—is, when read as in He-

brew, *mar*, and that when read backwards it is *ram*. By which he clearly shows his not being aware that Hebrew is read from right to left. But the worst of all is, that Mr. Kavanagh is represented as being the author of such very silly nonsense. And he adds: 'It is really wonderful to see the ramifications of the principle.'

"'Now, when a sorry dolt like this is allowed to review such a work as the '*Myths*,' who is the more to blame, the employer or the one employed? It is certainly the employer, who might have turned this man's services to better account than to allow him to be on the press. The poor man might have made himself very useful in some other way about the house; he might have done very well for running of messages, for sweeping out the office, or cleaning the windows; but it was a mortal sin to make a reviewer of him. At this time, when the reviewing department of the English press was in so very humble a state, who can be surprised at the Paul Pry of literary gentlemen having worked his way into one of the quarterly Scotch reviews[4]?'

"Now inasmuch as the discovery of the origin of language is concerned, what difference is there between Mr. Kavanagh's work of 1856 and the present one of 1871? There is none whatever, for this discovery is as fully and as clearly set forth in the one work as it is in the other; but there is in other respects a very great difference between the two works. In 1856 Professor Max Müller's 'Lectures on the Science of Language' had not appeared, nor for several years after; nor had M. Littré yet published any numbers of his great Dictionary; so that Mr. Kavanagh had not yet the opportunity, which has been

[4] Morning Chronicle, May 5th, 1857.

since so amply afforded him, of proving beyond all doubt his discovery of the origin of language and the great advantage it gave him over the best of living philologists. Still in many other respects our author's work of the present year is greatly superior to that of 1856, when he was very often only feeling his way to the making of rules and the applying of them; and hence he did on several occasions make mistakes, but not such as to affect the discovery, which was made as real then as it is now, though not so very evident. But if it lay beyond the reach of a second or third class intellect, a master-mind—a Carlyle, for instance—could perceive something in it like the germs of a real and important discovery.

"As to the myths, they could not be well explained without a perfect knowledge of the origin of words, hence their having until now remained so utterly unknown that whatever has appeared mysterious or incomprehensible has been frequently styled a myth. But the time must come when what is now obscure will be no longer called a myth, and that will be when every one will have made himself so well acquainted with Mr. Kavanagh's discovery and its principles as to find little or no difficulty in the analyzing of words.

"The first apparently unanswerable objection likely to be raised against our author's discovery is, that in the alphabet of some languages there is no sign bearing any resemblance in form to such a character as O. Witness, for instance, the representative of this sign in Hebrew, which is thus made ע, which is very artificial; whilst in Sanskrit it is a great deal more so, since in the alphabet of this language it is made thus ओ. But when human speech was yet in its infancy no people in the world

could have represented so natural a sign as O, as it is at present represented in Hebrew and Sanskrit. It has, no doubt, been at a much later period—and probably for secret purposes—that alphabetical signs were changed from the simple forms they must have first had to their artificial ones. That the Sanskrit alphabet was once composed of the O and segments of this sign may be safely inferred from the fact that this alphabet, now in use throughout Ava and Pegu, as stated in our author's first volume[5], belongs to a language which is, in the opinion of some of the best judges, nearly allied to the Sanskrit. The origin of the present strange characters of the Chinese language is to be accounted for in the same way. But the English student need not go beyond his own language in order to perceive how differently the same letter may be formed. Witness only E, which is also made thus, ɐ; yet that each of these two signs is but a different form of the O we have had occasion to show on many occasions. And thus it is with most of the alphabetical signs in all languages. Whence it were as difficult to prove that all letters have not grown out of one only as it were to discover the idea after which the sun was first called.

"Now as to the wager of two to one, which Mr. Kavanagh has offered to lay with the editor of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, why it may be asked, has he not rather offered to lay that wager with the critic of the *Athenæum?* Because our author cannot help regarding the latter character as too contemptible; he who could not only grossly misrepresent, but who could also add shameful falsehoods to his wilful misrepresentation is too

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low, too disreputable to be noticed in any other way than by holding him up to the hatred and scorn of all the respectable members of the press.

"And who is to act as umpire between this gentleman and our author? Mr. Kavanagh will accept for this purpose any half-dozen of gentlemen of the editor's own choosing, provided such gentlemen have a name to lose; he would accept even the editor himself—whose honour he does not call in question—if he could suppose him capable of forming a sound opinion of his own; but Mr. Kavanagh's conviction seems to be that this gentleman dares not to think for himself in literary matters, nor to have sufficient strength of mind to change the first erroneous impression he may have received from a corrupt or unworthy source, for one far more justly deserving of his attention and preference. As a critic, shallowness of judgment, want of discernment, and a base subserviency to the decisions of others, even to the lowest of the low, stand out not as the least prominent of his negative virtues. Of wilful duplicity our author does not accuse him, but he may safely accuse him of having been the dupe of some one else's duplicity."

The lecturer now made a pause of several minutes, and then, while looking fixedly at our colleague Littré, he resumed thus: "I can easily conceive that when a learned man is, notwithstanding his large stock of acquired knowledge, so narrow minded as not to have the power of believing in a state beyond the grave, that he may, from his views being so confined, be equally at a loss to conceive how Mr. Kavanagh's twofold discovery cannot have been made until late in the nineteenth century. But if——" the lecturer was not allowed to

proceed, for Littré, now interrupting him, bounded to his feet, and with a resolute look and a loud voice thus exclaimed: "Sir, your words are intended for me; but allow me to undeceive you. I do now believe in a future state, and to you my thanks are due for that belief. I have taken advantage of your theory, that our earth was never perfect, nor intended to be perfect, and by following up this idea from point to point, I have been finally led to believe in a state beyond the grave." On hearing Littré so express himself every one rose at the instant from his place, and with looks full of gladness and congratulation rushed towards our colleague, but the lecturer was the first of all, and pressing with enthusiasm Littré's hands in his own, he exclaimed, "This is, my dear friend, the happiest moment of my life." Every one present did the same, many of them shedding tears of joy. Methought the lecturer even sobbed audibly. The scene was altogether very affecting, and it called to my mind what I had often heard, namely, that one sinner on entering heaven causes more rejoicing than when ninety of the just enter.

The emotion having after some minutes subsided, the lecturer continued thus: "What we have just witnessed, my friends, argues well for the future of our author's twofold discovery. We see how much better calculated it must be to draw men out of the dark abyss of Atheism to a belief in an almighty power and a state of rewards and punishments beyond the grave. Such is, in substance, the religion at present in existence over all the civilized parts of the world. It has been embellished by some people with certain adjuncts more or less rational, but in the main they all agree; so that their differences in doctrines and dogmas are of secondary importance com-

pared to the fundamental and consoling belief that there is a hereafter, and that we shall never, never die, but while atoning for our transgressions in the flesh, live on through all eternity, still progressing as we advance, and never ceasing to progress.

"Such is our author's philosophy; and the train of thought through which it has been obtained, is the same as that which has led to his twofold discovery and its many startling results.

"And of this discovery and its results no more needs now be said: previously to its having been made, so very little was known of the origin of language, that not so much as a single letter or root could be accounted for. Indeed, to have accounted for either would have led at once to the discovery of the origin of language itself. Thus granting the hieroglyph O to have named the sun, we obtain in this sign a word, a root, and a letter, all three in one. This alone, had our author never gone any farther, might be well regarded as the real discovery of the origin of human speech. Hence all that follows this very simple but important beginning should not be regarded as the discovery of the origin of language, but as so many proofs of its reality. And never, perhaps, has any man offered more conclusive proofs of a discovery. But will they be admitted? Undoubtedly they will; every enlightened member of the press will admit them; but your lying journalist and his silly dupes, that is, his narrow-minded followers, will do all that in them lies to keep these proofs out of sight, or to give a very gross misrepresentation of them—such is *their duty;* they cannot do otherwise, their low and evil nature forbids it. Our author has therefore to rely on the enlightened part of the press and the public, who can easily confound his

adversaries by defying them to produce from any other philological source an equal amount of startling and real results. And if any reader of only ordinary intelligence were to ask how it happens that ideas the most dissimilar are frequently expressed by words which are radically the same, how your would-be critic and lying journalist would be puzzled to answer! Thus if he had to tell how it happens that in Latin *rosa*, a *rose*, and *ros*, *dew*, make only one word, what explanation could he give? None, or a very insignificant one. Or if he were requested to account for the flower named a *rose* and the French verb *arroser*, to *water*, being also, when radically considered, the same word, could he ever find so satisfactory a solution as our author has found? Never. And thus it is with all the etymologies of which Mr. Kavanagh's two volumes are full; they cannot be traced to their final source save by means of his discovery and the principles thence derived. And of this every intelligent reader must be well aware; and it is for him to do all that in him lies to make this important discovery known, for its author can do nothing more for it than he has already done. If this intelligent reader be therefore an enlightened member of the press, it will be his duty to give an able but impartial review of Mr. Kavanagh's work. If he should be in no way connected with the press but only a gentleman in private life, it will be his duty to call the attention of his friends and acquaintances to our author's work, and challenge inquiry respecting its reality, merits, or defects. But if the intelligent reader be a man of wealth and of the *grand monde*, yet anxious to advance the cause of truth and science, he should, instead of idly wasting his time and property at the gambling-table of his club or the race-course, allot a portion of it to the advertising of

a discovery which, when it becomes known, appears well calculated to throw a light on many of the dark spots in ancient history and religion.

"But there is a class of individuals more likely, perhaps, than any other to retard the progress of our author's discovery. And of what sort of persons is such a class usually composed? They are not the unenlightened, but are rather men provided with no small share of acquired knowledge, especially a knowledge of the world. Then why should such men oppose an important discovery? Because unwilling to think differently from others, especially if the latter belong to a learned body and are either his friends or his colleagues. And if in this case a prize be the reward offered for the best philological composition, and if this worldly gentleman conceal the fulness of his favourable opinion in order to keep on good terms with one or two interested members, his conduct will be, to say the least of it, both dishonest and dishonourable."

On hearing these words our honourable colleague, M. Patin, stood up, looking deadly pale and agitated. He would fain say something in reply to the lecturer's latter observation, but could not, the power of utterance seeming to have failed him. His excitement appeared intense; his limbs trembled under him, and he must have fallen had not several of his friends rushed, on perceiving his condition, to his assistance, and caught him in their arms. All then became commotion and confusion; the man had evidently fainted away. At once all tried to bring back animation: some fanned him with their pocket handkerchiefs, some unbuttoned his waistcoat, while others undid his necktie. But Littré, next whom methought I stood, told me to call out for water, which

I did as loudly as I possibly could. It was soon brought in on a huge iron tray loaded with decanters, jugs, and tumblers. Every one else, as well as Littré, tried to take possession of the tray, but, in their endeavours to seize it, methought it escaped them all, and, falling with an awful crash, it awoke me, when, starting and looking about me, what do I behold, and what do I hear? There is my old porter standing in the middle of the floor and exclaiming, while looking down, "Oh! see, sir, what you have made me do. Your beautiful decanter of cut glass is broken in a hundred bits. You called out for water so loudly as to make the house ring from top to bottom. I came to you as hastily as I could with all you desired; but, on arriving, I found you in so fearful a state of agitation that I thought you were dying, and the sight so shocked and unnerved me that I let the tray and all that was on it fall." "But where is," I asked, "Monsieur Patin, and where are all the gentlemen?" "Ah! my poor master; I am grieved to the soul to see you in such a state; your mind is, I am afraid, leaving you. Last night, or rather this morning, you came home in such a condition as I never saw you in before. There is no Monsieur Patin here nor any one else. You are certainly beside yourself; your mind is certainly wandering, if it has not already altogether left you."

Here the vision, by which I had been held so long like one in a trance, suddenly vanished; and as by this change I partly returned to the state in which I had previously been, I began anew to think of the kind of conclusion I should have for my work, when the same invisible being, who had then the power of reading so well my mind, once more accosted me, and in these words:—Authors in our present enlightened days never trouble themselves

about either the beginning or the ending of their works; you need, therefore, only relate what you have both seen and heard to-night, and that will do just as well as any thing else for

THE END.

AN EXCUSE FOR NO INDEX.

THE author has, by a note in volume the second, page 330, allowed it to be understood that he would add a copious index to the present work; but he regrets to perceive that he then promised more than he can now perform. For him the great obstacle lying in the way of such a task is the circumstance that by far the larger number of his numerous etymologies could not, if they were to be referred to separately, be clearly understood and admitted. And why so? Because of their having, for the most part, been suggested by other etymologies, which should be first made known and received as true previously to the least attention being drawn to such as have grown out of them.

Another reason for the author's objecting to an index of his own making—and it will perhaps be thought the only true one—is his want of aptitude and willingness for such an undertaking. The seeking and finding, after long research, truths lost to the whole world for many ages, is, while it lasts, a work for the discoverer so full of interest and excitement as never to become wearisome; but the mere classifying and putting in alphabetical

order discoveries of which there can be no longer any doubt, is so void of every thing calculated to stir up inquiry for research that the author would sooner write a whole volume of etymologies than a simple index.

But every intelligent reader of these volumes can, by the applying of their principles, make so many etymologies of his own, as seldom to need those of the author in order to be thoroughly convinced of the truth of his system. But he must not allow himself to be drawn easily aside from his conclusions by other philologists, however high the place they may hold in public opinion. Thus when he finds Latin scholars asserting that the etymology of *addo* is to *give to*[1] he must not believe them, for the root of *addo* or of its infinitive *addere* is *add*, the *o* being here for *io*[2], an elder form of *ego*, so that *addo* does not literally mean to *give to*, but *I add*. And as *add* is equal to *odd*, and as *odd*, as shown in this work, means *one*, and as a *one* is a *unit*, and as the verbal form of *unit* is *unite*, we see that to *add* is to *unite*, and not to *give to*.

Nor will the intelligent reader fail to confirm this etymology of *addo* when he brings to mind what has been also made evident in this work, namely, that *od*, which cannot differ from *odd*, is the root of *God*, once a name of the sun and of Buddha, and the idea *one* was named after the sun, the sun itself having no original for its name. This observation applying to *od* will apply to *ad* also, which is not only the root of *gad*, another name of the sun, but of Buddha, as the author has several times shown.

But when two words are radically the same, and have the same primary signification, must not, it may be

[1] See Ainsworth *in voce*.

[2] This is shown by the author in his first volume, page 109.

asked, one of the ideas they express have been called after the other? That does not follow. Thus the radical part of *dominus* is *dom*, and so is it the radical part of *domus*. The idea *lord*, *dominus*, was never, however, called after the idea *house*, *domus*, nor the idea *house* after that of *lord*. But Latin scholars think otherwise, since they explain *dominus* by "a master of a house," *qui domini præest*[3]. Then how are we to account for the two words in question being radically the same? By observing that *dominus* means *a high one*, and that such is also the primary signification of *domus*, as we see by comparing this word with δομή, a *building*, and δομή with δομέω, to *build*, and which is further confirmed by comparing *ædis*, another word for a building or house, with *ædifico*, of which the primary signification is to *make high*, to *erect*, to *build up*. But *dom* is only the radical part, not the root, of either *Dominus* or *domus*; the root of each word is *om*, one of the names of the sun, and not different from *on*, another name of the sun. But how is the *d* of *dom* to be accounted for? As representing the aspirate *h*, but probably indirectly, *hom* having first become *thom*, and then *dom*. To what does the latter etymology lead? To that of the English word *home*, which, we now see, does not differ from *domus*.

But how is the *inus* of *dominus* and the *us* of *domus* to be accounted for? Each is to be regarded as an article fallen behind its noun. In the *us* of *domus* there is only one article, but in the *inus* of *dominus* there are two united so as to stand for only one, this word being for *un* and *us*, that is *unus*. *Dominus* must have, therefore, once been *domunus*, and have then had the literal meaning of a *high one*, which is also the primary signifi-

[3] Ainsworth, *in voce*.

cation of the word *lord*, as shown in volume i., page 428, of this work.

To confirm what has been just said respecting the *dom* of *domus*, and its having first been *hom*, we need only remark that the aspirate *h* can be represented by *th*, as we must allow on observing, what no one denies, namely, that ἅλς, the *sea*, or *salt*, is the same as the θαλασ of θάλασσα, and θ is often changed for δ, and not only in Greek but in English also, as shown by *burthen* and *burden*. Greek scholars do, therefore, mistake when they tell us that the θ of θαμά (*closely, quickly, often*, &c.) is redundant[4]. They should say that it does here but represent the aspirate of ἅμα, which corresponds in meaning with θαμά.

But the reader will meet with no objection to his rules so often as that which shows that opposite or very different ideas are expressed by the same word. This rule is, however, apart from his own discoveries, borne out by numerous facts, and against facts it is useless to contend. Thus every one is aware that *altus* means both *high* and *low*, and that אל *al* in Hebrew has the same two opposite meanings, as the author shows in the first volume, page 15, of this work. This apparent anomaly has remained a mystery until fully accounted for in the present work, volume i., page 174. But how can a word meaning *high*, such as *hill*, for instance, be shown to be equal to one meaning *low*, when there is no similarity in form? By the application of the rules already exemplified. Thus from knowing that *i* is for *oi*, and that these two signs make *a*, we see how there can be no difference in meaning between *hill* and *hall* except conventionally; yet *hill* is expressive of *height*,

[4] Interdum Πλεονάζει, ut θαμά pro ἅμα.—Schrevelius.

whilst *hall, a ground floor,* is expressive of *lowness.* There is, moreover, no more difference between *hall* and *fall* than there is between *Hernando* and *Fernando.* Now the English word *low* does not, at first sight, appear equal to a word meaning *high;* but when we remark that it cannot differ from *lew* any more than *show* can from *shew,* and that its double *v* (*w*) is equal to a single *v,* we see that *low* is the same as *lev,* in which we have the radical part of the Latin *levare* and the French *lever,* each of which is expressive of *height.* And when we remark that *lev* cannot differ from *lav,* its *e* being equal to *o* and *o* to *oi* (the original of *a*), we obtain by reading this form *lav* after the Hebrew manner, *val,* which is radically the same as the Latin *vallis* and its English equivalent *valley,* each of which is radically the same as *low.*

It is in this way every intelligent reader can by the use of these principles make etymologies of his own, and so confirm the truth of the twofold discovery to which their author lays claim.

But according to what rule, it may be asked, can the reader account for a word having, when read after the Hebrew manner, a meaning that will not apply to the object it may then signify? Thus when the word *dog* is so read it becomes *God,* the present name of the Deity, though at first only a name of the sun. Here, though these two words are really one and the same word, it is evident that no people, however barbarous, ever named their object of divine worship after the *dog,* or the dog after their object of divine worship. Then how is the reader to account for the identity of the two words here mentioned? By observing that the *dog* was called after the idea *take,* as shown in volume i., pages

277 and 288, of the present work, and that the idea expressed by the word *take* was called after the hand, and the hand after the idea *maker;* and as this was one of the names of the sun, just as it is now one of the names of the Deity, we thus see how the name of the dog can become equal to one of the names of the sun. But though no people can have named their God after the dog, yet if a people found the two words to be identical, such a circumstance would have in ancient times led to the divine worship of the dog, just as it has led to the divine worship of the serpent, the bull, the ape, and other animals.

The author has now no more to offer than what he has just stated, as an excuse for his not compiling an index. But why, while offering this rather feeble excuse, does he again surfeit the reader with another lot of his etymologies, of which we have already had more than enough? The author cannot really call now to mind what has led him to do so. There was certainly no necessity for such a display. Perhaps it arose from the incorrigible propensity he has for a long time past contracted of tracing words to their sources, even when no philological inquiry has been needed; just as some men will, through their habitual greediness, eat and drink when not called upon to do so either by hunger or thirst. Or the author may, perhaps, have hoped to find in the latter etymologies some more conclusive proof of his discovery than any he has hitherto met with. But what more conclusive proof, the reader may ask, can the author expect to find for this purpose than the one to which he has already referred more than once? namely, the impossibility of discovering the idea after which the sun has been called. This is, without doubt, his strong arm of defence, his long

two-edged sword, by the mere showing and wielding of which he can drive all his opponents, from whatever parts of the world they chance to come, into such a corner as they cannot possibly leave without first passing, like the vanquished of old, under the yoke.

But there is another proof which, in the opinion of some, may be thought as conclusive as the impossibility of discovering the idea after which the sun was called, namely, the difficulty of accounting, otherwise than by the author's system, for the different necessaries of life having been expressed by words radically the same. Witness only *meat* and *wheat*, which are very different kinds of food, but the words by which they are expressed are not different, *eat* being the root of *meat* just as it is of *wheat*. And though each of these words signifies dry food, it might have just as well served to signify drink, all such ideas, as often shown in this work, having been named after life. And every intelligent reader must now know very well that the *m* of *meat* and the *wh* of *wheat* have each grown out of the aspirate *h*, and that they are consequently equal to each other. And as the *w* in Sanskrit is often represented by *m* in Latin and other languages, it follows that *meat* might just as well have been written *weat;* and as a combination of vowels is reducible to a single vowel, *weat* (this other form of *meat*) cannot differ from either *wet* or *wat*, of which the former (*wet*) has been called after *water*, whilst the latter (*wat*) is the radical part of the word *water* itself. And as this root *eat* is reducible to *et* or *at*, and as neither of these can differ from the root of *etan*, Anglo-Saxon of to *eat*, nor from the *ed* of the Latin *edere*, to *eat*, and as *edere* has also the meaning of *esse*, to *be*, we thus see how the verb to *eat* can be traced to a word expressive of

existence, and consequently to the supposed author of existence—the sun. If we now replace the *m* and *wh* of *meat* and *wheat* by the aspirate out of which they have grown, we shall, instead of either word, obtain *heat*, which has a meaning very different from either *meat* or *wheat*, but it is not the less traceable to a name of the sun, this luminary being the source of heat.

The reader will, it is to be hoped, excuse one etymology more—and it is a rather curious one—which serves to show how the same word might signify either dry food or drink. This word is the Latin *avena, oats*, of which the etymology is utterly unknown. As the *e* of this word is but a different form of *o*, and as *o* has *i* understood, it follows that *avena* cannot differ from *avoina*, which form it must have once had, it being much older than *avena*, and it was, no doubt, the original of its French equivalent, *avoine*. We have now to discover the original of *avoina* or *avoine*. As the final *a* of *avoina* must be left out, because an ending common to a great many words, and as the same may be said of the *e* of *avoine*, it follows that we have only *avoin* to account for. If we regard the *oin* of *avoin* as its root, we are naturally led to suppose that its *v* represents the aspirate, and that *avoin* must have once been only *voin*, or a form of equal value, such as *foin*, *poin*, or *boin*, of which the initial signs, *f*, *p*, and *b*, do constantly represent the aspirate *h*; and some of these words are as expressive of drink as those, from which they do not differ but conventionally, are of dry food. Witness *οἰν*, Greek of *wine*, and the *vin* of its Latin equivalent *vinum*, which cannot differ from *voin*. And as these other two forms of *voin*, namely, *poin* and *boin*, become, by the dropping of their *o*, *pin* and *bin*, we obtain the *pin* of *πίνω*, to *drink*, and the

bin of the Spanish word *bino, wine.* In *poin* we have, even when its *o* and *i* coalesce, making *a*, the *pan* of *panis,* Latin of *bread.* And as *foin,* which is another of these forms, cannot differ from *voin,* we see, though it is the French of *hay,* and is equal to the *fœn* of its Latin equivalent *fœnum,* that it cannot differ from a word meaning *wine;* from which we may conclude, since it is no kind of drink, that it was at first another word for food. This is confirmed by χόρτος, Greek of *fœnum;* for as its initial sign may, because for the aspirate *h,* be left out, we see in the ορτος which remains a form precisely equal to ἄρτος, which means *food.* And in the *ort* of ορτος and the *art* of ἄρτος, what have we when we aspirate their initial vowels and represent the aspirate by *b,* but *bort* and *bart,* that is, when the *o* and *a* fall each behind its *r*, *brot* and *brat,* of which the former is the German of *bread,* and the latter may, because equal to *brad,* be regarded as the word *bread* itself. Nor do we here fail to discover a word signifying drink, for *brot,* German of *bread,* cannot differ from the English word *broth,* and of which *froth* is but another form. Nor can *brot, bread,* differ from the *brot* of *brotos,* which in Greek means not only a kind of drink, but also *blood,* and *blood* is a liquor, and of which some animals drink, as men have been also known to do, and the use we make of black puddings must convince us that if men do not always drink blood they very often eat it.

In the *oat* of *oats* (English of *avena*) it is easy to perceive *eat, e* being a very common form of *o;* and *eating* is *food.* Hence βρόμος, *oats,* cannot differ from βρῶμος, which means *food;* and that it might as well mean *drink* is shown by its being radically the same as βρύω, to *overflow;* just as the *bar* of *barley* is but one of the many

forms which the word *beer* has obtained, and of which *boire*, French of to *drink*, is but a different form.

So much for our etymology of *avena*, of which nothing more has been hitherto known than that it appears under several forms, and these are, according to M. Littré, the following: "Bourguig., *avionne;* Berry, *aveinè;* Picard, *avene;* Provenç. et Espagn., *avena;* Portug., *avêa;* Ital., *avena;* du Latin, *avena*. *Aveïne* est la prononciation de l'ouest de la France."

And the philological student will, we may presume, receive the latter etymologies as a satisfactory compensation for the want of an index. But what is he who knows nothing of our discovery and its principles likely to think of those etymologies? What will he say, for instance, to our showing that in *foin* and *voin* we have the same word, though the one means *hay* and the other *wine?* He will regard such an etymology as not merely fanciful, but wild. But he who has read with some attention our work cannot but think otherwise. He will say that the two words are equal to each other, for the reason that the one signifies food and the other drink, and that as the substances so designated serve to support life, they have been named after it, just as life has been named after its supposed author, the sun. Hence when we drop the *i* of *oin*, which is the root of both *foin* and *voin*, we shall obtain *on*, a well-known name of the sun, as we have several times shown, and as a vowel may lose its nasal sound, it follows that *on* may be reduced to *o*, to which all words may be traced but none beyond it, for, being itself the origin of human speech, and consequently the first of all words, it cannot possibly have an original. Hence though it is not difficult to show how the idea *one* came from the hieroglyph O, then signifying

the sun, it is not in the power or wit of man to discover the idea after which the sun itself was called, which confirms our apparently bold but true assertion, that all words may be traced to the name of the sun but none beyond it.

END OF OUR EXCUSE FOR GIVING NO INDEX.

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